Belgian arms trade policy to Israel: Q&A

The war in Gaza and the violence in the West Bank are once again putting the Belgian arms trade policy with Israel in the spotlight. In this Q&A, we will discuss 11.11.11, Vredesactie and IPIS have listed a number of things you should know about this. 

In total, more than 43 million euros worth of permits were issued in recent years for the export of gunpowder, drone materials and F-16 aircraft parts, among other things. In addition, more than 253 tons of ammunition and other weapons passed through the port of Antwerp and the airport of Bierset (Liège) to Israel. This is evident from a new report investigation report that 11.11.11-member organization Vredesactie published together with IPIS. 

Since 2015, the Walloon government has issued 32 million euros worth of permits for the export of gunpowder to Israel. All these export licenses were given to the company Eurenco Clermont. Belgium thus became one of the most important global suppliers of gunpowder to Israel, and in 2021 our country itself accounted for more than half of the global export of gunpowder to Israel. The recipient of this gunpowder, Elbit or the IMI acquired by this company, is the main producer of ammunition for the Israeli army. 

On February 5, 2024, the Walloon government announced that it would suspend all export licenses for gunpowder to Israel, including two licenses granted in 2023. The Walloon government also referred to the ongoing genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, in which the Court ruled on January 26, 2023 that there are “plausible” indications that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza. 

The most important group of Flemish export licenses relates to the export of fire control systems and image processing technology. Since 2018 alone, 10,2 million euros worth of such exports have been licensed. 

The recipient of the majority of these permits is the company OIP Sensor SystemsThe company manufactures optical equipment, from night vision devices or sights for use by individual soldiers to fire control systems for vehicles. It is owned by Elbit, and its exports to Israel are explained by Elbit's integration into larger weapons systems. 

The second company exporting components for military systems to Israel is Scioteq, the former defense division of Barco that now continues as an independent company. Scioteq makes all kinds of screens adapted to military specifications and for use in military systems. One of those military applications is in ground stations of unmanned drones. For example, Scioteq supplied screens for various American drones, such as the Predator or the Reaper, but also for the Hermes devices from Elbit. The export licenses granted by the Flemish government mention Switzerland and Canada as end users, who purchased Hermes 900 drones from Elbit (including materials from Scioteq). However, given that these same Hermes drones are also used by the Israeli army, it is questionable to what extent there are guarantees that Scioteq screens do not contribute to strengthening the military capacity of the Israeli army. 

In addition, the Brussels regional government granted an export license to Israel in 2022 worth 1,26 million euros. This was intended for the export of aircraft parts by the company Sabca. 

According to the Brussels government the permit would be intended for 601 parts for the wings of F-16 fighter jets, ranging from the wing covering to the splits between the wings and the engine. These would be used in Israel by Israel Aerospace Industries to repair wings that would then be re-exported to the end user in the United States (weapons manufacturer Lockheed Martin). As a result, it would not conflict with the agreements made in 2009.

However, there is a serious question to be asked about this statement: Lockheed Martin is not the end user, those are the armed forces in the countries that have their F-16s repaired by Lockheed Martin, such as Israel. 

Belgium, with its ports (Antwerp) and airports (Bierset), is an important logistical hub. This means that not only exports but also transit of weapons to Israel takes place. 

The report by Vredesactie and IPIS maps out how the Israeli shipping company ZIM weekly container transports from Hamburg, via Antwerp and Le Havre, to Ashdod and Haifa in Israel. Between November 2022 and July 2023 there was at least ten ZIM ships transported 253 tons of ammunition to Israel via the port of Antwerp. No permit was requested for any of these passages, although this is required by law. 

In addition, there are also several Israeli airlines operating at Bierset Airport (Liège), which are directly involved in the transit of American weapons to Israel. 

Since the end of 2008, the Israeli airline El Al has been using Bierset as a stopover to refuel for flights from the United States to Israel. Before that, it had used Schiphol as a stopover for many years. When the Netherlands introduced a reporting requirement for transit without transshipment in 2005, it turned out that El Al was transporting large quantities of military equipment. In the period 2005-2006, some 160 million percussion caps, 18 million rounds of ammunition and all kinds of other equipment were transported via the Netherlands to Israel. El Al was not pleased with such openness and moved to Bierset. Although concrete data are not yet known, it can reasonably be assumed that this type of transport is now taking place via Bierset on an equally large scale. 

In addition, the Israeli airline Challenge Airlines is also active in Bierset. This company, which has played a central role in the export of agricultural products from the illegal Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory in recent years, has also clearly played an important role in the military supply of Israel since October 7, 2023. 

Challenger Airlines began flying between the United States and Israel on a much larger scale since October 7, with and without a stopover in Bierset, and also regularly called at American and Israeli air bases. The Israeli Ministry of Defense also published a video and photo of American military cargo, clearly showing a Challenger Airlines plane. When confronted with this information, the company also admitted to De Morgen and Le Soir that it transported military equipment to Israel. 

In 2009, following an earlier Gaza war, a consultation was organised with the three regions on the arms export policy to Israel and occupied Palestinian territory at the initiative of then Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel De Gucht (Open Vld). Such consultations are provided for in the cooperation agreement on arms trade (2007).

The regions are responsible for controlling the export and transit of defence-related goods and dual-use goods, but they need cooperation with the federal government for this, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs has a coordinating role for foreign policy. 

During the consultation in 2009, the regional governments policy line agreed to "not to issue arms export licenses that would strengthen the military capacity of the warring parties". An important nuance here is that such permits are allowed if the end user did not the Israeli military. Thus, export licenses to Israel are issued if the equipment is subsequently, after integration into a larger military system, for example, to an end user outside Israel. 

Despite this clear position, a significant amount of material still goes from Belgium to Israel. Part of the explanation for this is a number of deliveries with end users other than the Israeli army. But for part of this export, the question arises as to how credible the relevant end user certificates are. In addition, a large amount of material appears to be exported without any control or permit, as is also evident from the Vredesactie report. 

For conventional weapons, the main international treaty is the Arms Trade Treaty (Arms Trade Treaty) from 2013. In this treaty, the contracting states, including Belgium, commit themselves to export controls on all forms of arms transfer and to adhering to a number of minimum conditions. 

One of the most crucial agreements is in Article 6, which requires that permission for the transfer of weapons be refused in a number of situations. This includes:the weapons or products would be used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, serious breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes”. This provision concerns both export and transit. Specifically in connection with arms exports, contracting states undertake in Article 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty to set up a national control system and to permit export only after assessment against a number of criteria. For example, it must be assessed whether the goods could be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law or international human rights law. 

In the EU, export controls on “defense-related goods” are structured through a set of export criteria against which a license must be assessed before it is approved. These criteria are set out in a “Common Position” (2008/944/CFSP). These export criteria include respect for international humanitarian law and human rights, the impact of the export on regional or internal tensions, or the risk that the goods will be diverted to a destination other than that for which the licence was issued. The Common Position also states that Member States “shall refuse an export licence if there is a clear risk exists that the military equipment or technology to be exported will be used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law.”

In short: according to existing international and European frameworks, export or transit licenses must be denied if there are serious violations of international law, or a clear risk thereof. In practice, however, this assessment depends on what the notion of “clear risk” entails. This is also the case in Belgium, where each of the three regions has its own arms trade decree in which the above EU criteria are incorporated, but where the regions fail to carry out the risk assessment in a strict, proactive and transparent manner.

Moreover, when it comes to the transit of weapons via Belgian territory, not only the regulations on arms trade apply, but also the federal transport legislation. For example, there are specific regulations on explosives at the federal level, which subject the transport of such materials to a permit and information obligation. Carriers must apply for a permit from the Federal Public Service (FPS) Economy to be allowed to carry out this type of transport and must provide the necessary information to the competent government services for each transport. 

In addition, there is a specific EU framework on air transport, under which weapons of war or ammunition may only be transported “if all countries whose airspace will be used for the flight have given permission for this.” In Belgium, the authority for this lies with Minister of Mobility Gilkinet (in the case of commercial flights) and Minister of Foreign Affairs Lahbib (in the case of government flights). 

In other words, in principle the federal government must be aware of every flight with weapons or ammunition on board via a Belgian airport or through Belgian airspace, and can therefore block such transit by withholding permission. 

Finally, a final federal actor in the chain is the customs, which falls under the authority of Minister of Finance Van Peteghem. In principle, customs receives the transport documents for all cargo, including that in transit on a ship or aircraft. And they have the obligation to check whether all necessary permits are present before allowing the goods to leave. 

The strange final conclusion is that, spread across various administrations, the federal government does indeed have all the information about what weapons and ammunition are being transported. But, despite the agreements made in 2009, none of these federal administrations feels authorized to stop this kind of transit to Israel. In that context, they point to the regions as the authorized actor for arms trade. 

The regions, on the other hand, claim not to be aware of this and refer to customs for the enforcement of their legislation. This fragmentation of powers, combined with a lack of coordination and information exchange, means that the agreements from 2009 remain a dead letter as far as transit is concerned.

In 2024, large quantities of military equipment are still being transported from or via Belgium to Israel. In a context of the large-scale violations of international law currently taking place in Gaza and the West Bank, with the International Court of Justice even seeing “plausible” indications at the end of January 2024 that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, urgent action is needed from the regional and federal authorities. 

11.11.11, Vredesactie and IPIS therefore call for:

• An immediate suspension of all regional export licenses bound for Israel. 

• An immediate halt to all transit of military equipment to Israel, Through: 

• To instruct the FPS Mobility and the FPS Foreign Affairs to no longer grant permission for the air transport of weapons and ammunition destined for Israel.

• To instruct the FPS Economy to systematically communicate authorisations for the transport of dangerous goods to the regional export control services and the Directorate-General for Civil Aviation at the FPS Mobility. 

• To order customs to block all weapons and military goods on ships and aircraft bound for Israel and to check for the presence of the necessary permits.

• The organization, by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lahbib, of an Interministerial Conference with all federal and regional governments. This should not only address the effective implementation and enforcement of the agreements already made in 2009, but should also start discussions to arrive at a comprehensive arms embargo against all warring parties in Palestine and Israel.