

Impact evaluation of the coordination of CSO advocacy for climate justice in Belgium

Endline Evaluation Report

Impact evaluation of the coordination of CSO advocacy for climate justice in Belgium

Geert Phlix – ACE Europe

Loes Debuysere – ACE Europe

Rosa Hofgärtner – HIVA K.U. Leuven

Huib Huyse – HIVA K.U. Leuven

Preface

“Climate change is the single biggest thing that humans have ever done on this planet. The one thing that needs to be bigger is our movement to stop it.” (Bill McKibben)

The evaluation team would like to thank 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11, and the coordinator of the Climate Coalition for their constructive participation and operational support. And lots of thanks to the members of the Climate Coalition that have shared their experiences, ideas and thoughts about the functioning of the Climate Coalition. We also appreciate a lot that many political decision makers agreed to cooperate in this study. Without their inputs, it would not have been possible to gain some insight in the black box of policy development processes. Finally, we laud the service of the special evaluator and DGD for having taken the initiative to pilot impact studies on NGO interventions. We hope that this impact evaluation exercise contributes to reflections on how to further develop policy influencing processes and the monitoring thereof.

Geert Phlix (ACE Europe) Mechelen, Belgium. 2022



Executive summary

Subject

This Endline evaluation is part of a larger impact evaluation exercise on assessing impact of non-governmental development programmes, an exercise which is coordinated by the NGO Federatie, with support of the Belgian Ministry for Development Cooperation.

Subject of this impact evaluation are the policy influencing interventions implemented by the Political Working Group (PWG) of the Climate Coalition, coordinated by 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11, and financed by the Belgian Ministry for Development Cooperation. In the period 2017-2021, the programme aimed at influencing Belgian decision makers to develop and implement an ambitious Belgian policy in favour of climate justice, to enhance European ambitions and to implement the Paris agreement. The PWG is composed by CSOs (developmental, environmental, youth), trade unions, mutual health insurance companies and civic initiatives advocating for climate justice and amounts to more than 70 members, with a core political group of 11 members. The policy influencing strategy combines campaigning, advocacy, advisory support, formal and informal lobbying. The programme also aimed at enhancing knowledge and expertise on climate justice of the members of the PWG and to contribute to enhanced leverage and credibility of the PWG/Climate Coalition and its members on the topic of climate justice.

A baseline study was conducted in the first half of 2018. Implementation of the mid-term evaluation was delayed because of the absence of a new federal government and the long formation process 2019-2020. The MTR was started just before the new federal government came in place (October 2020) and covered the period November 2018 – September 2020. The final evaluation has started in March 2022 and captured policy influencing conducted in the period October 2020-December 2021. The impact study focused on the influence of the PWG on the Belgian positions during the consecutive international COP meetings that take place every year in the period November-December, with exception of COP 26 that was postponed in 2020 with one year because of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Methodology

The analysis of effectiveness and impact of policy influencing interventions is challenging as policy development processes are usually unpredictable and non-linear and policy influencing interventions often not documented. A black box remains with regard to how policy change eventually has taken place. Results of policy influencing interventions can be situated at different levels in the policy development process, ranging from political agenda setting and discursive change to procedural changes, policy change and eventually policy implementation. It must be noted that a Belgian climate policy does not exist. Belgian position in European and international climate debates is informed by the respective climate policies at Flemish, Walloon, Brussels and Federal government level.

- To gain insight in the contribution of the Climate Coalition to policy change, a qualitative mixed-methodology approach was applied: (i) A timeline exercise, combined with outcome harvesting was useful to identifying outcomes and impact, which informed case selection for the impact assessment; (ii) For the Endline, two cases (declarations and pledges made by Belgium during COP26) have been selected for further analysis applying contribution analysis and process tracing; (3) Process tracing involved an assessment of the strength of the evidence. Evidence for the policy change that had taken place and for the contributing causal mechanism (project mechanisms, cooperating mechanisms, rival explanations, contact factors) was collected through document analysis and semi-structured interviews with political decision makers (cabinets, member of parliament, study services of political parties, administrations) and external resource persons. Members of parliament of all political parties (except Vlaams Belang and Défi) participating in the parliamentary climate commissions, all climate related cabinets and all climate administrations at Flemish, Walloon, Brussels and Federal level have been interviewed. (4) Contribution analysis assessed the likelihood that causal mechanisms had taken place and their respective contribution to the policy change, resulting in a substantiated conclusion on the contribution claim.
- To gain insight in the extent knowledge and expertise on climate justice of the members of the PWG was enhanced and to assess the leverage and credibility of the Climate Coalition a mixed-method approach was applied, consisting in an online survey among all members of the Climate Coalition and semi-structured interviews with 15 members of the Climate Coalition. The leverage and credibility of the Climate Coalition was also included in the interviews with the lobby targets.

Several methodological limitations are described in the report: (1) lack of transparency in the climate policy debate makes it difficult to reconstruct the policy development process and a black box remains. (2) Several politicians remain rather general in their appreciations or are hesitant to explain in more detail the policy development process, as climate policy still is a very sensitive political topic, with frustrations among many different parties. Belgian climate policy is very much influenced by political dynamics, closely or vaguely related to climate topics. Afterwards reconstruction of these dynamics is difficult. Also, some information obtained through interviews could not be made public. (3) it is more difficult to engage members of political parties that are no allies of the Climate Coalition and/or that do not engage much with civil society. (4) A number of limitations have been identified with regard to the application of the contribution analysis and process tracing: limited time available by the PWG coordinators, the challenge to identify good and concrete cases of policy change in a context where policy change is hardly being achieved, limited time available by political decision makers. As the causal analysis requires substantial time and resources, only a limited number of project mechanisms was explored in the analysis, together with the most likely cooperating mechanisms and rival mechanisms.

Presentation of the main conclusions with regard to the contribution to policy change

The PWG succeeds in coordinating climate justice L&A, supported by a broad group of civil society organisations. The composition of the Climate Coalition, the high-level knowledge and quality of information provided contribute to the recognition of the Climate Coalition as a reputable and credible actor in the climate policy debate. The PWG applies a smart mix of strategies (activism, advocacy, formal and informal lobby and provision of advisory support) that has been relevant and



effective in putting topics on the political agenda and in some occasions in contributing to positions adopted by political decision makers.

Although not much tangible progress has been achieved towards an ambitious position of Belgium in European and international climate policy debates, the narrative and climate discourse in Belgium has evolved. All political parties acknowledge positions of the Climate Coalition, which is the result of the accosting L&A approach over time. Left-wing parties have adopted more positions, including references to concrete and higher targets; other parties are mainly adopting general principles and positions. The Climate Coalition has been able to put a number of specific topics and demands on the **political agenda** that otherwise would not have been on the radar, such as carbon taxation and regulations of the international carbon market, adaptation, Loss and Damage, fossil fuel subsidies, gender, climate refugees, the human rights perspective, the negative impact of biofuels, to name a few. The discussion about the memorandum in parliament forced all political parties to take position and discuss these topics.

The **discourse** on climate change has evolved due to several contextual factors. While the effects of climate change have long been visible in the Global South, its devastating effects have also become increasingly clear in Europe, through heat waves, floods and droughts. Especially the floods in Wallonia increased the visibility of the climate urgency in Belgium. Climate marches all over the world call their politicians to action. All policy makers share a sense of urgency, and agree that an ambitious and coherent Belgium climate policy is needed. An ambitious discourse is being promoted by the socialist and Green parties in the federal, Brussels and Walloon governments, since the elections of 2019. A sense of urgency is also shared among the political parties that used to adopt a more climate conservative approach (as documented during baseline), though they differ in opinion on the extent concrete ambitious targets need to be set, because of doubts regarding their feasibility and affordability. The Climate Coalition has not succeeded yet in refuting this narrative.

While the Climate Coalition has been addressing the lack of transparency in the decision making process of the national climate commission, the failing climate governance in Belgium and the lack of an integrated and coherent Belgian NECP, not much progress has been achieved so far. Climate policy in Belgium is complicated by its complex governance structure. Not only does climate policy belong to the competencies of both the regional governments and the federal government, which have different types of government coalitions. Climate policy is in and of itself also a ‘wicked problem’, in that it has multiple causes and solutions that belong to various policy domains and policy levels. In multi-level political systems as Belgium, it appears difficult to move towards a just climate policy and achieve consensus about common positions, despite the fact that high ambitions are being supported by the majority of the political parties. This is reflected in the **inter-parliamentary resolutions** that have not succeeded in including concrete ambitious targets. It is commonly known that mainly the Flemish government is hesitant in committing to concrete high targets.

Taking into account the complex nature of climate governance, also at international meetings such as **the COPs**, it is challenging for Belgium to defend ambitious positions. Some **small successes** have been achieved though. The Climate Coalition has had an important role in flagging several declarations to be signed by governments during the COP. At COP26 (2021) in Glasgow, Belgium signed the UK declaration '*Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition*', that formulates a commitment to a clean energy transition, by ending direct public funding for new fossil fuel projects abroad by the end of 2022. However, at COP26, Belgium again did not join the High Ambition Coalition, but at least did not block the European Union in doing so. A further increase of the Belgian contribution to international climate finance towards 500 million EUR/year was also not achieved. A small success was the pro-active role of the Walloon climate minister to join the Scottish initiative and make a symbolic pledge of 1 million EUR to the Loss and Damage fund.

The contribution by the Climate Coalition to these small successes was assessed as a necessary factor in a broader package of other interventions and factors for the outcome to take place. The Climate Coalition took on a meaningful supportive-informative role in engaging with policymakers, highlighting key declarations for signature at the COP and putting pressure on Belgian policy makers to sign. The contribution of the Climate Coalition to the case on Loss and Damage was assessed as more meaningful compared to the case on phasing out fossil fuels.

Several rival explanations were identified that have played a major role in the positions taken by Belgium, such as leadership and political will of the Walloon climate minister (who took the lead during COP), the pressure of the Green parties in regional and federal governments, actions taken by other CSOs and actors like the Alliance of Small Island States during the COP. The Climate Coalition's long-term and accosting lobby and advocacy over the past 15 years, emphasising each time the same topics, has contributed to increasing awareness among most policy-makers about the Climate Coalition's themes and positions, and certainly among Green parties. However, most important contributing factors are Belgium's EU commitments and relations, and the fact that Wallonia itself has been hit by devastating floods during summer 2021, which increased the understanding of the necessity of financing for loss and Damage.

The PWG is respected by lobby targets for its 'supportive/informative' role. Politicians assessed the information provided by the Climate Coalition as relevant, of high quality and useable. Mainly direct communication (personalised mails, phone contact or meetings) appears to be the most effective means to influence political decision-makers. Indirect communication through media was assessed to have little influence on shaping the opinions of political decision makers or in influencing the political agenda, at least not in direct ways. Mass demonstrations kept the climate debate on the political agenda but appear to have had more effect in influencing the political debate at European level than at Belgian level. Belgian policy makers not agreeing with the positions of the PWG consider the demonstrations as not representative for the general public debate. Similarly, companies pushing for ambitious climate policies are played off, by these politicians, against other companies that are slowing down the transition, whose positions are dominant in the discourse of the Federation of Belgian Enterprises (VBO/FEB).

The ToC was not guiding the L&A process of the Climate Coalition, though was helpful in reconstructing the intervention strategies and identifying assumptions for the evaluation exercise. Assumptions identified during baseline have been confirmed. The PWG manages to access spaces for political dialogue and is able to generate relevant policy input on its coordinated positions. The PWG is correctly identifying and targeting influential policy makers, though not based on a comprehensive stakeholder



and power mapping. The PWG has adaptive ability to respond quickly to changes in the political environment, seize policy windows and can rely on a visible support base that strengthens the legitimacy and leverage of the PWG interventions. The assumption that regional and federal governments would mutually influence each other could only be partially confirmed (no effect on Flemish government). This has not taken place. Although three of the four governments promote a more ambitious climate policy, the Flemish government is blocking.

Relevant assumptions are lacking that explain the causal linkages between informed and sensitised political decision makers and its impact on policy change, which might have affected the learning potential and adaptive ability to find responses to the status quo. During MTR, additional assumptions have been identified, though not all could be confirmed. It was assumed that having allies in power and having access to highly influential decisionmakers would be conducive for developing a more ambitious climate policy. While the Climate Coalition had smooth access to all climate ministers, including the Flemish minister, and with three out of four climate ministers being from the Green parties, who can be considered as allies of the Climate Coalition, the overall objective of contributing to an ambitious Belgian policy in favour of climate justice has not yet been realised. However, Belgium at least is supporting the European targets of -55% emission reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050, nonetheless the resistance of the Flemish government. Ambitious climate policies have been developed at federal, Brussels and Walloon government levels that reflect several of the concrete positions of the Climate Coalition.

One possible explanation for the low impact of the climate justice L&A on the Flemish government might be related to the narrative that is applied by the PWG. The narrative of the Climate Coalition is not addressing sufficiently the arguments of the Flemish government that just transition measures need to be feasible and affordable. Furthermore, the PWG is hesitant in naming and shaming. It does not bring the debate on the disagreements to the forefront. Interviewees confirmed that they would like to receive more hands-on input to that regard. The political disagreement is rooted in different visions on the solutions forward and relate to different levels (socio-economic, environmental-technological and social-technological positions). Researchers point out that the dominant approach is to mainstream and 'depoliticize' climate change in order to decrease disagreement, instead of 'repoliticizing' the climate change debate and make contingency, conflict, inequality, ideology and power visible.

Conclusions with regard to the internal coordination and capacity building efforts of the PWG so to strengthen the leverage, credibility and capacity of the PWG and its members

The climate coalition is an example of a strong coalition and unique in Europe as it unites diverse members from the North-South movement, the environmental movement, the trade unions, mutual health insurance companies, youth and civic initiatives. The composition of the coalition and the high level of expertise is highly valorised by lobby targets that perceive the Climate Coalition as a legitimate and credible actor for climate justice advocacy. The Climate Coalition is the primary source

of information for most of the lobby targets and invited as the legitimate representative of civic climate justice advocacy at institutionalised meetings and fora where climate justice is being debated. The integration of the PWG into the Climate Coalition has been conducive for strengthening the synergy between the political work and the mobilisations.

With the growth of the coalition, the relevant decision was taken to invest sufficient time and energy in developing a memorandum that would serve as a guiding tool for the L&A on climate justice. This process has contributed to enhanced respect, trust and confidence between members. Diversity of positions and sensitivities of the different members has been made visible. Compared to the situation at the baseline, the positions of the Climate Coalition have become clearer for all members. Diversity of the coalition is reflected in the ecological, social, educational and international dimensions of climate justice as elaborated in the memorandum, confirming the assumptions related to (i) the ability of the PWG to reach common positions on climate justice issues, and (ii) the ability of individual members of the PWG to transcend their individual interests. The memorandum is the result of a compromise (coordinated positions on climate justice), which is valorised positively by the lobby targets. Individual members complement the L&A of the Climate coalition with their own, often more concrete or more ambitious lobby agenda.

The coalition is a strong and well-functioning coalition that embraces diversity, that is supported by an appropriate governance structure and that relies on competent members that show collaborative attitude. There is a lack of sufficient resources to strengthen internal communication that is needed to organise an appropriate information flow within the large and diverse coalition it has become, so to keep all members up-to-date on current climate justice issues.

The PWG coordinators are very committed in completing their tasks, demonstrate diplomatic skills and are able to manage diversity of opinions and expectations of the members. The memorandum enables rapid reaction on current events. PWG and its members are able to adjust and capitalise on changing political and social context. Because of the growing number of members and internal staff changes within member organisations, not all members are fully aware of the past processes, not always sufficient familiar with the memorandum or the decision-making processes (as compared to the baseline and MTR). The limited resources of the Climate Coalition put limits to the opportunities to contribute to knowledge exchange and expertise building. Enhancing knowledge internally within the Climate Coalition as such depends on the initiative of the individual members, which is rather limited. As documented in the MTR, more systematisation and rationalisation of information flow still is suggested. Members also still ask for more information on the advocacy process. High quality knowledge is available within the Coalition (consistent over the three measurements) and used for the L&A, but less used for internal knowledge building. The assumption regarding the ability of the PWG members to combine their expertise and generate high quality knowledge in the PWG is confirmed with regard to the quality of the memorandum and the coordinated positions, but not confirmed regarding the internal knowledge building among members.

Recommendations

A set of recommendations have been formulated for the Climate Coalition with regard to the policy influencing process, which relate to (1) the narrative used to reach out to different lobby targets, (2) timing of the lobby interventions in order to better align to the policy making cycle, (3) the consideration to shift the focus from the Belgian level to the European level, taking into account the difficulties in pursuing changes at the level of the Flemish government, (4) openly questioning the



messages and framing from influential actors in the industry and be more upfront in naming and shaming, (5) improve the ToC so to bring the dynamics between different actors (different political groups, institutions, parliaments, cabinets, etc.) more to the forefront and identify assumptions that explain the causal linkages between informed and sensitised political decision makers and their impact on policy change, (6) make more use of direct testimonies from partner countries and ensuring that, for instance, small-scale farmers and civil society representatives from partner countries can also be present at the COP, preferably in their own country's delegations, (7) sensitize the respective support bases of members on the needed solutions to climate challenges. Especially when it comes to a transition that is socially fair, policy makers are looking at the Climate Coalition to help operationalise this concept with its members and support bases.

With regard to the functioning of the Climate Coalition, a set of recommendations were formulated referring to improving internal communication, strengthening knowledge exchange and - dissemination and a possible expansion of the Coalition so to become even more inclusive.

Endline evaluation data on the indicators of the evaluation framework

*Indicator 1a - **Outreach**: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who knowingly have received information from PWG*

- List of direct contacts was not updated (had been developed specifically for the baseline study but is not an existing M&E tool). From the contact tracing database, it appears that the PWG has contact with **49 persons**, of which 8 in administrations, 22 MP, 15 with cabinets, 4 contacts with study services or assistants of members of parliament. In total, the Climate Coalition had **87 direct contacts**, of which 53 with cabinets, 30 with MP, 2 with administration and 2 with political parties. These direct contacts include mailings and meetings (FRDO meetings not included)
- There have been **24 contacts (18 meetings and 6 mailings)** with individual MP or groups of MP of the different parliaments (regional and federal), and **6 meetings** with MP in institutionalised fora (parliamentary commissions).
- PWG had **24 encounters with all relevant ministers** (climate and development cooperation), and **29 times** contact via mail or personalised letters. Among these contacts, there was also contact with the prime minister.
- PWG invested more in direct contacts with the relevant cabinets, but still maintains contact (in person, through mails or participation in meetings of the parliamentary climate commissions) with **all the thematic leads of all political parties** (except extremist parties).
- **All** people interviewed confirmed having **received information** from PWG (6/8 administration, 10/22 members of the different parliaments, 8/15 members of cabinet and 2/4 staff at study services)

Indicator 1b - Spaces for influencing: *Number of meetings with cabinets, ministers, parliamentarians, study services of political parties*

- In total, the Climate Coalition had 87 direct contacts, of which 53 with cabinets, 30 with MP, 2 with administration and 2 with political parties. These direct contacts include mailings and meetings (FRDO meetings not included).
 - There have been 24 contacts (18 meetings and 6 mailings) with individual MP or groups of MP of the different parliaments (regional and federal), and 6 meetings with MP in institutionalised fora (parliamentary commissions).
 - PWG had 24 encounters with all relevant ministers (climate and development cooperation), and 29 times contact via mail or personalised letters. Among these contacts, there was also contact with the prime minister.

A list of meetings is presented in the report (and detailed overview in annex 6). The evaluators consider this number being less relevant because the number of meetings does not explain the level of success of policy influencing interventions. Moreover, not all contacts are being registered. A lot of contact takes place informally and through WhatsApp groups.

Indicator 2a - Appreciation of CJP's contributions: *Share of national policy makers reached by PWG, who view the information as (scale from 1 to 4: all / majority / minority / nobody) relevant, timely, qualitative and usable, and that perceive CJP members and 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 as legitimate and credible advocates for climate change*

- All people interviewed, without distinction to political parties, find the information provided by PWG relevant, usable and of high quality.
- PWG is an important information source mostly so for the interviewees on the left side of the political spectrum. The information was used to formulate their positions with regards to the interparliamentary resolution and/or to prepare parliamentary questions. Information provided by the Climate Coalition was also seen by some in providing guidance through the climate negotiations.
- While most interviewed thought the position of the Climate Coalition is not always realistic, they were understanding of this ambitious nature.
- The usability of the provided information could increase by paying more attention to timing (becoming more proactive) and to translate/adjust the information to different levels.

Indicator 2b - Agenda setting: *Number of parliamentary interpellations and questions, proposed resolutions, adopted; resolutions and motions introduced by PWG lobby targets that are in line with PWG positions; Number of amendments by parliamentarians in line with PWG positions; Number of interventions of the Belgian delegation of decision-makers at the next COPs in line with PWG positions.*

- From the 487 parliamentary questions, raised in the interparliamentary climate commission between March 2021 and December 2021, 23 (or 5 %) were related to selected case studies for the impact study.
- Several positions of the Climate Coalition were put on the political agenda during discussions in parliament. This includes climate finance, the need to reach an agreement on burden sharing, fossil fuel subsidies, increased ambition at COP26, climate governance, gender, GHG reduction targets. Loss and Damage was much less present in the debate.
- There is an increase in number of positions of the Climate Coalition that are being referred to in the Interparliamentary resolution on COP 26 that was adopted by October 2021, as compared to the baseline (interparliamentary declaration of 2018). With regard to the nine topics from the inter-parliamentary resolution that are relevant for this impact study, all topics align to positions of the Climate Coalition, however, in watered-down form, both in terms of numbers as well as in phrasing (a result of a political compromise).



- No parties openly opposed the climate science, but they did express different levels of concern with regards to the ambition of climate policy and the possible (economic) effects of climate policy. On the one hand, Groen-Ecolo, PVDA-PTB, PS consistently demand more ambition. Vlaams Belang, N-VA and Open VLD seemed opposed to setting (too ambitious) targets. The inter-parliamentary resolution was not supported by PVDA-PTB (for a lack of ambition) and by Vlaams Belang (for being too ambitious).

Indicator 3 - Discursive change: *Number of political parties who take-up the PWG positions/terminology/ rhetoric/framing in their line of argumentation during the policy preparation phase*

- There is a growing sense of urgency with regard to climate policy, also within the cabinet of N-VA. Result of the Climate Marches but also the drought and floods of the recent years.
- Not only the socialist and Green parties but also CD&V and MR have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the PWG and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP and to show more ambition during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA, Open VLD and Vlaams Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitions and as such are blocking the participation of Belgium in the High Ambition Coalition at the COP.
- Discussion on phasing out fossil fuels is sensitive when it relates to intra-Belgium measures (e.g. the topic of salary cars). The focus was moved towards disinvestment in fossil fuel by export agencies like Credendo.

Indicator 4 - Policy change: *Belgian Policy in favour of climate justice*

- At procedural level:
 - o No results yet with regard to enhancing transparency of the National Climate Commission or the Special Climate act
- At policy level:
 - o An update of the NECP is foreseen in 2022. The NECP will need to be aligned to the government agreement that refers to -55% emission reduction by 2030, aligned to the European Green deal that pushes for climate neutrality by 2050, and to the Belgian pledge made at COP 25 to contribute 100 million EUR/year to international climate finance. A pledge that is not fully implemented yet.
 - o Belgium not joining the High Ambition Coalition but accepting that the EU does
- COP 26: Belgium signing the UK declaration related to phasing out fossil fuels and the Walloon pledge for loss and Damage

Indicator 5 - Relevance of communication channels: *Share of national policy makers reached by PWG, who view the communication channels applied as relevant and Indicator 6 - Qualitative assessment of relevance of the different forms of communication channels and how they are embedded in the overall policy influencing strategy*

- All members of parliament reached (opposition and ruling parties) find direct contacts (both formal and informal) more relevant compared to indirect contact.
- All interviewees at cabinets agree that ministers want to be informed by civil society but that they also are sensitive for indirect actions like letters and civic actions

- Mass mobilisations and one-off actions have not influenced much positions of politicians but have contributed to putting or keeping the climate debate on the political agenda

Indicator 7 - Influence of PWG: *Share of national policy makers who view the PWG as influential on their opinion-forming process, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change*

- All interviewees recognise the PWG as a legitimate advocate for climate justice.
- The PWG is perceived by all interviewees as the most important information source and influencer from the civil society, on the topic of the Belgian position in the European and international negotiations.

Indicator 8 - Influence of other actors: *Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who name other actors than PWG as one of the more influential stakeholders on their opinion-forming process*

- Apart from the coordinators of the PWG, other CSOs are important resources such as BBL, IEW/Canopea, WWF, Greenpeace, Oxfam and CAN Europe. The Trade Unions are consulted with regard to their opinion on Just transition.
- Other sources are academic research, IPCC, private sector and their sector-organisations.

Indicator 9 - Knowing PWG: *Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who know the PWG*

- The PWG/Climate Coalition is well known by all policy makers interviewed. They do not make a distinction between PWG and Climate Coalition. The advocates are known as representing the Climate Coalition. They know that the Climate Coalition represents a large group of CSOs. In the French community, the spokesperson of the Climate Coalition is well known, through his participation in panels and debates in the media.

Indicator 10 - Added value of composition: *Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who view the specific composition of the CJP (with many different social organisations) as a comparative strength.*

- All thematic experts of the different political parties and all relevant cabinets know the existence of the PWG and the Climate Coalition.
- All interviewees (parliament and cabinets) appreciate the fact that a wide variety of civil society organisations have joined one platform at Belgian level and support common positions. It enables an efficient dialogue with civil society.

Indicator 11 - % of PWG member who use other channels for their advocacy work on climate justice; % of PWG members who rank the PWG as their main channel for advocacy work

- The majority of the PWG members do not have a policy officer or do not prioritise their policy influencing on the PWG topics and delegate the policy influencing on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian position in international negotiations to the PWG.
- Based on the analysis of the membership list, the evaluators roughly estimate that 70% of the members do not actively lobby on climate justice topics, 18% to a limited extent and 12% of the members have sufficient staff and resources to actively invest in climate justice advocacy. The latter are all part of the core group of the PWG



- Those members that have a policy officer and that are actively influencing policy decision makers on climate issues combine their own policy influencing strategies with policy influencing strategies through the PWG and often accompany the PWG coordinators during their meetings with decision makers. This is also the case of the PWG coordinators themselves who also relate with policy makers (directly and indirectly) on similar topics as defended by the PWG.

Indicator 12 - % of PWG members who use the positions of the PWG in communication with national political decision makers

- PWG members that are actively involved in climate justice policy influencing use also PWG positions in their own interventions.
- Individual members of the PWG most often defend more ambitious demands and positions as compared to the common positions of the PWG, which are based on a consensus of a broad and diverse group of CSO.
- Members of the Climate Coalition have also put their own specific demands on the agenda of the PWG, of which several have become included in the memorandum of the Climate Coalition.

Indicator 13 - Qualitative description of the strengths and weaknesses of the PWG by the members

Strengths:

- Diverse composition of the PWG, unique in Europe.
- Good knowledge of the PWG coordinators of the strengths, positions and sensitivity of each of the members and ability to propose positions that are acceptable for the entire group. Diversity is well managed. Diversity in expertise and networks is an added value of members.
- Different opinions are respected, transparent decision-making process. Consensus is being looked for
- Process and procedures in place to react quickly when needed
- The division of the PWG into a core group and the broader group has enhanced efficiency of developing positions.
- The PWG scores high on the 6 parameters for assessing collaborative processes
- Time invested in elaborating the memorandum has contributed to enhanced respect, trust and confidence between members. Members are informed about the diversity of positions and sensitivities of the different members. Ecological, social, educational and international dimensions of climate justice are being addressed.

Weaknesses:

- Diversity of the platform members that complicates the process of formulating ambitious positions and that demands time to formulate common positions is inherent part of this type of broad coalitions, but is being better managed currently.
- There were some staff changes in 2021, which had a negative influence on visibility at Flemish side and relation building
- Not all members of the PWG participate well-prepared at meetings
- Communication flow could be further rationalised and systematised, taking into account the different information needs of the members

Indicator 14 and Indicator 15 - To what extent are the PWG and its members able to adjust and capitalise on the changing political and social context

- The coordinators have shown good knowledge of the policy context and climate policy development processes. The PWG has been able to respond adequately to windows of opportunity for policy influencing and to react quickly.
- Since the elections from 2019 and the installation of the regional (2019) and federal (2020) governments, three out of the four climate ministers in Belgium (Flanders, Brussels, Wallonia, federal) are member of the Green Parties. From the contact tracing, it becomes clear that much more contacts and collaboration has been taken place with these 'Green' cabinets as compared to the period before 2019, where the contacts with members of parliaments outnumbered the outreach to cabinets. Having allies within the cabinets has certainly facilitated access to cabinets.

Indicator 16 - Qualitative assessment of the quality of the delivered products by PWG

- The quality of the products delivered by PWG is assessed as good by all respondents to the survey and members interviewed
- An appropriate communication mix is provided (newsletter, website, mailings), which is sufficient informative but more systematization and rationalisation of the information flow is suggested by interviewees and members also ask for more information on the advocacy process.
- Because of lack of resources and interruption of climate coordination, no study events have taken place. There are mixed expectations regarding the role of the Climate Coalition in knowledge building on climate justice.

Indicator 17- Qualitative assessment by the members about the quality of the coordination of the PWG

- The functioning of PWG is assessed as good by all respondents and members interviewed: good quality of reports of the meetings, good facilitation of the meetings, good quality of the preparatory work. More critical assessment of the frequency of meeting and the timely receipt of preparatory documents, as compared to the baseline. A broader group of members would also like to receive the minutes of the PWG.
- The participatory approach is appreciated and members feel that their opinions are taken into account.
- Leadership (of PWG and of the Climate Coalition) is shared rather than positional. There is sufficient transparency, data and research are freely shared and explained. the PWG coordinators put sufficient energy in completing the tasks and improving working relations.
- Members appreciate the participatory approach and feel that diversity is well managed. Because of the growing number of members of the PWG and internal staff changes at member organisations not all members seem to be fully informed on the decision-making process.

Indicator 18 - Qualitative assessment of synergies between the climate coalition and CJP

- As the PWG has become integrated in the Climate Coalition, synergy has improved considerably. The advocacy work is becoming more aligned to the mobilisation and campaigning, Synergy between the different working groups still is improving, but the alignment between the advocacy work and the mobilisation can be further strengthened.



List of Abbreviations

ACLVB	Algemene Centrale der Liberale Vakbonden
CAN	Climate Action Network
CD&V	Christen Democratische Volkspartij
CdH	Centre Démocrate Humaniste (now Les Engagées)
CJP	Climate Justice Platform
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DBE	Dienst Bijzondere Evaluaties
DGD	Directorat General for Development
ETS	Emission Trading System
EU	European Union
FRDO	Federale Raad voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
L&A	Lobbying and Advocacy
L&D	Loss and Damage
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MP	Member of Parliament
MR	Mouvement Reformateur
NECP	National Energy and Climate Plan
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
N-VA	Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie
PWG	Political Working Group
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SP.A	Socialistische Partij Anders (now Vooruit)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
VLD	Vlaamse Liberale Democraten
WWF	World Wide Fund

Table of Content

1	Introduction	20
1.1	Subject of the evaluation	20
1.2	Objectives of the impact study	20
1.3	Methodology and approach of the evaluation	21
1.4	Limitations of the evaluation	27
2	Description of the context of climate justice advocacy	28
2.1	Policy context on climate justice	28
2.2	Brief description of the evolution from the Climate Justice Platform towards the political Working group of the Climate Coalition	31
2.3	Envisaged policy outcomes of PWG as explained by the ToC	33
3	To what extent does the PWG influence the points of view of Belgian decision makers and the policy positions on climate justice-related topics and other topics covered by the PWG?	45
3.1	Description of the type of interventions implemented for the policy influencing Pathway of Change in the ToC	45
3.2	Data on output and outcome level (outcome 4 and impact 1)	48
3.3	Data at outcome and impact level – with regard to Policy results of the selected cases	67
3.4	Summary of Data on outcome and impact level (outcome 4 and impact 2 and 3)	91
4	To what extent do the internal coordination and capacity building efforts of the PWG strengthen the leverage, credibility and capacity of the PWG and its members?	101
4.1	Description of the intervention strategies as described in the ToC	101
4.2	Data at output level	103



4.3	Data on indicators at outcome level	114
5	Conclusions, recommendations and lessons learnt	121
5.1	Conclusions	121
5.2	Recommendations for PWG and the Climate Coalition	126
5.3	Lessons learnt regarding impact evaluation of policy influencing interventions	129
6	Annexes	132
	Annex 1: ToR	132
	Annex 2: Evaluation framework (revised version October 2018)	133
	Annex 3: List of people consulted	138
	Annex 4: list of documents consulted	143
	Annex 5: Reconstructed ToC	154
	Annex 6: Reconstructed timeline of key activities for influencing belgian climate policy by PWG, 11.11.11 & CNC/11.11.11	155
	Annex 7: Contribution analysis – analysis of evidence and the explaining mechanisms	159
	Annex 8: Interview guides	165
	Annex 9: Analytical framework	168
	Annex 10: E-survey members of the climate coalition	171

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 SUBJECT OF THE EVALUATION

- ¹ Subject of this impact evaluation is the coordination of civil society organisation (CSO) advocacy efforts for climate justice in Belgium in the period 2017-2021, the coordination being funded by the Belgian federal ministry for development cooperation. Both umbrella organisations, 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11, have implemented a programme on climate justice, aimed at influencing Belgian decision makers to develop and implement an ambitious Belgian policy in favour of climate justice, enhance European ambitions and promote the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The programme 2017-2021 included the continuation of climate advocacy in which both umbrella organisations were involved since for more than 10 years. In 2010, interested and committed CSOs in climate justice advocacy created the Climate Justice Platform (CJP), that has turned into the Political Working Group (PWG) of the Climate Coalition since the merge of the CJP and the Climate Coalition in 2018. 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 having assumed the role of coordinators of the Climate Justice Platform since its origin in 2011 continued to be the coordinators of the PWG, which is subject of this impact study. A policy influencing strategy has been developed that combines campaigning, advocacy, formal and informal lobbying.
- ² This report presents the findings and conclusions of the Endline. The Endline evaluation builds further on the methodology, evaluation design, experiences and results of the baseline study (2018) and the Mid-Term Evaluation (end of 2020, with report in 2021). The Endline was implemented from March till September 2022 and covered the programme period October 2020-December 2021.

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE IMPACT STUDY

- ³ The objectives of the impact study are twofold:
- (1) Accountability – measuring impact will enable 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 to account to DGD for the results achieved, including results at impact level.
 - (2) Learning – apart from identifying lessons learned from the intervention and the possibility to adapt the strategy during implementation, this assignment aims at providing insight in the set-up and implementation of impact evaluations of NGO-interventions. The objective is to draw lessons on the use of specific methodologies, on the feasibility of conducting impact studies of NGO interventions and to build experience in applying mixed methods evaluations. As such this evaluation is part of a learning trajectory on impact evaluations that is steered by the three NGA federations, DGD and DBE.
- ⁴ Primary users of the evaluation are the coordinating organisations of the PWG, 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11. The results of the evaluation have also been shared with the members of the Climate Coalition so to support reflection on policy influencing strategies of the PWG. As this impact study is part of a broader learning exercise on impact evaluations, an initiative taken by the ministry for development cooperation (DGD and DBE), lessons learnt will be shared with the wider community



of stakeholders that are managing development cooperation programmes, both within the administration and the non-governmental actors.

- ⁵ A ToC for the coordination of the climate justice policy influencing of the PWG was reconstructed by Syspons, in collaboration with 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11, during the preparatory phase of the impact studies (2017) and an assessment grid was developed. The assessment grid was further adapted by ACE Europe and HIVA K.U. Leuven during the baseline study. The ToC and assessment grid (evaluation framework, see annex 2) includes several result levels (output, outcome and impact) and questions related to relevance (e.g. relevance of information received). The focus of this evaluation is put on the impact level but also the other results levels are being assessed (effectiveness), which evidently will contribute to explaining the level of impact achieved.

1.3 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH OF THE EVALUATION

Case selection


- ⁶ The baseline study report suggested to select a number of policy influencing cases for both the mid-term and endline evaluation. The goal is to analyse these cases in more depth, by applying a contribution analysis. During the inception phase of both mid- and endline evaluations, the evaluators explored several cases with 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11. Cases have been selected on the basis of achieved policy successes, in order to be able to assess the Coalition's contribution to these successes.
- ⁷ The following four cases were selected during the mid-line evaluation:
- Belgian contribution to international climate finance
 - The Special Climate Act linked to Intra-Belgian climate governance
 - The effort sharing regulation linked to the National Energy and Climate Plan 2030
 - Influencing Belgian positions at COP24 (Katowice) and COP25 (Madrid)
- ⁸ During the endline evaluation, the following two cases were selected, both linked to the COP26:
- The Belgian signature on the Glasgow Pact and the UK statement, which both call for an end of fossil fuel subsidies
 - Wallonia's 1 million pledge to loss and damage during COP26
- ⁹ The evaluation framework (see annex 2) has been used to guide the overall data collection about these cases. The evaluations however showed that applying an evaluation framework in a rigid way is not suitable for assessing policy influencing interventions, as reporting on predefined indicators does not give good insight in the mechanisms that have contributed to the results. Since the MTR, a contribution analysis and narrative assessment approach were applied to assess the cases. Results of the

contribution analysis are used to inform the indicators of the evaluation framework, complemented with other data.

Contribution analysis and process tracing


- ¹⁰ Contribution analysis and process tracing have been combined in order to evaluate the contribution of the intervention towards observed outcomes/impact. A **contribution analysis** generally consists of six steps (cf. figure 1).

Figure 1: Steps in contribution analysis



- ¹¹ In the baseline phase, steps 1 and 2 of a contribution analysis were tackled. An attribution problem was clarified and the existing ToC was elaborated upon (clarifying underlying assumptions, causal mechanisms, potential rival explanations). During the MTR, this ToC ‘in use’ was further reconstructed, in order to update the Coalition’s strategies, assumptions and risks and in order to gain insight in causal mechanisms.
- ¹² During the mid- and end-line evaluation, steps 3 and 4 took centre stage. The evaluators collected evidence for the identified causal mechanisms and drafted performance stories. While the idea was to repeat these steps (i.e. step 5 and 6), especially during the endline evaluation, the evaluators noted that this caused problems as policy makers and resource persons were struggling to remember details about MTR cases that had happened years before. Therefore, limited additional evidence has been collected for the various case studies, nor have the performance stories been revised. During Endline, two new cases were added for contribution analysis.
- ¹³ In order to assess the contribution of the Climate Coalition to the envisaged changes and to find evidence for rival explanations, the methodology of **process tracing** was applied. The evaluators have used five steps to that end (figure 2).

Figure 2: Steps in process tracing (authors' own visualisation)



- ¹⁴ The methodology of process tracing starts with a clear description of the case(s) to be assessed, in order to identify a contribution claim (by the project) towards a specific policy outcome (step 1).
- ¹⁵ Then, various causal explanations or mechanisms are identified, which may have contributed to this policy outcome (step 2). In a contribution analysis, a distinction is made between the following types of causal explanations:
- Project mechanism (or primary explanation, i.e. mechanism related to the intervention)
 - Cooperating mechanism (or commingled rival, i.e. mechanism with whom the intervention cooperates to realise change)
 - Rival mechanism (or direct rival, i.e. a different mechanism that undermines the contribution story of the intervention)
 - influencing factors (or context factors that modify the outcomes)
- ¹⁶ The identification of these mechanisms takes place on the basis of a reconstruction of a timeline of the policy influencing work, combined with the methodology of outcome harvesting (identifying outcomes, assessing its significance, estimating contribution). To that end, a timeline exercise was organised during a workshop with the coordinators of the PWG. The timeline provides insight in internal and external factors (project, cooperating, rival and context mechanisms) that have contributed to the envisaged policy outcome. As the causal analysis requires substantial time and resources, in each case study, only a limited number of project mechanisms was explored in the analysis, together with the most likely cooperating mechanisms and rival mechanisms.

- ¹⁷ Once potential causal mechanisms were identified, evidence about contributing factors to the L&A successes was collected and triangulated through interviews with members of the Climate Coalition, policy targets, external resource persons and document analysis (step 3). Evidence can be labelled as weak, moderate or strong:
- Weak: one or a limited number of unilateral oral sources with limited credibility
 - Moderate: various oral sources with limited credibility or one oral source with high credibility
 - Strong: written sources that can be verified or various oral sources with high credibility
- ¹⁸ The collected evidence then serves to determine the likelihood that each of these mechanisms has taken place (step 4). The evaluators therefore used four categories:
- certainly or very likely happened
 - somewhat likely
 - unlikely or did not happen
 - impossible to decide (in the case of contradicting evidence)
- ¹⁹ For those mechanisms that are somewhat likely, very likely or certainly likely, the evaluators then make an assessment of the extent (low, moderate, high) to which these mechanisms may have contributed to the policy outcome (step 5). The collected evidence is used to substantiate that assessment. All the different contributions are then put into the balance in order to assess how necessary (what was the added value?) and sufficient (what were other (f)actors?) the contribution of the project/intervention has been. Detailed analysis of the strength of the evidence is added in annex 7.

Interviews

- ²⁰ In total, 50 interviews were conducted during Endline. A consolidated list of lobby targets is not existing. To select lobby targets for interviews, the evaluators made a list of lobby targets, based on the M&E information and the contact tracing databases of 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11. This list was then complemented by the PWG coordinators (see annex 3). No sampling was done. All lobby targets were contacted with a request for interview. From the list of 50 identified lobby targets, 27 people accepted to be interviewed (54%, see annex 3). When sending reminders and insisting in requests for collaboration, the evaluators tried to guarantee an equal distribution over different political parties and language groups.
- ²¹ We succeeded in having interviews with all relevant cabinets and all relevant administrations at the different governance levels of Belgium. However, equal representation could not be achieved at parliamentary level. As during baseline and MTR, mainly members of parliaments representing left-wing political parties have collaborated in the evaluation. Throughout the entire impact study (three evaluations), it appeared very difficult to convince MP of N-VA and MR to participate in an interview. Less staff of administrations have been interviewed as it appeared that, contrary to the baseline study, L&A of the PWG moved away from the administrative level and focused more on the cabinets.



Table 1: Overview of interviews with stakeholders planned and realised

Stakeholders	planned	realised
Members of Parliament	10	13
Members of cabinets	4	8
Staff at administrations	10	6
Resource persons (academic world, journalists, private sector, opinion makers)	6	6
Members of PWG	15	17
Total interviews	45	50

- 22 Resource persons were identified by the evaluators within their own network and upon suggestions of lobby targets interviewed. It appeared difficult to find journalist and academic researchers who were willing to give their opinion on the climate policy debate, several of them referring they have nothing to add as Belgian climate policy is lacking.
- 23 For the assessment of the functioning of the PWG and the Climate Coalition, an e-survey was sent to all members and results of the survey were discussed during interviews with a selection of 15 members participating in the core or broader PWG of the Climate Coalition. Also the two PWG coordinators were interviewed (see annex 3).
- 24 A narrative report of each interview was drafted. No software was used for data analysis as the number of interviews was manageable for manual review and assessment. The analysis started with a re-reading of the individual interviews to gain a deep understanding of the individual narratives and maintain a view on the coherence of the individual interviews. This review involved a first marking of interesting aspects and insights, questions that it raises, and issues that might need follow-up. Secondly, for the coding of the interviews an analytical matrix was developed based on the evaluation framework (see annex 9). In addition, the interviews were screened for unintended outcomes and effects, or for emerging themes, which were then included in the evaluation framework for further analysis. After the table was completed with the excerpts, a transversal analysis was done for each area of the analytical framework to highlight similarities and differences between interviews. For purposes of research triangulation, interview transcripts were analysed by two consultants. Findings were further discussed among the consultants involved in the evaluation to reach a consensus in interpretation and formulation of conclusions. Triangulation of information obtained through interviews was further complemented by the analysis of documents.

Online survey to members of the Climate Coalition

- 25 The e-survey consisted of three sections and 27 questions. A first section included questions related to the importance of the Climate Coalition for members' own L&A work and knowledge building on climate justice topics (14 questions), a second section focussed on assessing the quality of the outputs and the coordination of the PWG (5 questions) and a third section assessed the quality of the

action working group (8 questions). The latter section is not relevant for this impact study (results are not presented and analysed in this report), but included in the survey upon request of the Climate Coalition coordinator. The survey and the evaluation were introduced during the general assembly of the Climate Coalition on June 23, tested by two members, and launched in two languages on August 22 and run till September 21 (three reminders were sent).

- ²⁶ The survey was sent to all 255 members on the membership list received from the Climate Coalition Coordinator. Different people within one organisation have received the questionnaire, as such hoping that sufficient organisations would participate in the survey. The response rate of 19% (people that have started the survey¹) and 11% (people that had finalised the survey)² is a little bit higher compared to the baseline survey but still low. While the survey was much more promoted within the Climate Coalition compared to the baseline, this has not resulted in an increased response rate. Probing for an explanation for this low response during interviews with members of the Climate Coalition and the coordinator, reference was made to the fact that many members are rather passive members, all organisations experience heavy workloads and there is a kind of fatigue in participating in online surveys. The results of the e-survey, however, represent the opinions of a diversity of members as far as the different groups within the Climate Coalition are represented among the respondents, including a mix of very active and more passive members³. Evidently, the opinion of the vast majority of passive members is not reflected in the responses. Report of the survey is added in separate annex to this report.

Document review

- ²⁷ Policy documents relevant for the cases were analysed on content. For each document, the evaluators have identified what recommendations of the PWG had been included, in line with the evaluation framework. As indicated during baseline and MTR, because of the lack of transparency of climate governance in Belgium, reports and policy documents are not always easily accessible and a lot of policy influencing takes place informally without immediate results in formal documents (e.g. of National Climate Commission, COP meetings). Apart from the policy documents developed by the PWG, documents analysed concerned mainly reports of parliamentary commissions, parliamentary questions, and the climate policies of the different governments. Also grey literature was consulted to assess the ToC 'in use' against the state of art, with a particular focus on the role of civil society in climate justice advocacy. A list of documents consulted is added in annex 4.

¹ The coordinating organisations 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 were included in the membership list and not deleted from the mailing. Four staff officers have started the survey but realised that it was not appropriate for them to participate in this survey as they were the subject of the survey.

² Baseline survey response: 14% started the survey, 10% finishing the survey.

³ 30% of the respondents represent members of the core group of the PWG; 70% represent organisations that are member of the broader PWG. No responses were obtained from members not participating in the PWG. 40% French speaking persons, 60% Dutch speaking.



1.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE EVALUATION

- ²⁸ Because of the lack of transparency in the climate policy debate, it is difficult to reconstruct the policy development process and to assess the extent to which positions of the PWG are (literally) copied in policy documents. Information obtained through interviews and through the study of the available documents give already a clear indication of the extent positions have been taken into account in the policy development process, but a black box remains.
- ²⁹ Moreover, several politicians remain rather general in their appreciations or are hesitant to explain in more detail the policy development process, as climate policy still is a very sensitive political topic, with frustrations among many different parties. Furthermore, Belgian climate policy is very much influenced by political dynamics, closely or vaguely related to climate topics. Afterwards reconstruction of these dynamics is difficult. Also, some information obtained through interviews cannot be made public.
- ³⁰ It remains difficult to get interviews from members of parliament belonging to political parties that do not engage much with civil society organisations or that are no allies of the Climate Coalition. This could be compensated through the analysis of the political debates taken place in the different parliamentary commissions.
- ³¹ A number of limitations have been identified with regard to the application of the contribution analysis and process tracing applied on this particular case of policy influencing. These relate to the limited time available by the PWG coordinators for this evaluation, the challenge to identify good and concrete cases of policy change in a context where policy change is hardly being achieved, and the limited time available by political decision makers. To compensate for these limitations, the evaluators invested a lot in tracing and analysing documents to validate contribution claims. Furthermore, as the causal analysis requires substantial time and resources, only a limited number of project mechanisms was explored in the analysis, together with the most likely cooperating mechanisms and rival mechanisms. In the last chapter, a number of lessons learnt about the methodology are presented.
- ³² Lastly, the evaluation framework as developed at the start of the baseline study has not worked well because it does not do justice to the capricious course of policy influencing processes.

2 DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE JUSTICE ADVOCACY

2.1 POLICY CONTEXT ON CLIMATE JUSTICE

³³ Since the baseline study in late 2018, a number of evolutions, both in terms of broader trends and in terms of the policy context in Belgium, deserve attention, as they have had an influence on CSO advocacy on climate justice.

Broader national and international trends

³⁴ In **2019**, public attention for the climate urgency significantly increased, thanks to the growing *mobilisation by especially the youth* (school strikes, youth for climate, grandparents for climate, sign for my future...). From early 2019 until early 2020, mass mobilisations and climate demonstrations dominated media headlines. Climate change was also an important topic during the European and Belgian elections of May 2019. The new European Commission launched its ambitious *European Green Deal* in December 2019, committing to climate neutrality by 2050. This Green Deal is gradually being operationalised, with member states being obliged to reduce net emissions by at least 55% by 2030.

³⁵ In **2020**, the public attention shifted once the *Covid-19 pandemic* broke out in March 2020. The pandemic not only contributed to the fact that the climate emergency faded into the background, it also had a major repercussion for the policy work and L&A spaces available to NGOs and social movements. In the meantime, Belgian political parties were attempting to form a federal government. This took over 1,5 year, with a *new coalition agreement* being adopted in September 2020. While this agreement pays more attention to the climate emergency, it was clear that political parties were polarised on the topic, with very different positions about how to deal with the problem. Indeed, the different regions in Belgium have different climate agendas: while the new federal, Walloon and Brussels government have climate ministers from the Green Party, the Flemish region has a climate minister from N-VA. The latter party states that it wants to be 'more realistic' about climate goals.⁴

³⁶ **2021** brought forward new challenges that have had an impact on the discussion on climate change. First of all, while the effects of climate change have long been visible in the Global South, its devastating effects also became more and more clear in Europe, through heat waves, floods and droughts. Especially the floods in Wallonia, which cost the lives of 42 people and caused significant material damage, increased *the visibility of the climate urgency* in Belgium. Secondly, at a global stage, the world is becoming more and more *multipolar*, with power blocs like the US, China, Russia, India and Europe all vying for influence and power. This has an influence on international climate discussions, as dominant players try to include developing countries in their sphere of influence and as multilateralism and group pressure about climate ambitions fade.

³⁷ The culmination of this multipolar world came with *Russia's invasion of Ukraine*, starting in February **2022**. The war is having major repercussions on the energy debate in Europe. On the one hand, the war has increased a sense of urgency in Europe about the need for an energy transition (with a focus

⁴ <https://www.n-va.be/standpunten/klimaat>



on renewable energy), in order to no longer be dependent on Russian gas. However, on the other hand, the war has in the short term also increased a demand for non-sustainable energy sources (revival of coal), to meet the energy needs of Europeans in the next few years.

Belgian policy context

- ³⁸ Against the backdrop of this broader context, the policy debate in Belgium has gone through various evolutions. In what follows, a number of key evolutions related to Belgium's climate policy are being highlighted.
- ³⁹ National, federal and regional climate plans: Following the EU regulation 2018/19991 ('Governance regulation'), Belgium has been requested to develop a National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP). In these plans, member states need to show how they will meet the EU's energy and climate targets for 2030. In order to develop such NECP at Belgian level, various regional energy and climate plans were developed first: a federal contribution, a Flemish plan,⁵ a Walloon plan⁶ and a Brussels plan⁷. The National Climate Commission then used all these contributions to develop Belgium's National Energy and Climate Plan.⁸ The final version of this plan was submitted to the European Commission in December 2019.
- ⁴⁰ With European targets becoming more ambitious, including a commitment to a reduction of emissions by 55% by 2030, the Belgium NECP needs to be updated in its totality by the summer of 2023. In the lead-up to the COP26, the various regions in Belgium already revised their regional climate plans to meet the new European targets (e.g. reduction of emissions by 55%). It is not clear yet whether the proposed measures, especially in Flanders, will suffice to meet the European objectives for Belgium.
- ⁴¹ Belgian representation at European and international level: At the European level, Belgium is represented alternately by one of the regional ministers responsible for Climate. For the period under review in this report (2018-end 2021), the following Belgian Ministers seated in the Environment Council of the European Council:
- in the period July 2018-June 2019, Belgium was represented by Minister Crucke (Walloon government);
 - in the period July 2019-June 2020 by Minister Demir (Flemish government);
 - in the period 2020-June 2021 by Minister Maron (Brussels government);
 - and in the period July 2021-June 2022 by Minister Henry (Walloon government).

⁵ <https://www.vlaanderen.be/publicaties/vlaams-energie-en-klimaatplan-2021-2030-algemeen-kader-voor-de-geintegreerde-nationale-energie-en-klimaatplannen>

⁶ <https://energie.wallonie.be/servlet/Repository/pwec-2030-version-definitive-28-novembre-2019-approuvee-par-le-gw.pdf?ID=57845>

⁷ https://document.environment.brussels/opac_css/doc_num.php?explnum_id=9808&_ga=2.182258919.150013271.1664977506-480756082.1664977506

⁸ <https://www.nationaalenergieklimaatplan.be/admin/storage/nekp/nekp-deel-a.pdf>

- ⁴² At the international level, Belgium is represented by the federal minister for environment; since September 2020, this has been Zakia Khattabi (Ecolo). In the period under review, three COP meetings took place: COP24 in Katowice (end 2018-after the baseline study), COP 25 in Madrid (2019) and COP 26 in Glasgow (2021). Because of the COVID-19 situation, the COP26 in Glasgow was postponed with one year.
- ⁴³ Climate Governance in Belgium: Climate policy in Belgium is complicated by a complex governance structure. Not only does climate policy belong to the competencies of both the regional governments and the federal government, which have different types of government coalitions. Climate policy is in and of itself also a ‘wicked problem’, in that it has multiple causes and solutions that belong to various policy domains and policy levels.⁹ All of this makes it difficult to develop effective climate policy in Belgium.
- ⁴⁴ The first solution to this problem came in 2011 (‘Akkoord Zesde Staatshervorming’) with the decision to (1) strengthen the National Climate Commission, (2) to set up a ‘climate responsibility mechanism’ and (3) by giving the federal level a ‘substitution right’ in the case of international climate commitments. Moreover, various institutions have taken up the role to tackle the issue, with for example the Senate playing a role in intra-Belgian decision-making about climate policy and the inter-parliamentary Climate Dialogues that are regularly being organised.¹⁰ In November 2018, a dialogue was organised with academics to come up with concrete proposals for improvement of Belgian climate governance.¹¹
- ⁴⁵ However, despite these measures, Belgian climate governance continues to falter, also at the international level. According to the European commission, Belgium’s NECP lacks coherence and integration, as it brings together regional energy and climate plans with limited synergies.¹² In the build-up to the COP26, Belgium also failed to come up with an inter-federal agreement about burden-sharing and climate finance.¹³ To mitigate problems related to climate governance, the Climate Coalition has been calling for a Belgian Climate law. However, in order to create this law, article 7bis of the constitution needs to be altered. The plenary Chamber has thus far not approved of the revision of this article.¹⁴
- ⁴⁶ International climate finance: In 2009, during the COP15 in Copenhagen, a decision was taken at the international level to establish a Green Climate Fund to support mitigation projects in developing countries. Rich countries agreed during that COP to gradually increase their contributions. Belgium is one of the developed countries that committed to provide international climate financing for developing nations. In 2015, an intra-Belgian ‘Burden-Sharing Agreement’ determined that each year, until 2020, 50 million euro would be collected to that end (with 25 million coming from the federal government, 14,5 million from Flanders, 8,25 million from Wallonia and 2,25 million from Brussels). A recent evaluation showed that the federal government spent 504 million on international climate financing between 2013-2019, which amounts to 81% of the total Belgian contributions.¹⁵ The evaluation concluded that while Belgium achieves important results with its climate financing, the

⁹ <https://www.sampol.be/2020/04/is-belgie-te-complex-voor-een-effectief-klimaatbeleid>

¹⁰ https://klimaat.be/doc/KlimGov_Synth_NL.pdf

¹¹ https://klimaat.be/doc/Voornaamste_conclusies_Dialoog_Klimaatgovernance.pdf

¹² https://klimaatcoalitie.be/sites/default/files/documents/NI_Briefing-PNEC%202023-Methodologie%26gouvernance.pdf

¹³ https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20211109_97343536

¹⁴ <https://www.hln.be/binnenland/kamer-verwerpt-herziening-grondwet-die-klimaatwet-mogelijk-moest-maken~a18c3ff41/>

¹⁵ <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/beleid/beleidsthemas/uitgelicht/de-belgische-klimaatfinanciering-significante-resultaten-maar>



impact of its actions does not match existing climate challenges due to a lack of common vision. Moreover, most of the Belgian budget came from the budget of development cooperation.¹⁶

⁴⁷ International commitments towards climate financing changed in 2020. In the Paris Agreement that was concluded during the COP in 2015, rich countries committed to spending 100 billion on an annual basis from 2020 onwards, to be used for adaptation and mitigation. In the Coalition Agreement that was signed in September 2020, Belgium committed to increase its contribution for international climate financing, independent from the budget for development cooperation. While the Climate Coalition called for a Belgian contribution of 500 million euro per year, Belgium eventually decided to increase its climate financing to 135 million euro each year from 2022 onwards.¹⁷ This was agreed upon in December 2021, after COP26. This means that for 2020 and 2021, Belgium, like other countries, failed to abide by their promises under the Paris Agreement.

2.2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE EVOLUTION FROM THE CLIMATE JUSTICE PLATFORM TOWARDS THE POLITICAL WORKING GROUP OF THE CLIMATE COALITION

⁴⁸ During the baseline study, the Climate Justice Platform (CJP) has been transformed into the political working group (PWG) of the national Climate Coalition in March 2018, in order to strengthen alignment and coordination with the mobilisation and campaigns that are coordinated by the Climate Coalition. The composition of the political working group differs slightly from the former CJP, as does the way of working and internal governance procedures.

⁴⁹ The Climate Coalition has the independent juridical statute of a non-profit organisation, with a general assembly (all members), a management board, and three working groups (the political working group, the working group on mobilisation and the working group on communication). Statutes have been updated in 2018, among others to organise well the decision-making process within the coalition and to finetune the admission process (to enable also membership of the so-called 'civic initiatives' like grandparents for the Climate and youth for the climate). It was agreed that the two presidents (president and vice-president) would need to represent the two language communities and the two largest groups of CSO, namely the North-South movement and the environmental movement. In the period 2019-2021, these presidents, were the mobilisation coordinator of Greenpeace (vice) and the head of the policy department of CNCD-11.11.11. (president). These two presidents also act as spokesperson. In the management board, the different groups within civil society are represented: (i) ecological group (environmental and nature CSOs), (ii)

¹⁶ <https://11.be/verhalen/balans-van-tien-jaar-klimaatfinanciering>

¹⁷ <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/beleid/beleidsthemas/uitgelicht/belgie-wil-wereldwijd-meer-klimaatambitie>


North-South movement and human rights, (iii) the social group (trade unions and mutual health societies), (iv) youth and civic initiatives for the climate. There is also place for two representatives from the other CSOs that cannot be categorised in the former groups (like CSOs for education, democracy, alternative economy, ...). A bureau was established, consisting of the two presidents, the treasurer and the coordinator. The Climate Coalition has a small secretariat, with one employee, the Climate Coalition coordinator.

- ⁵⁰ Since the integration in the Climate Coalition, the scope of the political working group has been expanded and does not cover only international ambitions (such as emission reduction, international climate finance, Loss&Damage, etc.) but also national ambitions with regard to mobility, bio-diversity, renewable energy, bio-fuels, agro-ecology, etc. The political working group still is coordinated by 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11, funded through the DGD programme (2017-2021).¹⁸
- ⁵¹ The political working group counts 11 members (9 members + 2 coordinators + Climate Coalition coordinator). In 2019, the decision was taken to install a core group of nine members, all professional climate experts, that closely monitors policy processes, conducts the policy influencing work and has the mandate to make quick and flexible decisions with regard to urgent matters or current events. A broader group of 71 members supports the work of the core team (almost the entire Climate Coalition). It is the place for the broader discussions on the political analyses and the positioning of the Climate Coalition. The broader group was involved in the development of the memorandum of the Climate Coalition.
- ⁵² The L&A strategy remained similar during the period under evaluation (2018-2021) and is built on indirect and direct communication with political decision-makers and active participation and communication of positions in European and international networks. In practice most efforts go to *advocacy* (informing, sensitizing via policy briefs, conferences, hearings). Exceptionally, the PWG also provides *advisory services*, for example, to the study services of political parties or a specific cabinet (ex. Recently to the cabinet of Minister Henry to develop a policy on Loss and Damage, see further in the report). *Lobbying* (formal and informal) takes place during info sessions or meetings with Belgian decision-makers, both upon initiative of the Climate Coalition or upon invitation. During the COP, members of the Climate Coalition, including the two coordinators, are part of the official Belgian delegation¹⁹ and have daily meetings and informal contacts with Belgian politicians present at the COP. Stronger alignment with the *mobilisation* strategy of the Climate Coalition is taking place. In fact, the PWG and the Climate Coalition operate through the four quadrants of policy influencing as visualised in following figure.

¹⁸ It is difficult to provide the budget for the coordination of the PWG by 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11. as this coordination is part of the entire budget for policy influencing interventions of both organisations, which is further divided over several thematic subjects. At 11.11.11 0,5 FTE is foreseen for lobbying climate policies, at CNCD-11.11.11 0,75 FTE. However, these staff members are also implementing organisation specific interventions on climate justice policy, and are only partially involved in the coordination of the PWG. Both organisations also pay membership contribution to CAN Europe. It is difficult to provide specific information on working resources and direct costs (meeting costs, communication materials, transportation costs of staff members to attend meetings, etc.) as it is not possible to make a distinction between activities conducted on behalf of the PWG or for the organisation itself.

¹⁹ All interviewees refer to the fact that Belgium is one of the few countries that include a large representation of civil society in the official delegation.

Figure 3: Four engagement methods to policy influencing ²⁰



⁵³ Because of the integration of the PWG in the national Climate Coalition, the topics covered by the political working group have been expanded. For this evaluation, the focus will remain on the international dimensions of climate justice (and not on all thematic subjects that are on the agenda of the Climate Coalition and the PWG), as this was the initial focus of the impact study and included in the DGD programme.

2.3 ENVISAGED POLICY OUTCOMES OF PWG AS EXPLAINED BY THE TOC

⁵⁴ In the baseline study, the ToC for climate justice policy influencing was further developed, describing how the causal mechanisms are expected to work, what specific changes are expected to be seen in relation to the outcome, and identifying assumptions, rival explanations and risks. This ToC still is valid (see annex 5).

⁵⁵ The first group of outputs are situated at the **internal level of the Climate Coalition**: practices and knowledge on climate justice are developed and exchanged (output 2), the members of the PWG are up-to-date on current climate justice issues (output 3) and coordinated positions on climate justice issues are adopted (output 4). Following the causal logic of the ToC, these outputs should lead to a visible social support for demands in favour of climate justice (outcome 1) and high-quality knowledge on climate justice within the platform (outcome 2), which then would contribute to an increase in the leverage and credibility of the platform members and civil society organisations (CSOs) (outcome 3).

²⁰ https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/odi_roma_guide.pdf (page 31)

56 A second group of outputs is situated at the **external level**, including direct (formal and informal) and indirect (through media) communication to political decision makers (outputs 5 and 6) and an active participation and communication of the PWG positions in European and international networks (output 7). Output 5 also relates to the internal functioning of the platform, and contributes to an increase in leverage and credibility of the PWG and CSOs (outcome 3). Outputs 5, 6 and 7 combined have as a result that political decision makers receive information, positions and policy advice on climate justice (output 8), which then should contribute to the sensitisation and education on climate justice of these decision makers (outcome 4).

57 At the impact level, both outcomes 3 and 4 should lead to Belgian decision makers taking over positions of the platform and incorporating them in their decisions on national, European and international policy (impact 1 and 2), which would then lead to the adoption of a Belgian policy in favour of climate justice (impact 3). During the baseline study, indicators at outcome and impact level have been finetuned,²¹ making a distinction in levels of engagement that can be expected from political decision makers, and making it possible to identify clear targets. This resulted in the following indicators and targets as presented in following box.

Box 2: Revised indicators on outcome and impact level

- Agenda setting (outcome 4):
 - o Number of parliamentary interpellations, amendments and questions in relation to the (1) inter-parliamentary climate resolution, (2) the development of regional and Belgian climate policies, (3) the development of the burden sharing regulation, (4) the Belgian position at European and international level, that are in line with positions of the climate coalition
- Discursive change (impact 1 and 2)
 - o Political parties and thematic political experts take up positions of the climate coalition in their argumentation during debates, public events, in media, etc.
- Procedural change (impact 3)
 - o There is more transparency in the decision-making process of the national climate commission with regard to the development of the Belgian National Energy and Climate Plan 2030
- Policy change at Belgian level (impact 3)
 - o An ambitious interparliamentary resolution includes positions of the Climate Coalition
 - o Effort sharing regulation, with regard to emissions reduction at the national level (between the regions of Belgium) already takes place before the elections of 2019, is finished by 2020 and leaves room for a possible increase in EU (and Belgian) ambition.
 - o Ambitious National Energy- and Climate Plan 2030 (NEKP 2030) which leaves room for a possible increase in EU (and Belgian) ambition, with regard to emissions reduction.
 - o Belgian financial resources for climate finance are increased and 'additional'.
- Policy change regarding the Belgian position at European/international level (impact 2):
 - o Belgium strives for an increase of the European 2030-goals with regard to emissions reduction up to -55% emission reduction compared to 1990.
 - o Paris Rulebook contains positions of the climate coalition on definitions and clear agreements on reporting on climate finance.

58 Up till the merge of the CJP with the Climate Coalition and the formation of the PWG, L&A work was based on a framework of 11 common positions that guided the policy influencing work of the CJP. These common positions must rather be seen as the “driving narrative” for policy influencing on climate justice. With the evolution of the CJP to the PWG in 2018, there was a need to revise this framework. In 2019, the PWG embarked in a process of developing a memorandum that would become the reference document for guiding coordinated L&A of the Climate Coalition. The process took more than 1,5 year and was finalised in March 2021.

²¹ Indicators for Outcome 4 referred to actions taken like number of questions in parliament, which in fact can be seen as agenda setting. Agenda setting can be seen as a first step in the policy making process.



- ⁵⁹ The memorandum was developed through different sub-groups, steered by a member with expertise in a specific matter and refers to a set of concrete demands and proposals with regard to following domains: energy, mobility and spatial planning, buildings, industry, consumption, food and agriculture, nature and biodiversity. Following tables present an overview of the concrete demands of the Climate Coalition with regard to the international ambitions of Belgium and a just transition towards a carbon free society, both at national and international level, which are the focus of this Impact Study and their evolution over time. Table 2 presents the demands targeting the Belgian government, table 3 specifically highlights the demands with regard to the Belgian position at the COPs.
- ⁶⁰ Table 2: An analysis of the concrete demands of the PWG as formulated during the programme period under evaluation (2017-2021) shows a lot of consistency in these demands, proving the fact that not much advancement has been reached so far regarding the Belgian position in European and international climate policy. The **effort sharing regulation** between the regions in Belgium remained on the advocacy radar, closely linked to the demands to improve Belgian **climate governance** (NECP and Climate Act, coherence in policies). Challenges regarding the NECP remained the same over the entire period. Demands on improving Climate governance came to the forefront in 2019. The Climate Coalition keeps on pushing for more ambition regarding **emission reduction**, advocating for -55% emission reduction in the period 2017-2020) towards pushing for -60% in 2021. The demands regarding **international climate finance** remained the same over the programme period. In 2021, additional demands regarding debt relief were added, the focus on **adaptation** remained and the importance of **Loss and Damage** gained importance in the memorandum. Phasing out fossil fuels and decarbonisation always have been addressed in the different position papers. In 2019, the attention to **just transition** was added and the need to **phase out fossil fuel subsidies** was highlighted. Since 2019, there is also consistently attention for the topic **climate refugees and gender**. Since the merge of the CJP in the Climate Coalition, more concrete demands with regard to the Belgian climate policy were included in the position papers of the PWG. In 2019, a set of concrete demands were listed that needed to be included in the **revised NECP**.
- ⁶¹ Table 3: Positions of the Climate Coalition with regard to NDC and regulation of carbon markets, border tax adjustments, balancing mitigation and adaptation, international climate financing, Loss and Damage, climate refugees, food security have all already been addressed in the COP position papers in 2017 and have been repeated consistently over the years, showing that not much advancement has been obtained yet.

The visual on page 33 gives a summary of the most important milestones of the climate justice advocacy of the Climate Coalition in the period 2017-2021.

Table 2: Summary of concrete demands of CJP for 2017-2018, PWG for 2019-2020 and since the memorandum March 2021

	Demands CJP 2017-2018	Demands PWG since March 2019	Demand PWG since March 2021
Distribution of climate goals	The effort sharing regulation between the regions of Belgium starts before the 2019 elections, is finished before 2020, and leaves room for a possible increase of the European (and Belgian) ambition.	Improve intra-Belgian collaboration and develop effective effort sharing regulations to support the discussions after the current agreement will end by December 31, 2020	Conclude a new cooperation agreement as soon as possible, which will allow to share the climate targets within Belgium and to fulfil our European and international commitments for the period 2021-2030. Among other things, that agreement will have to correspond with the increased European ambition.
Ambition	The Talanoa Dialogue at the COP24 (Poland, 2018) gives a strong impulse to an increase of ambition of all National Determined Contributions (NDCs).	/	/
	Europe increases its 2030-goals to at least -55% emission reduction compared to 1990. Belgium takes an active role at the European level to push for this increase. Prioritise drastic emission reduction in the most polluting sectors	Europe increases its 2030-goals to at least -55% emission reduction compared to 1990. Belgium takes an active role at the European level to push for this increase.	Support a revision of Europe's climate targets in line with the Paris Agreement: reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 60% (compared to 1990 levels) and make every effort to stay below a climate warming of 1.5°C. Defend the European goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050, a vision that: 1. leads to an actual reduction in emissions of greenhouse gas emissions by at least 95% compared to 1990; 2. sets a goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 at the latest;
	Promote a European policy to phase out fossil fuels and nuclear energy and to set the goal of 100% renewable energy in 2050, taking into account a just transition process		
National policy	The National Energy and Climate Plan 2030 reflects a Belgian vision on climate policy, where complementarity is key and clear goals are being pursued such as on emission reduction (deadline first draft December 31, 2018), that includes an effort sharing regulation, phasing out of fossil fuels by 2020, implementation strategy towards a just	Revise and adapt fundamentally the National Energy and Climate Plan 2030, to align with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal. A set of concrete measures is listed to be included in this revised NECP, with regard to nuclear power, the phase-out of biofuels and subsidies for car	The concrete measures to implement the NECP and achieve the targets must be detailed, calculated (on impact), planned and budgeted over time. We should not settle for ambitious targets if there is no strategic plan to concretise those targets. Reduce the targets of the NECP regarding biofuels



	<p>transition (and included in the social dialogue), policy coherence, education to accompany a just transition to a carbon-zero society and that is aligned to the objectives set in the Paris agreement</p>	<p>(salariswagen en brandstofkaarten), public transport, promotions of products with low energy efficiency</p>	
		<p>Adopt an Inter-Federal climate law that aligns to the objectives of the Paris Agreement, that foresees in the installation of an independent climate council (involving academic experts, and guaranteeing a multi-disciplinary approach), that develops concrete action plans (developed through multi-stakeholder engagement including civil society, with a clear timing and sufficient budget), that takes into account the obligations for international climate finance</p>	<p>Adopt as soon as possible a special climate law, allowing for a national long-term vision to be ratified, with clear intermediate targets, that ensures a significant improvement of Belgian climate governance.</p> <p>Provide each regional and federal entity with climate legislation, with targets for direct and indirect emission reductions in the long and medium term and annual carbon budgets, providing for the drafting of measures to achieve those targets and requiring that governments to account annually for the progress of their work.</p>
		<p>Align Belgian positions to the Paris Agreement and European Green Deal, more in particular with regard to: support and strengthen the Green Deal, and ensure coherence of other EU policies (e.g. trade); invest in diplomacy with the Belgian trade partners to strengthen a common (fiscal) policy so to create a level playing field that takes into account environmental and social protection; promote circular economy</p>	

Inter-parliamentary resolution	The Inter-parliamentary resolution adopts a large part of the positions of the CJP and actively pushes for more cooperation between the entities. It pushes for an increase in Belgian and European ambitions. The resolution is voted by all parties in all parliaments.	The work that was started with the interparliamentary resolution for COP24 continues and the interparliamentary work adopts a large part of the positions of the PWG, and pushes for more cooperation between the entities.	Continuing the work initiated within the framework of the inter-parliamentary climate commission, in particular the adoption of the interparliamentary resolution on climate policy, adopted ahead of COP24. Parliaments could act as the – currently missing - engine of Belgian climate governance.
International climate finance	<p>Belgian contributions to climate finance do not drop below 100 million euro a year and Belgium agrees upon a structural increase of these resources to 500 million euro a year by 2020. The financial resources are new and additional. Look for innovative financial sources. .</p> <p>Harmonise the methods applied by the Belgian regions and the federal government when reporting on their contribution to international climate finance and optimise transparency</p>	Belgian contribution to international climate finance increases so to contribute a fair share to the realisation of the internationally agreed objective of 100 billion dollar/year for international climate finance. Belgium agrees upon a structural increase of these resources to 500 million euro a year. The financial resources are new and additional	<p>Increase Belgium's commitment to climate finance so that our country, in line with international agreements, contributes equitably and incrementally to the goal of \$100 billion a year from 2020, without prejudice to the resources available for development cooperation ('new and additional'); a fair contribution is at least 500 million per year.</p> <p>Guarantee the predictability of the resources that will be available to developing countries available by agreeing to require donor countries to report on the contributions foreseen for international financing through various channels, and well establishing commitments in advance.</p> <p>Play a role in debt relief and cancellation of bilateral and multilateral debt relief for all countries in need, especially those impacted by the sanitary and/or economic crisis resulting from COVID-19 and the climate crisis.</p>
	Guarantee that resources are being used for climate adaptation for the most vulnerable countries	Continue the focus of climate finance on adaptation and the most vulnerable countries	
		Recognise the necessity that additional funding is needed to compensate Loss and Damage for vulnerable countries	Recognise the need for additional funding for Loss and Damage, and work towards a comprehensive and effective mechanism for this funding, which should in no way detract from the resources promised for adaptation and low-carbon development of developing countries, by using innovative sources of financing such as the revenues



			from taxes on financial transactions, international air travel and the extraction of fossil fuels.
International negotiations (see following table with regard to COP meetings)	The 2018 Talanoa Dialogue builds on the conclusions of the IPCC report on 1,5°C goal and leads to more ambition. Europe takes the lead for an increase of the 2030-goals and Belgium actively urges for that.	See following table	See following table.
	A clear Paris Rulebook is agreed upon at the COP24 which includes agreements on all necessary issues, e.g. on the definition and reporting on climate finance.		
Decarbonisation and just transition towards a carbon free society	<p>Develop an ambitious and just national climate and energy plan 2030 that includes a decrease of energy consumption and 100% renewable energy by 2050, a coherent vision, phasing out of fossil fuel by 2050, a vision on a just transition.</p> <p>Guarantee coherence of all political decisions with the international climate objectives, which include the abolition of the structural dependency on fossil fuels and alignment of the National Pact for Strategic Investments with the Paris Agreement.</p>	Just transition towards a carbon neutral society has to become a transversal priority: prominent in the government agreement, assigned to a vice-prime minister, at least 55% emission reduction by 2030, align Belgian ambition to the European ambition, align all policy goals with the objectives of the Paris declaration and the European Green deal, stop policy measures that keep on enhancing dependency on fossil fuel and over consumption; gradual phasing-out of subsidies and tax exemption for fossil fuels, invest substantially in sectors to support just transition such as agro-ecology, renovation and isolation of buildings, carbon neutral public transport and renewable energy; install a just carbon tax in Belgium to finance just and sustainable transition; install a carbon stress test; invest all income from ETS in climate policy (national and as contribution to international climate finance)	Develop a vision for an equitable transition to a sustainable, carbon-free and resilient society. That vision should take into account: social dialogue and citizen participation; the development of quality public infrastructure for this transition; skills development, the relocation of the economy and respect for human rights; the creation of decent work; the recognition of unpaid care work as an integral part of the economy, which will be affected by transition in all its forms, and taking systemic measures to level out inequality; adding macroeconomic indicators to measure economic success measure based on the human economy; training and continuing education for the jobs of tomorrow; special attention should be paid to workers in affected sectors, but also to women, young people and people with a migration background. In parallel, also develop training of women for "green

			<p>jobs" develop and the formation of men for paid work in "care"; stronger social protection.</p> <p>To this end, it is important to provide resources for research and study on the meaning of an equitable transition to a carbon-free society.</p> <p>Consistently apply the polluter pays principle so that industry finances its own climate transition finances.</p> <p>Provide a specific transition for each sector operating on fossil and nuclear energy, to ensure an equitable and accelerated transition in companies for which a transition to carbon neutrality is more difficult to implement</p>
		<p>Install a national conference on just transition towards a carbon neutral society that includes political actors, civil society and citizens, develop a vision towards a just transition, provide funding for research and study and bring these on the agenda of the social dialogue.</p> <p>Reference is also made towards food security, human rights, rights of indigenous people, gender equality and women rights, land rights, natural resources.</p>	<p>In the short term, establish a "National Conference on the Just Transition to a carbon-free society" to bring together political actors, citizens and civil society together and jointly define the most socially just structural measures, including on taxation, training and employment and coherently reconcile the requirements of "the end of the month" reconcile with those of "the end of the world".</p>
Climate refugees		<p>Recognise the existence of climate refugees and look for solutions at international and national level</p>	<p>Recognise the growing problem of climate displacement and the need to urgently seek solutions at the international level and take initiatives at the national level.</p>




Table 3: Summary of the concrete demands regarding the COP meetings in 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020

2017 (Bonn)	2018 (Katowice)	2019 (Madrid)	2021 (Glasgow)
Increase the European 2030 climate ambition (-55% greenhouse gas reduction, 45% renewable energy and 40% energy-efficiency)	Increase the European 2030 climate ambition. Belgian has to support the initiative taken by the Netherlands that plead for an emission reduction of 55%	Europe increases its 2030-goals to at least -55% emission reduction compared to 1990 and aims at carbon neutrality by 2050. Belgium takes an active role at the European level to push for this increase	As the new European target is an absolute minimum, it is essential that implementation is done without resorting to false solutions or loopholes, and make it possible to move beyond the proposed emissions reduction of 55% by 2030, to an emissions reduction of at least 60% by 2030 compared to 1990.
Guarantee that the facilitative dialogue (2018) results in an increase of National Determined Contributions by 2020		Only agree on the implementation of international carbon markets, on the condition that a set of concrete measures and conditions to regulate the international carbon market system, that was established as a mechanism to support the achievement of the national goals as set in the Nationally Determined Contributions, is agreed, so that the system does not undermine the Paris Agreement and international agreements on human rights and sustainable development.	Convince all countries that have not yet submitted an updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and/or that have submitted an NDC that does not constitute an equitable share of the meet the target of limiting warming to no more than 1.5°C, in line with the new IPCC report, submit new, updated NDCs.
Enhance political pressure on countries that want to withdraw from the Paris agreement	/	/	/
Propose border tax adjustment measures on products imported from countries that do not respect social and environmental European regulations	<i>Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the EU negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission</i>	Just transition towards a carbon neutral, resilient and 100% renewable energy society, through carbon border tax adjustment measures at European level, a European Fund for Just transition and the Green Deal	In the context of COP26, the European Union, its member states, its institutions and diplomats must play an active and constructive role to promote the transition to a low-carbon society and ensure that strong and equal partnerships are built with the most vulnerable countries.

			In the context of raising targets and with a view to an equitable transition to a low-carbon society, Belgian governments should in the short term organise a 'National Conference on the equitable transition to a low-carbon Society'
Support educational programmes to fight climate change within Europe and in the World	<i>Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission</i>	<i>Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission</i>	<i>Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission</i>
Plead for a balance between financing for mitigation and adaptation		Plead for a balance between financing for mitigation and adaptation	Push forward additional commitments specifically for adaptation to balance between funding for mitigation and adaptation, as promised in the Paris Agreement.
Put the increase of European climate finance on the agenda of the COP24		Increase of International Climate Finance and include gender equality and women rights in the Funds mechanism	Announce a new, Belgian commitment to international climate finance for the the post-2020 period, or an incremental and equitable contribution in the form of a growth path to €500 million per year by 2023 at the latest, which does not weigh on the budget for development cooperation;
Accelerate the implementation of the Warsaw International mechanism for Loss and Damage, and plead for the need for a new financing mechanism		Recognise the necessity of financing for Loss and Damage	Recognise the need for additional funding for 'loss and damage' which should in no way weigh on the promised resources for adaptation and low-carbon development.
Look for solutions for climate refugees and include them in the new UN Global Compact on refugees and the UN Global Compact on safe and Regular Migration (by end 2018)	<i>Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission</i>	Recognise the existence of climate refugees + the need for solutions and national and international level	Recognise the growing problem of climate displacement and the urgent need to find solutions at the international, regional and national levels that respect human rights at all stages of displacement.
Develop a programme to promote sustainable food production systems and food security, to enhance human rights and protect the environment	<i>Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission</i>	Include food security, human rights and social protection in the international negotiations	Guarantee that food security, respect for human rights, social protection and, in particular, international texts and treaties on the rights of indigenous and local people, land rights and access to natural resources are central to the discussions.



TIMELINE CLIMATE JUSTICE ADVOCACY



- ⁶² Detailed reconstructions of the interventions of the Climate Coalition are included in the baseline and the MTR reports. The strategy of the PWG remained consistent over the years. The primary focus of the PWG are the international COP meetings, lobbying for more ambition positions of Belgium in these fora. Each time, a position paper of the Climate coalition has been developed prior to the COP meetings, to influence the interparliamentary dialogue that is the forum where the Belgium position at the COP is being prepared, resulting in an interparliamentary resolution that sets the boundaries for the Belgian negotiators. Members of the PWG are invited to take part in the official Belgian delegation at the COPs, enabling the advocacy officers to have formal and informal contacts with policy makers present at the COP. The advocacy officers are kept up to date of the dynamics of the COP by the Belgian officers that are involved in the technical negotiations at the COP. Each year, after the COP a position paper was drafted with the analysis of the outcomes of the COP. Prior to the COPs, usually in October, large climate marches have been organised, which took a next level since the School strikes for climate from 2019 onwards. The COP meetings also create momentum for ad-hoc actions and/or press releases of the Climate Coalition that are usually taken up by different media.
- ⁶³ The PWG has been invited each year to presents its positions at a meeting with the interparliamentary climate commission and at several times has participated in multi-stakeholder consultations (mainly concerning the NECP). Sometimes, the PWG has been invited for hearings in federal or regional parliamentary climate commissions.
- ⁶⁴ The timeline shows that L&A efforts concentrate around the COPs, during the last trimester of each year, with an exception of the year 2019. The latter was the year of the elections and the formation of new regional and federal governments. The climate coalition has been actively lobbying the formation process of the federal government and the development of the regional climate policies in Wallonia and Brussels. In 2019, prior to the election, the political debate on climate governance accelerated which demanded response by the Climate Coalition, as described in the MTR report.
- ⁶⁵ In the period covered by the Endline (October 2020-December 2021), the COP 26 planned for 2020 had to be postponed with one year. The PWG was auditioned in the interparliamentary climate dialogue, but no further follow-up was given. Because of the corona pandemic no climate march could be organised. Instead, an online supported 60 hours protest was organised, with every hour standing one representative of a member in front of a political building, reminding the people and politicians that climate change remains important. In the period September 2020-december 2020, after the installation of the new federal government, the PWG has visited all climate ministers. In March 2021 the memorandum of the Climate Coalition was finalised and presented in a virtual lunch meeting for all members of the interparliamentary climate commission. All parties were present (+/- 40 MP participated). Following, PWG had meetings with all cabinets to discuss the memorandum. By the end of 2021, the COP26 took place in Glasgow and L&A took place as described in the above.



3 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE PWG INFLUENCE THE POINTS OF VIEW OF BELGIAN DECISION MAKERS AND THE POLICY POSITIONS ON CLIMATE JUSTICE-RELATED TOPICS AND OTHER TOPICS COVERED BY THE PWG?

- ⁶⁶ This chapter describes the policy influencing findings of the L&A process of the PWG. We start by summarising the ToC, after which the report looks specifically at the programme-wide findings at output level and the first level of outcomes. These outputs and outcomes often entail conditions for the programme to be effective at higher levels of the causal chain. A third section then delves into the higher level outcomes and impacts by executing a contribution analysis on two selected case studies. In line with methodological insights for the evaluation of L&A, we provide thick descriptions of the context and pay sufficient attention to the narratives of key informants to document and assess the performance stories and the relative contribution of the PWG at outcome and impact level. A final section draws conclusions about the policy impact of the programme on different dimensions (agenda setting, discursive change, procedural change and policy change).
- ⁶⁷ The impact hypothesis that is under evaluation reads as “The PWG influences the points of view of Belgian decision makers and the policy positions on climate justice-related topics and other topics covered by the PWG”. The analysis of the impact hypothesis was applied on two cases (see chapter 3.3.).

3.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF INTERVENTIONS IMPLEMENTED FOR THE POLICY INFLUENCING PATHWAY OF CHANGE IN THE TOC

- ⁶⁸ Chapter three assesses the first causal question, namely “*to what extent does the PWG influence the points of view of Belgian decision makers and the policy positions on climate justice-related topics and other topics covered by the PWG?*” The ToC for policy influencing by the PWG is summarised in following table, which also includes the activity types per output as implemented by the PWG.

- ⁶⁹ As described in chapter 2, the PWG has developed a memorandum (March 2021)²² that is currently being used as the reference framework for further policy influencing. A specific position paper was derived from the memorandum with recommendations²³ for the Climate Summit in Glasgow November 2021.
- ⁷⁰ Policy influencing activities were conducted by the PWG coordinators, often in collaboration with some of the members, through direct, formal and informal, communication with political decision makers (output 5 and 6). Members of the PWG still participate in institutionalised dialogues that are organised by the federal administration for environment before and after the COP-meetings and are invited for meetings with the inter-parliamentary climate dialogue. PWG coordinators and several members are included in the Belgian delegation at the COP meetings and meet daily with the negotiators and policy-makers. In the margin of the COP-negotiations, there are plenty spaces to meet also informally with members of parliament and ministers. CNCD-11.11.11 and 11.11.11 also participate in the Federal Council for Sustainable Development (FRDO) where the different actors of the civil society (including workers organisations) and employers' organisations meet with representatives of the federal ministers. Yearly, the FRDO organises a round table with the federal minister for climate in preparation of the COP.
- ⁷¹ CNCD-11.11.11 and 11.11.11 do not actively participate in the European division of the Climate Action Network (CAN) but contribute financially and participate in meetings. Reference to CAN position papers is being put under the attention through websites and social media by CNCD-11.11.11 On March 21, 2021, for example, the Climate Coalition shared a letter of CAN Europe with the prime minister.
- ⁷² In the period under evaluation (2017-2021), the Climate Coalition has organised several campaigns and one-off actions, coordinated by the working group on mobilisation and aligned to the policy influencing work of the PWG (as documented in the baseline and MTR reports). In the period October 2020-December 2021), the Climate Coalition organised three one-off actions²⁴ and one mobilisation namely the Climate March #BackToTheClimate of October 20, 2021, prior to the COP 26.

²² Climate Coalition (March 2021) Memorandum for a Belgian Green Deal.

²³ Climate Coalition (October 2021) Recommendations for the Climate Summit in Glasgow (COP26)

²⁴ October 2020: petition organised by 11.11.11 demanding the Belgian government to increase its contribution to international climate finance with 1.431 signatures; November-2 December 2020: 60 hours of protest (online) to demand an emission reduction of -60% by 2030; 7 December 2020: public action handing over letters for prime minister De Croo demanding for more ambition;



Table 4: ToC for climate justice policy influencing

Outputs and activity type		Immediate outcome	Intermediate outcomes (or first impact level)	Impact (or second level impact)
1. Indirect communication to political decision makers through (social)media (output 5)	Press releases Twitter Website Climate Coalition	Political decision makers received information, positions and policy advice on climate justice (output 8)	Belgian decision makers take over positions of Climate Coalition and incorporate these in their decisions with regard to the Belgian climate policy (impact 1) Belgian decision makers take over positions of Climate Coalition and incorporate these in their decisions with regard to Belgian ambition at European or international level (impact 2)	Belgian policy in favour of climate justice adopted (impact 3)
2. Direct communication with ministers, MP, advisors (output 6)	Position briefs and memorandum sent by mail to all MP, cabinets and relevant administrations Formal and informal contact (by phone or face-to-face) with political decision makers	Political decision makers are sensitized and educated on climate justice (outcome 4)		
3. Active participation in institutionalised (multi-stakeholder) meetings (output 6)	Presenting positions in multi-stakeholder meetings: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – inter-parliamentary climate commission, federal and regional climate commissions, – multi-stakeholder meeting to prepare the COP, – member of FRDO 			
4. Active participation and communication of positions in European networks (output 7)	Financial support to CAN Europe (not as Climate Coalition but as 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11)			
5. PWG drafting and facilitating common positions (output 4)	Coordinated positions (memorandum, policy briefs with analyses and positions)	Climate Coalition gains leverage and credibility on the topic of climate justice (outcome 3)		
6. Conferences and lectures for members of CC (output 2)	Knowledge on climate justice developed and exchanged Members of CC are up-to-date of current climate justice issues			
7. Newsletters to keep CC members up-to-date (output 3)				
8. Mobilisation campaigns and one-off actions organised (output 1)	Petitions, public protest actions and climate marches	Visible support base for demands in favour of climate justice (outcome 1)		

3.2 DATA ON OUTPUT AND OUTCOME LEVEL (OUTCOME 4 AND IMPACT 1)

Share of national policy makers (from the total pool of policy makers engaged in the topic of climate change), who knowingly have received information from CJP (output 8, indicator 1)

⁷⁴ Annex 6 gives an overview of the number of L&A activities conducted by CNCD-11.11.11 and 11.11.11 in the period October 2020 – December 2021. The databases provided by the PWG coordinators do not always make a distinction between interventions conducted on behalf of the Climate Coalition or on behalf of the own organisation, which is not perceived as being relevant. The L&A on climate justice overlap between the coalition and the own organisation and mutually reinforce. Furthermore, the data in the contact tracing are not complete. A lot of informal direct contact is taking place via WhatsApp, which is not reported in the database.

⁷⁵ *Direct contacts:*²⁵ From the databases²⁶ of the PWG coordinators, it is learned that in the period October 2020-December 2021, there have been 87 direct contacts, which is a substantial increase compared to the MTR, explained by the fact that the MTR covered a difficult and unstable political period with elections and a long government formation process. During baseline 53 direct contacts were registered, but based on an uncomplete database. The nature of direct contacts differs between the Endline and the two former measurements, with an increased focus on the cabinets since the installation of the new federal and regional governments since the 2019 elections, when the Green parties have taken over the climate cabinets (except in Flanders).

Table 5: Number of direct contacts with ministers during the period October 2020-December 2021

Cabinet	Mails	Letters	Meetings	Total
Prime minister De Croo (Open VLD)	1	2	1	4
Federal climate minister Khattabi (Ecolo)	6	1	5	12
Flemish climate minister Demir (N-VA)	5	1	5	11
Brussels climate minister Maron (Ecolo)	6		2	8
Walloon climate minister Henry (Ecolo)	6		4	10
Federal minister Development Cooperation Kitir (Vooruit)	/		3	3
Federal minister energy Vanderstraeten (Groen)	/		2	2
Secretary of State Dermine (PS)	1		2	3
Total direct contacts cabinet level	25	4	24	53

⁷⁶ Where during the MTR most contacts were evidently with members of parliament (as no new cabinets had been installed), the focus shifted the last year towards the different cabinets. The contacts with cabinets outnumber the contacts with MP (53 vs 30). There were contacts with all four cabinets responsible for climate (Flemish, Walloon, Brussels and Federal). Three of these cabinets have a minister of the Green parties that share to a large extent the positions of the Climate Coalition. Also the baseline study documented that the Climate Coalition had access to all climate

²⁵ Direct contacts are personalised and non-personalised mailings, handing over letters, telephone contact and meetings. Telephone contacts and contact via WhatsApp are not registered.

²⁶ These databases keep track of meetings, and where relevant these encounters are substantiated by evidence (linkages to press releases, websites referring to the event).



ministers, with the exception of the federal climate minister at that time, belonging to MR (Minister Marghem). The Climate Coalition not only has contact with 'allies' within the government, but also with the Flemish climate minister, who does not share the ambitions as pushed by the Climate Coalition. Meetings took place before and during the COP 26. The Climate Coalition also had contact with other cabinets that are responsible for specific climate related topics, such as international climate finance (cabinet of Kitir), relance (cabinet Dermine), energy (cabinet Vanderstraeten). The Climate Coalition also had a meeting with the prime minister during the COP 26. During baseline it was not possible to track the number of contacts with these cabinets as data were not available. The Endline shows that there is frequent contact with all cabinets. Mailings are usually followed up by a meeting.

- 77 During baseline, it was noted that the majority of the contacts were within the different administrations (25 contacts) and also 5 contacts were registered with study services of the political parties. This has not been the case any-more during Endline. Only 4 contacts were registered with administration (one with the Walloon task force environment focusing on the regional policy 'Get Up Wallonia', one with the FOD economy on biofuels, one meeting with the members of the official COP delegation to discuss the European programme Fit for 55 and informal meetings with the Belgian delegation during the COP). L&A has shifted towards the centres of power, namely the cabinets. As documented during baseline and MTR, not much contacts are being taken with the political parties (study services, presidents). During baseline and MTR, five contacts were registered with study services of political parties, mainly so-called allies, with the exception that a contact could also be established with MR in the period covered by the MTR. In the Endline, contacts were registered with two presidents of political parties (Magnetite for PS and Bouchez for MR).
- 78 The Climate Coalition had contacts with MP of several political parties. Contacts with allies (progressive parties like Groen/Ecolo, PS/Vooruit) outnumber the contacts with the parties that adopt a liberal or conservative agenda and that push for so called realistic, less ambitious positions. Often these meetings took place upon request of the MP. Where there have been frequent contacts with the N-VA cabinet of Demir, there have not been contacts with the MP of N-VA in the Flemish and federal parliaments.

Table 6: Number of direct contacts with members of parliament, differentiated by political party, between October 2020 and December 2021

Political party	Number of personalised mails ²⁷	Number of meetings	Total
CD&V	1	1	2
Les engagées	/	/	0
Ecolo	/	/	0
Groen	2	4	6
N-VA	/	/	0
Open VLD	/	3	3
MR	/	/	0
PS	/	3	3
Vooruit	2	4	6
PvdA/PTB	1	3	4
Total	6	18	24

⁷⁹ Additionally, non-personalised mails were sent to all members of the Flemish and federal parliament (2 mailings), to the members of the interparliamentary dialogue (2 mailings) and to the different regional parliamentary climate commissions (2 mailings), informing the MP on the memorandum and the positions of the Climate Coalition regarding COP26. Interviews showed that non-personalised mails are not very effective and usually not opened, as opposed to personalised mails.

⁸⁰ The PWG has participated 16 times in institutionalised consultations (compared to 12 times described in MTR²⁸). This number includes the 7 meetings/year of the FRDO (Federal Council for Sustainable Development).²⁹ Several of the members of the PWG are member of the FRDO, who meets frequently to prepare advices for the federal government, among others on climate related topics. Furthermore, the PWG is every year invited to the interparliamentary climate commission to present and discuss its positions for the COP. PWG also participated in a hearing organised by this interparliamentary climate commission in October 7, 2020 and in a hearing of the European commission of the Walloon government to discuss the European Green Deal on January 26, 2021. On March 31, 2021 the PWG organised a parliamentary event to discuss the European Green Deal and present the memorandum. In November 2021, the Climate Coalition was invited by the senate for a hearing on climate governance, the climate act and state reform (climate governance has been a priority topic in the period covered by the MR, see cases in MTR report).

⁸¹ *Indirect contacts:* Whereas the indirect communication had been important during the period covered by the MTR (also due to the increased attention the topic was receiving as a consequence of the climate demonstrations), indirect communication in the period October 2020 – December 2021 decreased somehow. Only five press releases were made (compared to 14 during MTR). The decrease can also be explained by the fact that the COP 26, initially planned to take place in November 2020 had been postponed to November 2021. The PWG coordinators are also active on twitter,³⁰ and their organisations (11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11) regularly published opinions on their websites (six in total). There are no data on the extent these opinions are taken over by newspapers and websites of news channels. As described in the MTR report, the spokesperson of the Climate Coalition for the Walloon region (CNCD-11.11.11) still is given the floor in several panels, debates,

²⁷ No data on personalised mailings to French speaking MP

²⁸ Not precised during baseline study

²⁹ 10 meetings in the period October 2020-December 2021

³⁰ Always on behalf of their organisation. There is no consolidated overview of presence at Twitter



radio and television shows. There are no consolidated data on the presence of the PWG and the climate coalition in the media. From the interviews, it was learned that the climate coalition still is receiving much more media attention in the French speaking part of Belgium compared to the Flemish community.

Baseline data output 8
<ul style="list-style-type: none">– 52 direct contacts, of which 25 in administrations, 16 MP, 7 with cabinets (all but federal cabinet for development cooperation), 5 contacts with study services or assistants of members of parliament.– CJP has direct contact with all lead thematic experts of all political parties (except extremist parties), but the number of contacts with opposition parties outnumber the number of contacts with ruling parties and the quality of interaction differs. There is a closer relation and more frequent interaction with opposition parties (also requesting CJP for advice) compared to the interactions with ruling parties.– All 25 people interviewed confirmed having received information from CJP (9/25 administration, 9/16 members of parliament, 3/7 members of cabinet and 4/5 staff at study services).
MTR data
<ul style="list-style-type: none">– List of direct contacts was not updated (had been developed specifically for the baseline study but is not an existing M&E tool). There have been 19 direct contacts with individual MP or groups of MP, and 12 meetings in institutionalised fora where all climate experts of MP were met (varying from 20 to 79 persons).– PWG had encounters with all relevant ministers (climate and development cooperation), 7 formal meetings in total, and with the negotiators and ‘informateur’.– PWG has direct contact with all lead thematic experts of all political parties (except extremist parties), but the number of contacts with opposition parties outnumber the number of contacts with ruling parties and the quality of interaction differs. There is a closer relation and more frequent interaction with opposition parties (also requesting PWG for advice) compared to the interactions with ruling parties.– All 8 members of parliament interviewed confirmed having received information from PWG
Endline data
<ul style="list-style-type: none">– List of direct contacts was not updated (had been developed specifically for the baseline study but is not an existing M&E tool). From the contact tracing database, it appears that the PWG has contact with 49 persons, of which 8 in administrations, 22 MP, 15 with cabinets, 4 contacts with study services or assistants of members of parliament. In total the Climate Coalition had 87 direct contacts, of which 53 with cabinets, 30 with MP, 2 with administration and 2 with political parties. These direct contacts include mailings and meetings (FRDO meetings not included)– There have been 24 contacts (18 meetings and 6 mailings) with individual MP or groups of MP of the different parliaments (regional and federal), and 6 meetings with MP in institutionalised fora (parliamentary commissions).– PWG had 24 encounters with all relevant ministers (climate and development cooperation), and 29 times contact via mail or personalised letters. Among these contacts, there was also contact with the prime minister.– PWG invested more in direct contacts with the relevant cabinets, but still maintains contact (in person, through mails or participation in meetings of the parliamentary climate commissions) with all the thematic leads of all political parties (except extremist parties).– All people interviewed confirmed having received information from PWG (6/8 administration, 10/22 members of the different parliaments, 8/15 members of cabinet and 2/4 staff at study services)

⁸² **Summary on output 8, indicator 1:** During the whole period under evaluation (2017-2021) the PWG has been able to have regular contacts with all thematic leads within all political parties, both at cabinets and in the different parliaments (except the extremist parties). Where the contacts with administration and members of parliament outnumbered the amount of contacts with cabinets during baseline and MTR, the frequency of engagement with all climate cabinets has increased substantially since the new governments were installed at regional (2019) and federal level (2020). Three of the four climate cabinets are Green cabinets, considered allies of the Climate Coalition. However, also frequent contacts could be established with the Flemish cabinet of Demir, who is not sharing the ambitions of the Climate Coalition. Where contact with the federal minister for climate till October 2020 (MR) appeared very difficult, the Climate Coalition has been able to establish good contact with the new federal climate minister (Ecolo). The entire programme period, the Climate Coalition has been informing all contacts on their positions regarding the different COPs, and at times provided advisory support to MP in developing their resolutions to that regard. In 2021, several initiatives have been taken by the PWG to inform their contacts on the memorandum. At several occasions during the period 2017-2021, the PWG was also consulted by different contacts in between the COPs, on specific topics. For the period October 2020-December 2021 the European Green deal and the “fit for 55”- programme, post Covid relance plans, and intra-Belgian climate governance were also discussed with the Climate Coalition.

Share of national policy makers that have been reached who assess the information received from PWG as relevant, timely, qualitative and usable and that perceive PWG as a legitimate and credible advocate for climate justice (outcome 3&4)

⁸³ *Relevance* - All political decision makers interviewed confirmed that information received from the Climate Coalition (PWG) was relevant for their work. As stated during the baseline and the MTR, members of parliament acknowledge that the PWG/Climate Coalition is well informed on climate policy issues, and bring specific topics to the attention that are less addressed by other lobbyist, such as international climate finance, loss and damage, the perspective of the Global South in the climate debate, just transition and climate governance. The interviewees laude the fact that the Climate Coalition brings together the views of many different organisations: this does not only save the interviewees a lot of time, it also the reason why the information by the Climate Coalition is seen as relevant and important. Many interviewees agreed that the Climate Coalition is an important agenda setter and recognise it has a large mobilising power.

⁸⁴ *Quality* - All interviewees agree that the information provided by the PWG/Climate Coalition is of high quality: information is perceived as correct and reliable, well-structured and presented, and understandable. The thematic expertise of the PWG/Climate Coalition is acknowledged. Some interviewees stated that the information provided by the Climate Coalition lacks the depth that they need in their work, but if this is the case, they usually reach out to a specific member of the Climate Coalition with more expertise on the topic. The Memorandum, that was published in March 2021, was seen as an important step towards professionalisation.

⁸⁵ *Usability* – All interviewees perceive the Climate Coalition as an important information source, next to other sources of information. Interviewees from the left side of the political spectrum confirmed that information was used to formulate their positions (for example, with regards to the interparliamentary resolution) and/or to prepare parliamentary questions. Information provided by



the Climate Coalition was seen as useful during these negotiations especially by politicians on the left side of the spectrum, as it provided them with some guidance on what topics to focus on.

⁸⁶ While appreciative of their work, interviewees from the right side of the spectrum stated that information provided by the Climate Coalition was less useful to them, mostly due to the fact that they have fundamentally different views. Most interviewees agree that the Climate Coalition sets the bar (too) high when it comes to climate ambition (especially with regards to international climate finance, their demands were seen as unrealistic), but the interviewees are still understanding of this position and do not see this as a large problem. Especially when it comes to timing, several interviewees saw room for improvement: the work of the Climate Coalition is seen as rather reactive instead of proactive. The interviewees therefore recommend to start the lobby process as early as possible, as it becomes increasingly difficult to change course when certain discussions have already progressed and (draft) texts are already on the table. Some of the interviewees also suggested to adjust statements and positions to different policy levels in order to make their information more relevant for a wider audience. For example, the Memorandum was not always perceived as very useful at the regional level. Furthermore, it was also suggested to make more use of good practices from other countries as a source of inspiration.

⁸⁷ *Contact* – All interviewees agreed that the PWG can be more pro-active in seeking personal contact, which they usually perceive as the most useful form of contact: personal contact does not only allow for a quick information transfer (they do not always find the time to read the mailings), it can also be easier to find each other when an urgent issue arises at a later stage once a personal relationship has been established. Interviewees, especially from the right side of the political spectrum, indicated to not always find time to attend activities organised by the Climate Coalition. The list of direct contacts shows that much of the contact the PWG had, revolved around the preparation of the interparliamentary resolution and the COP26 itself. The PWG had fourteen individual or group meetings during COP26 with a variety of politicians (from N-VA, Open Vld, to Vooruit, Groen/Ecolo and PS).

Baseline data on outcome 3&4

- All people interviewed, without distinction to political parties, find the information provided by CJP relevant, usable and of high quality.
- CJP is an important information source for all interviewees for formulating their positions:
 - Opposition parties: for questioning the positions taken by the ruling parties
 - Ruling parties: to know the position of the opposition as CJP is considered to be “leftist”
- Cabinets and administration: use the CJP information to strengthen their own positions (when deviating from the dominant discourse internally) and to enrich the debate
- All opposition parties and the majority of cabinets appreciate the ambitious character of the CJP positions as it calls for urgent action. One cabinet argues that the positions do not fully take into account the political sensitivity and room for manoeuvre as described by the government agreement.

All ruling parties agree with the principles of the analyses and positions but do not agree with the concrete and ambitious targets proposed (as assessed not being feasible)

<p>MTR data</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – All people interviewed, without distinction to political parties, find the information provided by CJP relevant, usable and of high quality. – PWG is an important information source for all interviewees for formulating their positions. – Cabinets and administration: not interviewed during MTE – All opposition parties appreciate the ambitious character of the positions of the climate coalition, and even think they can be more ambitious. It was recognised that the memorandum is a compromised text. – All ruling parties agree with the principles of the analyses and positions but do not agree with the concrete and ambitious targets proposed (as assessed not being feasible) and ask for more suggestions on the 'how', a roadmap towards just transition.
<p>Endline data</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – All people interviewed, without distinction to political parties, find the information provided by CJP relevant, usable and of high quality. – PWG is an important information source mostly so for the interviewees on the left side of the political spectrum. The information was used to formulate their positions with regards to the interparliamentary resolution and/or to prepare parliamentary questions. Information provided by the Climate Coalition was also seen by some in providing some guidance through the climate negotiations. – While most people interviewed thought the position of the Climate Coalition is not always realistic, they were understanding of this ambitious nature. – The usability of the provided information could increase by paying more attention to timing (becoming more proactive) and to translate/adjust the information to different policy levels.

Summary outcome 3&4: The Endline data confirm the findings that were described in the baseline and MTR. All policy makers interviewed assess the information received from PWG as relevant, qualitative and usable and perceive PWG as a legitimate and credible advocate for climate justice. During Endline, remarks were made regarding the timing of the L&A process.

Level of agenda-setting with regard to climate justice (outcome 3&4, indicator 2b)

⁸⁸ This chapter shows to what extent the positions of the Climate Coalition reached the policy agenda. The indicators for this outcome (agenda setting) are the *parliamentary questions* posed at the federal parliamentary Commission for Energy, Environment and Climate (meeting once or twice a month), the *discussions* at the Interparliamentary Climate Dialogue (meeting on average twice a year) and the proposed *resolutions* in the four Belgian parliaments. We only analysed topics that are in line with the positions of the Climate Coalition and concern Belgium's contributions to (international) climate policy before and at the climate summit in Glasgow.

⁸⁹ For the analysis of the *parliamentary questions* posed at the federal parliamentary Commission for Energy, Environment and Climate, the period between March 2021 (when the Climate Coalition released its Memorandum) and December 2021 (end of evaluation programme) was examined. In this period the commission gathered nineteen times. From the 487 parliamentary questions that have been raised during this period, 23 (or 5 %) were related to selected case studies for the impact study (see chapter 2). They are divided along different topics as shown in following table. A full list of questions is added in annex 4.



Table 7: Overview of number of questions raised for the study topics, the content (in shortened form) and the political groups that drafted the question or interpellation.

Topic (and # of questions)	Question	Party
COP26 / climate summit / Glasgow (6)	<p>In December 2020, emissions were already higher than the level in December 2019. How do you analyse the recent studies, five years after the Paris climate agreement and a few months before COP 26? What initiatives are being developed at the Belgian and European levels in preparation for this summit? What is the timeframe for determining the Belgian and European position?</p> <p>In November 2021, the COP 26 climate conference will take place. Like the other participants, the EU must again submit its climate targets for 2030 and 2050. What is our country's current position for COP 26?</p> <p>Where does Belgium stand in its preparations for COP26? What are the most important knots to be cut there? Is there already more clarity about the organization and who will be represented?</p> <p>The COP 26 climate summit is about to start in Glasgow. By Sept. 30, all ministers should have their proposals for reducing CO2 emissions on the table. Which government members have already delivered their proposals and what do they entail?</p> <p><i>Inclusivity of COP26:</i> The Climate Action Network questions whether the COP 26 in Glasgow will be sufficiently inclusive and therefore proposes a postponement of the climate summit. What is the minister's view?</p>	<p>MR</p> <p>PVDA-PTB</p> <p>Vooruit</p> <p>N-VA</p> <p>VB, PVDA-PTB</p>
Climate finance (3)	<p>Belgium committed to an annual contribution of €50 million, and that commitment expired on December 31, 2020. 50 million euros per year, in light of our country's responsibility and capacity, is not a fair contribution to the common international objective. Moreover, that amount does not grow and does not complement, contrary to what was agreed at the international level. Belgium must now announce a new contribution ahead of COP 26 in Glasgow. What is the state of national negotiations on climate finance? How much is the federal level prepared to contribute to that end?</p> <p>Asking for update on negotiations on climate finance (at the national level) and for explanation of strategy/intentions of federal level/minister in these negotiations.</p> <p>Is there any prospect of a new agreement on Belgium's contribution to international climate finance in view of COP26?</p>	<p>Groen-Ecolo</p> <p>VB, PVDA-PTB</p>
Burden sharing (5)	<p>The agreement was supposed to be concluded before COP 26 in November. What is the status of work to reach a cooperation agreement? Can an agreement be expected before COP 26?</p> <p>Timing to have an agreement before COP26 seems tight. What steps should lead to an agreement on burden sharing? When will talks between the four entities start on this?</p>	<p>MR</p> <p>N-VA</p>

	<p>The minister intends to reach an agreement with the Regions on the distribution of our climate efforts before the start of the climate summit. Will that succeed? Will we get a transparent overview of the ambitions?</p> <p>The minister stated earlier that the timing to reach an agreement before COP 26 is not obvious. Has she already received the negotiating proposals from the chairman of the National Climate Commission, Walloon Environment Minister Henry? Has a calendar already been set for the negotiations?</p> <p>The minister wants to be able to conclude an agreement around an intra-Belgian cooperation agreement before COP 26 in Glasgow. What is the status of Belgium's climate and energy targets? Does the new agreement fall back on the current one, which has expired? If not, what other topics should be the subject of an agreement?</p>	<p>PVDA-PTB</p> <p>N-VA</p> <p>VB</p>
IPCC report (3)	<p>The IPCC proposes five scenarios. In only two of them will global temperatures rise by no more than 1.5°C in the 21st century. Those scenarios take into account drastic reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The political response must be equally decisive. We have no other choice. What lessons does the government draw from this? What are the short-term implications for commitments made and actions taken? How will this report affect national preparations for COP 26?</p> <p>The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, already partially presented in August, is sounding the alarm bell for humanity, which is responsible for global, ocean and atmospheric warming. The effects are being felt faster than expected and the warming is also accelerating. What lessons does the government draw from that climate report? How is our preparation for the upcoming climate summit going? Does this report influence our preparation in any way?</p> <p>The IPCC has published its sixth assessment report Climate Change 2021. The projections made in it regarding the rise in air and ocean temperatures, the melting of glaciers and the extreme consequences are catastrophic. What is your take on the report? In November, COP 26 will take place in Glasgow. What will be the impact of the IPCC report on the ambitions we will defend there?</p>	<p>Ecolo-Groen</p> <p>Ecolo-Groen</p> <p>PS</p>
Fossil fuel subsidies (3)	<p>What is the status of the inventory of fossil fuel subsidies and the action plan to phase them out? What is the timeline?</p> <p>In a speech to the OECD, the minister indicated that all fossil fuel subsidies are being mapped. Has that exercise been completed in the meantime? Is the data publicly available? What are the main findings? What support is given to different types of fossil fuels? Will the minister prioritize phasing out support for fuels with the greatest climate impact? What time frame will be followed in doing so?</p> <p>The FPSs of Finance and Health prepared a report in implementation of a European regulation on governance and the National Energy and Climate Plan (NEKP). In a first step, it identifies existing direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies. According to the study, it involves €11.2 billion in direct subsidies and €2.1 billion in indirect subsidies for the year 2019. What will be the follow-up process? Can the minister comment on the action plan to phase out subsidies? What is the timeframe for this? In what sense will the social objectives of certain subsidies be taken into account?</p>	<p>VB</p> <p>N-VA</p> <p>VB</p>
Transparency of national climate commission (2)	<p>The minister's policy paper promises greater transparency and efficiency and stronger democratic control of the National Climate Commission (NCC).</p>	<p>N-VA</p>



	<p>However, the work of the governance working group does not appear to be really flowing. Have there been any consultations with the regional ministers on the reform? What form will it take? Will the 2002 cooperation agreement be effectively revised? Will the process within the working group be restarted? What other steps will the minister take and what is the timetable?</p> <p>Although the minister, according to her policy statement, wants to improve the transparency of the National Climate Commission, minutes of meetings are still not made public. On June 28, 2021, it was decided to discuss publishing documents on the site at the next meeting. What steps has the minister taken to improve transparency? Can we get more thorough records of NKC meetings instead of the current, very brief decision reports?</p>	VB
Loss and damage (0)	<i>Shortly mentioned in the above question of PVDA-PTB about Belgium's position on COP 26. Other than that, not mentioned.</i>	
Memorandum of Climate Coalition (1)	In what ways will the Climate Coalition memorandum be taken into account at the climate tables and the National Conference for a Just Transition?	PVDA-PTB

⁹⁰ The table shows that most questions concerned the preparations of COP26 (#6) followed by the agreement around burden sharing (#5). Those topics were raised by a variety of parties. Questions concerning climate finance came from both Groen-Ecolo, PVDA-PTB and Vlaams Belang. References to the new IPCC report (2021) were made by Ecolo-Groen and PS. On the other hand, questions about fossil fuel subsidies and the transparency of the national climate commission were solely posed by N-VA and Vlaams Belang. The topic of Loss and Damage was, with one minor exception, not mentioned at all. The Memorandum of the Climate Coalition was specifically mentioned once by PVDA-PTB.

⁹¹ Vlaams Belang posed most questions (#6), followed by PVDA-PTB (#5), N-VA (#5), Groen-Ecolo (#3), MR (#2), Vooruit and PS (both #1). Thus, questions with regards to COP26 and climate justice came from the whole political spectrum. The stances of the parties do not always become clear in the questions that were analysed: many questions were quite neutrally phrased, as parties were simply asking for clarifications.

⁹² Only a small portion (5%) of the total amount of questions refer to the topics of this evaluation. In the period from March 2021 until December 2021, there was significantly more debate around (the phasing out of) nuclear energy and (the construction of) gas-fired power plants. This debate was not analysed in this section, as it mainly concerns the national/regional level.

⁹³ Other recurring topics were off-shore wind energy, energy pricing (and social tariff), the Climate Court Case, deep sea mining, biofuels, emission trading systems, carbon taxes and decarbonisation of mobility. However, since these topics are not the main focus of this study, they were not analysed in the table above.

- ⁹⁴ While the above parliamentary questions posed in the Commission for Energy, Environment and Climate were often quite impartially phrased, the positions of different parties on the topics studied in this evaluation become more clear when reading the discussions in the Interparliamentary Climate Dialogue. Table 8 provides an overview of their most important contributions of the parties to the dialogue. In 2020 and 2021, the Interparliamentary Climate Dialogue gathered four times in total. All four were analysed for this evaluation. Nicolas Van Nuffel and Lien Vandamme presented the Climate Coalition's point of view in the meeting that took place on October 7, 2020.
- ⁹⁵ The topic of international climate finance was brought up relatively frequently (by PTB, CD&V, Groen-Ecolo, CdH and PS). While this was mostly in the form of a clarifying/informative question, PS insisted twice on increasing Belgium's contributions to international climate finance. Furthermore, the cooperation between the regions and/or reaching a new intra-Belgium agreement was also a reoccurring subject (SP, Ecolo, PTB, MR, DéFi and cdH): most parties asked for advice about how to pursue the negotiations. Sp.a (now Vooruit) and Ecolo also touched upon climate governance. Loss and Damage was not discussed at all.
- ⁹⁶ Ecolo-Groen, PVDA-PTB, PS - and to a lesser extent also MR, cdH and Vooruit - have all demanded more ambition or expressed their support for ambition when it comes to Belgium's contributions to (international) climate policy. PVDA-PTB was the only party to demand a 60% reduction of greenhouse gasses instead of 55%. MR had a specific focus on biodiversity loss in its statements. PVDA-PTB does differ from these parties in their unwillingness to remain working in the current political context: while most parties still aimed to work towards a compromise, PVDA-PTB abstained the resolution which was in their eyes far from ambitious enough.
- ⁹⁷ Both N-VA and Vlaams Belang regularly drew attention to the costs of the transition. N-VA mainly stressed that the transition should happen in the most cost-efficient manner possible, whereas Vlaams Belang expressed their fear that citizens will have to pay for the transition. Open Vld emphasized the role (their needs as well as their contributions) of the private sector in the transition. N-VA, Open VLD and Vlaams Belang all stated that the focus should be less on *formulating* (ambitious) targets, but to *realise* them and to stay realistic. In the end, Vlaams Belang was the only party to oppose the resolution.
- ⁹⁸ In the debrief of COP26, Open Vld, Ecolo, PS and MR expressed their disappointment about not reaching an agreement on burden sharing before COP26, while Vooruit said it was ashamed of Belgium's performance at the COP. More generally, Ecolo and MR expressed their disappointment about the results of the COP26. Both Open VLD and Vlaams Belang said they were surprised about the focus on gender at the COP, which in their view received a disproportionate amount of attention.



Table 8: Overview of contributions of different parties to the interparliamentary dialogue period October 2020 – December 2021

Date and theme	Most important takeaways
<p>07-10-20: Preparation of COP26 (which was postponed due to the COVID pandemic)³¹</p>	<p><i>The session starts with Mr. Wittoeck³² introducing the most important development with regards to COP26. Afterwards Nicolas Van Nuffel and Lien Vandamme (both representing the Climate Coalition) get the floor. They demand more ambition, highlight the importance of a just transition and international solidarity, they stress that it is expensive to not act upon the climate crisis, link covid crisis to climate crisis, elaborate on climate finance target of 500 million per year, and demand more transparency.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SP: asks about main reasons why Belgium does not want to pursue climate neutrality and wants to know how the Climate Coalition thinks they can contribute to better cooperation between different policy levels to achieve the stated goals • N-VA: points out that it is not difficult to formulate targets, but to <i>realise</i> them. Also asks about chance to prioritize cost efficiency in the transition within Europe. Wants a clarification about the numbers; whether the emission targets concern ETS or non-ETS, and whether the GHG emissions are compared to 2005 or 1990. • Ecolo: asks what is expected of politicians with regards to intra-Belgium burden sharing. Stresses that Belgium needs to increase its ambition and hand in its NDCs. Asks what it needed to finalise this and whether the target of -55% will be taken into account. Also wonders about institutional reform to increase transparency without slowing down the transition. Wants to know why the National Climate Commission did not discuss burden sharing yet. • PTB: points out that all parties in Wallonia parliament are worried about climate challenges and the declaration of Wallonia government mentions -55% GHG emissions by 2030. Expresses hope that other regions in Belgium will do the same. Also wants to know what the consequences are of postponing the climate summit, and asks about climate finance target of 500 million and intra-Belgian burden sharing agreement. • PS: asks whether the topic biodiversity can be discussed as well, especially keeping in mind the fight against possible future pandemics. Also wants to know Mr. Wittoeck's opinion about the 500 million climate finance target and where the money could come from. States that international climate finance should be central topic during COP26. • VB: wants more information about the timing of NEKP and the situation of the Just Transition Fund. • MR: wants to know what the consequences are of postponing the climate summit and stresses the importance of protecting biodiversity (in oceans in particular). Also has a question about best way to pursue intra-Belgian burden sharing agreement.

³¹ [SÉANCE PLÉNIÈRE \(dekamer.be\)](https://www.dekamer.be)

³² Head of Climate Change Department at Federal Public Service Health, Food Chain Safety. Head of the Belgian delegation of negotiators at climate summits

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SP.A: wants more information about combining economic revival and sustainable transition, wants to know whether studies were conducted around job losses in heavy industry due to the climate transition and stresses the importance of bringing stakeholders together in 'climate tables'. Also wants to know whether the studies around governance can be released. • CdH: asks whether previous targets were reached. Also stresses that the target of -55% for CdH is very important and wants to confirm if Flanders is the only region that still has to be convinced about this target. Wants more information about the 500 million climate finance target. • DéFi: lauds the higher ambitions of Green Deal, wants more information about intra-Belgian burden sharing and wants to know whether the nuclear phase-out was taken into account in the 2030 targets.
<p>12-10-21: Exchange of views with Frans Timmermans³³</p>	<p><i>Frans Timmermans gets the chance to explain the importance of reaching the target of -55% GHGs by 2030, as well as the importance of a just transition.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open VLD: asks about levers of the European Union to encourage other major countries and trading blocs to decrease GHGs, wants to know whether there enough attention for the support and motivation of SMEs, stresses that consumers have to change behaviour, and points to the efforts already done by big companies and the important role of innovation. Also states that the focus of the transition should be on <i>doing</i>, and not so much about setting <i>objectives</i>. • N-VA: stresses that the transition has to happen at lowest cost possible, points to the importance of working with a clear purpose and from 'the bottom up' (involving the regions more in decision making), and wants to know why there is not more focus on CCS. • Ecolo: supports a CO2 tax used to pay for a just transition, wants to know what the commission plans are regarding this, and asks about energy directive prohibiting kerosine taxes. • PS: asks about the application of the carbon adjustment mechanism at the border. • VB: stresses social concerns, wants to know whether there is a guarantee the transition will not cost too much for citizens (energy and living costs), wants to avoid the increase of a social divide, asks about the possible role of nuclear energy in the transition. • MR: expresses concern about biodiversity loss, and asks about the role Brussels can play regarding this. • Sp.a: states that the Green Deal is a strong agreement, wonders whether the focus on hydrogen comes too early as there is not enough renewable energy yet, asks opinion about introducing a carbon tax in Belgium, and wants to know about the costs of climate sceptic policy. • Groen: asks about mechanisms of the Commission to fine/sanction member states that are unable to meet the target. • PVDA: demands -60% GHGs instead of -55%, and stresses the importance of binding measures for the big polluters.
<p>23-06-21: Discussion with a view to a</p>	<p><i>The positions of different parties about the draft text are as follows:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • N-VA: It's a good start, but not perfect yet. Will prepare some amendments.

³³ [SÉANCE PLÉNIÈRE \(dekamer.be\)](https://www.dekamer.be)



<p>preparation of a joint resolution on the COP26³⁴</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Groen-Ecolo: The text should be more ambitious. It sounds too cautious. A reduction of 55% by 2030 is the minimum: this target should not only be 'noted', but binding. Also demanding more climate finance. • PS: We want more ambition. Significantly more climate finance (compared to last engagements). Also a part about gender, migration and food supply should be added. • VB: A target of 55% by 2030 seems unrealistic. It would be better to <i>realise</i> ambition instead of expressing it. We cannot vote in favour of the current text. • MR: Largely agree with the text. It is important to reach a consensus, as the climate challenge is large. • CD&V: Current text is a good foundation, with some room for improvement: some formulations can be stronger (not just 'noting' but 'supporting'). Important to distinguish between development money and climate finance. • PVDA-PTB: The IPCC report states that strong measures and a radical transformation is needed. This radical transformation cannot be found in the current text. Far from enough. Against international carbon market. • SP: Would like that the resolution also addresses the German community, not only the federal and regional governments.
<p>14-12-21: Debrief of COP26³⁵</p>	<p><i>The session starts with Mr. Wittoeck providing an overview of the main decisions taken at COP26</i></p> <p>Themes that were discussed in the debate afterwards:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disappointment about not reaching an agreement on burden sharing (Open VLD, Ecolo, PS, MR) • Disappointment about results of COP26 (Ecolo, MR) • Ashamed about performance of Belgium (Vooruit) • Goal of climate finance not reached (PS) • Questions about carbon market (Ecolo, Open Vld) • Disproportionate focus on gender equality (Open VLD, VB) • High Ambition Coalition: stressing that Belgium did sign it in European context (N-VA)

⁹⁹ The following table presents an overview of the politicians who posed the questions analysed above in the federal Commission for Energy, Environment and Climate as well as the politicians who took the floor in the Interparliamentary Climate Dialogue.

³⁴ [SÉANCE PLÉNIÈRE \(dekamer.be\)](https://www.dekamer.be/PLN/2021/12/14/141221001.htm)

³⁵ [SÉANCE PLÉNIÈRE \(dekamer.be\)](https://www.dekamer.be/PLN/2021/12/14/141221001.htm)

Table 9: Overview of politicians that formulated parliamentary questions period October 2020 – December 2021

	Politicians
Commission for Energy, Environment and Climate	<p>Christophe Bombled (MR): 2x Kurt Ravyts (VB): 6x Bert Wollants (N-VA): 4x Greet Daems (PVDA-PTB): 5x Kris Verduyckt (Vooruit): 1x Wouter Raskin (N-VA): 1x Séverine de Laveleye (Ecolo-Groen): 2x Kim Buyst (Ecolo-Groen): 1x Daniel Senesael (PS): 1x</p>
Interparliamentary Climate Dialogue	<p><u>07/10/20</u>: Karl-Heinz Lambertz (SP), Philippe Muyters (N-VA), Tristan Roberti (Ecolo), Antoine Hermant (PTB), Mélissa Hanus (PS), Andries Gryffroy (N-VA), Jean-Philippe Florent (Ecolo), Laurent Leonard (PS), Kurt Ravyts (VB), Aurélie Czekalski (MR), Kris Verduyckt (Sp.a), Christophe De Beukelaar (cdH), Marie Nagy (DéFi)</p> <p><u>12/10/20</u>: Philippe Muyters (N-VA), Karl-Heinz Lambertz (SP), Tristan Roberti (Ecolo), Antoine Hermant (PTB), Patrick Dewael (Open Vld), Andries Gryffroy (N-VA), Jean-Philippe Florent (Ecolo), Malik Ben Achour (PS), Kurt Ravyts (VB), Aurélie Czekalski (MR), Jos D'Haese (PVDA), Christian Leysen (Open Vld), Kris Verduyckt (Sp.a), Chris Steenwegen (Groen)</p> <p><u>23/06/21</u>: Philippe Muyters (N-VA), Andries Gryffroy (N-VA), Kim Buyst (Groen-Ecolo), Jean-Philippe Florent (Ecolo), Mélissa Hanus (PS), Leo Pieters (VB), Patrick Dewael (Open Vld), Kurt Ravyts (VB), Aurélie Czekalski (MR), Robrecht Bothuyne (CD&V), Thierry Warmoes (PVDA-PTB), Karl Heinz Lambertz (SP), Tristan Roberti (Ecolo)</p> <p><u>14/12/21</u>: Christian Leysen (Open Vld), Andries Gryffroy (N-VA), Antoine Hermant (PTB), Jean-Philippe Florent (Ecolo), Mélissa Hanus (PS), Aurélie Czekalski (MR), Robrecht Bothuyne (CD&V), Kris Verduyck (Sp.a)</p>

¹⁰⁰ Members of the Commission for Energy, Environment and Climate and the Interparliamentary Climate Dialogue are informed on the positions of the Climate Coalition through the mailings, during meetings and upon invitation (see Interparliamentary Climate Dialogue on 07/10/20). Of the MPs listed in the table, formal individual and/or group meetings have taken place with Greet Daems (PVDA-PTB), Kris Verduyck (Sp.a), Séverine de Laveleye (Ecolo-Groen), Jean-Philippe Florent (Ecolo), Chris Steenwegen (Groen), Mélissa Hanus (PS) and Christian Leysen (Open Vld). Moreover, during the COP26, several politicians were informally contacted by the Climate Coalition.

¹⁰¹ It was confirmed by several MPs who were interviewed, that they have used the information provided by the PWG in the development of their parliamentary questions and in their contributions to drafting the resolution (see next paragraphs for more information). It is not possible to analyse to what questions or comments the PWG directly has contributed.

¹⁰² In the run-up to COP26, on October 21, 2021, an interparliamentary resolution was adopted by all four parliaments in Belgium following the Interparliamentary Climate Dialogue of June 23, 2021. The text contains a wide range of recommendations, points of attention and proposals (43 in total)

regarding COP26 in Glasgow directed to the Belgian governments, the Belgian representative and the Belgian negotiators. The resolution received the support of most parties. Only PVDA/PTB abstained and Vlaams Belang opposed the resolution. The table below compares the content of the resolution to the Climate Coalition's memorandum as well as recommendations for COP26.

Table 10: Comparison of positions in the interparliamentary resolution and the positions of the PWG, with regard to COP26

Topic	Interparliamentary resolution	Climate Coalition's memorandum as well as recommendations for COP26
<i>Inclusiveness of negotiations</i>	Drawing attention to the importance of an <i>inclusive</i> international climate conference with full participation (especially of vulnerable countries).	Points out the issues around vaccination inequality and inclusivity of COP26. The UK presidency, Belgium and the European Union should actively advocate and work towards a suspension of patents on vaccines to enable global, affordable access.
<i>Degrees of global warming</i>	Reaffirm the goals and principles agreed upon at the Paris Climate Conference: the intention to limit global temperature increase to well below 2°C and to make efforts so that the temperature increase is limited to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.	Limit global warming to maximum 1.5 degrees.
<i>Fossil fuels</i>	Develop a policy of divestment of public resources from fossil emissions.	Make fossil fuels an agenda item at COP26 and work towards their progressive abolition of them. Develop a policy to divest public resources from fossil fuels. Abolish, in the short term and with appropriate flanking measures, fossil fuel subsidies.
<i>Greenhouse gas emissions</i>	Noting the guidelines of the European Council to reduce GHG emissions by at least 55% compared to compared to 1990. Regarding that, under the European climate and energy targets for 2030 for the non-ETS sectors, Belgium has a reduction target of 35 per cent by 2030 compared to 2005.	Decrease GHGs by 60% by 2030 compared to 1990. Through the new NEKP, Belgium must: significantly reduce annual greenhouse gas emissions to at least be in line with the European "Fit for 55" package.
<i>Intra-Belgian targets</i>	As soon as possible coming to an intra-Belgian agreement on burden sharing for the increased EU 2030 target, preferably even before the start of COP26.	Conclude a new cooperation agreement that will allow sharing the intra-Belgian climate targets and fulfil our European and international commitments for the period 2021-2030 <i>before</i> COP26.

<i>Gender/Migration</i>	<p>To ensure that resources for gender justice and women's rights are released.</p> <p>To recognize the growing problem of relocation under influence of climate change and to recognize that the climate crisis is not gender neutral.</p>	<p>Belgian governments should consider gender justice as one of the main pillars of climate justice.</p> <p>Recognise the growing problem of climate displacement and the urgent need to find solutions at the international, regional and national levels that respect human rights at all stages of displacement.</p>
<i>Loss and Damage</i>	<p>Sufficiently talk through the bottleneck of liability and compensation between developed and developing countries with other EU member states so that a sufficiently supported position is adopted. Although 'Loss and Damage' is a core component in the Paris Agreement, there is as yet within the UNFCCC no mechanism to fund measures for vulnerable countries experiencing loss and damage.</p>	<p>Recognise the need for additional funding for 'Loss and Damage'. Ensure the full operationalisation of the Santiago Network so that it can fulfil its mandate to provide vulnerable developing countries action and support, and make Loss and Damage a standing agenda item during climate negotiations.</p>
<i>Climate finance</i>	<p>Supporting the common objective of international climate finance (100 billion dollars) and showing climate ambition by further contributing and mobilising sufficient funds for (adaptation) projects in developing countries.</p> <p>Advocating for a balanced, appropriate contribution to international climate finance as was enshrined in the UN Climate Convention and to call on participating countries to call for correct contributions.</p> <p>Demonstrate international climate ambition themselves by contributing correctly to that international climate finance and development cooperation.</p>	<p>Announce a new, Belgian commitment to international climate finance; an incremental and equitable contribution in the form of a growth path to €500 million per year by 2023 at the latest.</p> <p>Acknowledge the financing gap at the international level and reaffirm the importance of meeting the annual target of USD 100 billion from now until 2025.</p>
<i>Climate governance</i>	<p>To take note of the fact that negotiators of the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament on 21 April 2021 reached a provisional political agreement on a European Climate Law and of the fact that on 24 June 2021 the European Climate Law had already been formally ratified by the European Parliament;</p>	<p>Belgium should adopt a special climate law as soon as possible, which would enable a national long-term vision with clear interim targets, and ensure a substantial improvement of Belgian climate governance.</p>

¹²⁵ Many of the topics mentioned in the Memorandum and COP26 recommendations by the Climate Coalition have found their way into the interparliamentary resolution (loss and damage, climate finance, gender, ...). Yet in watered-down form, both in terms of numbers as well as in phrasing. For example, the phrase 'to take note of' turns up multiple times in the resolution. While this way of phrasing does not promise any concrete or measurable commitments, it still does put a topic on the political agenda.

¹²⁶ In the resolution, 'the guidelines of the European Council to reduce GHG emissions by at least 55% compared to compared to 1990' are *noted* while the position of the Climate Coalition is to go beyond this target and 'decrease GHGs by 60% by 2030 compared to 1990'. With regards to reaching a



burden sharing agreement, the resolution mentions to ‘preferably even before the start of COP26’ come to an agreement, whereas the Climate Coalition sternly states to ‘reach it before COP26’.

- ¹²⁷ In the resolution, no concrete amount is mentioned when it comes to Belgium’s contribution to international climate finance – solely to ‘support the common objective of international climate finance’ – whereas the Climate Coalition recommends a concrete, annual contribution of €500 million by 2023. Moreover, the resolution does not mention anything about the adoption of a national climate law nor about measures to improve Belgian climate governance. It does ‘take note of’ the ongoing negotiations around a European Climate Law’.
- ¹²⁸ While the Climate Coalition states that the Belgian governments should consider gender justice as one of the main pillars of climate justice, the text in the resolution says ‘to recognize that the climate crisis is not gender neutral’. The phrasing regarding climate displacement is more similar: both texts mention to recognize the growing problem of dislocation due to climate change.
- ¹²⁹ Finally, the Climate Coalition recommends to ‘abolish, in the short term and with appropriate flanking measures, fossil fuel subsidies’ and to ‘develop a policy to divest public resources from fossil fuels.’ The resolution does not contain the word ‘fossil fuel’, but does mention to ‘develop a policy of divestment of public resources from fossil emissions.’
- ¹³⁰ The number of parliamentary questions analysed in the baseline study, midterm and endline differ quite significantly. Due to political and societal context factors, the number raised tremendously from the baseline to the midterm. In this study the number of questions analysed is again significantly less compared to the midterm evaluation: partly because of a shift in the debate around nuclear and gas, and partly because of the focus of the Climate Coalition on COP26.
- ¹³¹ While the PWG focus was on influencing the position of Belgium at the COP26, much of the debate in the Commission for Energy, Environment and Climate was dominated by (technical) discussions around the phasing out nuclear energy and possibly constructing new gas power plants. The Climate Coalition did not engage much in these discussions³⁶ and hence only a small portion of the questions raised were related to the case studies in this report (i.e. international climate policy at COP26): the scope of this analysis was thus narrower than the midterm evaluation. Moreover, due to the COVID-pandemic, much of the mobilising work by the climate movement had come to a halt and the COP in 2020 was postponed. The climate movement, including the Climate Coalition, seemed to have lost a fair amount of their momentum and motivation gained in the years before. Later in 2021, among other reasons, the floods in Wallonia, the Climate March and the COP in Glasgow redirected some of the public attention to the climate crisis again.

³⁶ This was confirmed in several interviews.

<p>Baseline data outcome 3&4, indicator 2b</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Positions of CJP with regard to carbon taxation, climate refugees, Belgian climate ambitions (emission reduction), burden sharing and Belgian contribution to international climate financing are put on the political agenda during discussions in parliament. – In principle, all Belgian parties support the Paris Agreement and agree with the principle that Belgium needs to develop an ambitious climate policy. Only the opposition parties have formulated a set of amendments³⁷ that refer to the CJP positions and insist in putting concrete targets in the inter-parliamentary resolution that will set the boundaries for developing the Belgian climate policy. – Mainly opposition parties are questioning the government on the Belgian climate policy (11 of the 14 parliamentary questions formulated by opposition parties)
<p>MTR data</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Positions of the Climate Coalition with regard to the ambition level in the NECP, the need to include human rights and gender in the NECP, the negative impact of biofuels, the Belgian contribution to the Green Climate Fund, regulations of the international carbon market are put on the political agenda during discussions in parliament. The Climate Coalition also contributed to the discussions in parliament on the Special Climate Act. – In principle all Belgian parties support the Paris Agreement and agree with the principle that Belgium needs to develop an ambitious climate policy. Not only the opposition parties but also Open VLD, CD&V and MR (part of the coalition at that time) have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the Climate Coalition and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP and to show more ambitions during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA and Vlaamse Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitious. – The inter-parliamentary resolution was adopted by November 15, 2019 and includes several of the positions of the PWG/Climate Coalition but does not refer to concrete ambitious targets
<p>Endline</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – From the 487 parliamentary questions, raised in the interparliamentary climate commission between March 2021 and December 2021, 23 (or 5 %) were related to selected case studies for the impact study. – Several positions of the Climate Coalition were put on the political agenda during discussions in parliament. This includes climate finance, the need to reach an agreement on burden sharing, fossil fuel subsidies, increased ambition at COP26, climate governance, gender, GHG reduction targets. Loss and Damage was much less present in the debate. – No parties openly opposed the climate science, but they did express different levels of concern with regards to the ambition of climate policy and the possible (economic) effects of climate policy. On the one hand, Groen-Ecolo, PVDA-PTB, PS consistently demand more ambition. Vlaams Belang, N-VA and Open Vld seemed opposed to setting (too ambitious) targets. In the end, the resolution was not supported by PVDA-PTB (for a lack of ambition) and by Vlaams Belang (for being too ambitious). – The inter-parliamentary resolution on COP26 was adopted by October 21, 2021 and includes several of the positions of the PWG/Climate Coalition.

Summary outcome 3&4: The baseline and MTR data are confirmed by the Endline evaluation. Positions of the Climate Coalition have been discussed in different parliaments. Similar tensions between political parties as documented in the baseline and MTR are still at stake. The long-term and consistent L&A of the Climate Coalition is paying off. There is an increase in number of positions of the Climate Coalition that are being referred to in the Inter-parliamentary resolution. However, in watered-down form, both in terms of numbers as well as in phrasing, a result of a compromise.

³⁷ Difficult to calculate the number of amendments. There are many drafts of the inter-parliamentary resolution, which is amended at several occasions. The evaluators do not have access to all amendments (only Groen/Ecolo) and can only track the discussion based on the minutes of the meetings of this commission.



While this way of phrasing does not promise any concrete or measurable commitments, it still does put a topic on the political agenda.

3.3 DATA AT OUTCOME AND IMPACT LEVEL – WITH REGARD TO POLICY RESULTS OF THE SELECTED CASES

- ¹³² Before presenting the data at outcome and impact level (policy change and analysis of the influence of the PWG) according to the indicators set-out in the evaluation framework, the results of the contribution analysis are presented that was applied on two cases related to results at the COP that constitute the backbone of the policy influencing work of October 2020 – December 2021 (and which provided the input for assessing the data of the evaluation framework).
- ¹³³ Cases were selected based on the result of the outcome harvesting exercise that was done with the two coordinators of the PWG. To be able to conduct a contribution analysis, cases must show some elements of policy change or a breakthrough in agenda setting or policy discourse with regard to the main subjects defended by the Climate Coalition. Such cases could not be identified during baseline.
- ¹³⁴ The cases analysed during the MTR (Belgian contribution to international climate finance; Belgian climate governance; NECP and the Belgian positions at COP 25) could not be further elaborated and validated during the Endline, as no other breakthroughs or changes could be identified and no new information could be obtained as topics were less prominent in the Belgian policy debates during COP26.
- During the period covered by the Endline, the Climate Coalition advocated for a further increase of the Belgian contribution to international climate finance (pledge of 100 million EUR/year obtained in 2019) towards 500 million EUR/year, which was not achieved. Linked to the debate on international climate financing, the topic of financing for Loss&Damage was put on the table during the last COP26, and will receive further priority at the COP 27 that will be organised in Egypt in November 2022. The case on Loss&Damage will be subject of the contribution analysis.
 - Discussions on Belgian Climate governance and the NECP remained limited and will be accelerated from 2022 onwards. The Climate Coalition has been invited for a hearing in the senate about climate governance and related state reform (Article 6 of the constitution) but not much has taken place since then. The NECP was finalized in December 2019 and needs to be updated by the end of 2022. This process has only started in 2022.
 - With regard to climate advocacy during the COPs, the PWG coordinators identified two specific outcomes obtained at the COP26. The coordinators pointed out to the fact that Belgium did not block the European Union to join the High Ambition Coalition and the fact that Belgium committed

to phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and signed the ‘Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy transition’. The latter has been selected as a case for the contribution analysis. The case on the High Ambition Coalition is worth mentioning, as Belgium (in particular the Flemish government) did not block the EU to sign. However, it is not a suitable case for contribution analysis as Belgium itself still is not a member of this High Ambition Coalition. The Climate Coalition had been lobbying different ministers, including the prime minister during the COP. A lot of time and energy was spent on this specific lobby. Several ministers, including the prime minister, confirmed that Belgium would join the High Ambition Coalition. However, eventually it appeared that the Flemish government only agreed for the EU joining the High Ambition Coalition. On the last day of the COP, the Climate Coalition and Youth for the Climate have put bags on their heads to show that they were ashamed of Belgium’s lack of ambition.

- ¹³⁵ During the COP, several declarations are to be signed by the member states. During the COP26, Belgium has signed 17 declarations and statements related to forestry, energy, transport, just transition, oceans, health,³⁸ which are a result of the technical negotiations of the Belgian delegations, supported at political level. Several interviewees mentioned that the different climate administrations in Belgium look for more ambitions and advocate for more transparent climate governance for which political will is often lacking.³⁹ These declarations are outside of the scope of the evaluation and mostly outside the scope of the L&A conducted by the PWG of the Climate Coalition.
- ¹³⁶ Contribution analysis was used as an overarching methodological framework, but specific steps were further elaborated with complementary methodologies. Process tracing was used for the assessment of the strength of evidence related to the causal claims (see annexes 7 and 8). The two in-depth case studies are, aside from document review and interviews with external stakeholders, informed by Narrative Assessment,⁴⁰ an approach specifically designed for the evaluation of lobby & advocacy programmes. Narrative Assessment takes the day-to-day experiences and strategic reflections of the advocates as an important source of information. This helps to reconstruct the complex story of change in the case studies as experienced by key stakeholders. These stories of change (or performance stories) are presented in this chapter, followed by the results of the contribution analysis to confirm or refute the claims made by the coordinators of the PWG.

³⁸ Forest Agriculture Commodities and Trade Dialogue, The Alliance for the Conversation of Rainforests, the Global Coal-To-Clean Power Transition Statement, Global Methane Pledge, Glasgow leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use, Global Forest Finance Pledge, Congo Basin joint Donor Statement, Statement on Public Support for Clean Energy Transition, Declaration on accelerating the transition to 100% zero emission cars and vans, Clydebank Declaration for Green Shipping Corridors, India/UK Green Grids Initiative, Support for the Conditions for a Just Transition internationally, Bleu leaders declaration, COP 26 Health Programme, Breakthrough Statements with regard to energy, transport, steel and hydrogen energy, Declaration on Zero Emission Shipping by 2050 and the Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones (source. [Klimaat.be/klimaatbeleid/Belgisch](https://klimaat.be/klimaatbeleid/Belgisch))

³⁹ Also confirmed during official launch event of the Climate Round Tables of September 21, 2022, a multi-stakeholder process for the update of the NECP.

⁴⁰ <https://hivos.org/news/narrative-assessment-bringing-out-the-story-of-your-advocacy/>



3.3.1. PERFORMANCE STORIES OF THE SELECTED CASES

Case 1: Belgium commits to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and signs the ‘Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition’

¹³⁷ Context: One key achievement of the COP26, which ran from October 31 until November 12, 2021 in Glasgow, was the commitment of the nearly 200 participating countries to the phasing out of fossil fuels subsidies. While fossil fuels has for a long time be a central topic to the climate debate, it was the first time that the issue was at the heart of discussions during a COP. Belgium is one of the signatories of the Glasgow Climate Pact, which stated under article 20:

“Calls upon Parties to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition;”⁴¹

¹³⁸ In the margins of the COP, the United Kingdom also presented a declaration ‘*Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition*’ on 4 November. This declaration formulates a commitment to a clean energy transition, by ending direct public funding for new fossil fuel projects abroad by the end of 2022.⁴² The declaration only focuses on ending financing of ‘unabated’ oil and gas projects and does not include projects that include carbon capture and sequestration technology.⁴³ The Statement was eventually signed by 34 governments and five public finance institutions. Countries and institutions like the US, Canada, Denmark and the European Investment Bank signed the pledge from the start. Towards the end of COP26, more countries followed and Belgium was among the last countries to sign the declaration.⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Contribution claim: The Climate Coalition has contributed to the fact that the Belgian government signed the Glasgow Pact as well as *the ‘Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition’*.

⁴¹ https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop26_auv_2f_cover_decision.pdf

⁴² <https://ukcop26.org/statement-on-international-public-support-for-the-clean-energy-transition/>

⁴³ <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/11/04/us-uk-pledge-end-overseas-oil-gas-financing-519573>

⁴⁴ <https://ukcop26.org/statement-on-international-public-support-for-the-clean-energy-transition/>

Performance story

- ¹⁴⁰ In **December 2018**, the EU adopted the regulation 2018/19991, which is also known as the ‘governance regulation’.⁴⁵ This regulation calls for Member States to develop National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) for the period 2021-2030. In these plans, member states should include ‘national objectives to phase out energy subsidies, in particular for fossil fuels.’⁴⁶
- ¹⁴¹ In **February 2019**, WWF wrote a report ‘Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Hidden impediments on Belgian climate objectives’. The study aimed to increase transparency on fossil fuel subsidies in Belgium, by providing a comprehensive, up to date fossil fuel inventory for Belgium. The report included recommendations for subsidy reform and lessons learnt from reform efforts elsewhere.⁴⁷ It is the first study to make an inventory of fossil fuel subsidies in Belgium.
- ¹⁴² The Belgian National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), which was approved in **December 2019**, is committed to ending financial investments and support to fossil fuels. The first draft of this plan, which was presented to the EU a year earlier, contained many shortcomings according to the European Commission. One change in the new version of December 2019, which also came about thanks to lobby work from the Climate Coalition,⁴⁸ is that Belgium now commits to develop an inventory of fossil fuel subsidies, followed by an action plan to phase out these subsidies step by step.⁴⁹

“België zal in samenwerking met andere lidstaten van de Europese Unie geleidelijk een einde maken aan de financiële investeringen in en de steun aan fossiele brandstoffen en maakt een inventaris op van alle fossiele brandstofsubsidies om te communiceren aan de Europese Commissie tegen eind 2020. België maakt een actieplan op tegen 2021 om de subsidies voor fossiele brandstoffen stap voor stap te laten uitdoven rekening houdend met onder meer het garanderen van de bevoorradingszekerheid van het land. Dit plan moet concrete stappen én sociale corrigerende maatregelen omvatten om de transitie naar een klimaatneutrale maatschappij te begeleiden.” (p.274)

- ¹⁴³ In **September 2020**, a new Coalition Agreement was signed by the Vivaldi Government. In this Agreement, there is some attention for the phasing out of investments in fossil fuels and for the need to develop a new fiscality in sync with the ecological transition.⁵⁰ However, the Agreement remains vague on the topic of fossil fuel subsidies or disinvestment of public resources in fossil fuels.

“De Federale Participatie- en Investeringsmaatschappij zal ermee worden belast een gecoördineerde, duurzame en ambitieuze investerings- en beleggingsstrategie uit te werken. Eén van de doelstellingen van die strategie zal erin bestaan geleidelijk minder te beleggen in fossiele energie en brandstoffen, naar het voorbeeld van de door de Europese Investeringsbank gemaakte keuzes. Tegen 2030 zullen de federale Staat en de instellingen die onder de

⁴⁵ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018R1999&from=EN>

⁴⁶ See p.30 of regulation (ibid).

⁴⁷ <https://wwf.be/sites/default/files/articles/files/WWF-Fossil-fuels-report-FINAL.pdf>

⁴⁸ The Climate Coalition has lobbied about the Belgian NECP. This case has been studied in the mid-term evaluation. The Coalition did not succeed in having a major influence on Belgium’s plan, except for a reference to an inventory for fossil fuel subsidies.

⁴⁹ <https://www.nationalenergyclimateplan.be/admin/storage/nekp/nekp-finaal-plan.pdf>

⁵⁰ “De Federale Participatie- en Investeringsmaatschappij zal ermee worden belast een gecoördineerde, duurzame en ambitieuze investerings- en beleggingsstrategie uit te werken. Eén van de doelstellingen van die strategie zal erin bestaan geleidelijk minder te beleggen in fossiele energie en brandstoffen, naar het voorbeeld van de door de Europese Investeringsbank gemaakte keuzes. Tegen 2030 zullen de federale Staat en de instellingen die onder de bevoegdheid ervan vallen, zich volledig hebben teruggetrokken uit bedrijven die intensief broeikasgas uitstoten en zich niet actief inzetten in de energietransitie.” (p.60) “De fiscaliteit zal worden bestudeerd om ze klimaat- en milieuvriendelijker te maken. We vertrekken vanuit het principe van de vervuiler betaalt, waarbij we het gebruik van fossiele brandstoffen zoveel mogelijk willen ontmoedigen door de invoering van een fiscaal sturend instrument.” (p.61)



bevoegdheid ervan vallen, zich volledig hebben teruggetrokken uit bedrijven die intensief broeikasgas uitstoten en zich niet actief inzetten in de energietransitie.” (p.60)

“De fiscaliteit zal worden bestudeerd om ze klimaat- en milieuvriendelijker te maken. We vertrekken vanuit het principe van de vervuiler betaalt, waarbij we het gebruik van fossiele brandstoffen zoveel mogelijk willen ontmoedigen door de invoering van een fiscaal sturend instrument.” (p.61)

¹⁴⁴ The Climate Coalition published in **March 2021** a ‘Memorandum voor een Belgische Green New Deal’. In this document, there are several mentions about fossil fuels:

- “Een financiering op maat van de uitdaging: investeringen die tegelijk sociaal, groen en duurzaam zijn en zo een geleidelijke en doorgesproken verschuiving van fossiele brandstoffen naar duurzame sectoren mogelijk maken, zodat iedereen toegang heeft tot betaalbare energie voor de basisbehoeften;” (p.4)
- “Ontwikkel een beleid tot desinvestering van publieke middelen uit fossiele en nucleaire brandstoffen en betrek daar ook de sectoren en procedés bij die structureel koolstof produceren of afhankelijk zijn van fossiele brandstoffen.” (p.15)
- “De afschaffing, op korte termijn en met de nodige flankerende maatregelen, van de subsidies voor fossiele brandstoffen. Deze middelen kunnen worden herbestemd om de bovengenoemde maatregelen te bevorderen (zie ook 3.3)” (p.18)

¹⁴⁵ The memorandum has been the basis of a lobby and advocacy campaign by the Climate Coalition. The document has been emailed to all climate ministers late March, presented during a virtual lunch with parliamentarians and presented to multiple cabinets (cabinet Khattabi and Maron in April 2021, cabinet Demir in May 2021, cabinet Henry in June 2021, cabinet Van Peteghem in September 2021).

¹⁴⁶ From **March 2021** onwards, the Climate Coalition also sent emails and organised meetings with parliamentarians to discuss an upcoming interparliamentary resolution about the COP26. The Climate Coalition tried to secure a minimum set of achievements in the final text. Especially on the Wallonian side, there was a strong wish to make the interparliamentary dialogue and resolution a success. The Climate Coalition provided input during preparatory meetings with leftwing parties in Wallonia (Ecolo, les Engagées, PTB). Eventually, a Wallonian resolution proposal was developed⁵¹, which was used as a starting point for the discussions during the interparliamentary dialogue. In this resolution, there is no mention of fossil fuels.

¹⁴⁷ In line with the Belgian NECP, the Federal Public Service on Finance developed a study in **May 2021** on ‘Federal Inventory of Fossil Fuel Subsidies’.⁵² The report was a response to the first requirement of the National Energy and Climate Plan related to fossil fuel subsidies, namely the identification of subsidies. The second requirement of the National Energy and Climate Plan related to fossil fuel subsidies

⁵¹ http://nautilus.parlement-wallon.be/Archives/2021_2022/RES/668_1.pdf

⁵² <https://climat.be/doc/ffs-2021-summary.pdf>

concerns the phasing-out of these subsidies. Like the report by WWF, the study shows the high number of subsidies.

¹⁴⁸ On **October 6, 2021**, the Environment Council of the European Council convened to discuss the COP26 Climate Summit. Due to the rotating system in Belgium, Philippe Henry (climate minister in Wallonia) participated for Belgium. The Council adopted Council conclusions that outlined the EU's position at the meeting, including the need for ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), need to scaling up international climate finance and the EU position about international carbon markets and emission reduction commitments.⁵³ However, there was no explicit mention of the need to phase out fossil fuels subsidies in this document.

¹⁴⁹ In **October 2021**, The Climate Coalition also published its recommendations about the COP26. These recommendations have been sent to climate ministers and parliamentarians mid-October 2021. In these recommendations, the following was written down about fossil fuels:

- "Maak van fossiele brandstoffen een agendapunt op de COP26 en werk toe naar de progressieve afschaffing ervan." (p.2)
- "De uitdaging omvat zowel (i) het op gang brengen van een toename in de middelen voor duurzame bestemmingen, als (ii) het laten opdrogen van de middelen voor de 'fossiele' economie. We roepen op tot nieuwe nationale engagementen en verdere internationale samenwerking, op verschillende fronten." (p.7)
- "Faseer subsidies voor fossiele brandstoffen (en productiewijzen, transportmodi, ...), zo snel mogelijk uit met de nodige sociale omkadering. Deze subsidies bedragen ook in België minstens 13 miljard per jaar. Voer een actieve publieke investeringspolitiek voor de ontwikkeling van groene alternatieven." (p.8)

¹⁵⁰ On **October 20, 2021**, the Climate Coalition organised a Klimaatmars #BackToTheClimate in Brussels. There were over 25 000 participants. The organisers stressed the need for a Belgian Green New Deal, including the need to stop subsidies for fossil fuels.⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ On **October 21, 2021**, the interparliamentary resolution about the COP26 gets adopted.⁵⁵ The Climate Coalition participated in the preceding interparliamentary dialogue to discuss its Memorandum (which includes references to fossil fuels). The eventually adopted non-binding resolution calls on all regional governments, the federal government and the Belgian representation in Glasgow to commit to developing a policy of desinvestment of public resources in fossil emissions during COP26.⁵⁶ The resolution was adopted by the plenary meeting and signed by the majority parties, as well as by the N-VA and DéFI, which are present in the Flemish and Brussels majorities respectively. The cdH voted in favour, Vlaams Belang voted against and the PVDA-PTB abstained.⁵⁷

¹⁵² The COP started about a week later (October 31-November 12). During the COP26, the UK launched on **November 4** a Statement on ending direct public funding for new fossil fuel projects abroad by the end of 2022. The Statement has been drafted in such way that it was embraced by many (for example, through its focus on subsidies abroad).

⁵³ <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12594-2021-INIT/en/pdf>

⁵⁴ <https://www.greenpeace.org/belgium/nl/story/24014/10-oktober-weer-samen-op-straat-voor-het-klimaat/>

⁵⁵ <https://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/55/2200/55K2200006.pdf>

⁵⁶ "een beleid van desinvestering van publieke middelen uit fossiele emissies te ontwikkelen;" (p.8)

⁵⁷ <https://www.rtbef.be/article/cop-26-la-chambre-approuve-a-son-tour-la-resolution-interfederale-climat-10865092>



- ¹⁵³ The Climate Coalition and some of its individual members had regular informal conversations with the Belgian Delegation (led by Peter Wittoeck), during which they discussed this Statement. Moreover, they had formal and informal meetings with a series of Belgian (climate) ministers (including De Croo, Vander Straeten, Demir, Kitir, Maron, Henry, Magnette, Bouchez). The Climate Coalition nudged Belgian decision-makers to participate in various initiatives at the COP, including the UK statement.
- ¹⁵⁴ Gradually, various other countries decided to sign the UK Statement during the conference (US, Canada, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands). This put pressure on countries like Belgium and France to also sign.⁵⁸ **Towards the end of the conference**, Belgium eventually decided to sign the UK Statement.
- ¹⁵⁵ Also at the end of the conference, on **November 13**, the overarching Glasgow Pact got signed by nearly 200 countries. This Pact included for the first time a reference to the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies. With three Belgian climate ministers present from Green parties (and only N-VA minister Demir absent), there was a lot of political will to sign. Moreover, given that most other European countries – many of whom were also led by Green ministers – decided to sign, Belgium felt compelled to sign in order not to become isolated at the EU level. At EU level, a 2019 regulation (cf. supra) and the Belgian NECP (cf. supra) already pushes member states to phase out fossil fuel subsidies.

Case 2: Wallonia commits to symbolic contribution to Loss and Damage

- ¹⁵⁶ Context: Loss and damage (L&D) is a term used in UN climate negotiations to indicate the consequences of climate change that go beyond the possibilities of climate adaptation or beyond the resources/capacity of a given country to adapt. It constitutes a third pillar alongside mitigation and adaptation.
- ¹⁵⁷ The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, which came into being in 2013 during the COP19 in Warsaw, seeks to address loss and damage in developing countries. The Paris Agreement of 2015 reaffirmed the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage as the main vehicle under the UNFCCC process to avert, minimize and address loss and damage stemming from climate change impact. During the COP25 in Madrid in 2019, the Santiago Network was created to further the work of the loss and damage mechanism, by connecting vulnerable developing countries with providers of technical assistance, knowledge and resources.
- ¹⁵⁸ However, channelling finance to the most vulnerable remains controversial, also within the EU. During COP26, when vulnerable developing countries called for more efforts on the topic, Wallonia decided to follow the lead of Scotland and earmarked one million euro for L&D.

⁵⁸ <https://www.e3g.org/news/coal-cop26-ending-international-public-fossil-finance-coal-done-oil-and-gas-began/>

¹⁵⁹ Contribution claim: The Climate Coalition has contributed to the fact that the Walloon government earmarked one million euro to Loss and Damage during COP26.

Performance story

¹⁶⁰ Loss and damage is one of the subtopics linked to the discussion about international climate financing. CNCD-11.11.11., one of the members of the political working group of the Climate Coalition, engages in lobby and advocacy on this topic since longtime. In **November 2013**, for example, CNCD wrote a study ‘Loss and damage: Providing assistance to climate victims’.⁵⁹

¹⁶¹ While Belgium has committed to increasing contribution to international climate financing in its coalition agreement of **September 2020**, there has not been a mention of Loss and Damage in this agreement.⁶⁰

¹⁶² In the lead-up to the COP26, the Climate Coalition insisted on the importance of funds for Loss and Damage. In the Memorandum, which was released in **March 2021** and which was shared and discussed with various parliamentarians and cabinets (cf. supra), the Climate Coalition writes:

“Erken de noodzaak van extra financiering voor schade en verlies, en maak werk van een omvattend en effectief mechanisme voor deze financiering, dat in geen geval afbreuk mag doen aan de middelen die zijn beloofd voor adaptatie en voor koolstofarme ontwikkeling van ontwikkelingslanden, door gebruik te maken van innovatieve financieringsbronnen zoals de inkomsten van taksen op financiële transacties, internationaal vliegverkeer en de ontginning van fossiele brandstoffen.” (p.6)

¹⁶³ In **June 2021**, the Bonn Climate Change Conference was held to prepare for COP26. The Bonn sessions hosted meetings of the technical groupings (under the UN Convention) that addressed issues as technology transfer, climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage, and implementation and compliance.⁶¹ Civil society organisations like CAN Europe, together with vulnerable countries, advocate around the topic of Loss and Damage during this conference.

¹⁶⁴ In **July 2021**, extreme floods caused human and material losses in Wallonia. In the aftermath of this tragedy, the discussion about Loss and Damage gained traction. Els Hertogen of 11.11.11. for example wrote various pieces, including in the newspaper De Morgen, linking the events in Wallonia to the international debate about Loss & Damage.⁶²

¹⁶⁵ In its recommendations for the COP26, which were shared with various policy makers (cf. supra) in **October 2021**, the Climate Coalition writes:

“Erken de nood aan additionele financiering voor ‘loss and damage’ die op geen enkele manier mag wege op de beloofde middelen voor aanpassing en koolstofarme ontwikkeling en richt in dat kader een sterke, betrouwbare en omvattende financieringsfaciliteit op onder het Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage. Zorg voor een volledige operationalisering van het Santiago Network zodat het zijn mandaat om kwetsbare

⁵⁹ <https://www.cncd.be/Loss-and-damage-Providing?lang=fr>

⁶⁰ https://www.belgium.be/sites/default/files/Regeerakkoord_2020.pdf

⁶¹ https://climate.ec.europa.eu/news-your-voice/news/road-cop-26-bonn-climate-change-conference-2021-06-18_en

⁶² <https://www.demorgen.be/meningen/wie-vergoedt-de-klimaat schade-in-de-rest-van-de-wereld~b51959d8/> and <https://www.mo.be/opinie/dat-de-klimaatcrisis-hier-en-nu-plaatsvindt-valt-niet-langer-te-ontkennen>



ontwikkelingslanden actie en steun te verlenen, kan vervullen, en maak van loss and damage een vast agenda-item tijdens de klimaatonderhandelingen.” (p.5)

“Werk proactief aan duidelijke afspraken over het proces om tot een nieuwe doelstelling te komen voor 2025, die moet bestaan uit specifieke sub-doelstellingen (bv. een sub-doelstelling over financiering voor adaptatie en een sub-doelstelling over publieke financiering). Neem ‘loss and damage’ op in de besprekingen over deze doelstelling, met nieuwe en additionele financieringsbronnen. Garandeer aan de hand van duidelijke definities van internationale klimaatfinanciering en strikte rapporteringsafspraken dat de doelstelling niet opnieuw wordt ondermijnd door overrapportering.” (p.7)

- ¹⁶⁶ On **October 6, 2021**, the Environment Council of the Council of the European Union convened to discuss the COP26 Climate Summit. Due to the rotating system in Belgium, Philippe Henry (climate minister in Wallonia) participated for Belgium.⁶³ The Council adopted Council Conclusions that outlined the EU’s position at the meeting, including the need to scaling up international climate finance.⁶⁴ On Loss and Damage, the following was written:

“(The Council looks forward to...) advancing work related to adaptation, including activities relevant to averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, including timely and full operationalisation of the Santiago Network;” (p.10)

- ¹⁶⁷ In the meantime, the Climate Coalition tried to influence an inter-parliamentary resolution about the COP26. In the resolution that was adopted in **October 2021**, Loss and Damage is mentioned, yet the signatories refer to the EU level to take a stance on this topic:

“32. het knelpunt van aansprakelijkheid en compensatie tussen ontwikkelde en ontwikkelingslanden voldoende door te spreken met andere lidstaten uit de EU, zodat een voldoende gedragen standpunt wordt ingenomen. Hoewel “loss and damage” een kernonderdeel is in het Akkoord van Parijs, is er binnen het UNFCCC nog geen mechanisme om maatregelen te financieren voor kwetsbare landen die verlies en schade ondervinden;”

- ¹⁶⁸ During **the opening week of COP26**, the first Minister of Schotland Nicola Sturgeon declared Schotland would be the first developed nation to pledge L&D finance (2 million pound, coming in part from the Scottish Government’s Climate Justice Fund). Schotland also called for global leaders to step up their efforts and deliver on climate finance.⁶⁵ The Climate Coalition linked the Wallonia’s Green climate minister to the Scottish delegation on this topic.

⁶³ http://nautilus.parlement-wallon.be/Archives/2020_2021/CRIC/cric199.pdf

⁶⁴ <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12594-2021-INIT/en/pdf>

⁶⁵ <https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-government-cop26-achieved/pages/15/>

- ¹⁶⁹ On **November 8**, the Alliance for Small Island States (AOSIS), who are increasingly and disproportionately impacted by climate change, continued to advocate for a financing facility to address Loss and Damage. They organised a high-level event together with the Government of Jamaica about the topic and shared a declaration during the World Leaders' Summit at COP26.⁶⁶
- ¹⁷⁰ The Climate Coalition held several discussions about climate finance during the COP26, including with cabinet Demir (6 November) and with minister Kitir (8 November). On **November 9**, the Climate Coalition also spoke with Philippe Henry, also about Loss and Damage. The fact that Henry is a minister from the Green party Ecolo, a party which deems climate financing very important,⁶⁷ contributes to the discussion.
- ¹⁷¹ On **November 14**, Philippe Henry pledged that the Wallonian government would earmark one million euros to Loss and Damage. He mentioned that implementation modalities will be coordinated between the Climate Ministers of Schotland and Wallonia.
- ¹⁷² Due to resistance from the US, European Union and some other rich nations, the Glasgow Climate Pact that was adopted on **November 14** does not include a reference to a dedicated Damages facility.⁶⁸

3.3.2. CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS

Case 1: Belgium commits to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and signs the 'Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition'

- ¹⁷³ Below follows a summary of the analysis of causal mechanisms, by distinguishing between project mechanisms, cooperating mechanisms and rival mechanisms. It looks into the collected evidence (see annex) to assess the *likelihood* that the mechanisms took place and the *contribution* each of the mechanisms may have had on the identified outcome (low, moderate or high).

Outcome: Belgium commits to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and signs the 'Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition' of the UK			
Contribution claim: The Climate Coalition has contributed to the fact that the Belgian government signed the Glasgow Pact as well as the 'Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition'.			
Type of causal mechanism	Identified mechanisms	Likelihood that mechanism took place (cf. evidence in annex)	Contribution to outcome Low, moderate, high (+/++/+++)
Project mechanisms	Direct communication (advocacy) based on Memorandum to inform and sensitise politicians	Certainly or very likely happened	Low (+) <i>While decision-makers are aware of the points of view of the Climate Coalition, there is no evidence that (the presentation of) the Memorandum has had an influence on the position of Belgian decision-makers about fossil fuels during COP26.</i>
	Direct communication (advocacy) around interparliamentary resolution to inform and sensitise politicians	Certainly or very likely happened	Low (+) <i>While the interparliamentary resolution has been adopted, its influence as a non-binding document is limited. The resolution principally focused on the issue of climate governance in Belgium, rather</i>

⁶⁶ <https://www.un.org/ohrlls/news/loss-and-damage-major-demand-island-nations-cop26> and <https://www.aosis.org/aosis-statement-at-cop26-world-leaders-summit/>

⁶⁷ <https://ecolo.be/actualites/sous-limpulsion-des-ecologistes-et-liberaux-la-chambre-donne-un-mandat-clair-au-gouvernement-federal-pour-doubler-le-financement-international-de-la-lutte-contre-le-dereglement-climatique/>

⁶⁸ <https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/climate-loss-damage-earns-recognition-little-action-cop26-deal-2021-11-13/>



			<i>than the need to disinvest public resources in fossil fuels (only one sentence).</i>
	Direct communication (advocacy) about COP26 recommendations to inform and sensitise politicians	Certainly or very likely happened	Low (+) <i>While decision-makers are aware of the points of view of the Climate Coalition, there is no evidence that the Recommendations have had an influence on the position of Belgian decision-makers about fossil fuels during COP26.</i>
	Climate March pushes politicians to be more ambitious	Somewhat likely	Low (+) <i>A number of decision-makers confirm that climate marches in general put pressure on politicians to be more ambitious. However, there is no evidence that the Climate March of October 2021 directly influenced the Belgian commitments about fossil fuels at COP26.</i>
	Direct communication (formal and informal lobby) during the COP26 to inform politicians and flagging the importance of the declaration	Somewhat likely	Moderate (++) <i>There is evidence that the Climate Coalition engaged in formal and informal meetings with key decision-makers and administration during COP26, also about the UK Statement. This makes it likely that the Coalition was one of the parties that put pressure on Belgium to sign it.</i>
Cooperating mechanisms	L&A done by WWF informs and sensitises politicians to take into account their positions	Somewhat likely	Low (+) <i>WWF has been the first organisation to draft an inventory of fossil fuel subsidies, putting the issue on the agenda. However, there is no evidence that this has directly influenced Belgian decision-makers during COP26.</i>
Rival mechanisms	The European Regulation of 2018 puts pressure on EU member states to phase out fossil fuel subsidies	Certainly or very likely happened	Moderate (++) <i>Belgium is required to phase out fossil fuels subsidies, as outlined in the binding EU regulation. It is therefore likely that its European commitments have played a role in the decision to sign the Glasgow Pact and the UK Statement.</i>
	Belgian NECP of December 2019 outlines that Belgium will phase out fossil fuels in upcoming years	Certainly or very likely happened	Moderate (++) <i>Belgium has already committed to phase out fossil fuels under its NECP that runs from 2021-2030. It is therefore likely that its European commitments have played a role in the decision to sign the Glasgow Pact and the UK Statement.</i>
	Belgian coalition agreement is in favour of greener fiscal policy and therefore puts pressure on decision-makers to phase out fossil fuel subsidies	Unlikely or did not happen	Low (+) <i>Given that the Coalition Agreement is vague on the topic of phasing out fossil fuels subsidies, it is unlikely that this mechanism has played a major role.</i>

Presence of Green climate Ministers (in Belgium and other EU member states) raises ambitions	Certainly or very likely happened	Moderate (++) <i>With three Belgian Green climate ministers present during COP26, while minister Demir was absent, it is likely that this increased the ambition to sign the Glasgow Pact and the Statement about fossil fuels.</i>
The UK formulated the Statement in a way that it convinced many to sign the declaration (focus on disinvestment abroad). There was inter-country competition (especially at EU level) to sign the declaration.	Somewhat likely	High (+++) <i>After the signature of countries like Germany, Netherlands and Spain, it is likely that Belgium felt compelled to also sign the UK Statement. Various interviews confirm that inter-country competition was a decisive mechanism.</i>
The Belgian delegation follows up on multiple initiatives at the COP and informs decision-makers about them	Somewhat likely	Low (+) <i>The Belgian delegation is not in a position to pressure decision-makers into making certain decisions about fossil fuels. However, they did play a role in informing decision makers.</i>

Contribution analysis:

The assessments shows that project and cooperating mechanisms ‘very’ or ‘somehow likely’ have taken place and have contributed to informing policy-makers on the positions of the Climate Coalition and the debates at stake during the COP. However, their contribution to the outcome was assessed as rather low. There is not much evidence that confirms that these interventions have had an influence on the position of the Belgian decision makers at the COP26 about fossil fuels. Several rival and context mechanisms seem to have played a more important role, as summarised here.

Project and cooperating mechanisms:

- (+) Direct communication before the COP26 (based on Memorandum/interparliamentary resolution/COP 26 recommendations) to inform and sensitise politicians
- (+) Climate March informs and sensitizes politicians and pushes them to be more ambitious
- (+) L&A done by WWF informs and sensitises politicians to take into account their positions
- (++) Direct communication during the COP26 to inform and sensitise politicians/administration

Rival and context mechanisms:

- (+) Belgian coalition agreement is in favour of greener fiscality and therefore puts pressure on decision-makers to phase out fossil fuel subsidies
- (+) The Belgian delegation follows up on multiple initiatives at the COP and informs decision-makers about them
- (++) The European Regulation of 2019 puts pressure on EU member states to phase out fossil fuel subsidies
- (++) Belgian NECP of December 2019 outlines that Belgium will phase out fossil fuels in upcoming years
- (++) Presence of Green climate Ministers (in Belgium and other EU member states) raises ambitions
- (+++) The UK formulated the Statement in a way that it convinced many to sign the declaration. There was inter-country competition (especially at EU level) to sign the declaration.

Conclusion

¹⁷⁴ The contribution by the Climate Coalition to the Belgian signature of the UK Statement and the Glasgow pact has been rather limited. While the Coalition’s contribution may have been necessary for Belgium to sign the UK Statement (less so for the Glasgow Pact), their contribution was not sufficient. The role or added value of the Climate Coalition in this case study has been mainly to pressure Belgium to raise its ambitions (in general, not just about fossil fuels).

¹⁷⁵ The Climate coalition successfully informed politicians and administration about its positions about fossil fuels, both via its Memorandum or COP26 recommendations, yet there is no evidence that this



pressured Belgium into signing the Glasgow Pact or the UK Statement about fossil fuels. Also its direct communication about the adopted inter-parliamentary resolution played a limited role.

¹⁷⁶ What may have been necessary, though, was the Climate Coalition’s role in informing Belgian decision-makers about various COP26 initiatives, including the UK Statement, and putting pressure on politicians to sign these. The informal engagement with the Belgian administration was also important in this regard.

¹⁷⁷ However, the most important contributing factors when assessing the package that has led to Belgium’s signature of the Pact and the UK Statement, are Belgium’s EU commitments and relations. A 2018 EU regulation and the Belgian NECP already oblige Belgium to phase out its fossil fuel subsidies before 2030. The fact that other EU member states also signed the UK Statement (which was formulated in a way that was not threatening) and the Glasgow Pact raised the stakes. It is therefore very likely that Belgium felt compelled to sign the Glasgow Pact and the UK Statement in order not to become isolated at the EU level. The fact that Green climate ministers took the lead at the COP (with Demir being at home) ensured that there was sufficient political will.

Case 2: Wallonia commits to symbolic contribution to Loss and Damage

¹⁷⁸ Below follows a summary of the analysis of causal mechanisms, by distinguishing between project mechanisms, cooperating mechanisms, rival and context mechanisms. It looks into the collected evidence (see annex) to assess the *likelihood* that the mechanisms took place and the *contribution* each of the mechanisms may have had on the identified outcome (low, moderate or high).

Outcome: Wallonia commits to symbolic contribution to Loss and Damage			
Contribution claim: The Climate Coalition has contributed to the fact that the Walloon government earmarked one million euro to Loss and Damage during COP26			
Type of causal mechanism	Identified mechanisms	Likelihood that mechanism took place (cf. evidence in annex)	Contribution to outcome Low, moderate, high (+/++/+++)
Project mechanisms	Direct communication (advocacy) about Memorandum to inform and sensitise politicians	Certainly or very likely happened	Moderate (++) <i>Various cabinet officials and politicians (in Wallonia and Flanders) confirm that the Climate Coalition has put the topic of Loss and Damage on the Belgian political agenda. It is likely that direct communication surrounding the Memorandum has contributed to this.</i>
	Direct communication (advocacy) around interparliamentary resolution to inform and sensitise politicians	Certainly or very likely happened	Low (+) <i>Given that the resolution barely touches upon Loss and Damage, it is unlikely that the resolution played a major role in the Walloon decision to contribute to L&D.</i>
	Direct communication (advocacy and formal and	Certainly or very likely happened	Moderate (++)

	informal lobby) about COP26 recommendations to inform and sensitise politicians		<i>Various cabinet officials and politicians (in Wallonia and Flanders) confirm that the Climate Coalition has put the topic of Loss and Damage on the Belgian political agenda. It is likely that direct communication surrounding the COP26 recommendations has contributed to this.</i>
	Climate March pushes them to be more ambitious	Somewhat likely	Low (+) <i>A number of decision-makers confirm that climate marches put pressure on politicians to be more ambitious. However, there is no evidence that the Climate March of October 2021 directly influenced the Walloon decision about L&D.</i>
	Direct communication (formal and informal lobby) during the COP26 to inform and sensitise politicians/administration	Certainly or very likely happened	Moderate (++) <i>There is some evidence that the meeting between the Climate Coalition and Minister Henry during the COP26 has helped him to make an informed decision about the Walloon pledge of one million for L&D.</i>
Cooperating mechanisms	L&A done by CNCD informs and sensitises politicians to take into account their positions	Certainly or very likely happened	Moderate (++) <i>There is evidence that CNCD provides the Walloon government and administration with concrete information about L&D. This continues to happen, also after COP26.</i>
	Indirect communication (press article) by 11.11.11. to inform and sensitise politicians	Somewhat likely	Low (+) <i>While climate financing in general and L&D more particular has been somehow covered in Flemish media, there is no evidence that this influenced Wallonia's decision during COP26.</i>
Rival mechanisms	Scotland commits to L&D at the start of COP26 with 2 million pound and attempts to convince other countries/regions to contribute	Certainly or very likely happened	High (+++) <i>There is evidence that Scotland took on a leadership role and had bilateral meetings with Henry, which helped convince the latter to contribute to L&D during COP26.</i>
	During the Bonn Climate Change Conference in June 2021, civil society organisations (like CAN Europe) draw attention to Loss and Damage	Somewhat likely	Moderate (++) <i>It is likely that civil society organisations like CAN Europe have contributed to continuously keeping the topic of L&D on the agenda, including during the preparatory Bonn climate negotiations.</i>
	Philippe Henry, green Climate Minister in Wallonia, participates in the European Council for Belgium in the Environment Council on the COP26, which has an influence on Belgium's position on Loss and Damage.	Unlikely or did not happen	Low (+) <i>While Henry participated for Belgium in the EU Council that prepared the EU position about the COP26, the EU is generally not in favour of L&D and the Council Conclusions are vague on the topic. It is therefore unlikely that Henry's position about L&D has been influenced by his participation in the EU Council.</i>
	The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) engage in L&A on the topic of a Loss and Damage facility.	Certainly or very likely happened	Moderate (++) <i>Given that the AOSIS played a key role in advocating for L&A during COP26, with statements and high-level meetings, it is likely that Henry picked up their demands in favour of L&D during COP26.</i>
Context mechanisms	Floods in Wallonia make it clear that Loss and	Certainly or very likely happened	Moderate (++)



	Damage is an issue, also within Belgium.	<i>With Wallonia having suffered from the devastating effects of the floods during the summer of 2021, it is likely that the topic of L&D gained more traction in the region, including for Henry.</i>
<p>Contribution analysis:</p> <p>The assessments shows that project and cooperating mechanisms ‘very’ or ‘somehow likely’ have taken place and have contributed to informing policy-makers on the positions of the Climate Coalition and the debates at stake during the COP. Their contribution to the outcome on Loss and Damage can be assessed as moderate, as various sources confirm that the Climate Coalition and its members have managed to put the topic of Loss and Damage on the political agenda (no longer a taboo subject). Several rival and context mechanisms also played an important role, as summarised here.</p> <p><u>Project and cooperating mechanisms:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (+) Direct communication around interparliamentary resolution to inform and sensitise politicians (+) Climate March informs and sensitizes politicians and pushes them to be more ambitious (+) Indirect communication (press article) by 11.11.11. to inform and sensitise politicians (++) Direct communication before the COP26 (based on Memorandum/COP 26 recommendations) to inform and sensitise politicians about L&D (++) Direct communication during the COP26 to inform and sensitise politicians/administration (++) L&A done by CNCD informs and sensitises politicians to take into account their positions <p><u>Rival and context mechanisms:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (+) Philippe Henry, green Climate Minister in Wallonia, participates in the European Council for Belgium in the Environment Council on the COP26, which has an influence on Belgium’s position on Loss and Damage. (++) During the Bonn Climate Change Conference in June 2021, civil society organisations (like CAN Europe) draw attention to Loss and Damage (++) The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) engage in L&A on the topic of a Loss and Damage facility. (++) Floods in Wallonia make it clear that Loss and Damage is an issue, also within Belgium. (+++) Scotland commits to L&D at the start of COP26 with 2 million pound and attempts to convince other countries/regions to contribute 		

Conclusion

¹⁷⁹ The contribution by the Climate Coalition to the decision of the Walloon government to commit to L&D has been necessary for the outcome to take place. The Climate Coalition principally took on the role of agenda setter of the topic of L&D. Thanks to coverage of the topic – via its Memorandum, COP26 recommendations, but also via the efforts of various members (especially CNCD/11.11.11 and 11.11.11.) – Belgian politicians in general have been made aware of the issue of L&D as a third pillar next to adaptation and mitigation. The Coalition’s direct contacts with Philippe Henry and his cabinet further helped convince the Walloon Minister to pledge (symbolic) money to L&D.

¹⁸⁰ Of course, the contribution by the Climate Coalition has not been sufficient in and of itself. The efforts of the Climate Coalition were part of a broader package that made Henry decide in favour of a L&D pledge on the side of Wallonia. Most important has been the leadership role taken up by Scotland and the efforts by the Scots to convince others to pledge money to L&D, including Wallonia. Bilateral meetings were frequent between both regions. Moreover, the active L&A by both the Alliance of Small

Island states and other civil society organisations (already in the lead-up to COP26) also helped to put the issue on the agenda and to signal its urgency. Finally, the fact that Wallonia itself has been hit by devastating floods during the summer of 2021 increased the understanding of the necessity of financing for Loss and Damage.

¹⁸¹ The contribution analysis also informs the assessment of the assumptions that were identified during inception phase for each part of the chain between interventions and impacts. Following table complements the data from the baseline and the MTR.



Table 11: Baseline, MTE and Endline data for identified assumptions

Assumptions as formulated in the inception report	Results of baseline data	Results of MTE	Results Endline
<p>There are spaces for dialogue between policy makers and the PWG on climate justice issues, and PWG manages to access those spaces.</p>	<p>Confirmed. Consultation of civil society is institutionalised (see multi-stakeholder dialogues) and there are ample formal and non-formal meetings with policy makers. Dialogue with opposition parties is more fluid compared to dialogue with some ruling parties.</p>	<p>Confirmed In most countries NGOs have no formal role in international negotiations.⁶⁹ In Belgium some of the members of the PWG are included in the formal delegation and have direct access to the negotiators.</p>	<p>Confirmed. The PWG manages to access policy makers and is invited for institutionalised meetings with policy makers to prepare for the COP meetings. PWG is included in the official Belgian delegation at the COP. Since the elections of 2019 three of the four climate cabinets are taken by Green parties, which are allies of the Climate Coalition. There has been much more contact with cabinets compared to the previous period.</p>
<p>The PWG is able to generate relevant (from a decision-maker perspective) policy input on its coordinated positions.</p>	<p>Confirmed. Positive assessment of the relevance, quality and usability of the CJP information. Positions are perceived as ambitious. Different opinions between opposition and ruling parties about feasibility of the CJP's positions.</p>	<p>Confirmed Comments made by some interviewees that they need more practical and feasible recommendations.</p>	<p>Confirmed. Positive assessment of the relevance, quality and usability of the PWG information. The memorandum (March 2021) describes a set of coordinated positions, a document that is very informative, well developed and sufficiently substantiated according to lobby targets interviewed. Several</p>

⁶⁹ Rietig, K. The Power of Strategy: environmental NGO influence in International Climate Negotiations. on file://C:/users/gebruiker/Downloads/22GlobalGovernance269.pdf

			interviewees repeat the need for more practical and feasible recommendations, while others think that it is the task of civil society to be ambitious and to focus more on general principles and positions.
PWG is correctly identifying and targeting influential policy makers.	<p>Partially confirmed. CJP is targeting all relevant and thematic experts within all political parties (except extremist parties) and has contacts with all relevant cabinets. Contact with the federal ministry for environment is more difficult.</p> <p>A comprehensive stakeholder analysis is lacking and no information is available on who are the opponents and allies within each political party and at cabinets. MTR and final evaluation need to provide more information on the appropriate mix of interventions to target policy makers.</p>	<p>Confirmed</p> <p>The PWG has had meetings also with political groups that are more critical towards the positions of the PWG (like CD&V, Open VLD ad MR) and had meetings with highly influential policy makers, such as the prime ministers, the ministers for climate the negotiators of the new government and the informateur.</p> <p>A comprehensive stakeholder analysis is lacking and no information is available on who are the opponents and allies within each political party and at cabinets</p>	<p>Confirmed⁷⁰</p> <p>The PWG has had more contacts with cabinets, at the centre of the power. The PWG also has had meetings with political groups that are more critical towards the positions of the PWG (like N-VA, CD&V, Open VLD ad MR) and had meetings with highly influential policy makers, such as the prime ministers, the different ministers for climate.</p> <p>A comprehensive stakeholder analysis is lacking and no information is available on who are the opponents and allies within each political party and at cabinets.</p>
Policy makers at the federal level can be influenced directly but also via their counterparts at the regional level.	Partially confirmed. In particular the inter-parliamentary climate commission provides a space where the different government levels meet, which justifies the fact that policy influencing is targeting all these levels. The interaction between the regional and federal governance levels needs to be further confirmed during MTR and final evaluation.	Partially confirmed. Policy makers meet each other at the inter-parliamentary climate commission, and lobbying the regional governments has resulted in the Brussels and Walloon regional government to take over several PWG positions in their new government agreements. However, in federal parliament these political groups (composing	Partially confirmed. The inter-parliamentary climate commission is an important forum where the different governments meet and engage in a dialogue on Climate policy. However, several interviewees state that this dialogue remains superficial and that although three of the four parliaments

⁷⁰ See contact tracing database of PWG coordinators added in annex 6



		the Brussels and Walloon regional governments) do not have a majority of votes and have not been able to convince the other political groups to share their positions.	aim for more ambitions, they were not able to convince the Flemish parliament to be equally ambitious.
PWG structure and governance allow PWG members to work together in ways that maximize their influence.	Confirmed. Via the contribution analysis more detailed information will become available.	Confirmed. See under chapter 4	Confirmed. See under chapter 4
PWG quickly recognizes changes in the political environment and adapts the strategy for greater impact.	Confirmed. CJP has good knowledge of the political environment and adapts its strategy accordingly. For example, with the installation of the inter-parliamentary climate commission it was decided to lobby a broader package of demands on behalf of the CJP platform, to have more influence (instead of all members lobbying for their own specific points of interest). This assumption needs to be reconfirmed during MTR and final evaluation.	Confirmed. The PWG is able to grasp political momentum and act accordingly. The decision to lobby for a broader package of demands on behalf of the Climate Coalition proved to be effective. Interviewees confirm the advantage of having one main interlocutor for Climate Justice Policy. For specific subjects, like climate act, the Climate Coalition collaborated with academic researchers.	Confirmed. Interviewees confirmed that the PWG have good knowledge of the political environment and a good L&A strategy, combining lobby, advocacy, action and advisory support. A critical comment was made regarding the timing of the lobby process, indicating that lobby could be more effective earlier in the process, for example during budget negotiations or the development of specific climate related policies.
Decision makers take informed decisions, based on the information provided by - among others – PWG.	Confirmed. CJP is an important information source for policy makers, both opposition and ruling parties but information is used in different ways by opposition and ruling parties.	Confirmed, but not all decision makers agree with the positions of the PWG.	Confirmed. The PWG is an important information source for MP and cabinets. Especially MP rely on expert information that comes from abroad. Cabinets make use a very specific expertise available within the PWG, like expertise on

			Loss&Damage and international climate finance.
A visible support base strengthens the legitimacy and leverage of the PWG interventions.	Not confirmed yet. Policy makers acknowledged the variety of the CJP composition as a strength and appreciate the fact that they have one counterpart within civil society to interact with. The interviewees did not provide confirmation explicitly on the importance of a visible support base of CJP but recognize CJP platform as a legitimate advocate for climate justice.	Confirmed. The PWG and the climate coalition are considered as legitimate and credible advocates for climate justice, mainly for their demonstrated expertise and knowledge and the fact that the coalition unites the civil society on the climate issue. Their support base became visible through the mass mobilisations (not only organised by the Climate Coalition) and the one-off actions organised by the Climate Coalition.	Confirmed. The PWG and the climate coalition are considered as legitimate and credible advocates for climate justice, mainly for their demonstrated expertise and knowledge and the fact that the coalition unites the civil society on the climate issue. Their support base became visible through the mass mobilisations and the one-off actions organised by the Climate Coalition. Moreover, many interviewees stated that the Climate Coalition also has a task in informing and sensitizing their respective support bases for the measures that need to be taken by all towards a just transition.
If the PWG's advocacy actions are more aligned with the mobilisation and campaign work on climate justice, thanks to the merger of the PWG and the climate coalition, the leverage and credibility of the PWG will increase.	Not confirmed yet. During baseline there were no large mobilisations and campaigns implemented.	Not confirmed. There is more alignment between the political work and the mobilisations, but interviewees seem not to be aware of this integration process. Mobilisations were conducive for keeping the climate topic on the political agenda but have not increased the leverage of credibility of the PWG.	Partially confirmed. There is more alignment between the political work and the mobilisation. Interviewees acknowledge that the Climate Coalition has a large support base that also can be mobilised, which enhances the legitimacy and credibility of the Climate Coalition. However, these mobilisations do not seem to be a leverage for policy change. They mainly keep the topic of climate change on the agenda.



3.3.3. CONCLUSIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE STORIES

- ¹⁸² **Contribution:** The contribution analysis shows that the contribution by the PWG in the two studied cases varies between low and moderate. Such score does not comment on the quality of policy influencing and effectiveness with respect to output levels. The score demonstrates the relative contribution of the Climate Coalition towards policy changes (outcome level). A contribution that is significant given the complex political context in which climate policy is being developed and the limited resources of the Climate Coalition. The PWG has particularly been important in the second case (L&D) and to a lesser extent in the first case (fossil fuels). Its principal added value lies in putting and keeping topics on the political agenda (agenda setting on fossil fuels and loss and damage). In both cases, the contribution by the PWG was part of a broader package of rival and context mechanisms that brought about the policy changes. Intra-European pressure and ‘competition’ played a significant role in both cases to realise the policy outcomes.
- ¹⁸³ **Effectiveness of L&A tactics:** The PWG used various tactics to influence policy makers: direct communication (via sharing of input, via group presentations or via one-on-one meetings), indirect communication (generating media attention) and mobilisation (climate marches). What has been most effective in the two case studies has been the direct communication, whether formal or informal, with policy makers. This aligns with the broadly shared feeling among interviewees that direct personal contact, based on clearly defined input, works best to influence policy makers.
- ¹⁸⁴ **Assumptions:** The endline evaluation shows that most of the assumptions that underpin the ToC have been confirmed (cf. supra). During the MTR, the evaluators identified a number of new assumptions, which were strongly based on the policy theories as identified by Stachowiak (2013).⁷¹ In what follows, the evaluators take a closer look at these assumptions, in order to see whether or not they hold during the endline evaluation. It distinguishes between assumptions linked to global theories on how policy change takes place (window of opportunity; role of power elites; coalition theory) and assumptions linked to advocacy tactics (messaging and frameworks; diffusion theory).

⁷¹ Stachowiak, S. (2013) Pathways for Change: 10 Theories to inform Advocacy and policy Change efforts. Retrieved from https://www.orsimpact.com/DirectoryAttachments/132018_13248_359_Center_Pathways_FINAL.pdf

New assumption	Results MTE	Results Endline
Assumptions linked to global theories about policy change		
<p>Policy window or agenda setting theory (Kingdon): Policy can change during a window of opportunity, when advocates manage to connect two or more components of the policy process</p>	<p><i>Confirmed</i> – In both cases, a policy window, an opportunity was properly grasped by the PWG (profiling of prime minister at the New York Climate summit, and the initiative of Costa Rica at the COP to create an Article 6 coalition and the presence of the Brussels minister for climate). The cases show that policy change can happen during a window of opportunity when advocates can successfully connect two or more components of the policy process, in these cases the way the problem was defined, the policy solution to the problem and the political climate of that issues.</p>	<p><i>Confirmed</i> – As both cases took place within the COP26, it is clear that the PWG seized this opportunity – which generates global attention for climate change – to push forward policy change on fossil fuels and L&D. Especially in the case of L&D, the PWG and other actors (civil society, AOSIS...) managed to connect the problem of disproportionate losses and damages in the Global South to the solution of a L&D facility, by influencing the political climate via media advocacy, coalition building, climate marches...</p>
<p>Role of power elites (Mill): Policy change takes place by working directly with those who are in power and can make decisions (elites)</p>	<p><i>Confirmed</i> – The cases also give prove of the power elites theory. Policy change is made by working directly with those with power. In both cases, the PWG had lobbied formally and informally the former prime minister (case 1) and the current Brussels minister for climate (case 4).</p>	<p><i>Confirmed</i> – Both cases confirm the role of power elites. The PWG has directly cooperated with those in power, including ministers, cabinet officials and administration. Both cases show a close cooperation with the Belgian delegation at the COP26 and the relations with Henry were crucial in the L&D case.</p>
<p>Having allies in power or coalition theory (Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith): Policy changes through coordinated action by a set of individuals/organisations with the same policy beliefs (importance of problem, causes of problem, solutions to problem)</p>	<p><i>Partially confirmed</i> – It is clear that, within the parliament, there are several political groups that share the same beliefs, opinion and positions taken by the PWG, the so-called allies or friends. More is possible with regard to climate policy since like-minded political groups have joined the federal and regional governments. However, many climate policy issues are complicated, comprising several aspects. Allies may agree on some positions but may still differ over other positions. In the cases 1 and 4, topics were at stake that were less controversial, the so-called social dimensions or ‘softer’ dimensions of the climate debate, that are impacting less on our daily lives. In the two other cases (case 3 and 4) also more technical topics were at stake or positions needed to be taken that directly impact our lives, showing more disagreement within and between political groups.</p>	<p><i>Partially confirmed</i> – Both cases show that the presence of Green Ministers, who have gained power since the 2019 elections, have played a role in facilitating policy change. Interviews show that most politicians in the Green Party share the same views as the PWG about the importance, the causes and the solutions of the problem. However, while the PWG has cooperated with and tried to influence these Green politicians, interviews show that the latter sometimes struggled with the feedback from the Coalition. The fact that Belgium was shamed at the COP26 by the Climate Coalition (even though it was mainly the Flemish government that blocked change and not the federal one), has not been appreciated among Green politicians at federal level. Similarly, the fact that the Climate Coalition was not fully happy with the inter-parliamentary resolution, despite them having agreed upon certain red lines with Green allies, which were</p>



		eventually adopted, was also uncomfortable for Green allies in the parliament.
--	--	--

Assumptions linked to advocacy tactics		
<p>Messaging and Frameworks or Prospect theory (Tversky & Khaneman): Adapting the narrative and message according to the lobby targets</p>	<p><i>Not confirmed</i> – The memorandum and positions of the PWG mainly refer to general ambitions and positions but are not accompanied with roadmaps or clear solutions on how to reach these objectives. Several interviewees pointed out that they were lacking such suggestions. One can also reflect on the narrative that is disseminated by Climate Coalition. The narrative uses a language that is recognised by the group of politicians and the general public that share the same opinion but is less convincing for parties that are not fully aligned with the positions of the PWG. The narrative is based on general principles and general long-term objectives, but does not explain the reasons behind the disagreements in the political debate. As such it creates less opportunities to enter into a debate with different groups in society. Research of Katharina Rietig also confirmed the need to differentiate the messages between aligned objectives (friends) and not-aligned objectives (foes) in order to change the governments’ positions.⁷²</p>	<p><i>Not confirmed</i> – Interviewees share that the Coalition does not differentiate its input (Memorandum, COP26 recommendations...) based on the target audience. There is no difference between Belgian vs. European-level policy makers, regional vs. federal politicians, left-wing vs. right-wing, majority vs. opposition. This makes it less likely for politicians to read the full documents, as they often lack time to go through lengthy documents. Moreover, as outlined during the MTR, the narrative and framing of the message is also not adapted according to the target audience, which makes it less likely to convince ‘foes’ (those not aligned with the Climate Coalition).</p>
<p>Diffusion Theory of Change (Roger): The process by which a change agent (e.g., individual,</p>	<p><i>Not assessed during the MTR. Added during Endline</i></p>	<p><i>Confirmed</i> – Once a taboo subject in Belgium, according to a couple of interviewees from the administration, the Climate Coalition managed to help disseminate and mainstream the idea of ‘loss and damage’, as a third</p>

⁷² Rietig, K. (2016). The power of strategy: environmental NGO influence in international climate negotiations. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 22(2), 269-288.

informal group, or organization) models or communicates an innovation

pillar next to adaptation and mitigation. The fact that minister Henry decided to pledge funding for L&D during COP26 shows that L&D is no longer a fringe topic, but has become a central discussion. The upcoming COP27 will also revolve around the subject.⁷³

⁷³ <https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop27-why-is-addressing-loss-and-damage-crucial-for-climate-justice/>



3.4 SUMMARY OF DATA ON OUTCOME AND IMPACT LEVEL (OUTCOME 4 AND IMPACT 2 AND 3)

Discursive change with regard to climate policy (impact 1, indicator 3)

- ¹⁸⁵ As described in the MTR report, the climate crisis has become more visible (e.g. more drought, rains, cold, floods in Wallonia) and there are less climate change deniers. The equation is currently rather between climate realist and the ambitious group. All political decision makers understand the urgency for ambitious climate policy but differ in opinion regarding the need for concrete targets and measures to be taken and as such differ in opinion regarding the commitments that need to be taken towards emission reduction and decarbonisation. On soft issues, such as the impact of climate on gender, the existence of climate refugees and the importance of international climate finance there is less disagreement.
- ¹⁸⁶ Till the end of 2018, ruling parties adopted a climate conservative approach whereas opposition parties pushed for concrete and ambitious targets that are in line with PWG positions. The new federal government that was installed in October 2020 shows more commitment in its government agreement for climate policy. Three relevant ministers that are responsible for climate related policy domains within the federal government belong to the Green parties. At regional level, the Walloon and Brussels governments and parliaments (dominated by socialist and Green parties) have formulated climate policies with concrete and ambitious targets.
- ¹⁸⁷ Although several targets as proposed by the PWG have not been adopted as formal Belgian position, there is an evolution in the political debate. For example, the NECP already indicates that the emission reduction should be higher than -40% by 2030. A revision of the NECP is foreseen in 2022.
- ¹⁸⁸ Not only the socialist and Green parties but also CD&V and MR have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the PWG and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP and to show more ambition during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA, Open VLD and Vlaams Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitions and as such are blocking the participation of Belgium in the High Ambition Coalition at the COP.

Baseline data:

- There are no base-line data on policy discourse on the Belgian climate policy of the main thematic experts in the different political parties, as this is currently not being tracked systematically by CJP coordinators.
- With regard to the European negotiations, under the current government, Belgium has lost its position of a constructive and progressive ally on climate policy topics.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Under pressure of N-VA, Belgium is not lobbying for ambitious concrete targets with regard to emission reduction, stating that the lower targets are already not being achieved.
<p>MTE data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – All political decision makers understand the urgency for ambitious climate policy but differ in opinion regarding the need for concrete targets and commitments with regard to emission reduction and international climate finance. – Not only the opposition parties but also Open VLD, CD&V and MR (part of the coalition till October 2020) have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the PWG and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP and to show more ambition during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA and Vlaamse Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitious. – Till the end of 2018, ruling parties adopted a climate conservative approach whereas opposition parties pushed for concrete and ambitious targets that are in line with PWG positions. The new federal government that was installed in October 2020 shows more commitment in its government agreement for climate policy. Three relevant ministers that are responsible for climate relate policy domains within the federal government belong to the green parties.
<p>Endline data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – There is a growing sense of urgency with regard to climate policy, also within the cabinet of N-VA. Result of the Climate Marches but also the drought and floods of the recent years. – Not only the socialist and Green parties but also CD&V and MR have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the PWG and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP and to show more ambition during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA, Open VLD and Vlaams Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitions and as such are blocking the participation of Belgium in the High Ambition Coalition at the COP. – Discussion on phasing out fossil fuels is sensitive when it relates to intra-Belgium measures (e.g. the topic of salary cars). The focus was moved towards disinvestment in fossil fuel by export agencies like Credendo.

Belgian policy in favour of climate justice (impact 3, indicator 4)

¹⁸⁹ *Procedural change* – The PWG has already since long advocated to increase transparency of the policy making process with regard to climate policy. Mainly the lack of transparency of the National Climate Commission is criticized. The lack of transparency was also criticised by several MP when discussing the development of the NECP (see MTR report) and raised again during the discussion in the inter-parliamentary commission in 2021. Climate governance is perceived by many stakeholders (including political decision makers) as problematic. PWG has formulated several proposals, among them the need for a Special Climate Act, the need for the installation of an independent climate expert panel and independent audits of the work of the National Climate Commission. The only progress achieved is the fact that Article 7bis of the constitution was accepted to be open for revision during the new government period (2020 onwards), which can create the modalities to vote for a Special Climate Act. The relevance of such a Special Climate Act is accepted by all political parties, except N-VA. Discussions on the content of the Act prove to be challenging. Debates on climate governance and the Climate Act will accelerate from 2022 onwards. In the period 2020-2021, managing the Covid pandemic received priority.

Policy change – policy change achieved is summarised in table 10 at the start of this section and described in the cases presented in chapter 3. Following table, presents an overview of the evolution in the Belgian climate policy development process, compared to the baseline situation and MTR.



Table 12: Description of the state of affairs regarding climate policy development processes

Policy development processes	State of affairs mid 2018⁷⁴	State of affairs October 2020	State of affairs December 2021
The effort sharing regulation between the regions of Belgium	The effort sharing regulation horizon 2030 between the regions has not started. There are no indications for an increased Belgian and European ambition.	Discussions on the effort sharing regulations have started at the National Climate Commission.	Effort sharing regulations could not be agreed upon prior to COP26.
The inter-parliamentary climate resolution	The draft resolution was being discussed at the moment of the baseline. CJP positions with regard to emission reduction targets and international climate finance (without targets) will only be dealt with as minority amendments. The draft of June 2018 does not reflect any of the CJP ambitions and refers only to some principles of the urgency of a need for an ambitious climate policy.	The inter-parliamentary resolution was voted on 15 November 2018. 13 of the 24 PWG positions have been being discussed of which 7 have been adopted. ⁷⁵ No reference to concrete ambitious targets as proposed by the PWG (e.g. -55% emission reduction by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2050, phasing out of biofuels). Further, the resolution is rather vague with regard to the intra-Belgian governance and strategies towards a just transition to a carbon free society. With regard to the emission reduction target for 2030. A compromise seems to have been reached as reference is made to an emission reduction target that should be	A new inter-parliamentary resolution was voted on October 21, 2021. Many of the topics mentioned in the Memorandum and COP26 recommendations by the Climate Coalition have found their way into the interparliamentary resolution. Yet in watered-down form, both in terms of numbers as well as in phrasing.

⁷⁴ Based on CJP (Februari 2018) beleidscontext Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid. And CJP (s.d.) Analyse van de klimaatop in Bonn (COP23) Aanbevelingen voor 2018. And minutes from the inter-parliamentary climate commission. And Interviews conducted during baseline study.

⁷⁵ From the initial set of 24 demands 7 have been adopted: the need for a Climate Act, Reform of company-car system, border tax system, recognition of climate refugees, biodiversity, carbon tax, enhance transparency in decision making of national climate commission. Other demands of PWG also have been adopted that refer to the need to support for vulnerable countries, climate change impacting on gender and women rights, right of indigenous people, loss and damages regulations, contribution to international climate financing (but only up to 50 million EUR/year)

		higher than -40% and in line with the European ambition. ⁷⁶	
The National Energy and Climate Plan 2030	Policy development process is ongoing and guided by the NCC. No drafts are available yet. From the interviews, it appears that there is a lack of political will to develop a national policy with clear ambitious targets.	A NECP was finalised by December 2019 but judged by the European Commission as not sufficiently ambitious. Critique of the Climate Coalition is the following: (i) lack of ambition by 2030, (ii) lack of shared long term vision, (iii) no balanced decision of commitments to reduce emissions between ETS sectors on the one hand and citizens and SME on the other hand, (iv) lack of concrete measures to realise the ambitions set towards a just transition, (v) an unacceptable focus on biofuels, (vi) lack of planning, budget and modalities to realise a just transition and no attention for the impact of the global South, (vii) the NECP is not an integrated plan but a compilation of the separate regional and federal climate policies. The new federal government, installed in October 2020, fully aligns with the European ambitions of the Green deal, which is in line with the demands of the PWG, and which means that the NECP needs to be adapted to these new goals. The federal government engaged to make the necessary adaptations through an 'action plan'.	The NECP will be updated in 2022.
The Belgian position in the international negotiations	The COP24 In Katowice is the next milestone (end 2018) Belgium has not shown yet commitment to take an ambitious position in the international negotiations.	<i>COP24 Katowice (December 2018):</i> Belgium did not join the High Ambition Coalition, blocked by the position of the Flemish government. No ambition shown with regard to the Belgian contribution to international climate finance.	<i>COP 26 Glasgow (November 2021)</i> Belgium did not join the High Ambition Coalition, blocked by the position of the Flemish government but accepted the EU to do so.

⁷⁶ Voorstel van resolutie betreffende het Vlaamse en nationale klimaatbeleid van Robrecht Bothuyne, Andries Gryffroy, Willem-Fredeik Schilts, Bruno Tobback en Johan Danen. Voorstel van 24 oktober 2018 en goedgekeurd op 15 november 2018.



	<p>Room for manoeuvre for the negotiators is guided by the inter-parliamentary resolution.</p> <p>Indications that the Belgian delegation will ask for a clear Paris Rulebook, which includes agreements on all necessary issues, such as on the definition and reporting on climate finance (as defended by Belgian at COP23 in Bonn). But discussions ongoing at federal and regional level about the definition of climate finance.</p> <p>The permanent representation of Belgium towards the EU abstained during the voting (June 2018) in the European council, of the European climate agreement between the European council, the commission and the European parliament, not wanting a commitment to increase emission reduction up to -40% by 2030.</p>	<p>The Paris Rulebook⁷⁷ was adopted but remains vague on several topics. No agreement obtained on how to regulate the international carbon market. Belgium, together with 52 countries, signed the declaration towards just transition but this is not yet included in the Paris Rulebook or other mechanisms to implement the Paris Agreement. In the margin of the COP, Belgium signed a declaration on gender and climate refugees.</p> <p><i>COP25 Madrid (December 2019):</i></p> <p>Belgium not joining the High Ambition Coalition. The European Green Deal presented at the COP, showing commitment to an emission reduction of -55% by 2030 and to become carbon neutral by 2050. Belgium does not support this ambition.⁷⁸ Belgium joining the Article 6 coalition, a group headed by Costa Rica that plea for strong rules for the introduction of global carbon markets. Belgium (federal) confirmed a pledge to the GCF of 100 million EUR/year.</p>	<p>Belgium signing the UK declaration related to phasing out fossil fuels and Wallonia committed a symbolic pledge of 1 million EUR to Loss and Damage.</p>
--	---	---	---

⁷⁷ Rules and guidelines to put the Paris Agreement into practice

⁷⁸ In December 2020, the new government has taken the decision to adopt the European ambition of -55% emission reduction by 2030 (to be subject of the final evaluation)

Baseline data:

- At procedural level: lack of transparency of the decision-making process of the national climate commission.
- At policy level:
 - Absence of a National Energy and Climate plan 2030. Policy development ongoing. Lack of political will so far to develop an ambitious national policy that also includes ambitious targets regarding burden sharing within Belgium.
 - Effort sharing regulations⁷⁹ date from 2015 (only put in practice since 2017) but stay far below the targets asked by CJP. Effort sharing regulation horizon 2030 between the regions has not started. No indications that there is room for an increased Belgian and European ambition.
 - Draft inter-parliamentary resolution does not include concrete targets for emission reduction and international climate finance. 13 of the 24 CJP positions are being discussed.
 - Preparations for COP24 in Katowice: Belgium is not willing to take an active role at the European level to push for an increase of the European 2030 goals to -55% emission reduction and is, besides Italy, the only country in west-Europe that is not pushing for this ambition.
 - No tangible commitments for an annual increase in the Belgian contribution to climate finance; and contribution is not new or additional. Belgian contribution to climate finance mounted to 100 million in 2016 but CJP critique on the definition of climate financing number (no numbers yet for 2017)
 - No official government position to push for ambitious targets regarding emission reduction. Government does not want concrete targets and defends an emission reduction of maximum – 40% by 2020.
- All political decision makers understand the urgency for ambitious climate policy but differ in opinion regarding the need for concrete targets and commitments with regard to emission reduction and international climate finance. Ruling parties adopt a climate conservative approach whereas opposition parties push for concrete and ambitious targets that are in line with CJP positions.

Mid-Term data:

- At procedural level: lack of transparency of the decision-making process of the national climate commission still continues. Improvement of climate governance, as demanded by PWG, is included in the proposal for Special Climate Act.
- At policy level:
 - Effort sharing regulation horizon 2030 between the regions was part of the development of the NECP. The NECP only aims at -35% emission reduction in non ETS sectors, which is far below the demands of the PWG, and the European ambition.
 - NECP 2030 finalised in December 2019 not demonstrating sufficient ambition and lacking concrete measures towards just transition. The NECP is not an integrated plan but a compilation of the regional and federal climate policies.
 - Inter-parliamentary resolution adopted but without concrete targets for emission reduction and international climate finance. Several positions of PWG have been being included.
 - Positions at COP meetings (Katowice and Madrid): Belgium not joining the High Ambition Coalition. Belgium not supporting the European ambition of -55% emission reduction by 2030. Belgium joining Article 6 coalition that pleads for strong rules for the global carbon markets.

⁷⁹ The Effort Sharing legislation establishes binding annual greenhouse gas emission targets for Member States for the periods 2013–2020 and 2021–2030. These targets concern emissions from most sectors not included in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), such as transport, buildings, agriculture and waste.



<p>Belgium confirming contribution of 100 million EUR to the Green Climate Fund that is additional.⁸⁰</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Official government position regarding emission reduction was in 2018 set on -35% by 2030. The NECP of December 2019 refers to an increase in ambition and states that the emission reduction should be higher than -40% by 2030 (but without clear targets).○ The new federal government, installed in October 2020, fully aligns with the European ambitions of the Green Deal, which means that the NECP needs to be adapted to these new goals. The federal government engaged to make the necessary adaptations through an 'action plan'.
<p>Endline data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">– At procedural level:<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ No results yet with regard to enhancing transparency of the National Climate Commission or the Special Climate act– At policy level:<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ An update of the NECP is foreseen in 2022. The NECP will need to be aligned to the government agreement that refers to -55% emission reduction by 2030, aligned to the European Green deal that pushes for climate neutrality by 2050, and to the Belgian pledge made at COP 25 to contribute 100 million EUR/year to international climate finance. A pledge that is not fully implemented yet.○ Belgium not joining the High Ambition Coalition but accepting that the EU does○ COP 26: Belgium signing the UK declaration related to phasing out fossil fuels and the Walloon pledge for loss and Damage

¹⁹⁰ **Summary impact 1 and 3:** The discourse on climate change has evolved due to several contextual factors, as devastating effects of climate change have also become increasingly clear in Europe, through heat waves, floods and droughts. Climate marches all over the world call their politicians for action. All policy makers share a sense of urgency, and agree that an ambitious and coherent Belgian climate policy is needed. An ambitious discourse is being promoted by the socialist and Green parties in the federal, Brussels and Walloon governments, since the elections of 2019. A sense of urgency is also shared among the political parties that used to adopt a more climate conservative approach, though they differ in opinion on the extent to which concrete ambitious targets need to be set.

¹⁹¹ Taking into account the complex nature of climate governance, not much evolution could be noticed over the years regarding Belgian climate governance (including NECP, transparency of the national Climate Commission and the need for a Climate Act) or a coordinated Belgian climate policy. Ambitious climate policies have been developed at Walloon and Brussels government level and to - a certain extent - at federal level. Also at international meetings such as the COPs, it is challenging for

⁸⁰ The Belgium contribution to international climate finance till 2020 was set on 50 million EUR/year, new and additional. Belgium reported a contribution of 100 million EUR in 2016 but PWG had critique on the definition of climate financing, and contribution was not new or additional.

Belgium to defend ambitious positions. Some small successes have been achieved though. The Climate Coalition has had an important role in flagging several declarations to be signed by governments during the COP. A small success was the pro-active role of the Walloon climate minister to join the Scottish initiative and make a symbolic pledge of 1 million EUR to the Loss and Damage fund. However, at the COP26, Belgium again did not join the High Ambition Coalition (but at least did not block the European Union in doing so). A further increase of the Belgian contribution to international climate finance towards 500 million EUR/year was also not achieved, nor is the implementation of former pledges (100 million EUR/year) guaranteed.

Share of national policy makers reached by PWG, who view information channels (direct formal, direct non-formal and indirect communication) as relevant. (output 8, indicator 5 and 6)

- ¹⁹² All political decision makers interviewed confirmed that information received from the PWG was relevant for their work. Results of baseline and MTR can be confirmed. Members of parliament acknowledge that the PWG/Climate Coalition is well informed on climate policy issues, and brings specific topics to the attention that are less addressed by other lobbyist, such as international climate finance and putting the climate debate in an international perspective (e.g. climate refugees, leaving no-one behind, Loss&Damage). The information provided appears to be more relevant for new members of parliament, of which several did not know the content of the inter-parliamentary resolution that was adopted under the former government.
- ¹⁹³ The most effective L&A strategy in influencing positions of decision makers is through direct contact (formal and non-formal), to a lesser extent mailing, and even less relevant the presence in the media. Several interviewees indicated they would like to have more contact, to feel more supported by the members of the PWG during their policy work.
- ¹⁹⁴ Mass mobilisations and one-off actions have not influenced much positions of politicians but have contributed to putting or keeping the climate debate on the political agenda.

<p>Baseline data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – All members of parliament reached (opposition and ruling parties) find direct contacts (both formal and informal) more relevant compared to indirect contact. – All interviewees at cabinets agree that ministers want to be informed by civil society but that they also are sensitive for indirect actions like letters and civic actions.
<p>MTE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – idem as baseline – Mass mobilisations and one-off actions have not influenced much positions of politicians but have contributed to putting or keeping the climate debate on the political agenda
<p>Endline:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – All members of parliament reached (opposition and ruling parties) find direct contacts (both formal and informal) more relevant compared to indirect contact. – All interviewees at cabinets agree that ministers want to be informed by civil society but that they also are sensitive for indirect actions like letters and civic actions – Mass mobilisations and one-off actions have not influenced much positions of politicians but have contributed to putting or keeping the climate debate on the political agenda –



Share of national policy makers, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who view the PWG as influential on their opinion forming process (outcome 3, indicator 7)

- ¹⁹⁵ All interviewees perceive the Climate Coalition as an important information source, next to other sources of information. Interviewees from the left side of the political spectrum confirmed that information was used to formulate their positions (for example, with regards to the interparliamentary resolution) and/or to prepare parliamentary questions. Information provided by the Climate Coalition was seen as useful during these negotiations especially by politicians on the left side of the spectrum, as it provided them with some guidance on what topics to focus on.
- ¹⁹⁶ While appreciative of their work, interviewees from the right side of the spectrum stated that information provided by the Climate Coalition was less useful to them, mostly due to the fact that they have fundamentally different views. Most interviewees agree that the Climate Coalition sets the bar (too) high when it comes to climate ambition (especially with regards to international climate finance, their demands were seen as unrealistic), but the interviewees are still understanding of this position and do not see this as a large problem. Especially when it comes to timing, several interviewees saw room for improvement: the work of the Climate Coalition is seen as rather reactive instead of proactive.

Share of national policy makers, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who name other actors as one of the more influential stakeholders on their opinion-forming process (outcome 3, indicator 8)

- ¹⁹⁷ All interviewees have referred to other sources and stakeholders that inform them on climate policy matters, but none of these other actors lobby on the international dimension of the climate debate. Environmental NGOs are recognised for the technical-environmental expertise and consulted as such. Trade unions are seen as the resource regarding just transition. The societal and political vision of decision makers is dominant in developing their positions. The position of MP is strongly influenced by the programme and official positions of the respective political parties.

Baseline data:

- The large majority of the interviewees and 22 of the 31 respondents (online survey) recognise the CJP as a legitimate advocate for climate justice.
- The CJP is perceived by all interviewees as the most important information source and influencer from the civil society, on the topic of the Belgian position in the European and international negotiations.
- Other important influencers, from civil society, on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian position in international climate negotiations are Greenpeace, WWF, 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11

MTE data:

- idem baseline

Endline data:

- Idem as baseline and MTR. Apart from the coordinators of the PWG, other CSO are important resources such as BBL, IEW/Canopea, WWF, Greenpeace, Oxfam and CAN Europe. The Trade Unions are consulted with regard to their opinion on Just transition.
- Other sources are academic research, IPCC, private sector and their sector-organisations

Share of national policy makers form the total pool of policy makers engaged in the topic of climate change, who know the PWG (outcome 3, indicator 9)

¹⁹⁸ The PWG/Climate Coalition is well known by all policy makers interviewed. They do not make a distinction between PWG and Climate Coalition. The advocates are known as representing the Climate Coalition. They know that the Climate Coalition represents a large group of CSOs. In the French community, the spokesperson of the Climate Coalition is well known, through his participation in panels and debates in the media.

Share of national policy makers form the total pool of policy makers engaged in the topic of climate change, who view the specific composition of the PWG as a comparative strength. (outcome 3, indicator 10)

¹⁹⁹ All interviewees appreciate the fact that a wide variety of civil society organisations have joined one platform at Belgian level (including Flemish and Walloon organisations) and support common positions. It facilitates the dialogue with the civil society. Interviewees appreciate the variety of expertise that is present in the Coalition. There is no misunderstanding among policy makers of the positions and advocacy agendas of the PWG and of its separate members, except the fact that it is for many policy makers difficult to separate the positions defended by 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 directly from the positions brought forward as spokesperson and coordinators of the PWG (as they often relate to the same topic and/or the same advocates lobby on behalf of the own organisation and of the Climate Coalition).

Baseline data:

- All thematic experts of the different political parties and all relevant cabinets know the existence of the CJP platform.
- The majority of the policy makers also know the composition of the platform (they can name the different groups constituting the platform)
- All interviewees (parliament and cabinets) appreciate the fact that a wide variety of civil society organisations have joined one platform at Belgian level and support common positions. It enables an efficient dialogue with civil society.

MTE data:

- idem as baseline

Endline data:

- All thematic experts of the different political parties and all relevant cabinets know the existence of the PWG and the Climate Coalition.
- All interviewees (parliament and cabinets) appreciate the fact that a wide variety of civil society organisations have joined one platform at Belgian level and support common positions. It enables an efficient dialogue with civil society.



4 TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE INTERNAL COORDINATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORTS OF THE PWG STRENGTHEN THE LEVERAGE, CREDIBILITY AND CAPACITY OF THE PWG AND ITS MEMBERS?

4.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION STRATEGIES AS DESCRIBED IN THE TOC

²⁰⁰ The second causal question is related to the internal functioning of the Climate Coalition, more specifically its political working group (PWG) and reads as follow “*To what extent do the internal coordination and capacity building efforts of the PWG strengthen the leverage, credibility and capacity of the PWG and its members?*” (impact hypothesis).

²⁰¹ In the reconstructed ToC (see baseline study), several outputs are situated at the internal level of the Climate Coalition: practices and knowledge on climate justice are developed and exchanged (output 2), the members of the PWG are up-to-date on current climate justice issues (output 3) and coordinated positions on climate justice issues are adopted (output 4). These outputs should lead to a visible social support for demands in favour of climate justice (outcome 1) and high-quality knowledge on climate justice within the platform (outcome 2), which then would contribute to an increase in the leverage and credibility of the platform members and civil society organisations (CSOs) (outcome 3).

Table 13: Reconstructed pathway of change with regard to the internal functioning of the Climate Coalition

Activity type	Outputs	Immediate outcome	Intermediate outcome	Impact
Dialogue between the PWG and the Climate Coalition	Mobilisation campaigns and one-off actions organised and aligned to political work (output 1)	Visible support base for demands in favour of climate justice is generated (outcome 1)	The Climate Coalition gains leverage and credibility on the topic of climate justice (outcome 3)	Contribution to different levels of impact at policy level (see table 10 in chapter 3.4)
Meetings of the PWG	Coordinated positions on climate justice (memorandum, policy briefs with analyses and positions) (output 4)			
Policy monitoring				
Drafting and facilitating common positions				
Research on climate justice topics (by members PWG)	Practices and knowledge on climate justice are developed and exchanged (Output 2)	High quality knowledge on climate justice within the PWG is		
Study days (organised by				

Climate Coalition and/or its members)	The members of the PWG are up-to-date on current climate justice issues (output 3)	available (outcome 2)		
Information put on the website of the Climate Coalition (by the coordinator of the Climate Coalition)				
Mailings to members of the Climate Coalition (by the coordinator of the Climate Coalition)				

²⁰² **Output 1 (not subject of the impact evaluation):** Since the integration of the Climate Justice Platform in the Climate Coalition and the establishment of three working groups, the PWG, the action working group and the group on communication, more alignment between the policy influencing work and mobilisation is taking place. The coordination of the action working group, and as such the organisation of on-off actions and large mobilisations like the climate marches, is not part of the tasks of the coordinators of the PWG. The latter support the mobilisation with coordinated and targeted positions.

²⁰³ **Output 2 and 3:** As described in the MTR-report, the role of the coordinators of the PWG (11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11) has slightly changed since the integration of the PWG in the Climate Coalition in 2018. The secretariat of the Climate Coalition (and not the PWG coordinators) has become responsible for facilitating knowledge exchange and bringing members up-to-date on climate justice issues, which is not limited to the members of the PWG but targets all members of the Climate Coalition. This is mainly done through the organisation of study events (no full consolidated list of events available), the development of a newsletter (4 in 2019, 7 in 2020, 0 in 2021), through the website (information on activities of the Climate Coalition, newsletter, press releases, positions of the PWG and policy briefs) and direct mailings to the members of the Climate Coalition. In 2021 there was gap of several months between the departure of the former coordinator and the appointment of the new coordinator of the Climate Coalition.

²⁰⁴ Research and analysis of policy evolutions (policy monitoring) is taken up by the individual members of the PWG on their topics of interest. The extent research is being conducted depends on the human and financial resources available at the respective member organisations. For 2021, no new research studies were flagged in the interviews (see overview of older studies, conducted by WWF, Oxfam and Arbeid & Milieu in the MTR report). In their analyses, the position of the own organisation is guiding, which is often more ambitious than the positions taken by the Climate Coalition. Research and policy analyses are shared among the coalition members, but this process is not systematised and dependent on the initiative of the individual members.

²⁰⁵ **Output 4:** The role of the coordinators of the PWG (subject of this impact evaluation) consists mainly in preparing and facilitating the meetings of the PWG, preparing draft positions and facilitating the process of drafting coordinated positions of the PWG. In the period 2019 - 2021, a lot of effort was put in developing a memorandum that has become a comprehensive policy document representing all shared positions of the Climate Coalition (representing positions of the North-South movement, the environmental movement, the trade unions, mutual health societies, youth and civic initiatives).



The memorandum has become the reference document for guiding the policy influencing process of the Climate Coalition and sets the boundaries for rapid response by the Coalition on current events.

²⁰⁶ The baseline data for the internal stream of the ToC are grouped under three evaluation questions (see annex 2) :

1. To what extent do the members of the PWG view the PWG as their main channel for advocacy on climate justice (with indicators 11, 12 and 13)
2. To what extent are the PWG and its members able to adjust and capitalise on the changing political and social context (indicators 14 and 15) and
3. how are the members of the PWG and the Climate Coalition cooperating with each other (indicators 16, 17 and 18).

²⁰⁷ Following assumptions have been identified for the functioning of the PWG:

- PWG members are able to reach common positions on climate justice issues
- Individual members of the PWG are able to transcend their individual interests
- PWG member organisations combine sufficient expertise in order to generate high quality knowledge in the platform

²⁰⁸ Following, the results of the analysis of the interviews with members of the Climate Coalition, the e-survey and the document study are presented.

4.2 DATA AT OUTPUT LEVEL

Share of PWG members who use other channels for their advocacy work on climate justice (success factor, indicator 11)

²⁰⁹ The majority of the members of the Climate Coalition do not use other channels for their advocacy works on climate justice. As described in the baseline and MTR, the variety of members in terms of capacity, human and financial resources, interests, support base explains the respective levels of involvement in and contribution to the Climate Coalition. Organisations that do not have climate justice at the core of their work and/or that do not have specific staff available to that end, rely on the Climate Coalition for the climate justice advocacy (e.g. JNM, Vlaamse Jeugdraad, Scouts, Forum des Jeunes, Fian, Natuurpunt, ACLVB, mutual health societies, etc.). Several organisations, among them many civic initiatives, focus more on the action and mobilisation, like Youth for Climate, Climate

express, Rise for the Climate, Grand-parents for Climate and delegate the climate justice advocacy to the PWG of the Climate Coalition.

²¹⁰ Based on the analysis of the membership list, done by the evaluators based on knowledge of the organisations and info from interviews, the evaluators roughly estimate that 70% of the members do not actively lobby on climate justice topics, 18% to a limited extent and 12% of the members have sufficient staff and resources to actively invest in climate justice advocacy. The latter are all part of the core group of the PWG. From the respondents of the e-survey only 34% have no staff available for L&A, which indicates that the group of members that engage in climate justice advocacy is overrepresented in the survey. From this group that actively engages in climate justice L&A 66% of the respondents combine different channels for their advocacy work and 20% lobby mainly directly. The latter are members that support the Climate Coalition but that prefer to lobby for more ambitious or radical positions.

Table 13: Share of members of PWG using other channels for their climate justice advocacy (n=41)

How important is the L&A of the Climate Coalition for your own organisation	%
All our lobby efforts are channelled through the Climate Coalition	5%
We do not lobby, we only participate in public actions	10%
We lobby directly and rarely through the Climate Coalition	20%
We participate in L&A of the Climate Coalition but we also conduct our own L&A directly or through membership of other coalitions/networks	66%

²¹¹ The most active climate advocates within civil society are member of the core group of the PWG (11 members). Members of the core-group invest a lot of time and energy in the political work of the Climate Coalition, but all of them also use other channels for their advocacy work:

- They conduct a lot of policy influencing directly, focusing on their specific priorities (e.g. WWF on fossil fuels and biodiversity, Greenpeace on mobility, Oxfam on gender and climate, BBL on energy, trade unions on just transition, etc.). They often complement the policy influencing efforts of the Climate Coalition. Where the Climate Coalition puts general principles and goals to the forefront, they often lobby on more concrete topics and advocate for more ambitious goals than could be agreed upon in the Climate Coalition. Also 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 lobby directly on their own priority topics, like international climate finance, Loss&Damage and climate governance for CNCD/11.11.11 and international climate finance and bio-fuels for 11.11.11, pushing for more ambitious goals as set by the Climate Coalition.
- Almost all members of the core group are also included in the official delegation of Belgium at the COP. During the COP, they lobby on their own priorities.
- NGOs that are part of an international network, like Oxfam, WWF and Greenpeace also conduct L&A through their own international networks, that are also present at the COP. Same applies for the trade unions, also present at the COP and also operating through the European and international trade union confederations (ITUC, ETUC). Moreover, as Belgium is one of the few countries that invites a large number of CSOs to be part of the official delegation, the Belgian chapters of the international CSO networks operate as spokespersons for their networks at the COP.



- 13 members⁸¹ of the PWG of the Climate Coalition are also participating in the FRDO,⁸² a multi-stakeholder forum that has to prepare advices for the federal government on sustainable development, including climate policy topics.

<p>Baseline data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- The majority of the platform members do not have a policy officer or do not prioritise their policy influencing on the CJP topics and delegate the policy influencing on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian position in international negotiations to the platform.- Those members that have a policy officer and that are actively influencing policy decision makers on climate issues combine their own policy influencing strategies with policy influencing strategies through the platform and often accompany the CJP coordinators during their meetings with decision makers. This is also the case of the CJP coordinators themselves who also relate with policy makers (directly and indirectly) on similar topics as defended by the platform.
<p>MTE data</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- idem as baseline
<p>Endline</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- The majority of the PWG members do not have a policy officer or do not prioritise their policy influencing on the PWG topics and delegate the policy influencing on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian position in international negotiations to the PWG.- Based on the analysis of the membership list, the evaluators roughly estimate that 70% of the members do not actively lobby on climate justice topics, 18% to a limited extent and 12% of the members have sufficient staff and resources to actively invest in climate justice advocacy. The latter are all part of the core group of the PWG- Those members that have a policy officer and that are actively influencing policy decision makers on climate issues combine their own policy influencing strategies with policy influencing strategies through the PWG and often accompany the PWG coordinators during their meetings with decision makers. This is also the case of the PWG coordinators themselves who also relate with policy makers (directly and indirectly) on similar topics as defended by the PWG.-

Share of PWG members who use the positions of PWG in communication with national policy makers (success factor, indicator 12)

- ²¹² Members of the Climate Coalition interviewed confirmed that in their communication with policy makers they refer to the positions of the Climate Coalition, which are complementary to their own theme-specific advocacy and as such mutually strengthening the L&A work of the Climate Coalition and the individual member organisations.

⁸¹ BBL, BRAL, IEW, WWF, IEB, Oxfam, 11.11.11, CNCD/11.11.11, Vlaamse Jeugdraad, Forum des Jeunes, three trade union confederations

⁸² Federal Council for Sustainable Development

- 213 The members of the core group confirm that the membership of the Coalition creates a win-win situation. They were able to put their own priorities on the agenda of the Climate Coalition, which is reflected in the memorandum that was finalised by March 2021. For example, the trade unions brought the issue of just transition under the attention, NGOs for development cooperation the international dimension and international solidarity, environmentalist and nature-based organisations brought in the importance of nature-based solutions, youth brought forward the importance of education, etc. The Coalition as such serves as a megaphone for the own demands of the different members. Equally, being a member of the Coalition also allows some organisations to support positions through the Coalition that they find difficult to defend within their own organisations, given the sensitivity or lack of consensus or position within their own organisations on the specific topic.
- 214 The e-survey included a question on the extent members of the PWG have used the positions described in the memorandum in their own communication with policy makers. From the 12 respondents that are member of the PWG (core and broader group), 9 indicated that they use the positions of the memorandum, complemented with their own theme specific positions. 2 out of 12 respondents did not use the positions of the memorandum. One respondents did not know (see annex 10 full survey report). In another question, 81% of the respondents (n=38) indicated that the Climate Coalition is a (very) important source of information for the development of their own positions.


<p>Baseline data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CJP members that are actively involved in climate justice policy influencing use also CJP positions in their own interventions. - Individual members of the platform most often defend more ambitious demands and positions as compared to the common positions of CJP, which are based on a consensus of a broad and diverse group of CSO.
<p>MTE data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - idem as baseline - Members of the Climate Coalition have also put their own specific demands on the agenda of the PWG, of which several have become included in the memorandum of the Climate Coalition.
<p>Endline data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PWG members that are actively involved in climate justice policy influencing use also PWG positions in their own interventions. - Individual members of the PWG most often defend more ambitious demands and positions as compared to the common positions of the PWG, which are based on a consensus of a broad and diverse group of CSO. - Members of the Climate Coalition have also put their own specific demands on the agenda of the PWG, of which several have become included in the memorandum of the Climate Coalition. -

Qualitative description of the strengths and weaknesses of the PWG by the members (success factor, indicator 13)

- 215 For the Endline, the framework for Assessing Collaborative Processes (JP Mc Mahon 2008) as applied during the MTR was used again to assess strengths and weaknesses of the PWG on six parameters (using evidence-based indicators of success of coalitions as documented by the TCC Group for the

California Endowment).⁸³ The following figure presents the results of the MTR and of the Endline evaluation. Variation in scoring between the MTR and the Endline can be explained by the fact that more and also some other members of the PWG have been interviewed as compared to the MTR, the fact that there have been staff changes within several member organisations, and the fact that the communication challenges, as already described during the MTR, have become more compelling (see further).

Figure 3: Scoring on the six dimensions for assessing collaborative processes (MTR and Endline)



²¹⁶ *Collaborative context*: as described during the MTR, the context is demanding for collaboration within civil society on topics related to climate justice. The transition that is needed for the implementation of the Paris Declaration requires a broad support base within society and political will. Both, civil society organisation as policy makers, acknowledge the importance of collaboration. The Climate Coalition has been growing since 2008, with an acceleration since the School Strikes for Climate in 2018, The European Green Deal of 2019 and latest Climate Marches (organised prior to the COP meetings). During MTR, the Climate Coalition counted more than 70 members, which has increased up to more than 90 members in 2021. As described in the MTR report, the topic is suitable for collaboration. It touches upon many different topics that demand a variety of expertise, which is

⁸³ Raynor, J. (2011) What makes an effective coalition? Evidence-based indicators of success. USA/ The California Endowment.

represented in the Climate Coalition. An added value of the Coalition, according to the interviewees, is that ecological, social, educational and international dimensions of climate justice are being addressed.

- ²¹⁷ All policy makers interviewed stress the importance of civil society speaking with one voice, which contributes to efficiency. Besides only having to talk to one interlocutor, policy makers valorise that the coalition already presents substantiated positions that are the result of a compromise of different opinions within civil society itself.
- ²¹⁸ *Competent representation*: This criterion assesses to what extent representatives of participating organisations in a collaborative process are sufficiently qualified, well selected and sufficiently engaged in the collaboration. The scoring and the analysis of the MTR can be confirmed by the interviews during the Endline. The variety and number of members, in terms of expertise and knowledge, human and financial resources available for climate justice advocacy is a strength and a challenge.
- ²¹⁹ Interviewees confirmed that only a small group of members are actively investing in climate justice advocacy. These are represented in the core group of the PWG. The decision to create a core group of climate experts and a broader group involving the majority of the members still is perceived as a good decision and is working well. Members of this core group attend the meetings well prepared.
- ²²⁰ The broader group of the PWG has actively been involved in the development of the memorandum. Within this broader group, members show varying levels of commitment and motivation, and do not always attend well-prepared the meetings. This has delayed the decision-making process in the PWG as members needed to be brought up-to-date and discussions needed to be repeated. And as described in the MTR report, smaller organisations that have to rely on the advocacy work of the Climate Coalition sometimes strongly pushed for their opinions to be included in the positions of the PWG, which were sometimes more interest driven than based upon evidence and/or not supported by a broad support base. As decisions are taken by consensus/unanimity, all members have equal power and all voices are taken into account, which at times delayed the decision-making process. Involvement has decreased since the finalisation of the memorandum. New staff members at the member organisations of the broader group are not yet fully informed on the memorandum and L&A process of the Climate Coalition
- ²²¹ Staff turn-over can be challenging for organisations and collaborative processes and is often affecting L&A processes and coalition building. Contacts with lobby targets depend a lot on personal networking and confidence building. In 2021, there were staff changes at the level of the coordination of the PWG (11.11.11) and the coordination of the Climate Coalition. This has affected somehow the relations with policy makers but was sufficiently compensated by the stability at the side of CNCD/11.11.11 (delivering one of the coordinators of the PWG and the spokesperson for the French community). Also at member organisations, there have been staff changes and internal knowledge transfer within the respective organisations is not always secured, which demands extra time investment by the coordinators to bring new staff members up-to-date.
- ²²² The Climate Coalition appears to have been less visible at the Flemish side compared to the Walloon side, which can be explained by -apart from the different media attention the Climate Coalition is receiving in both parts of the country - the staff changes of the advocacy officer at 11.11.11 and the spokesperson at Greenpeace (being vice-president of the Climate Coalition and Flemish




spokesperson). Flemish lobby targets do not know well who the spokespersons and lobbyists are of the Climate Coalition.

- ²²³ *Embrace diversity*: the observation of the MTR that the diversity of the coalition is well managed by the coordinators of the PWG is confirmed during the Endline. The tension between the more pragmatic opinions and the more radical opinions, often becoming visible along the divide between professional organisations (having more technical expertise, evidence based) and volunteers (more emotional or value driven), still is a continuous challenge for the coalition. For example, more radical organisations still are of the opinion that the Climate Coalition is not pushing enough for system change. However, all interviewees confirm that the coordinators of the PWG demonstrate good diplomatic skills, sensitivity for all different opinions, and that they give the radical organisations proper attention without allowing them to take-over the debates. The coordinators also ensure that the views of less powerful members are given a voice.
- ²²⁴ Interviewees confirmed that the process of developing the memorandum (period 2019-2021) has been important and relevant for bringing all different positions and sensitivities to the forefront. This has contributed to increased mutual respect and understanding of each other positions, and strengthened the internal democracy. For the coordinators of the PWG and the spokespersons of the Climate Coalition, the memorandum is an important tool and reference document to support their daily advocacy work. As the memorandum is the result of a process of consensus building, this is reflected in the different opinions about the content of the memorandum in the e-survey. 2/3 of the respondents only partially agree that the positions in the memorandum are realistic, feasible and sufficiently concrete. 66% of the respondents (partially) agree that the positions are sufficiently ambitious and that the positions, being the result of a consensus, are less ambitious compared to the organisation specific positions. However, 25% of the respondents disagree on these topics. Furthermore, 33% of the respondents identify themselves with positions of the Climate Coalition, half of them only partially.
- ²²⁵ The Endline adds on the MTR assessment an observation regarding the extent sufficient use is made of available expertise within the Climate Coalition. During MTR, several examples were given on the way members make use of available expertise and networks. Fewer examples were given for 2021 and more critical comments were shared. As described under 4.1. enhancing and exchanges practical climate knowledge is not a task of the coordinators of the PWG, but depends on the initiative of the members, coordinated or facilitated by the Climate Coalition Coordination. Because of the time that was needed to engage a new coordinator in 2021, not much action was taken upon initiative of the Climate Coalition and there have not been proactive initiatives taken up by the members. Furthermore, the number of general assemblies, a forum that was used for exchange and knowledge building, has been reduced from four to two in 2021, also limiting the opportunities, time and space for institutionalised knowledge exchange. The evaluators have no overview of bilateral exchanges between members, which appears to take place, certainly between the most active members of the PWG.

- ²²⁶ *Collaborative attitude:* The assessment of the MTR can be confirmed by the Endline: members demonstrate attitudes of respect and trust. Leadership is shared, rather than positional. Members show flexibility. There is sufficient transparency, data and research are freely shared and explained. The coordinators put energy in completing the tasks and improving the working relationships. The analysis of data collected during the Endline add also some critical reflections. The collaboration attitude as shown during the development of the memorandum has decreased slightly, mainly within the broader group of the PWG, due to internal staff changes within member organisations and the challenges regarding internal communication (see following point).
- ²²⁷ *Effective communication:* The high score during the MTR was influenced by the smooth process of developing the memorandum and the fact that dialogue and consensus building had been key in the decision-making process, within the PWG and the coalition at large. During the MTR, several comments were made by interviewees on the need for systematization of the information flow. A balance needed to be looked for between general and specialised information, between too technical and too simple, between information needs of the climate experts and the needs of the non-experts. Some interviewees also demanded more information on the advocacy process itself and the progress or milestones realised. These demands were again raised during the Edline. Not much has changed since the MTR, explained by the fact that the Coalition has very limited resources, almost no communication budget, and no communication officer. Only recently (September 2022) a communication officer has been hired.
- ²²⁸ The e-survey results show a mixed picture about the quality of information sharing and communication of the PWG towards all members of the Climate Coalition, as shown in following graphic. Over half of the group of respondents agree that the frequency, the accessibility, the amount and the clarity of information from the PWG towards all members of the Coalition is 'good' to 'very good', in particularly the clarity and amount of information (respectively 68% and 62%). 32% of the respondents indicate that the information is not well adapted to the diversified information needs and interest of the members, confirming the results of the MTR and confirmed during the Endline interviews.




Graphic 1: How do you assess the information flow and communication from the PWG towards the members of the Climate Coalition? (n=31)



N 31

229 In the e-survey 43% of the respondents indicate that they are insufficiently or to a limited extent kept up-to-date about the L&A results of the Climate Coalition, as shown in following graphic, which was confirmed by the interviews.




Graphic 2: To what extent the Climate Coalition keeps your organisation up-to-date regarding the results of the L&A of the Climate Coalition? (n=35)



N 35

230 Another point of attention is the collaboration and alignment between the different working groups. The e-survey shows mixed results. 24% of the respondents feel there is no good cooperation or alignment, 27% feel there is. 48% indicate they have no opinion on this. The interviews explain that the difference in assessment can be explained by the characteristics of the members, with members that are not very actively involved being more critical compared to the active members.

Graphic 3: Do you think there is good collaboration and/or alignment between the different working groups of the Climate Coalition? (n=33)

	Aantal	% van de antwoorden	%
Helemaal niet	0		
Eerder niet	8		24%
Eerder wel	9		27%
Zeer zeker	0		
Geen mening/weet niet	16		48%

N 33

231 *Collaborative structure:* as described in the MTR report, a good functional collaborative structure has been established since the merge of the CJP in the Climate Coalition, a structure that reflects sufficiently the diversity of the membership. Appropriate decision-making procedures have been installed. The interviews during the endline were somehow critical on the internal governance and decision-making process. Mainly members that are not active in the core group of the PWG and new members seem to lack knowledge on how the decision-making process is organised.

<p>Baseline data:</p> <p>Strengths:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Diverse composition of the platform, which is unique in Europe. Including a North-South dimension in to the policy debates of the environmentalist group and trade unions – CJP contributes to enhanced knowledge on climate issues, keeps the members up-to-date on actual climate debates at Belgian and international level and contributes to the internal policy debates within the members organisations – Good knowledge of the CJP coordinators of the strengths, positions and sensitivity of each of the members and ability to propose positions that are acceptable for the entire group – Different opinions are respected, transparent decision-making process. Consensus is being looked for – Process and procedures in place to react quickly when needed <p>Weaknesses:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Diversity of the platform members complicates the process of formulating ambitious positions – It takes time to come to common positions shared by the large and diverse group
<p>MTE data:</p> <p>Strengths:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Idem as baseline +



- The division of the PWG into a core group and the broader group has enhanced efficiency of developing positions.
- Consistency of representatives of the Climate Coalition and the PWG, which has a positive influence on visibility and relation building
- Diversity is well managed. Diversity in expertise and networks is an added value of members.
- The PWG scores high on the 6 parameters for assessing collaborative processes

Weaknesses:

- Weaknesses identified during baseline are still valid (and inherent part of this type of broad coalitions) but are better managed currently.
- Not all members of the PWG participate well-prepared at meetings
- Communication flow could be further rationalised and systematised, taking into account the different information needs of the members.

Endline data:

Strengths:

- Diverse composition of the PWG, unique in Europe.
- Good knowledge of the PWG coordinators of the strengths, positions and sensitivity of each of the members and ability to propose positions that are acceptable for the entire group. Diversity is well managed. Diversity in expertise and networks is an added value of members.
- Different opinions are respected, transparent decision-making process. Consensus is being looked for
- Process and procedures in place to react quickly when needed
- The division of the PWG into a core group and the broader group has enhanced efficiency of developing positions.
- The PWG scores high on the 6 parameters for assessing collaborative processes
- Time invested in elaborating the memorandum has contributed to enhanced respect, trust and confidence between members. Members are informed about the diversity of positions and sensitivities of the different members. Ecological, social, educational and international dimensions of climate justice are being addressed.
- .

Weaknesses:

- Diversity of the platform members that complicates the process of formulating ambitious positions and that demands time to formulate common positions is inherent part of this type of broad coalitions, but is being better managed currently.
- There were some staff changes in 2021, which had a negative influence on visibility at Flemish side and relation building
- Not all members of the PWG participate well-prepared at meetings
- Communication flow could be further rationalised and systematised, taking into account the different information needs of the members
-

- ²³² **Summary of output level:** The data on the indicators at output level remain the same over the different measurements. The Climate Coalition is a unique coalition in Europe that represent a large variety of civil society actors that are actively or passively interested in climate justice advocacy. The majority of the members use the Climate Coalition as their main channel for climate justice advocacy as they lack resources themselves for L&A on climate matters. For the members of the core group of the PWG, the Climate Coalition is not the only channel, but an important one, as the Coalition represents a large support base within civil society that enhances its legitimacy and credibility.
- ²³³ With the growth of the coalition, the relevant decision was taken to invest sufficient time and energy in developing a memorandum that would serve as a guiding tool for the L&A on climate justice. This process has contributed to enhanced respect, trust and confidence between members. Diversity of positions and sensitivities of the different members have been made visible. Compared to the situation at the baseline, the positions of the Climate Coalition have become clearer for all members. Diversity of the coalition is reflected in the ecological, social, educational and international dimensions of climate justice as elaborated in the memorandum, confirming the assumptions related to (i) the ability of the PWG to reach common positions on climate justice issues, and (ii) the ability of individual members of the PWG to transcend their individual interests. The memorandum is the result of a compromise (coordinated positions on climate justice), which is valorised positively by the lobby targets. Individual members complement the L&A of the Climate coalition with their own, often more concrete or more ambitious lobby agenda.
- ²³⁴ The coalition is a strong and well-functional coalition that embraces diversity, that is supported by an appropriate governance structure and that relies on competent members that show collaborative attitude. There is a lack of sufficient resources to strengthen internal communication that is needed to organise an appropriate information flow within the large and diverse coalition it has become, so to keep all members up-to-date on current climate justice issues.

4.3 DATA ON INDICATORS AT OUTCOME LEVEL

To what extent are the PWG and its members able to adjust and capitalise on the changing political and social context? (success factor; indicators 14 and 15)

See chapter 3.3. under the assessment of the contribution of the PWG to policy changes.

- ²³⁵ The coordinators have shown good knowledge of the policy context and climate policy development processes, which was also confirmed in the interviews with lobby targets. The PWG has been able to respond adequately to windows of opportunity for policy influencing and to react quickly. Examples are described in the cases (see chapter 3). Other examples are the attention given in the policy brief for COP26 Glasgow⁸⁴ on the negative effect of the corona crisis with regard to the participation of delegations from countries that had limited access to Covid vaccins, or the recent positions formulated as a response to the energy crisis and the Ukraine war.

⁸⁴ Climate Coalition (October 2021) Aanbevelingen voor de klimaatop van Glasgow



²³⁶ Since the elections from 2019 and the installation of the regional (2019) and federal (2020) governments, three out of the four climate ministers in Belgium (Flanders, Brussels, Wallonia, federal) are member of the Green Parties. From the contact tracing, it becomes clear that much more contacts and collaboration has been taken place with these 'Green' cabinets as compared to the period before 2019, where the contacts with members of parliaments outnumbered the outreach to cabinets. Having allies within the cabinets has certainly facilitated access to cabinets.


Qualitative assessment of the quality of the delivered products by PWG and quality of the coordination (outcome 2, indicators 16 and 17)

²³⁷ The PWG is responsible for the development of policy briefs and position papers, the development of the memorandum and analysis of policies and COP results. The coordinators also provide input in the newsletters.

²³⁸ The process of developing the memorandum and the quality of the memorandum are positively assessed by the majority of the interviewees. As already addressed in the MTR report, the memorandum was developed through a transparent, participatory, democratic and inclusive decision-making processes, which is appreciated of all members involved in this process. Apart from having a reference document for the L&A work, the whole process enabled members to become aware of different positions en respective sensitivities, which contributed to increased coherence, mutual understanding and respect and improved collaboration. The memorandum has been recently (2022) summarised in a 10-point action plan, visualised in an attractive info-graphic, which responds to a demand of several members for a more concise policy document (as described in the MTR), and that can be easily used in the L&A work.

²³⁹ Members of the PWG interviewed consider the outputs of the PWG as of high quality (position papers/policy briefs, analysis of policies, press releases), confirmed by the results of the survey as shown in graphic 4. All members interviewed and 18% of the respondents of the survey are more critical on the website of the Climate Coalition, mainly pointing out that information is not well structured, difficult to find the information one needs, some information is lacking. The website currently has also no space for knowledge and information sharing provided by members. From all information sources (mailing, research shared, study events, newsletters, website), the website is seen as the less important information source by 32% of the respondents (n=38) (see annex 10). Also lobby targets are interested in the website of the Climate Coalition. They would like to find information on lobbyists and spokespersons on the website (names, email and telephone numbers).


Graphic 4: Only for members of PWG: How do you assess the quality of following outputs of the PWG of the Climate Coalition? (n=11)



N 11

240 From the interviews, it is learned that there are mixed expectations regarding the role of the Climate Coalition in enhancing knowledge on climate justice. Especially members with limited resources or limited focus on climate justice advocacy expect a more proactive role of the Climate Coalition to that regard, whereas the founding members and the experienced advocates state that the primary goal of the Coalition is to conduct L&A. Resources are lacking to fully invest in knowledge generation, knowledge exchange and dissemination. The expectation of the members is somehow contradicted by the results of the e-survey, when asking for the extent organisations have made use of the different information products and sources made available by the Climate Coalition, as shown in following graphic. The majority of the respondents do never or only sporadic make use of information sources shared by the Climate Coalition. The most important information source appears to be mailing. Almost all organisations have added (and keep on adding) colleagues to the mailinglist of the Climate Coalition (source: Excell file mailing list Climate Coalition).

Graphic 5: To what extent have you used following information sources on climate justice? N=41



N 41



- ²⁴¹ The functioning of the PWG and the quality of the coordination is positively assessed by all interviewees and confirmed by the online survey. Interviewees acknowledge the difficult task to manage a large coalition with such a diversity in opinions, strategies and capacity. Interviewees and respondents are positive about the facilitation of the meetings, including the way the PWG has operated during the corona crisis.
- ²⁴² 27% of the respondents are not satisfied with the frequency of the meetings and timely receipt of preparatory documents. Nine percent of the respondents assess the minutes of the PWG meetings as not good. From the interviews, it is learned that minutes sometimes are not made in time. Several members interviewed that are not member of the PWG would like to access equally the minutes of these meetings.
- ²⁴³ Interviewees and respondents of the survey show mixed appreciations of the quality of the meetings of the PWG. In general, there is a positive assessment of these meetings, but there is room for improvement. 55% of the respondents (n=11, question only for members of the PWG) indicate that the transparency of the decision-making process is not fully clear, confirmed by several interviewees. 36% of the respondents are of the opinion that the participatory approach during meetings can be improved and 18% only agree 'more or less' whether there is sufficient respect for the different opinions. 27% think that the process of consensus building can be improved. The Endline results seem more critical on the quality of meetings of the PWG as compared to the baseline. A possible explanation might be that during the baseline, the CJP was relatively small, whereas since its integration in the Climate Coalition much more organisations are participating in the PWG. Furthermore, there have been several staff changes within member organisations, which also can explain the difference in assessment between the MTR and the Endline.
- ²⁴⁴ The baseline study already noted that the active participation and communication of positions in European and international networks is very limited. Some interviewees from the baseline study found it regrettable that the PWG does not make sufficient use of the presence of members that are embedded within European and international organisations or networks to also lobby directly European stakeholders or the Belgian members of the European parliament, as the European climate policy is decisive for the development of the Belgian climate policy. From the interviews, it is learned that this is a deliberate choice of the Climate Coalition (as such, output 7 was removed from the reconstructed ToC during MTR, as this is not correct output of the PWG). Because of lack of sufficient capacity, the focus is on the Belgian level and the Belgian position in European and international negotiations. 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 support financially CAN Europe but do not actively contribute to positions and lobby interventions of CAN Europe, except in those occasions that CAN Europe asks the Coalition to bring certain topics under the attention of Belgian decision makers. CAN Europe and external resource persons regret that the Climate Coalition is not more active at the European level.

Qualitative assessment of synergies between the climate coalition and PWG (outcome 1, indicator 18)

- ²⁴⁵ The MTR already documented that the integration of the former Climate Justice Platform in the Climate Coalition has improved the synergy between the PWG and the Climate Coalition. In fact, the PWG is now integral part of the Climate Coalition. Much more members are interested in and involved in the political work, as compared to the baseline (29 members of the CJP, more than 70 members of PWG in 2021). Effective decision-making processes and voting procedures have been installed to guarantee inclusive, transparent and democratic decision making. However, these procedures are not well-known by all members.
- ²⁴⁶ Synergy between the political work and the actions/mobilisations has improved a lot. During MTR, several examples were given of a more coherent link between the advocacy work and the actions (e.g. the Occupy for Climate when Article 7bis was being debated and voted, the 100 days Countdown on the NECP, Fries and beers action in Brussels when the PWG handed over a letter with demands to the 'preformateurs'). As the COP 2020 was postponed, not much actions have taken place since then, till the new mobilisation in 2021 right before the COP26 in Glasgow.
- ²⁴⁷ As in the MTR, some interviewees still state that alignment between the political work and 'mobilisations/actions' can be improved. In the e-survey, 27% of the respondents (n=33) agree that there is good collaboration and alignment between the different working groups of the Climate Coalition, but also 24% of the respondents think rather not. 48% of the respondents do not know.⁸⁵ Alignment is guaranteed through the coordination of the Climate Coalition and its bureau.

Baseline data:

- The quality of the products delivered by CJP is assessed as good by all 11 members CJP interviewed and confirmed in the survey
- The functioning of CJP is assessed as good by all 11 CJP members interviewed: good quality of reports of the platform meetings, good facilitation of the meetings, good quality of the preparatory work, good frequency of meetings and the timely delivery of preparatory documents. The participatory approach is appreciated and members feel that their opinions are taken into account.
- The CJP coordinator manage to find a good balance in the different positions of CJP members.
- Active participation of CJP and communication of its positions in European and international networks is perceived by CJP members as limited.
- As there was not much synergy in action between CJP and the climate coalition before the merger, it is expected that synergy will improve after the merger of the CJP and the climate coalition.

MTE data:

- idem as baseline data
- An appropriate communication mix is provided (newsletters, website, mailings), which is sufficient informative but more systematization and rationalisation of the information flow is suggested by interviewees. More information on the advocacy process is asked for.
- Study events are of high quality, high experts are engaged. Study events have become more relevant with the acceleration of the climate policy debates and the entrance of new members in the Climate Coalition.
- The PWG coordinators manage well the diversity of the coalition.

⁸⁵ Respondents themselves are not a member of working groups and/or a colleague is member of the working group but information on the synergy between the working groups is usually not shared internally within member organisations, as confirmed by interviews.



- Leadership (of PWG and of the Climate Coalition) is shared rather than positional. There is sufficient transparency, data and research are freely shared and explained. the PWG coordinators put sufficient energy in completing the tasks and improving working relations.
- As the PWG has become integrated in the Climate Coalition, synergy has improved considerably. The advocacy work is becoming more aligned to the mobilisation and campaigning, but can be further strengthened.

Endline data:

- Confirmation of the baseline and MTR data, except
 - o More critical assessment of the frequency of meeting, the timely receipt of preparatory documents. A broader group of members would also like to receive the minutes of the PWG
 - o Members still appreciate the participatory approach and feel that diversity is well managed. Because of the growing number of members of the PWG and internal staff changes at member organisations not all members seem to be fully informed on the decision-making process.
- More systematisation and rationalisation of information flow still is suggested, and members also ask for more information on the advocacy process
- Because of lack of resources and interruption of climate coordination, no study events have taken place. There are mixed expectations regarding the role of the Climate Coalition in knowledge building on climate justice.
- Synergy between the different working groups still is improving, but the alignment between the advocacy work and the mobilisation can be further strengthened

²⁴⁸ **Summary of data at outcome level:** The PWG coordinators are very committed in completing their tasks, demonstrate diplomatic skills and are able to manage diversity of opinions and expectations of the members. The memorandum enables rapid reaction on current events. PWG and its members are able to adjust and capitalise on changing political and social context. Because of the growing number of members and internal staff changes within member organisations, not all members are fully aware of the past processes, not always sufficient familiar with the memorandum or the decision-making processes (as compared to the baseline and MTR). The limited resources of the Climate Coalition put limits to the opportunities to contribute to knowledge exchange and expertise building. Enhancing knowledge internally within the Climate Coalition as such depends on the initiative of the individual members, which is rather limited. Information sharing takes place bilaterally, between members, but not structurally at the level of the coalition. As documented in the MTR, more systematisation and rationalisation of information flow still is suggested, and members also still ask for more information on the advocacy process. High quality knowledge is available within the Coalition (consistent over the three measurements) and used for the L&A, but less used for internal knowledge building. The assumption regarding the ability of the PWG members to combine their expertise and generate high quality knowledge in the PWG is confirmed with regard to the quality of the memorandum and the coordinated positions, but not confirmed regarding the

internal knowledge building among members. The primary objective of the Climate Coalition is climate justice L&A, supported by a broad coalition.

²⁴⁹ The Climate Coalition has been able to involve a large number and diverse civil society organisations in the policy influencing process. A visible support base was created for the demands in favour of climate justice, also supported by the mass demonstration. The composition of the coalition and the high level of expertise is highly valorised by lobby targets that perceive the Climate Coalition as a legitimate and credible actor for climate justice advocacy. The Climate Coalition is the primary source of information for most of the lobby targets and invited as the legitimate representative of civic climate justice advocacy at institutionalised meetings and fora where climate justice is being debated. (see also chapter 3)



5 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT

5.1 CONCLUSIONS

First impact hypothesis - The PWG influences the points of view of Belgian decision makers and the policy positions on climate justice-related topics and other topics covered by the PWG.

- ²⁵⁰ Since its existence in 2010 (as CJP) and especially since the merge in the Climate Coalition, the PWG has become stronger and more coordinated in conducting climate justice lobby and advocacy. The PWG succeeds in coordinating climate justice L&A, supported by a broad group of civil society organisations. The composition of the Climate Coalition (variety of civil society represented, complementary expertise and intergenerational), the high-level knowledge and quality of information provided contribute to the recognition of the Climate Coalition as a reputable and credible actor in the climate policy debate. The PWG applies a smart mix of strategies (activism, advocacy, formal and informal lobby and provision of advisory support) that has been relevant and effective in putting topics on the political agenda and in some occasions in contributing to positions adopted by political decision makers.
- ²⁵¹ Although not much tangible progress has been achieved towards an ambitious position of Belgium in European and international climate policy debates, the narrative and climate discourse in Belgium has evolved. All political parties acknowledge positions of the Climate Coalition, which is the result of the accosting L&A approach over time. Left-wing parties have adopted more positions, including references to concrete and higher targets; other parties are mainly adopting general principles and positions. The Climate Coalition has been able to put a number of specific topics and demands on the **political agenda** that otherwise would not have been on the radar, such as carbon taxation and regulations of the international carbon market, adaptation, Loss and Damage, fossil fuel subsidies, gender, climate refugees, the human rights perspective, the negative impact of biofuels, to name a few. The discussion about the memorandum in parliament forced all political parties to take position and discuss these topics.
- ²⁵² The **discourse** on climate change has evolved due to several contextual factors. While the effects of climate change have long been visible in the Global South, its devastating effects have also become increasingly clear in Europe, through heat waves, floods and droughts. Especially the floods in Wallonia increased the visibility of the climate urgency in Belgium. Climate marches all over the world call their politicians to action. All policy makers share a sense of urgency, and agree that an ambitious and coherent Belgium climate policy is needed. An ambitious discourse is being promoted by the socialist and Green parties in the federal, Brussels and Walloon governments, since the elections of 2019. A sense of urgency is also shared among the political parties that used to adopt a

more climate conservative approach, though they differ in opinion on the extent concrete ambitious targets need to be set, because of doubts regarding their feasibility and affordability, and fear for law suits when targets will not be realised. The Climate Coalition has not succeeded yet in refuting this narrative.

- ²⁵³ While the Climate Coalition has been addressing the lack of transparency in the decision making process of the national climate commission, the failing climate **governance** in Belgium and the lack of an integrated and coherent Belgian NECP, not much progress has been achieved so far. Climate policy in Belgium is complicated by its complex governance structure. Not only does climate policy belong to the competencies of both the regional governments and the federal government, which have different types of government coalitions. Climate policy is in and of itself also a ‘wicked problem’, in that it has multiple causes and solutions that belong to various policy domains and policy levels. In multi-level political systems as Belgium, it appears difficult to move towards a just climate policy and achieve consensus about common positions, despite the fact that high ambitions are being supported by the majority of the political parties. This is reflected in the inter-parliamentary resolutions that have not succeeded in including concrete ambitious targets. It is commonly known that mainly the Flemish government is hesitant in committing to concrete high targets. International literature has pointed that sub-national governments are no longer mere observers in international climate policies but also influential actors, as is the case in Belgium.
- ²⁵⁴ In multi-level political systems as Belgium, a large part of inter-governmental co-operation is triggered by external requirements, mostly European commitments and requirements, as is the case for climate policy. The new European Commission launched its ambitious European Green Deal in december 2019, committing to climate neutrality by 2050. This Green Deal is gradually being operationalised, with member states being obliged to reduce net emissions by at least 55% by 2030 (fir for 55 proramme). The European commission is monitoring the transposition of European policy to national policies and expects countries to implement a set of declarations, for example with regard to the required update of the NECP or the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies. The fact that the federal government agreement refers to the ambition of -55% emission reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050, is to a large extent inspired by the European Green Deal and the pressure of the Green parties. However, the federal government agreement only applies to the federal level. A Belgian statement still is lacking.
- ²⁵⁵ Taking into account the complex nature of climate governance, also at international meetings such as **the COPs**, it is challenging for Belgium to defend ambitious positions. Some **small successes** have been achieved though. The Climate Coalition has had an important role in flagging several declarations to be signed by governments during the COP. The MTR report documented examples of Belgium signing the declaration on gender and on climate refugees (COP24, 2018) and joining the Article 6 coalition that pleas for strong rules for the global carbon markets (COP25, 2019). At COP 25, the federal government (not Belgium) confirmed doubling its initial contribution by making a pledge of 100 million EUR to the Green Climate Fund and confirmed that the funding is additional. At COP26 (2021) in Glasgow, Belgium signed the UK declaration ‘*Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition*’, that formulates a commitment to a clean energy transition, by ending direct public funding for new fossil fuel projects abroad by the end of 2022.
- ²⁵⁶ However, at COP26, Belgium again did not join the High Ambition Coalition, but at least did not block the European Union in doing so. A further increase of the Belgian contribution to international climate finance towards 500 million EUR/year was also not achieved. A small success was the pro-



active role of the Walloon climate minister to join the Scottish initiative and make a symbolic pledge of 1 million EUR to the Loss and Damage fund.

- ²⁵⁷ The contribution by the Climate Coalition to these small successes was assessed as a necessary factor in a broader package of other interventions and factors for the outcome to take place. The Climate Coalition took on a meaningful supportive-informative role in engaging with policymakers (e.g. creating awareness of the issue such as L&D as a third pillar next to adaptation and mitigation), highlighting key declarations for signature at the COP and putting pressure on Belgian policy makers to sign (e.g. stressing the fact that Belgium would become isolated at the EU level). The contribution of the Climate Coalition to the case on Loss and Damage was assessed as more meaningful compared to the case on phasing out fossil fuels.
- ²⁵⁸ Several rival explanations were identified that have played a major role in the positions taken by Belgium, such as leadership and political will of the Walloon climate minister (who took the lead during COP), the pressure of the Green parties in regional and federal governments, actions taken by other CSOs and actors like the Alliance of Small Island States during the COP. The Climate Coalition's long-term and accosting lobby and advocacy over the past 15 years, emphasising each time the same topics, has contributed to increasing awareness among most policymakers about the Climate Coalition's themes and positions, and certainly among Green parties. However, most important contributing factors are Belgium's EU commitments and relations, and the fact that Wallonia itself has been hit by devastating floods during summer 2021, which increased the understanding of the necessity of financing for loss and Damage.
- ²⁵⁹ The PWG is respected by lobby targets for its 'supportive/informative' role. Politicians assessed the information provided by the Climate Coalition as relevant, of high quality and useable. Mainly direct communication (personalised mails, phone contact or meetings) appears to be the most effective means to influence political decision-makers. Indirect communication through media was assessed to have little influence on shaping the opinions of political decision makers or in influencing the political agenda, at least not in direct ways. Mass demonstrations kept the climate debate on the political agenda but appear to have had more effect in influencing the political debate at European level than at Belgian level. Belgian policy makers not agreeing with the positions of the PWG consider the demonstrations as not representative for the general public debate, although research showed that 94% of the Belgians support the European ambition to become climate neutral by 2050. Similarly, companies pushing for ambitious climate policies are played off, by these politicians, against other companies that are slowing down the transition, whose positions are dominant in the discourse of the Federation of Belgian Enterprises (VBO/FEB).
- ²⁶⁰ The ToC was not guiding the L&A process of the Climate Coalition, though was helpful in reconstructing the intervention strategies and identifying assumptions for the evaluation exercise. Assumptions identified during baseline have been confirmed. The PWG manages to access spaces for political dialogue and is able to generate relevant policy input on its coordinated positions. The PWG is correctly

identifying and targeting influential policy makers, though not based on a comprehensive stakeholder and power mapping. The PWG has adaptive ability to respond quickly to changes in the political environment, seize policy windows and can rely on a visible support base that strengthens the legitimacy and leverage of the PWG interventions. The assumption that regional and federal governments would mutually influence each other could only be partially confirmed (no effect on Flemish government). This has not taken place. Although three of the four governments promote a more ambitious climate policy, the Flemish government is blocking.

²⁶¹ Relevant assumptions are lacking that explain the causal linkages between informed and sensitised political decision makers and its impact on policy change, which might have affected the learning potential and adaptive ability to find responses to the status quo. During MTR, additional assumptions have been identified, though not all could be confirmed.

²⁶² It was assumed that having allies in power and having access to highly influential decisionmakers would be conducive for developing a more ambitious climate policy. While the Climate Coalition had smooth access to all climate ministers, including the Flemish minister, and with three out of four climate ministers being from the Green parties, who can be considered as allies of the Climate Coalition, the overall objective of contributing to an ambitious Belgian policy in favour of climate justice has not yet been realised. However, Belgium at least is supporting the European targets of -55% emission reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050, nonetheless the resistance of the Flemish government. Ambitious climate policies have been developed at federal, Brussels and Walloon government levels that reflect several of the concrete positions of the Climate Coalition.

²⁶³ One possible explanation for the low impact of the climate justice L&A on the Flemish government might be related to the narrative that is applied by the PWG. The narrative of the Climate Coalition is not addressing sufficiently the arguments of the Flemish government that just transition measures need to be feasible and affordable. Furthermore, the PWG is hesitant in naming and shaming. It does not bring the debate on these disagreement to the forefront, while pointing out the reasons behind the disagreements and how to address these. Interviewees confirmed that they would like to receive more hands-on input to that regard. The political disagreement is rooted in different visions on the solutions forward and relate to different levels (socio-economic, environmental-technological and social-technological positions). Researchers point out that the dominant approach is to mainstream and 'depoliticize' climate change in order to decrease disagreement, instead of 'repoliticizing' the climate change debate and make contingency, conflict, inequality, ideology and power visible.

The second impact hypothesis “*The internal coordination and capacity building efforts of the PWG strengthen the leverage, credibility and capacity of the PWG and its members*”

²⁶⁴ The climate coalition is an example of a strong coalition and unique in Europe as it unites diverse members from the North-South movement, the environmental movement, the trade unions, youth and civic initiatives. The composition of the coalition and the high level of expertise is highly valorised by lobby targets that perceive the Climate Coalition as a legitimate and credible actor for climate justice advocacy. The Climate Coalition is the primary source of information for most of the lobby targets and invited as the legitimate representative of civic climate justice advocacy at institutionalised meetings and fora where climate justice is being debated. The integration of the PWG into the Climate Coalition has been conducive for strengthening the synergy between the political work and the mobilisations.



- ²⁶⁵ With the growth of the coalition, the relevant decision was taken to invest sufficient time and energy in developing a memorandum that would serve as a guiding tool for the L&A on climate justice. This process has contributed to enhanced respect, trust and confidence between members. Diversity of positions and sensitivities of the different members has been made visible. Compared to the situation at the baseline, the positions of the Climate Coalition have become clearer for all members. Diversity of the coalition is reflected in the ecological, social, educational and international dimensions of climate justice as elaborated in the memorandum, confirming the assumptions related to (i) the ability of the PWG to reach common positions on climate justice issues, and (ii) the ability of individual members of the PWG to transcend their individual interests. The memorandum is the result of a compromise (coordinated positions on climate justice), which is valorised positively by the lobby targets. Individual members complement the L&A of the Climate coalition with their own, often more concrete or more ambitious lobby agenda.
- ²⁶⁶ The coalition is a strong and well-functioning coalition that embraces diversity, that is supported by an appropriate governance structure and that relies on competent members that show collaborative attitude. There is a lack of sufficient resources to strengthen internal communication that is needed to organise an appropriate information flow within the large and diverse coalition it has become, so to keep all members up-to-date on current climate justice issues.
- ²⁶⁷ The PWG coordinators are very committed in completing their tasks, demonstrate diplomatic skills and are able to manage diversity of opinions and expectations of the members. The memorandum enables rapid reaction on current events. PWG and its members are able to adjust and capitalise on changing political and social context. Because of the growing number of members and internal staff changes within member organisations, not all members are fully aware of the past processes, not always sufficient familiar with the memorandum or the decision-making processes (as compared to the baseline and MTR). The limited resources of the Climate Coalition put limits to the opportunities to contribute to knowledge exchange and expertise building. Enhancing knowledge internally within the Climate Coalition as such depends on the initiative of the individual members, which is rather limited. Information sharing takes place bilaterally, between members, but not structurally at the level of the coalition. As documented in the MTR, more systematisation and rationalisation of information flow still is suggested. Members also still ask for more information on the advocacy process. High quality knowledge is available within the Coalition (consistent over the three measurements) and used for the L&A, but less used for internal knowledge building. The assumption regarding the ability of the PWG members to combine their expertise and generate high quality knowledge in the PWG is confirmed with regard to the quality of the memorandum and the coordinated positions, but not confirmed regarding the internal knowledge building among members. The primary objective of the Climate Coalition is climate justice L&A, supported by a broad coalition.
- ²⁶⁸ Lastly, the PWG has no resources available for L&A at European level. This is being done separately by individual members, often through their international branches and through CAN Europe.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PWG AND THE CLIMATE COALITION

With regard to the policy influencing process

²⁶⁹ Lobby and advocacy processes are often erratic and unpredictable. The climate justice lobby has contributed to growing awareness and knowledge of policy makers on a number of topics over the past 15 years. This has not yet led to tangible results in favour of a just and ambitious transition policy. Currently, due to context factors (such as drought, floods, energy crisis) the climate and energy crises have become more visible, which has contributed to a greater sense of urgency and awareness that we are at a point of no return. Various initiatives are also being taken by a number of small and bigger enterprises, moving towards climate neutrality by 2050. It is assumed that in the near future, the climate justice advocacy might reap the benefits from past efforts and push for more breakthroughs. This context presumably sets different expectations for the climate lobby. The evaluation has shown that a reflection about the assumptions regarding causal mechanisms might help to adapt L&A strategies, in order to realise more impact.

1. As recommended in the MTR, the narrative adopted by the Climate Coalition needs to take into account the diversity in opinions and positions. More diversity in narratives will be needed to remain relevant, not only for allies but also among the foes (politicians and public). A narrative to target the Flemish government could refer to science-based data on the real cost of not investing in just transition, or could document that a combination of ecological and economic solutions could go hand in hand and are beneficial for economic development of the regions. It is noted that in the new programme 2022-2026, specific attention will be given to the use of narratives and framing in the policy debates.
2. Although policy influencing takes place on a continuous basis, the L&A interventions of the Climate Coalition are very much concentrated on the period of the COP meetings. However, many policy decisions take place much earlier. Several policy targets commented that the timing of the lobby interventions can be improved and be better aligned with the policy making cycle. For example, the period of budget talks and budget revisions is more suitable to lobby for increased contributions for international climate finance.
3. As documented in the evaluation, a large part of Belgium's climate policy development is triggered by European commitments and requirements. It could be a good idea to shift the focus from the Belgian level to the European level, taking into account the difficulties in pursuing changes at the level of the Flemish government. European networks like CAN Europe also depend on the commitment and contribution of its members.
4. With the Green Deal being implemented, the industry is enhancing its own lobby. Although there are diverse positions within private sector, the position of the Belgian Federation of Enterprises is dominant in slowing down the transition process. As suggested in the MTR, the Climate Coalition can play a role in openly questioning the messages and framing from influential actors in the industry. This is already somehow being done by the spokespersons of the Climate Coalition, more so in the French speaking part of Belgium compared to the Flemish speaking part. It might pay off to openly question the messages of these influential actors, especially also in Flanders, and be more upfront in naming and shaming.



5. The ToC has not been guiding the policy influencing process and was only reconstructed for the purpose of the evaluation. However, a more elaborated ToC, developed from an actor-based approach and based on a political economy analysis, might bring the dynamics between different actors (different political groups, institutions, parliaments, cabinets, etc.) more to the forefront and inform the L&A process. Currently all these parties are put under the same denominator 'policy makers or key decision makers'. Furthermore, relevant assumptions are lacking that explain the causal linkages between informed and sensitised political decision makers and their impact on policy change. Such assumptions are however relevant and important to support adaptive programme management.
6. In the aftermath of the floods in Wallonia, which cost the lives of 42 people and caused significant material damage, the discussion about Loss and Damage gained traction. Both public opinion and politicians are triggered by concrete events. It comes down to also giving a face to the harmful impact of climate change in partner countries. This can be done, for instance, by working with direct testimonies from partner countries and ensuring that, for instance, small-scale farmers and civil society representatives from partner countries can also be present at the COP, preferably in their own country's delegations. Various NGOs that are members of the Climate Coalition can use their network for this purpose.
7. As described in the MTR but highlighted again by policy targets during Endline, the Climate Coalition has a role to play in strengthening the support base among the general public for needed solutions to climate challenges. As such, the technical debates do not only take place in the political arena but also in the society at large. The Climate Coalition is already providing some support to its members in bringing the climate debate alive among their respective support bases, but this remains rather limited and needs to be intensified. Especially when it comes to a transition that is socially fair, policy makers are looking at the Climate Coalition to help operationalise this concept with its members and support bases)

²⁷⁰ Several recommendations that were formulated in the MTR report have been taken forward by 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 in the development and implementation of the new programme 2022-2026, such as the attention given to the use of narratives and framing the debate, bringing and keeping the climate change debate public and transparent, mainly through an increase of the use of social media. Some recommendations did not find a consensus among the different members of the Climate Coalition (e.g. how to interact with politicians and with private sector, balancing confrontational and collaborative approaches), or are difficult to implement taking into account the limited resources (elaborating more concrete and technical proposals, consulting support base and involving them in exploring technical solutions).

With regard to the PWG/Climate Coalition

²⁷¹ The integration of the PWG into the Climate Coalition and the further broadening of the Coalition further galvanises and professionalises the coalition. The coalition seems to be at a tipping point in its life phase where it is evolving from the pioneering phase to a phase that focusses on getting better organised and professionalised. As with organisations, the transition from one life phase to another is often marked by small or large crises. The coordinators of the Climate Coalition, both the PWG coordinators and the coalition coordinator, and day-to-day management have been successful in managing different expectations and interests of the members. Small additional funding could be attracted in 2022 that will be used to improve internal and external communication. Regarding this continuous development process of the Coalition, following recommendations are made.

8. There is general agreement that internal communication needs to be strengthened, as was also recommended in the MTR, and already included as point of attention in the new programme 2022-2026. The evaluators would like to highlight following issues:

- (i) In its communication strategy, the Climate Coalition needs to take into account the frequent staff changes within member organisations and the limited internal knowledge transfer that is taken place at member organisations. Start-up information packages (explaining the procedures, way of working, position developed, contact persons, who is who, etc.) could be development for the interest of new staff members at member organisations or new volunteers in civic driven initiatives.
- (ii) Members need to be kept up-to-date upon the nature, progress and results of the L&A process. For that purpose, it might be relevant to identify clear outcomes of the L&A process by applying -for example- progress markers and report on these progress markers. These will also be useful in monitoring L&A progress. Infographics can be derived from these databases and shared with the members.
- (iii) The decision-making process can be made even more transparent, by sending out the agenda of working groups to all, and making minutes of meeting of working groups available for all. Increasing again the number of general assemblies (or meetings open for all members) can also create space for information exchange and discussion.
- (iv) In their management response on the MTR, 11.11.11 already indicated to intensify its digital communication to diversify and intensify internal communication. The evaluators add to this that choices for digital communication need to be adapted to the practices of the different publics. Youth, for example, seem to make less use of traditional mails and prefer other channels like Slack for example; whereas Slack could be a barrier for 'older' activists.
- (v) Information flow needs to respond to varying needs of the different coalition members. A dashboard approach on the website might be relevant.

9. The expertise and knowledge available within the Coalition is not sufficiently exploited for internal knowledge building, -exchange and networking. Moreover, many members are rather 'silent' members. The drive created during the development of the memorandum, when a lot



of discussions and knowledge exchange took place, could not be maintained. It needs to be further explored what role the Climate Coalition can/wants to take up to that regard, taking into account the available resources (time, people and financially). Furthermore, the Climate Coalition needs to be prepared for internal positions switches with regard to the functions of working group coordinators and spokespersons. It might be relevant to identify interested members who can tag along with lobbyists and spokespersons and be introduced to the existing network of contacts.

10. Lastly, it might be relevant to further broaden the Climate Coalition. The respondents of the e-survey suggested a whole list of possible organisations. The Climate Coalition is not sufficiently inclusive. In particularly target groups that are the first victim of climate change and/or that have interest in the fact that transition should be just and inclusive are under-represented (organisation that work around decolonisation, representatives of the Global South, poverty organisations, etc.). They most probably have also strong ideas and opinions about the way forward and also can mobilise their own support base. Several collaboration options are possible, from expanding membership to engaging in more structural collaboration with other networks and alliances.

5.3 LESSONS LEARNT REGARDING IMPACT EVALUATION OF POLICY INFLUENCING INTERVENTIONS

- ²⁷² Having conducted contribution analyses in both the mid-term and the end-term evaluation, the evaluators confirm that a contribution analysis allows to provide reasonable evidence for the contribution being made by a L&A programme to policy changes. It does so by reducing uncertainty about the contribution of the intervention through an increased understanding of why the observed results have occurred.⁸⁶ In this process, the roles played by the intervention and other internal and external factors are balanced out.
- ²⁷³ The strength of contribution analysis lies specifically in its combined use of various methods and methodologies: desk study, interviews, timeline exercises, outcome harvesting, contribution analysis and process tracing. Building on all these methodologies, contribution analysis allows to make an assessment of the performance of complex programmes like L&A programmes. Rather than providing conclusive evidence for contribution, it comes up with narratives that are both evidence-based and likely to have taken place.

⁸⁶ https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/contribution_analysis

²⁷⁴ At the same time, the evaluators also faced a number of challenges and obstacles, which provide room for learning and reflections about the methodology.

When selecting cases for contribution analysis

Lesson learnt n°1: Be as specific as possible when defining the case (policy change)

²⁷⁵ If one is to determine what type of contribution a certain project has made to a policy change, it is important to identify as specifically as possible the change. What policy change are we talking about? Which documents record the change? Who exactly was involved in the change? For example, rather than defining a case as ‘fossil fuel subsidies at COP26’, it is better to formulate a change (‘the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies’) and to link the change to one or more concrete policy documents (Glasgow Pact, UK statement...). If the change is not identified in a concrete manner, this creates problems when drafting a performance story, as it becomes hard to identify concrete causal mechanisms.

Lesson learnt n°2: Select cases where an actual contribution by the project has taken place

²⁷⁶ It is impossible to find evidence for contributions that have not taken place. It is therefore important to select cases where the project itself is confident that it has had an impact or played a certain role. Contribution analysis is especially interesting when a project’s contribution (project mechanisms) can be compared to a broader package of contributing (f)actors.

When you define various mechanisms that have played a role

Lesson learnt n°3: Timeline exercises may have to be repeated

²⁷⁷ While it is good to kick off a contribution analysis with a timeline exercise combined with outcome harvesting, it is likely that the input that stems from this exercise may not be specific enough the first time. Therefore, in addition to organising a first timeline exercise (which generally provides a good first grasp of the interventions and policy changes), it may be good to organise a follow-up timeline exercise once specific case studies have been selected, in order to go into more detail.

When you collect evidence

Lesson learnt n°4: Be well prepared before speaking to policy makers and resource persons

²⁷⁸ Convincing policy makers and resource persons to grant interviews is not always easy due to packed professional time schedules on their end. Therefore, it is good to propose short timeslots for interviews and make sure that your questions are as targeted as possible. What helps is for the evaluator to reconstruct, before the interview and based on existing M&E data, what contacts have taken place between the interviewee and the project, and which concrete policy initiatives have been discussed. This not only allows the evaluator to be as short as possible during the interview, but it also helps the interviewee to reminisce important details.



Lessons learnt n°5: It is not easy to revise performance stories or add evidence about a change at a later stage

²⁷⁹ While it would be good to revise performance stories and collect extra evidence at a later stage, as the fifth and sixth step of a contribution analysis require, the reality shows that it is hard enough already for policy makers and resource persons to remember what has taken place over the past year, let alone a number of years ago. Therefore, it is difficult to revise performance stories a couple of years after the policy change took place or to collect additional evidence at a later stage.

6 ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: TOR

See separate file



ANNEX 2: EVALUATION FRAMEWORK (REVISED VERSION OCTOBER 2018)

Revised version of the evaluation framework (October 2018)				
Evaluation question	Reference	Indicators / descriptors	Differentiation	
Online survey and narrative interviews with policy makers				
To what extent was the CJP successful in influencing points of view of political decision makers?	Output 8	1a	Outreach: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who knowingly have received information from CJP	Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition parties - ruling parties - administration & diplomats
		1b	Spaces for influencing: Number of meetings with cabinets, ministers, parliamentarians, study services of political parties	
	Outcome 3 & 4	2a	Appreciation of CJP's contributions: Share of national policy makers reached by CJP, who view the information as (scale from 1 to 4: all / majority / minority / nobody) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - relevant - timely - qualitative - usable and perceive CJP members and 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 as legitimate and credible advocates for climate change	Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition parties - ruling parties - administration & diplomats

		2b	Agenda setting⁸⁷: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Number of parliamentary interpellations and questions, proposed resolutions, adopted resolutions and motions introduced by CJP lobby targets that are in line with CJP positions. – Number of amendments by parliamentarians in line with CJP positions. – Number of interventions of the Belgian delegation of decision-makers at the next COPs in line with CJP positions 	Differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - interpellations, resolutions, and motions - amendments - interventions during COPs
	Impact 1 & 2	3	Discursive change⁸⁸: Number of political parties who take-up the CJP positions/terminology/rhetoric/framing in their line of argumentation during the policy preparation phase	Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition parties - ruling parties
	Impact 3	4	Procedural change⁸⁹: Certain institutional procedures are adjusted in line with CJP's priorities Policy change⁹⁰: Belgian Policy in favour of climate justice ⁹¹ <i>Demands related to the following 4 areas (to be differentiated between expect to see/like to see/love to see)</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Ambition and quality of the national energy and climate plan 2030⁹² – Ambition and quality of the interparliamentary climate resolution – Effort sharing⁹³ regulation adopted with room for increase in EU ambition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Belgian national policy – Belgian position in European policy – Belgian position on international policy

⁸⁷ Awareness raising, getting issues on the political agenda (Kamstra, 2017)

⁸⁸ Advocacy targets adopt terminology, rhetoric, and/or framing (Kamstra, 2017)

⁸⁹ Influencing institutional (decision-making) procedures (Kamstra, 2017)

⁹⁰ Actors change their policies related to climate change

⁹¹ Impact three is added in the baseline study to document the current state of affairs. Policy change to be measured at mid-term and endline measurement.

⁹² To be further elaborated: what ambition and what quality

⁹³ This relates to the agreement between the different regional governments with regard to climate ambitions and measure that will be taken and targets set at each of the governance levels. The CJP advocates for an ambitious agenda, which includes that the agreement around this "effort sharing" also is ambitious. CJP does not formulate minimum or maximum expectations regarding this effort sharing.



			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Belgian financial resources for climate finance increase and are ‘additional’⁹⁴ 	
What are the most effective means for influencing political decision makers?	Output 8	5	<p>Relevance of communication channels: Share of national policy makers reached by CJP, who view the following communication channels as relevant (all / majority / minority / nobody):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Indirect communication (media & social media⁹⁵) - Direct formal communication - Direct informal communication 	<p>Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition parties - ruling parties - administration & diplomats
	Outcome 3 & 4	6	<p>Qualitative assessment of relevance of the different forms of communication channels and how they are embedded in the overall policy influencing strategy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – In mid-term evaluation
To what extent do the political decision makers recognize influence of the CJP?	Outcome 3	7	<p>Influence of CJP:- Share of national policy makers who view the CJP platform as influential on their opinion-forming process, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change</p>	<p>Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats – (cabinet & parliament)

⁹⁴ Additional refers to the fact that extra budget for climate finance is foreseen and not taken from the budget for development cooperation.

⁹⁵ Data to be collected & analysed by CJP/11.11.11

		8	Influence of other actors: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who name other actors than CJP as one of the more influential stakeholders on their opinion-forming process	Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats (cabinet & parliament)
To what extent is CJP recognised as a platform with a broad social basis, encompassing trade unions, etc.?	Outcome 3	9	Knowing CJP: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who know the CJP	Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats (cabinet & parliament)
		10	Added value of composition: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who view the specific composition of the CJP (with many different social organisations) as a comparative strength.	Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats (cabinet & parliament)

		Online survey and narrative interviews with CJP members and members of the climate coalition:		
To what extent do the members of CJP view the CJP as their main channel for advocacy on climate justice?	Success factors	11	% of CJP member who use other channels for their advocacy work on climate justice % of CJP members who rank the CJP as their main channel for advocacy work	/
		12	% of CJP members who use the positions of the CJP in communication with national political decision makers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Members which have a policy officer with dedicated time to do climate policy work – Members which do not have a policy officer with dedicated time to do climate policy work
		13	Qualitative description of the strengths and weaknesses of the CJP by the members	/



To what extent are the CJP and its members able to adjust and capitalise on the changing political and social context?	Success factors	14	Qualitative analysis of success and non-success cases (change in policy decision makers' view points) with regard to:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The influence of CJP – Influence of external factors (e.g. Trump decision) – The influence of internal factors (e.g. party politics)
		15	Qualitative analysis of the CJP's activities with regard to the timely internalisation of external events into their activities, especially with regard to the following themes:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Belgian contribution to climate finance – Belgian emissions reduction – Just transition to a zero-carbon society
How are the members of the CJP <i>and the climate coalition</i> cooperating with each other	Outcome 2	16	Qualitative assessment of the quality of the delivered products by CJP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Coordinated positions – Information materials – Events & actions – Created communication channels within the platform
		17	Qualitative assessment by the members about the quality of the coordination of the CJP	/
	Outcome 1	18	Qualitative assessment of synergies between the climate coalition and CJP	/

ANNEX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

Political decision makers and resource persons

	Dutch	Function	French	Function
Administration # 6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Greet Fremout Annemarie Van der Avort Ulrike Lenaerts Marc Velghe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FOD Leefmilieu DGD, deputy director climate and environment DGD, deputy director, climate negotiator VEKA, Vlemish Agency Energy and Climate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Julien Berry Olivier Kassi 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bruxelles environnement, climate and energy advisor AWAC-Agence Wallonne Air et Climat
Parliament # 13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kris Verduykt Caitlin De Muer Chris Steenwegen Johan Malcorps Staf Aerts Robrecht Bothuyne Pieter-Jan Cluyse Amaury Defrere 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Federal parliament – Vooruit Federal parliament – PvdA Flemish parliament – Groen Flemish parliament – Groen Flemish parliament – Groen Flemish parliament – CD&V Study service Open VLD Study service – CD&V 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Severine de Laveleye Melissa Hanus Jean-Philippe Florent François Desquennes Aurélie Czesalski 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Federal parliament – Ecolo Federal parliament - PS Walloon parliament – Ecolo Walloon parliament – Les engages Brussels parliament – MR
Cabinet #8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Alexander Verstraete Bert Van Loon Filip Smet Stijn Caekelberg Yannick Van den Broeck 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Federal– cabinet Kitir (development cooperation) Vooruit Federal cabinet Van der Straeten (energy) CD&V – federal cabinet Van Peteghem (finance) Groen Flemish cabinet Demir (climate) N-VA Flemish cabinet Jambon (minister-president) N-VA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Matthias Bienstman Liesbeth Goosens Nicolas Raimondi 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Federal cabinet Khattabi (climate) Ecolo Federal cabinet Khattabi (climate) Ecolo Brussels Cabinet Maron (climate) Ecolo
Resource persons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wendel Trio Frédérique De Roeck 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Former director CAN Europe Post doc researcher U Ghent -CDO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Frédéric Rohart 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Journalist l’Echo



#6	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tessa Geudens• Kris Bachus• Karen Bens	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Assistant Kathleen Van Brempt (MEP for Vooruit)• Researcher at HIVA KU Leuven – Climate and Sustainable Development• Business Controller Sustainability – Atlas Copco		
----	--	---	--	--

Full list of people contacted

Instelling	Persoon	partij	Status (groen = afgenomen; oranje = pending; rood = geen optie)
	Alexander Verstraete	Adviseur kabinet Kitir – Vooruit	
	Joris Totté	Adviseur kabinet Kitir - Vooruit	
	Nele Roobrouck	Member of NCC Kabinetschef De Croo - OpenVLD	
	Carole van Eyll		
	Tom Vanden Borre	Kabinetschef Tine Van der Straeten - Groen	
	Bert Van Loon	Beleidsadviseur Tine van der Straeten - Groen	
	Minister Khattabi	Ecolo	
	Liesbeth Goossens	Adviseur klimaat Khattabi – Ecolo	
	Matthias Bienstman	Member of NCC Celhoofd klimaat Khattabi – Ecolo	
	Minister Van Peteghem Iemand van dat kabinet?	CD&V	
	Stijn Caekelberg	member NCC Raadgever Klimaat Demir - N-VA	
	Laura Vroonen	Medewerker Omgeving Demir - N-VA	
	Sam Nuel	Demir N-VA	
	Yannick Van den broeck	Beleidsadviseur Energie en Klimaat Jambon - N-VA (also member NCC)	
	Dominique Perrin	Kabinetschef adjoint Henry - Ecolo	No response
	Nicolas Raimondi	Department Climate Change, Environment, Energy, Port of Brussels Alain Maron - Ecolo	
Federaal Parlement	Greet Daems	Federaal parlementslid – PvdA	
	Severine De Laveleye	Federaal parlementslid – Ecolo	
	Kris Verduykt	Federaal parlementslid – Vooruit	
	Bart Peeters	PvdA	
	Caitlin De Muer	Parlementair medewerker PvdA	
	Wim Debucquoy	Fractiemedewerker klimaat en energie - PvdA	No response
	Christaen Leysen	Federaal parlementslid - Open VLD	No response
	Barbara Creemers	Federaal parlementslid - Groen	
	Kim Buyst	Federaal parlementslid - Groen	No response
	Mélissa Hanus	Federaal parlementslid – PS	
	Michelle Haas	Beleidsmedewerker federale fractie - Groen	
Vlaams parlement	Chris Steenwegen	Vlaams parlementslid – Groen	
	Johan Malcorps	Vlaams parlementslid - Groen	
	Robrecht Bothuyne	Vlaams parlementslid - CD&V	
	Bruno Tobback	Vooruit	
	Staf Aerts	Vlaams Parlementslid - Groen	
	Antoine Hermant	Deelstaatsenator - PTB	No response



Waals parlement	Jean-Philippe Florent	Waals parlements lid – Ecolo	
	François Desquennes	Waals parlements lid – Les engagés	
Brussels parlement	Tristan Roberti	Brussels parlements lid – Ecolo	No response
	Christophe De Beukelaere	Brussels parlements lid – Les engagés	No response
	Aurélie Czesalski	MR	
Administratie	Geert Fremout	FOD leefmilieu	
	Peter Wittoeck	FOD Leefmilieu	
	Olivier Kassi	AWAC - Waals Agentschap voor Lucht en Klimaat	
	Julien Berry	Klimaat en energie adviseur bij Bruxelles Environnement/Leefmilieu Brussel	
	Ouafae Salmi	Expert internationaal klimaatbeleid - FOD Leefmilieu	
	Annemarie Van der Avort	Deputy Director Climate and Environment - DGD	
	Ulrik Lenaerts (nieuw toegevoegd)	DGD Deputy Director - Climate Negotiations	
	Marc velghe	VEKA - Vlaamse administratie	
Studiedienst	Arnout Pieters	Climate, Energy, Sustainability Advisor - Vooruit	
	Pieter-Jan Cluyse	Advisor Energy & Environment - Open VLD	
	Annelore Nys	Beleidsmedewerker landbouw, milieu, klimaat, natuur - Groen	
	Amaury Defrere	Adviseur Energie en Klimaat - CD&V	

Members of the Climate Justice Platform and Climate coalition

Instelling	Persoon	organisatie	
kerngroep	Nicolas Van Nuffel (voorzitter)	CNCD/11.11.11	
	Rebecca Thissen	PWG coordinator for CNCD/11.11.11	
	Kiki Berkers	PWG coordinator for 11.11.11	
	Zanna Vanrenterghem (co-voorzitter)	Greenpeace	
	Koen Stuyck	WWF	
	Benjamin Clarysse	BBL	
	Sylvie Meekers	IEW	
	Brede groep	Sacha Dierckx	ABVV/FGTB
		Louise Lebichot	Forum des jeunes
		Bernard Hubeau	Grootouders voor het klimaat
Coordinator	Oliver Mechthold	JNM	
	Pieter vandesype	Bos +	
	Brigitte Gloire	Klimaat en sociale rechtvaardigheid	
	Frédéric Possemiers	Mutualité chrétienne	
	Laurence Rouffart	Rise for Climate	
Coordinator	Jasmijn Defize	Youth for climate	
	John Dams	Coordinator Climate Coalition	



ANNEX 4: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Academic literature

Croeser, E. (2021). What to expect from COP26: climate action, climate justice or greenwashing?. Retrieved from: <https://iiraorg.com/2021/11/05/what-to-expect-from-cop26-climate-actionclimate-justice-or-greenwashing>.

Dupont, C. (2020) Is België te complex voor een effectief klimaatbeleid? Samenleving & Politiek 27 (4). Retrieved from: <https://www.sampol.be/2020/04/is-belgie-te-complex-voor-een-effectief-klimaatbeleid>

Gunningham, N. (2018). Mobilising civil society: Can the climate movement achieve transformational social change. *Interface*, 10 (1-2): 149 - 169

Kythreotis, A. P., Howarth, C., Mercer, T. G., Awcock, H., & Jonas, A. E. (2021). Re-evaluating the changing geographies of climate activism and the state in the post-climate emergency era in the build-up to COP26. *Journal of the British Academy*, 9, 69-93.

KNOCA, Knowledge Network On Climate Assemblies. (June 2021) How does the framing of climate change affect the conclusions reached in climate assemblies. Retrieved from: [Climateoutreach.org](https://climateoutreach.org)

Pidcock, R. et al (2021) Evaluating effective public engagement: local stories from a global network of IPCC scientists. *Climatic change*. 168 (3-4) <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-021-03230-w>

Rietig, K. (2016). The power of strategy: environmental NGO influence in international climate negotiations. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 22(2), 269-288.

Stachowiak, S. (2013) Pathways for Change: 10 Theories to inform Advocacy and policy Change efforts. Retrieved from https://www.orsimpact.com/DirectoryAttachments/132018_13248_359_Center_Pathways_FINAL.pdf

UCL (2018) Belgisch Klimaat-governance. Syntheserapport van reeks academische seminars. Retrieved from: https://klimaat.be/doc/KlimGov_Synth_NL.pdf

Civil society documents

Canopea (2022) Quelle politique climatique belge. Recommendations pour un plan énergie climat.

Greenpeace Belgium (2021) 10 oktober, weer smaen op straat voor het Klimaat. Retrieved from: <https://www.greenpeace.org/belgium/nl/story/24014/10-oktober-weer-samen-op-straat-voor-het-klimaat/>

Klimaatcoalitie (2021) Memorandum voor een Belgische Green New Deal. Retrieved from: <https://www.klimaatcoalitie.be/sites/default/files/documents/MEMORANDUM%20VOOR%20EEN%20BELGISCHE%20GREEN%20NEW%20DEAL.pdf>

Klimaatcoalitie (2021) Aanbevelingen voor de Klimaattop van Glasgow (COP26). Retrieved from: <https://klimaatcoalitie.be/sites/default/files/documents/Aanbevelingen%20COP26%20Klimaatcoalitie.pdf>

Klimaatcoalitie (2022) Briefing NEKP 2023. Retrieved from: https://klimaatcoalitie.be/sites/default/files/documents/NL_Briefing-PNEC%202023-Methodologie%26gouvernance.pdf

Rigot, V. (2013) Loss and damage. Providing assistance to climate victims. CNCD. Retrieved from: <https://www.cncd.be/Loss-and-damage-Providing?lang=fr>

WWF (2019) Fossil fuel subsidies: Hidden impediments on Belgian climate objectives. Retrieved from: <https://wwf.be/sites/default/files/articles/files/WWF-Fossil-fuels-report-FINAL.pdf>

Press articles

AOSIS (2021, November 1) AOSIS Statement at COP26 World Leaders' Summit. Retrieved from: <https://www.aosis.org/aosis-statement-at-cop26-world-leaders-summit/>

Belga (2021, October 21) Cop26: la Chambre approuve à son tour la résolution interfédérale climat. RTBF.be. Retrieved from : <https://www.rtbf.be/article/cop-26-la-chambre-approuve-a-son-tour-la-resolution-interfederale-climat-10865092>

Belga (2021, November 9) Interfederaal akkoord blijft uit op COP26: een schande. De Standaard. Retrieved from: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20211109_97343536

Colman, Z. (2021, April 11) US, UK lead pledge to end overseas oil and gas financing, but with big caveats. Politico. Retrieved from: <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/11/04/us-uk-pledge-end-overseas-oil-gas-financing-519573>

Directorate General for Climate Action (2021, 18 June) The road to COP26: the Bonn Climate Change Conference. Retrieved from: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/news-your-voice/news/road-cop-26-bonn-climate-change-conference-2021-06-18_en



Energy and Climate Change Directorate Scotland (2022, May 20) Scottish Government at COP26: What was achieved? Retrieved from: <https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-government-cop26-achieved/pages/15/>

FOD Buitenlandse Zaken (2022, December 14) België wil wereldwijd meer klimaatambitie. Retrieved from: <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/beleid/beleidsthemas/uitgelicht/belgie-wil-wereldwijd-meer-klimaatambitie>

FOD Buitenlandse Zaken (2022, February 25) De Belgische klimaatfinanciering: significante resultaten, maar onvoldoende voor klimaatuitdagingen. Retrieved from: <https://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/beleid/beleidsthemas/uitgelicht/de-belgische-klimaatfinanciering-significante-resultaten-maar>

Harris, R. (2021, July 27). Floods: Inquiry launched into who knew what, and when. Retrieved from: <https://www.thebulletin.be/floods-inquiry-launched-who-knew-what-and-when>

Heinrichs, P.S. (2021, November 11) Coal @COP26: Ending international public fossil finance. E3G. Retrieved from: <https://www.e3g.org/news/coal-cop26-ending-international-public-fossil-finance-coal-done-oil-and-gas-began/>

Hertogen, E. (2021, Juli 30) Wie vergoedt de klimaatschade in de rest van de wereld? De Morgen. Retrieved from: <https://www.demorgen.be/meningen/wie-vergoedt-de-klimaatschade-in-de-rest-van-de-wereld~b51959d8/>

Hertogen, E. (2021, Juli 31). Dat de Klimaatcrisis hier en nu plaatsvindt, valt niet langer te ontkennen. MO Magazine. Retrieved from: <https://www.mo.be/opinie/dat-de-klimaatcrisis-hier-en-nu-plaatsvindt-valt-niet-langer-te-ontkennen>

Hertogen, E. (2021, November 4). Klimaatfinanciering: essentieel voor de geloofwaardigheid van ons land. Retrieved from: <https://11.be/verhalen/klimaatfinanciering-essentieel-voor-de-geloofwaardigheid-van-ons-land>

HLN (2019, March 29) Kamer verwerpt herziening Grondwet die Klimaatwet mogelijk moest maken. Retrieved from: <https://www.hln.be/binnenland/kamer-verwerpt-herziening-grondwet-die-klimaatwet-mogelijk-moest-maken~a18c3ff41/>

Nakate, V. (2022, September 29) *COP 27: Why is addressing 'loss and damage' crucial for climate justice?* Retrieved from: <https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop27-why-is-addressing-loss-and-damage-crucial-for-climate-justice/>

RFI (2021, November 12). France commits to end global financing of fossil fuels by 2022. Retrieved from: <https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20211112-cop-26-france-commits-to-end-global-financing-of-fossil-fuels-by-2022-oil-gas-coal-renewable-energy-climate>

Rowling, M. (2021, November 13) Climate 'loss and damage' earns recognition but little action in COP26 deal. Reuters. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/climate-loss-damage-earns-recognition-little-action-cop26-deal-2021-11-13/>

Schlitz, S. (2019, October 25) Sous l'impulsion des écologistes et libéraux, la chambre donne un mandat au gouvernement fédéral pour doubler le financement international de la lutte contre le dérèglement climatique. Retrieved from : <https://ecolo.be/actualites/sous-limpulsion-des-ecologistes-et-liberaux-la-chambre-donne-un-mandat-clair-au-gouvernement-federal-pour-doubler-le-financement-international-de-la-lutte-contre-le-dereglement-climatique/>

UN (2021, November 2021) Loss and damage a major demand for Island Nations at COP26. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/ohrrls/news/loss-and-damage-major-demand-island-nations-cop26>

Policy documents

Belgium

Commission de l'énergie, du climat et de la mobilité (2021) Compte rendu intégral. Retrieved from : http://nautilus.parlement-wallon.be/Archives/2020_2021/CRIC/cric199.pdf

Contribution de la Wallonie au Plan National Energie Climat 2030 (2019). Retrieved from : <https://energie.wallonie.be/servlet/Repository/pwec-2030-version-definitive-28-novembre-2019-approuvee-par-le-gw.pdf?ID=57845>

Energie-Klimaatplan 2030 Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest (2019) Retrieved from: https://document.environnement.brussels/opac_css/doc_num.php?explnum_id=9808&_ga=2.182258919.150013271.1664977506-480756082.1664977506

Federal Inventory of Fossil Fuel Subsidies (2021) FOD Finance. Retrieved from: <https://climat.be/doc/ffs-2021-summary.pdf>

Nationaal energie- en klimaatplan België 2021-2030 (2019) Retrieved from: <https://www.nationalenergyclimateplan.be/admin/storage/nekp/nekp-finaal-plan.pdf>

Proposition de résolution 668 interparlementaire du Dialogue interparlementaire pour le Climat en prévision de la COP26 de Glasgow (2021) Retrieved from : http://nautilus.parlement-wallon.be/Archives/2021_2022/RES/668_1.pdf

Regeerakkoord België (2020) Retrieved from : https://www.belgium.be/sites/default/files/Regeerakkoord_2020.pdf

Resolutie over COP26, de Klimaatconferentie van de Verenigde Naties te Glasgow in november 2021. Doc 55 2200/006. Retrieved from: <https://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/55/2200/55K2200006.pdf>



COP26 in Glasgow. Een stap vooruit op weg naar de doelstellingen van de Overeenkomst van Parijs. Retrieved from: <https://klimaat.be/klimaatbeleid/internationaal/klimaatconferenties/2021-COP26-glasgow>

Vlaams energie- en klimaatplan 2021-2030. (2019) Retrieved from: <https://www.vlaanderen.be/publicaties/vlaams-energie-en-klimaatplan-2021-2030-algemeen-kader-voor-de-geintegreerde-nationale-energie-en-klimaatplannen>

Europe

Council Conclusions - Preparations for the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meetings (Glasgow, 31 October - 12 November 2021) (2021) Retrieved from: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12594-2021-INIT/en/pdf>

REGULATION (EU) 2018/1999 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action. Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018R1999&from=EN>

United Nations

Glasgow Climate Pact (2021) Decision /CP.26 Retrieved from: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop26_auv_2f_cover_decision.pdf

Statement on international public support for the Clean Energy Transition (2021) Retrieved from: <https://ukcop26.org/statement-on-international-public-support-for-the-clean-energy-transition/>

Websites

- www.caneurope.org/
- <https://www.frdo-cfdd.be>
- www.11.be
- www.cncd.be
- www.klimaatcoalitie.be
- <https://climateoutreach.org>
- <https://www.dekamer.be/>

https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2018.06.25_statement_ggg_climat.pdf

Uit de beknopte verslagen van de Commissie Energie, Leefmilieu en Klimaat: interpellaties en mondelinge vragen

[09-03-21](#)

Vraag van Christophe Bombled aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De stijging van de CO2-uitstoot" (55015011C)

- Christophe Bombled (MR): In 2020 is de broeikasgasuitstoot met 7 % gedaald als gevolg van de lockdown. In december 2020 lag de uitstoot alweer hoger dan het niveau in december 2019. Hoe analyseert u de recente studies, vijf jaar na het klimaatakkoord van Parijs en enkele maanden vóór de COP 26? Welke initiatieven worden er op het Belgische en Europese niveau ontwikkeld ter voorbereiding van deze top? Wat is het tijdspad voor de bepaling van het Belgische en het Europese standpunt?

[30-03-21](#)

Vraag van Séverine de Laveleye aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De klimaatfinanciering" (55015973C)

Séverine de Laveleye (Ecolo-Groen): Het voorzitterschap van de COP 26 organiseert op 31 maart een ministeriële top over klimaat en ontwikkeling. Tot de discussieonderwerpen behoren de kwantiteit, de kwaliteit en de samenstelling van de klimaatfinanciering. België werd niet op die vergadering uitgenodigd. Niettemin voorziet het Akkoord van Parijs in de goedkeuring tegen 2025 van een nieuw jaarlijks streefcijfer voor de klimaatfinanciering met een ondergrens van 100 miljard euro.

België heeft zich tot een jaarlijkse bijdrage van 50 miljoen euro verbonden en die verbintenis is op 31 december 2020 verstreken. 50 miljoen euro per jaar is in het licht van de verantwoordelijkheid en de capaciteit van ons land geen billijke bijdrage aan de gemeenschappelijke internationale doelstelling. Bovendien groeit dat bedrag niet en vormt het geen aanvulling, in tegenstelling tot wat er op internationaal niveau overeengekomen werd. In werkelijkheid komen de toegewezen middelen bijna uitsluitend uit de Belgische begroting voor ontwikkelingshulp. België moet nu in de aanloop naar de COP 26 in Glasgow een nieuwe bijdrage aankondigen. Hoe staat het met de nationale onderhandelingen over de klimaatfinanciering? Hoeveel is het federale niveau bereid daartoe bij te dragen?

[11-05-21](#)

Vraag van Kurt Ravyts aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De nieuwe ambitieuzere Belgische doelstelling i.v.m. de internationale klimaatfinanciering" (55016289C)

Kurt Ravyts (VB): Na kritiek van ngo's dat België zijn beloftes aangaande internationale klimaatfinanciering niet of onvoldoende nakomt, twitterde de minister op 31 maart dat ze 12 miljoen euro extra zal vrijmaken en dat ze met de regio's zal overleggen over een nieuwe ambitieuze doelstelling. Van de 100 miljoen euro die op federaal niveau voor internationale klimaatfinanciering is begroot, komt 12 miljoen euro niet uit de pot van



Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. De ngo's vragen echter een jaarlijkse bijdrage van 500 miljoen of zelfs 1 miljard euro.

Heeft de minister plannen om de bijdrage van België in aanloop naar de COP26 in Glasgow nog op te vijzelen? Zal ze daarvoor haar regionale collega's onder druk zetten in de Nationale Klimaatcommissie? Zijn de gesprekken al gestart? Met welke timing?

Vraag van Kurt Ravyts aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De uitwerking van een groene financieringsstrategie" (55016292C)

Kurt Ravyts (VB): Wat is de stand van zaken van de groene financieringsstrategie om de financiële sector te begeleiden bij het afstemmen van haar activiteiten op de Belgische klimaatdoelstellingen? Hoeveel staan de inventaris van de subsidies voor fossiele brandstoffen en het actieplan om ze geleidelijk af te schaffen? Wat is het tijdspad?

[08-06-21](#)

Vraag van Bert Wollants aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De stand van zaken m.b.t. de hervorming van de Nationale Klimaatcommissie" (55017541C)

Bert Wollants (N-VA): De interparlementaire klimaatresolutie voorzagt in een verbetering van de governance, onder meer door de herziening van het samenwerkingsakkoord van 2002. In de beleidsnota van de minister worden meer transparantie en efficiëntie en een sterkere democratische controle van de Nationale Klimaatcommissie (NKC) in het vooruitzicht gesteld. De werkzaamheden van de werkgroep governance blijken echter niet echt te vlotten en in het laatste verslag van december 2020 is er enkel nog sprake van de verhouding tussen de NKC en de overleggroep ENOVER. Vond er al overleg plaats met de gewestministers over de hervorming? Welke vorm zal die aannemen? Zal het samenwerkingsakkoord van 2002 effectief worden herzien? Zal het proces binnen de werkgroep opnieuw op gang worden gebracht? Welke andere stappen zal de minister nemen en wat is het tijdspad?

Samengevoegde vragen van

- Bert Wollants aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De OESO-speech van de minister inzake de inventaris van de subsidies voor fossiele brandstoffen" (55017544C)
- Kurt Ravyts aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De federale inventaris van de subsidies voor fossiele brandstoffen" (55017912C)

Bert Wollants (N-VA): In een speech voor de OESO gaf de minister aan dat alle subsidies voor fossiele brandstoffen in kaart worden gebracht. Is die oefening intussen afgerond? Zijn de gegevens publiek beschikbaar? Wat zijn de belangrijkste vaststellingen? Welke steun wordt toegekend aan de verschillende soorten fossiele

brandstoffen? Zal de minister prioritair de steun afbouwen voor brandstoffen met de grootste klimaatimpact? Welk tijdspad zal daarbij worden gevolgd?

Kurt Ravyts (VB): De FOD's Financiën en Volksgezondheid stelden een rapport op in uitvoering van een Europese verordening inzake governance en het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan (NEKP). In een eerste fase worden de bestaande directe en indirecte subsidies voor fossiele brandstoffen in kaart gebracht. Volgens het onderzoek gaat het om 11,2 miljard euro aan directe subsidies en 2,1 miljard euro aan indirecte subsidies voor het jaar 2019. Wat zal het vervolgtraject zijn? Kan de minister een toelichting geven bij het actieplan om de subsidies geleidelijk te laten uitdoven? Wat is daarvoor het tijdspad? In welke zin zal rekening worden gehouden met de sociale doelstellingen van bepaalde subsidies?

Vraag van Greet Daems aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "Het memorandum van de Klimaatcoalitie" (55017583C)

Greet Daems (PVDA-PTB): De Klimaatcoalitie publiceerde onlangs een nieuw memorandum met haar eisen voor een Belgische Green Deal. Met welke daarvan zal de minister rekening houden: het optrekken van de Europese klimaatdoelstelling, een bindend kader voor de industrie, die haar eigen transitie moet betalen, het optrekken van de overheidsinvestering, een eerlijker transitie via de fiscaliteit of de uitsluiting van biobrandstoffen op basis van voedsel- en landbouwgewassen? Op welke manier wordt het memorandum van de Klimaatcoalitie meegenomen tijdens de klimaattafels en de nationale conferentie voor een rechtvaardige transitie?

Vraag van Greet Daems aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De COP 26" (55017584C)

Greet Daems (PVDA-PTB): In november 2021 vindt de klimaatconferentie COP 26 plaats. De EU moet daar, net als de andere deelnemers, opnieuw haar klimaatdoelstellingen voor 2030 en 2050 indienen. Naast het verhogen van de doelstellingen zullen andere zaken worden besproken, zoals de steun aan ontwikkelingslanden, het operationaliseren van de internationale koolstofmarkt conform artikel 6 en de middelen voor het loss-and-damagemechanisme. Wat is de huidige positie van ons land voor COP 26? Wat zullen onze engagementen zijn in het kader van de internationale klimaatfinanciering en de steun aan arme landen? Wat is ons standpunt over de operationalisering conform artikel 6 en over het loss-and-damagemechanisme, dat in schadevergoeding voorziet voor arme landen die zich niet kunnen aanpassen aan de gevolgen van de klimaatverandering?

Vraag van Christophe Bombled aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "Het samenwerkingsakkoord over de veiling van emissierechten" (55018581C)

Christophe Bombled (MR): Het jongste samenwerkingsakkoord over de veiling van uitstootquota betreft de periode 2013-2020. In een nieuw akkoord voor de periode 2021-2030 zal de verdeling van de ontvangsten uit de veilingen geregeld moeten worden, maar zal er ook een breder kader voor de doelstellingen en de controle erop bepaald moeten worden. Dat akkoord zou vóór de COP 26 in november gesloten worden. Hoe staat het met de werkzaamheden om tot een samenwerkingsakkoord te komen? Heeft de vergadering van de Nationale Klimaatcommissie en de overleggroep plaatsgevonden zoals gepland? Wat zullen de volgende stappen zijn? Mag men vóór de COP 26 een akkoord verwachten? Is de doelstelling om vóór die datum tot een akkoord te komen houdbaar?



[13-07-21](#)

Vraag van Kris Verduyck aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De voorbereidingen van de COP26" (55019346C)

Kris Verduyck (Vooruit): COP26 is een uitgestelde COP, want vorig jaar heeft er geen plaatsgevonden. Het prangende klimaatthema staat op steeds meer internationale agenda's. Hoever staat België met de voorbereidingen voor de COP26? Wat zijn de belangrijkste knopen die daar moeten worden doorgehakt? Is er al meer duidelijkheid over de organisatie en over wie er vertegenwoordigd zal zijn?

Vraag van Greet Daems aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De internationale klimaatfinanciering" (55019876C)

Greet Daems (PVDA-PTB): Op 18 juni kondigde de minister samen met minister Kitir een verhoging aan van de federale bijdrage aan de internationale klimaatfinanciering. Het gaat hier slechts om 12 miljoen euro per jaar, veel te weinig in verhouding tot wat België als historische uitstoter jaarlijks zou moeten bijdragen aan de internationale klimaatfinanciering. Volgens het middenveld zou dit jaarlijks minstens 500 miljoen euro moeten zijn. Vanwaar de dubbele aankondigingspolitiek en die lage federale bijdrage? Is er al zicht op een nieuw akkoord over de Belgische bijdrage aan de internationale klimaatfinanciering met het oog op de COP26?

Vraag van Bert Wollants aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De evolutie van de burden sharing voor de periode 2021-2030" (55019891C)

Bert Wollants (N-VA): Het huidige voorzitterschap van de Nationale Klimaatcommissie voert voorbereidende bilaterale gesprekken en in dit Huis gaan stemmen op om die voor de start van de COP in Glasgow af te ronden. Die timing lijkt me scherp. Wat is de tijdlijn? Welke stappen moeten leiden tot een akkoord over de burden sharing? Wanneer starten de gesprekken tussen de vier entiteiten hierover?

Vraag van Kurt Ravyts aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De stand van zaken betreffende de transparantie van de werking van de Nationale Klimaatcommissie" (55020531C)

Kurt Ravyts (VB): Hoewel de minister volgens haar beleidsverklaring de transparantie van de Nationale Klimaatcommissie wil verbeteren, worden de notulen van de vergaderingen nog steeds niet openbaar gemaakt. Op 28 juni 2021 werd beslist om tijdens de volgende vergadering de publicatie van documenten op de site te bespreken. Welke stappen heeft de minister genomen om de transparantie te verbeteren? Kunnen wij grondigere verslagen krijgen van de bijeenkomsten van de NKC in plaats van de huidige, zeer summierse

beslissingsverslagen?

[21-09-21](#)

Vraag van Wouter Raskin aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De concrete voorstellen van de regering om de CO2-uitstoot te verminderen" (55020041C)

Wouter Raskin (N-VA): Binnenkort start in Glasgow de klimaattop COP 26. Tegen 30 september zouden alle ministers hun voorstellen om de uitstoot van CO2 terug te dringen, op tafel moeten leggen. Welke regeringsleden hebben hun voorstellen al bezorgd en wat houden zij in?

Samengevoegde vragen van

- Greet Daems aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "Burden sharing" (55020810C)

- Bert Wollants aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De stand van zaken betreffende de burden sharing voor de periode 2021-2030" (55020493C)

- Kurt Ravyts aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De Belgische klimaat- en energiedoelstellingen voor de periode 2021-2030" (55020530C)

Greet Daems (PVDA-PTB): In november moeten de landen op de COP 26 in Glasgow hun klimaatambities voorleggen. De minister heeft het voornemen om vóór de start van de klimaattop met de Gewesten een akkoord te bereiken over de verdeling van onze klimaatinspanningen. Zal dat lukken? Krijgen wij een transparant overzicht van de ambities?

Bert Wollants (N-VA): De minister verklaarde eerder al dat de timing om nog voor de COP 26 tot een akkoord te komen, niet evident is. Heeft zij de onderhandelingsvoorstellen van de voorzitter van de Nationale Klimaatcommissie, Waals milieuminister Henry, al ontvangen? Is er al een kalender opgesteld voor de onderhandelingen?

Kurt Ravyts (VB): De minister wil voor de COP 26 in Glasgow een akkoord kunnen sluiten rond een intra-Belgische samenwerkingsovereenkomst. Een eerste gezamenlijke plenaire vergadering van de Nationale Klimaatcommissie en de administraties was gepland op 21 mei 2021. Wat is de stand van zaken met betrekking tot de Belgische klimaat- en energiedoelstellingen? Valt het nieuwe akkoord terug op het huidige, dat verlopen is? Zo niet, over welke andere thema's moet er dan een akkoord worden gesloten?

Samengevoegde vragen van

- Kurt Ravyts aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De bezorgdheid rond een voldoende inclusieve UNFCCC COP 26" (55020407C)

- Greet Daems aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "De COP 26" (55020812C)

- Kurt Ravyts (VB): Het Climate Action Network vraagt zich af of de COP 26 in Glasgow wel voldoende inclusief zal zijn en stelt daarom een uitstel van de klimaattop voor. Er zouden immers te veel deelnemers uit de landen van het Zuiden niet kunnen deelnemen omdat ze op de rode lijst van COVID-19 zouden staan. De VN wil echter



van geen uitstel weten en zal indien nodig de vaccins en de hotelkosten ten gevolge van quarantaine betalen. Wat is de visie van de minister?

- Greet Daems (PVDA-PTB): Meer dan 1.000 ngo's dringen aan op uitstel van de COP 26 omdat er door de wereldwijde vaccinatieapartheid onvoldoende vertegenwoordigers uit het Zuiden zouden kunnen deelnemen. Steunt de minister die eis? Is ze voorstander van de operationalisering van artikel 6 over de installatie van een wereldwijde koolstofmarkt? Steunt ze de oproep van meer dan 2.000 wetenschappers voor een non-proliferatieverdrag voor fossiele brandstoffen?

Samengevoegde vragen:

- Séverine de Laveleye aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "Het jongste verslag van het IPCC" (55020250C)
- Kim Buyst aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "Het zesde IPCC-rapport" (55020352C)
- Daniel Senesael aan Zakia Khattabi (Klimaat, Leefmilieu, Duurzame Ontwikkeling en Green Deal) over "Het zesde rapport van het IPCC" (55020795C)


Séverine de Laveleye (Ecolo-Groen): We hebben een rampzalige zomer achter de rug: dodelijke overstromingen, de warmste maand juli sinds het begin van de metingen en talloze brandhaarden over de hele wereld. Op 9 augustus heeft het IPCC het eerste deel van zijn zesde rapport gepubliceerd. Het vorige dateerde van 2014. In dat rapport wordt de verantwoordelijkheid van de mens voor de opwarming buiten alle twijfel verheven. Die opwarming is overigens wereldwijd aan de gang en laat overal haar sporen na. De drempel van 1,5°C opwarming nadert met rasse schreden. Het IPCC stelt vijf scenario's voor. In slechts twee daarvan zal de temperatuur van de aarde in de 21ste eeuw met niet meer dan 1,5°C stijgen. In die scenario's wordt er rekening gehouden met een drastische vermindering van de broeikasgasuitstoot. Het politieke antwoord moet even daadkrachtig zijn. We hebben geen andere keuze. Welke lessen trekt de regering daaruit? Wat zijn op korte termijn de gevolgen voor de aangegane verbintenissen en de genomen maatregelen? Wat zal de invloed zijn van dit rapport op de nationale voorbereiding van de COP 26?

Kim Buyst (Ecolo-Groen): Het Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)-rapport, dat in augustus al deels werd voorgesteld, luidt de alarmbel voor de mensheid, die verantwoordelijk is voor de opwarming van de aarde, de oceanen en de atmosfeer. De gevolgen laten zich sneller voelen dan verwacht en de opwarming evolueert ook alsnog sneller. Welke lessen trekt de regering uit dat klimaatrapport? Hoe verloopt onze voorbereiding op de komende klimaatop? Beïnvloedt dit rapport onze voorbereiding op een of andere manier?

Daniel Senesael (PS): Het IPCC heeft zijn zesde evaluatierapport Climate Change 2021 gepubliceerd. De daarin geformuleerde vooruitzichten met betrekking tot de stijging van de lucht- en oceaantemperatuur, het afsmelten van de gletsjers en de extreme gevolgen daarvan zijn rampzalig. Wat is uw mening over het rapport? In november zal in Glasgow de COP 26 plaatsvinden. Wat zal de impact van het IPCC-rapport zijn op de ambities die wij daar zullen verdedigen?

ANNEX 5: RECONSTRUCTED TOC

Theory of Change:
Climate Justice Platform 11.11.11 en
CNCD/11.11.11



Sphere of control
Inputs:
The financial, human, and material resources used for the development intervention (DAC/OECD)

Sphere of control
Activities:
Actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, technical assistance and other types of resources are mobilized to produce specific outputs (DAC/OECD)

Sphere of control
Outputs:
The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention (DAC/OECD)

Sphere of influence
Outcomes:
The direct benefits on the level of the beneficiaries realized through the intervention objectives (European Commission)

Sphere of interest
Impacts:
Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended (DAC/OECD)

ANNEX 6: RECONSTRUCTED TIMELINE OF KEY ACTIVITIES FOR INFLUENCING BELGIAN CLIMATE POLICY BY PWG, 11.11.11 & CNCD/11.11.11

<i>2020 (Transitional government till October 2020 when new government came in place, Corona crisis since March)</i>		
7 October 2020	Hearing in the inter-parliamentary climate commission	3
7 October 2020	Email to Parliamentarians Climate Commissions with information about campagne financement climat et nouvelle contribution belge avant la fin de l'année	2
19 October 2020	Online meeting with Get Up Wallonia and Cabinet Henry about reconstruction post-Covid-19	2
October 2020	Petition demanding the Belgian government to increase its contribution to international climate finance (1.431 signatures) (11.11.11)	8
22 October 2020	Meeting FOD economy – on biofuels	2
26 October 2020	Email to Henry, Maron, Khattabi with interpellation quant à la campagne financement climat et une nouvelle contribution belge avant la fin de l'année	2
27 November 2020	Press release: Climate coalition organises longest climate protest ever (announcing 60 hrs of protest)	1
27 November 2020	Email to De Croo, Henry, Maron, Demir, Khattabi about 'La Belgique doit rehausser sa contribution au financement climat international'	1
30 November – 2 December 2020	60 hours of protest (online) to demand an emission reduction of -60 % by 2030	8
20 November 2020	Press release: The Climate Coalition enlists the help of Sinterklaas	1
1 December 2020	Email to Climate Parliamentarians (IP Commission Climate) about amelioration substantielle de la gouvernance climatique en Belgique	2
3 December 2020	Meeting with Zakia Khattabi and Cabinet Khattabi (Rabab Khairy and Cedric Chevalier) about Transition juste and Sondage CNCD-11.11.11	2
4 December 2020	Meeting with Henry and Tellier about Get Up Wallonia	2
4 December 2020	Meeting with Task Force Environment Get Up Wallonia	2
7 December 2020	Handing over letters to prime minister De Croo demanding for more ambition	8
7 December 2020	Press release: St. Nicholas and Climate Coalition paid a visit to the prime minister	1
11 December 2020	Press release: European climate ambition: important step but no big party on the European decision for -55% emission reduction by 2030	1
15 December 2020	Meeting with cabinet Henry (Dominique Perrin) about climate financing	2
October 2020 – December 2020	3 meetings with FRDO	3

2021		
26 January 2021	Audition Wallon Parliament (commission questions européennes) – European Green Deal	3
10 February 2021	Meeting Alexander Verstraete (Vooruit, cabinet Kitir): follow-up engagement international climate finance by federal government	2
12 February 2021	Meeting Greet Daems (PvdA -MP): presentation priorities climate coalition	2
17 February 2021	Meeting Liesbeth Goossens (Ecolo, cabinet Khattabi): follow-up engagement international climate finance by federal government	2
10 March 2021	Phone call to Samuel Cogolati about Ecocide	2
12 March 2021	Meeting with J-P Florent (Ecolo) about political priorities and interparliamentary resolution COP 26	2
25 March 2021	Meeting Severine De Laveleye (Ecolo, MP): interparlementarian resolution COP26	2
26 March 2021	Mail to parliamentarians climate commissions from each parliament with briefing on sommet ministériel ‘Climat et développement’ of 31 March and parliamentary questions	2
30 March 2021	Email to Climate Ministers with Memorandum of the Climate Coalition	2
31 March 2021	Participation in parliamentary event “a Belgian green new deal”	3
31 March 2021	Input for journalist resulting in article in de Morgen on lack of Belgian ambitions to international climate finance	1
20 April 2021	Mail to Thomas Dermine (Secretary of State) with input on plan de relance	2
21 April 2021	Meeting minister Khattabi (Ecolo): presentation memorandum climate coalition	2
26 April 2021	Debate organized by 11.11.11 with young politicians on climate justice	3
27 April	Meeting with cabinets Maron and Trachte with presentation of memorandum	2
7 May 2021	Meeting Stijn Caekelbergh and Sam Nuel (cabinet Demir), Luc Peeters (VEKA): presentation memorandum climate coalition	2
20 May 2021	Email to parliamentarians of climate commission with input for the drafting of IP resolution COP 26	2
21 May 2021	Letter from CAN Europe to prime minister De Croo	2
10 June 2021	Email to climate cabinets and administrations with new report of CARE about financing	2
16 June 2021	Meeting Kris Verduyck (Vooruit, MP): interparlementarian resolution COP26	2
18 June 2021	Mails to Kris Verduyck and Bruno Tobback (Vooruit, MP), Chris Steenwegen (Groen, VL MP), Kim Buyst (Groen, MP), Wim Debucquoy (PvdA assistent MP), Robrecht Bothuyne (CD&V VL MP): input and discussion amendements on new climate resolution COP 26	2
25 June 2021	Meeting with PS collaborators about interparliamentary resolution COP 26	2
28 June 2021	Meeting with cabinet Philippe Henry with presentation Memorandum	2
may-june 2021	Several formal and informal contacts with Kris Verduyck (Vooruit, MP), Robrecht Bothuyne (CD&V, VL MP), Wim Debucquoy (PvdA assistent MP), Chris Steenwegen (Groen, VL MP), Bruno Tobback (Vooruit, VL MP), Kim Buyst (Groen, MP), Patrick Dewael (Open VLD, MP): interparliamentary dialogue on climate resolution COP26	2
7 September 2021	Meeting Alexander Verstraete (Vooruit, cabinet Kitir): follow-up engagement international climate finance by federal government	2
13 September 2021	Meeting Minister Van Peteghem (CD&V): presentation memorandum climate coalition	2
23 September 2021	Meeting cabinet Demir (Stijn Caekelbergh, Laura vroomen: International climate finance	2
29 September 2021	Meeting minister Khattabi and member of staff (Liesbeth Goossens) + FOD environment (Geert Fremout): FRDO advice on COP26	2
6 October 2021	Meeting minister Van Der Straeten and member of staff (Tom Vanden Borre, Bert Van Loon): FRDO advice on COP26	2
6 October 2021	Meeting minister Zakia Khattabi and assistants on federal climate plan	2

8 October 2021	Opinion on website 11.11.11 on the Belgian position on international climate finance	1
10 October 2021	Back to the Climate: large mobilization – climate march	8
13 October 2021	Phone call to Simon Moutqin (Ecolo) about Rapport Conseil de l'Europe Droit à un environnement sain	2
14 October 2021	Mail to Climate Ministers and Parliamentarians with position COP 26	2
15 October 2021	Letter to minister Khattabi and cabinet (Liesbeth Goossens and Matthias Bienstman): recommendations of climate coalition to COP26	2
15 October 2021	Letter to cabinet Demir and cabinet: recommendations of climate coalition to COP26	2
15 October 2021	Mailing to all MP federal parliament: recommendations of climate coalition to COP26	2
15 October 2021	Mailing to all MP of Flemish parliament: recommendations of climate coalition to COP26	2
20 October 2021	Mail to Climate Ministers with briefing on financement climat international (COP26)	2
21 October 2021	Meeting Kris Verduykt (Vooruit, MP): position climate coalition on COP 26	2
22 October 2021	Meeting Johan Malcorps and Chris Steenwegen (Groen, MP): position climate coalition on COP 26	2
26 October 2021	Article on website 11.11.11 to inform the general public on COP26	1
27 October 2021	Meeting with Belgian EU delegation about Fit for 55	2
28 October 2021	Informal meeting Kris Verduykt (Vooruit, MP): informing on the Belgian position during COP26 negotiations	2
29 October 2021	Article on website 11.11.11 on Belgian ambitions for COP26	1
2 November 2021	Meeting prime minister De Croo (Open VLD): position climate coalition on COP 26	2
2 November 2021	Article on website 11.11.11: on COP 26 (focus on debt cancellation)	1
4 November 2021	Article on website 11.11.11: on COP 26 (focus on climate finance)	1
4 November 2021	Meeting with Minister of Energy Tine Vander Straeten on COP 26 and positions of Climate Coalition	2
6 November 2021	Meeting Laura Vronen (cabinet Demir): International climate finance	2
8 November 2021	Meeting with MP: Chris Steenwegen, Sarah Mathieu, Severine Delavaley, Christian Leysen, Michelle Hanus: interparliamentary dialogue on the Flemish position during COP26	2
8 November 2021	Meeting minister Kitir (Vooruit): on COP26 with focus on climate finance, loss and damage (incl. linkages with debt alleviation and humanitarian aid)	2
9 November 2021	Meeting with Minister Alain Maron about COP 26 and positions of Climate Coalition	2
9 November 2021	Meeting with Minister Philippe Henry about COP 26 and positions of Climate Coalition	2
10 November 2021	Meeting with Bart Peeters (PvdA, MP): analysis policy Kitir	2
10 November 2021	Meetings Minister Demir (V-VA): Flemish position on COP26 and fossil fuel subsidies	2
10 November 2021	Meeting Christian Leysen (Open VLD, MP, president of parliamentary climate coalition): position climate coalition on COP 26	2

1-10 November 2021	Meeting FOD environment Peter Wittoeck: informal exchanges during COP26	2
11 November 2021	Meeting with Meyrem Almaci and Rajae Maouane Ecolo-Groen about COP 26 and positions of Climate Coalition	2
11 November 2021	Meeting with Paul Magnette about COP 26 and positions of Climate Coalition	2
11 November 2021	Meeting with Georges Louis Bouchez about COP 26 and positions of Climate Coalition	2
14 November 2021	Press release climate coalition: evaluation COP26	1
26 November 2021	Article on website 11.11.11 Evaluation of COP26	1
? November 2021	Hearing in senate on Belgian governance, climate act and state reform	3
30 November	Phone call to cabinet Dermine on gouvernance climatique (centre d'excellence climat)	2
1 December 2021	Meeting Griet Daems and assistant (PvdA, MP): on agro-fuels and loss and damage	2
2 December 2021	Meeting with political advisor PS about gouvernance climatique	2
17 December 2021	Input on DGD policy note Worldbank, chapter climate	2
May – September 2021	7 meetings FRDO	3

ANNEX 7: CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS – ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE AND THE EXPLAINING MECHANISMS

REF Framework Fossil Fuels Case

Type of causal mechanism	Identified mechanism	What does the evidence say?	Does evidence confirm or refute the mechanism?	Strength of evidence for causal mechanism ⁹⁶	Likelihood that mechanism took place based on collected evidence
Project mechanisms	Direct communication (advocacy) based on Memorandum to inform and sensitise politicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk study confirms that the Memorandum calls for abolishment of fossil fuel subsidies and disinvestment of public funds in fossil fuel. - Interview with Climate Coalition shows that around time of the launch of the Memorandum, a virtual lunch was organised for all members of relevant commissions and parties (40 parliamentarians) - M&E material of the Climate Coalition confirms that meetings have been held with cabinet Khattabi and Maron in April 2021, cabinet Demir in May 2021, cabinet Henry in June 2021, cabinet Van Peteghem in September 2021 to present the Memorandum 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened
	Direct communication (advocacy) around interparliamentary resolution to inform and sensitise politicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - M&E data show that meetings took place with parliamentarians on both Flemish and Walloon side about the upcoming inter-parliamentary resolution about COP26 - Interviews with Flemish and Walloon parliamentarians confirm that they held meetings with the Coalition about the parliamentary resolution, especially to draw red lines of what should pass eventually - Interview with Walloon parliamentarian confirms that there was extensive exchange in lead-up to interparliamentary resolution - Desk study confirms that the adopted inter-parliamentary resolution (October 2021) mentions the need to disinvest public resources in fossil fuel subsidies 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened

⁹⁶ Weak = One or a limited number of unilateral oral sources with limited credibility; Moderate = Various oral sources with limited credibility or one oral source with high credibility; Strong = Written sources that can be verified or various oral sources with high credibility.

	Direct communication (advocacy) about COP26 recommendations to inform and sensitise politicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk study confirms that the Recommendations call for a progressive abolishment of fossil fuels and phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies. - M&E material of the Climate Coalition confirms that an email has been sent and at least 3 meetings have been held about this document with parliamentarians. - During interviews conducted by the evaluators, a number of cabinets confirm that they have received and read these recommendations. 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened
	Climate March pushes politicians to be more ambitious	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Websites of members of the Climate Coalition (e.g. Natuurpunt, Greenpeace...) mention that the 2021 Climate March calls for the phase out of fossil fuels. - A number of interviewees (parliamentarians and cabinet members), especially on the left side of the political spectrum, confirm that the climate marches in general put pressure on decision-makers (also at European level) to act and be more ambitious. There was no specific mention of the 2021 Climate March. 	Confirming	Moderate	Somewhat likely
	Direct communication (formal and informal lobby) during the COP26 to inform politicians and flagging the importance of the declaration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - M&E data show that informal exchanges took place during the COP26 with Peter Wittoeck and his delegation - M&E data show that formal exchanges took place during the COP26 with the climate ministers - Interview with Climate Coalition confirms that they nudged decision-makers to make them aware about the UK Statement 	Confirming	Moderate	Somewhat likely
Cooperating mechanisms	L&A done by WWF (including study on fossil fuel subsidies) informs and sensitises politicians to take into account their positions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk study confirms that WWF was the first one to write a report with an inventory of fossil fuel subsidies in Belgium - Mid-term evaluation confirms the role of WWF on fossil fuels 	Confirming	Moderate	Somewhat likely
Rival mechanisms	A European Regulation of 2018 puts pressure on EU member states to phase out fossil fuel subsidies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk study confirms that the European regulation (2018/19991) requires from EU member states to phase out fossil fuels. - Interview with European stakeholders (CAN Europe, European parliamentarian) confirm that the need to phase out of fossil fuel subsidies is already on the European agenda since more than 15 years (after the G7 in 2007) 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened
	Belgian NECP of December 2019 outlines that Belgium will phase out fossil fuels in upcoming years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk study confirms that the Belgian NECP (adopted in December 2019) commits to the drafting of an action plan in 2021 to phase out fossil fuel subsidies - The Federal Public Service on Finance developed a study in May 2021 on 'Federal Inventory of Fossil Fuel Subsidies'. The report was a response to the first requirement of the National Energy and Climate Plan related to fossil fuel subsidies, namely the identification of subsidies. 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened
	Belgian coalition agreement is in favour of greener fiscality and therefore puts pressure on	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk study confirms that the Coalition Agreement talks about the need to phase out of investments and to develop a new fiscality in sync with the ecological transition. However, the content remains rather vague on the topic of fossil fuel subsidies. 	Confirming	Weak	Unlikely or did not happen

decision-makers to phase out fossil fuel subsidies				
Philippe Henry, green Climate Minister in Wallonia, participates in the European Council for Belgium in the Environment Council on the COP26, which impacts Belgium's position on fossil fuels.	- Desk study shows that Henry participated in the Environment Council of the European Council to pre-discuss the COP26 Climate summit. However, the council conclusions that were adopted after this summit do not explicitly mention the need to phase out fossil fuels.	Refuting	/	/
Presence of Green climate Ministers (in Belgium and other EU member states) raises ambitions	- Various interviewees (including 2 at EU level) stress the importance of having Green climate ministers to raise the level of ambition. - Desk study shows that at least six EU countries have a Green climate minister There are six EU countries with a green minister of climate: Luxembourg, Germany, Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden (at the time), Belgium.	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened
The UK formulated the Statement in a way that it convinced many to sign the declaration (focus on disinvestment abroad). There was inter-country competition (especially at EU level) to sign the declaration.	- Desk study shows that the declaration only concerns subsidies abroad and has been written in a way that allows for exemptions. - Press coverage of COP26 ⁹⁷ confirms that pressure mounted on countries like France and Belgium to sign after other countries like Spain, Germany, the Netherlands decided to sign the Statement.	Confirming	Moderate	Somewhat likely
The Belgian delegation follows up on multiple initiatives at the COP and informs decision-makers about them	- Interviewees confirm the important role that the Belgian delegation plays	Confirming	Weak	Somewhat likely

⁹⁷ See for example: <https://www.e3g.org/news/coal-cop26-ending-international-public-fossil-finance-coal-done-oil-and-gas-began/> or <https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20211112-cop-26-france-commits-to-end-global-financing-of-fossil-fuels-by-2022-oil-gas-coal-renewable-energy-climate>

REF framework Loss and Damage Case

Type of causal mechanism	Identified mechanism	What does the evidence say?	Confirming or refuting	Strength of evidence for causal mechanism	Assessment of causal mechanism
Project mechanisms	Direct communication (advocacy) about Memorandum to inform and sensitise politicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk study confirms that the Memorandum calls for the need to allocate extra financing for Loss and Damage and the need for an effective and comprehensive mechanism for this financing. - Interview with Climate Coalition indicates that a virtual lunch was organised for all members of relevant commissions and parties (40 parliamentarians) - M&E material of the Climate Coalition confirms that meetings have been held with cabinet Khattabi and Maron in April 2021, cabinet Demir in May 2021, cabinet Henry in June 2021, cabinet Van Peteghem in September 2021 to present the Memorandum. - Various interviews with administration and politicians confirm that it was Climate Coalition who put the topic of L&D on the agenda. One person from the administration referred to L&D as a previously 'taboo' subject. 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened
	Direct communication (advocacy) around interparliamentary resolution to inform and sensitise politicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - M&E data show that meetings took place with parliamentarians on both Flemish and Walloon side about the upcoming inter-parliamentary resolution about COP26 - Interviews with Flemish and Walloon parliamentarians confirm that they held meetings with the Coalition about the parliamentary resolution, especially to draw red lines of what should pass eventually - Interview with Walloon parliamentarian confirms that there was extensive exchange in lead-up to interparliamentary resolution with a Walloon resolution (that failed to weigh on the final resolution due to push back from NVA and OpenVLD). - Desk study shows that the adopted resolution vaguely tackles the topic of Loss and Damage, yet the resolution states that it is up to the EU and member states to take a broadly accepted stance on this topic. 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened
	Direct communication (advocacy and formal and informal lobby) about COP26 recommendations to inform and sensitise politicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk study confirms that the Recommendations call for additional financing for Loss and Damage via Santiago Network. - M&E material of the Climate Coalition confirms that an email has been sent to all climate cabinets and at least 3 meetings have been held about this document with politicians - During interviews conducted by the evaluators, a number of cabinets confirm that they have received and read these recommendations. - Various interviews with administration and politicians confirm that it was Climate Coalition who put the topic of L&D on the agenda. One person from the administration referred to L&D as a previously 'taboo' subject. 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened

	Climate March pushes them to be more ambitious	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A number of interviewees (parliamentarians and cabinet members), especially on the left side of the political spectrum, confirm that the climate marches put pressure on decision-makers (also at European level) to act and be more ambitious. - There is no evidence the Climate March of October 2021 revolved, among other things, around Loss and Damage. 	Confirming	Weak	Somewhat likely
	Direct communication (formal and informal lobby) during the COP26 to inform and sensitise politicians/administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - M&E data show that an exchange took place with Philippe Henry on November 9. - Interview with Climate Coalition shows that there was informal contact after that meeting with his chef of cabinet. - In 2022, Wallonia is asking for input and advice to Climate Coalition to further develop Loss and Damage dossier 	Confirming	Moderate	Certainly or very likely happened
Cooperating mechanisms	L&A done by CNCD informs and sensitises politicians to take into account their positions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CNCD/11.11.11 released a study in 2013 on the topic of Loss and Damage - One member of the Walloon administration who was interviewed mentions that CNCD/11.11.11 informed them about climate justice and Loss and Damage. Their input was crucial according to the interviewee. 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened
	Indirect communication (press article) by 11.11.11. to inform and sensitise politicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 11.11.11. director writes an opinion piece about Loss and Damage in De Morgen in July 2021, linking the events in Wallonia with the need for funds for loss and damage. - Desk study of press and website coverage shows some attention among NGOs for climate financing in the lead-up to the COP26.⁹⁸ - One politician confirmed that NGOs manage to bring the topic of climate financing in the media. 	Confirming	Moderate	Somewhat likely
Rival mechanisms	Scotland commits to L&D at the start of COP26 with 2 million pound and attempts to convince other countries/regions to contribute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One parliamentarian from Ecolo confirms that there were many bilateral meetings between Scotland and Henry. - Desk study of the website of the Scottish government shows that government Scotland took up leadership that encouraged others to commit funding, including five philanthropies and government of Wallonia.⁹⁹ 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened

⁹⁸ <https://11.be/verhalen/klimaatfinanciering-essentieel-voor-de-geloofwaardigheid-van-ons-land>

⁹⁹ <https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-government-cop26-achieved/pages/15/>

	During the Bonn Climate Change Conference in June 2021, civil society organisations (like CAN Europe) draw attention to Loss and Damage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - During the virtual conference in Bonn in 2021, the topic of Loss and Damage was touched upon in one of the technical working groups.¹⁰⁰ - Two interviewees mention the role of CAN Europe about the topic of Loss and Damage (including in Bonn). 	Confirming	Moderate	Somewhat likely
	Philippe Henry, green Climate Minister in Wallonia, participates in the European Council for Belgium in the Environment Council on the COP26 and impacts Belgium's position on Loss and Damage.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk study shows that Henry participated in the Environment Council of the European Council to pre-discuss the COP26 Climate summit. - However, the council conclusions that were adopted after this summit only call to 'advance work related to adaptation, including ... loss and damage... under the Warsaw International Mechanism' - Given that the EU is generally not in favour of Loss and Damage, according to one interviewee (academic), it is unlikely that Henry was influenced by the European decision 	Confirming	Weak	Unlikely or did not happen
	The Alliance of Small Island States engage in L&A on the topic of a Loss and Damage facility.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk study shows that they organised a high-level meeting on November 8 with the Government of Jamaica - AOSIS released a statement at COP26 during the World Leaders' Summit in which they call for direct attention to loss and damage at this COP, as a distinct issue (not on the margins of adaptation).¹⁰¹ - One interview with a cabinet official confirms that the Small Island States are putting the issue of L&A on the agenda 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened
Context	Floods in Wallonia make it clear that Loss and Damage is an issue, also within Belgium.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One newspaper piece in De Morgen draws the link between the events in Wallonia and the debate on Loss and Damage. - Two interviewees who were interviewed (one politician, one NGO member) mentioned the importance of the floods in Wallonia for the discussion about Loss and Damage. - Philippe Henry is also Walloon minister in charge of infrastructures, who asked for complete clarity about the information of the Walloon administration in the hours preceding the floods.¹⁰² 	Confirming	Strong	Certainly or very likely happened

¹⁰⁰ <https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/loss-and-damage/ld/executive-committee-of-the-warsaw-international-mechanism-for-loss-and-damage/workshops-meetings-loss-and-damage>

¹⁰¹ <https://www.aosis.org/aosis-statement-at-cop26-world-leaders-summit/>

¹⁰² <https://www.thebulletin.be/floods-inquiry-launched-who-knew-what-and-when>

ANNEX 8: INTERVIEW GUIDES

Politicians

- Hoe lang bent u al politiek actief op het thema klimaatrechtvaardigheid ?
- Welke organisaties of instellingen zijn uw voornaamste informatiebronnen?
- Welke organisaties of instellingen zijn de actiefste lobbyisten?
- Over welke onderwerpen m.b.t. klimaatrechtvaardigheid werd u in het bijzonder geïnformeerd door organisaties uit het middenveld?
 - Over welke onderwerpen heeft u informatie, verkregen van organisaties uit het middenveld, goed kunnen gebruiken in uw eigen beleidswerk? En welke acties heeft u genomen (vb. thema's op de agenda gezet binnen uw eigen partij, standpunten van de klimaatcoalitie verdedigd in de klimaatcommissie, ontwikkeling van een resolutie, parlementaire vraag, in publieke verklaringen, ...)
 - Welk informatiekanaal of informatiedrager is voor u het meest informatief: direct persoonlijk contact, telefonisch contact, mailing, nieuwsbrieven, conferenties, studiedagen, andere ... ?
 - Heeft u deelgenomen aan activiteiten (hoorzitting, studiedag, conferentie, ...), die door het middenveld georganiseerd werden over klimaatrechtvaardigheid? Indien ja, welke? In welke mate was deze activiteit zinvol voor uw werk?
- Wat zijn voor u de belangrijkste evoluties m.b.t. het politiek debat over klimaat en klimaatrechtvaardigheid sinds de laatste verkiezingen van 2019?
 - Welke factoren hebben hierin een rol gespeeld?
- Kent u de klimaatcoalitie? Indien ja :
 - Met wie of met welke organisatie had u contact en op welke manier bent u in contact gekomen?
 - Wat vindt u van de kwaliteit en bruikbaarheid van de informatie aangeleverd door de klimaatcoalitie:
 - Zijn de standpunten over klimaatrechtvaardigheid voor u duidelijk?
 - Zijn de voorstellen/standpunten haalbaar?
 - Zijn de analyses voldoende onderbouwd, evidence-based, betrouwbaar?
 - Hoe situeert u de klimaatcoalitie ten opzichte van andere organisaties/personen wat betreft het belang dat ze hebben om u te informeren en/of invloed uit te oefenen?
- Hoe beoordeelt u in het algemeen het politieke werk van NGOs en de klimaatcoalitie met betrekking tot klimaatrechtvaardigheid? Wat zijn sterke kanten en wat kan verbeterd worden? Denk aan:
 - Manier van contact nemen, framen van boodschap, expertise, legitimiteit, aanvoelen van de context van de beleidsmaker, aanpak en timing, samenwerking academici, rol van netwerken, ...
- Kan u de aanpak van (leden van) klimaatcoalitie vergelijken met andere actoren die ook aan beleidsbeïnvloeding doen? Zijn er andere methoden van beleidsbeïnvloeding die u goed/beter vindt werken?
 - Wanneer en hoe kunnen NGO's het meeste wegen op uw standpuntbepaling?
- Is het voor u duidelijk wanneer een individuele organisatie uit het middenveld de eigen standpunten verdedigd en wanneer dit gebeurt in naam van de klimaatcoalitie?

- Heeft u nog suggesties voor andere (resource) persons om te interviewen ?

Members Climate Coalition

Deel 1: evaluatie werking klimaatcoalitie

- Sinds wanneer bent u lid van de politieke werkgroep van de klimaatcoalitie?
 - Wat zijn voor u belangrijke evoluties in het functioneren van de politieke werkgroep sinds u lid bent?
 - Wat zijn de sterktes en wat zou sterker of anders kunnen?
- Bijdrage van de klimaatcoalitie aan opbouw klimaatexpertise:
 - Is volgens de enquête eerder beperkt. Nieuwsbrieven, website en mailings worden maar door de helft van de respondenten geconsulteerd. Wat is uw ervaring? Vindt u dat de klimaatcoalitie een taak heeft om bij te dragen aan expertise/kennis-opbouw van de leden?
 - Sommige respondenten vinden dat er te weinig gebruik gemaakt wordt van aanwezige expertise bij de leden. Andere geven aan dat ze zelf weinig gebruik maken van expertise bij andere leden. Wat is jouw ervaring?
- Interne communicatie
 - Wisselend beeld in de enquête. De helft van de respondenten vindt dat er goed gecommuniceerd wordt over het politiek werk en de resultaten; de andere helft vindt dat niet. Sommigen vinden dat de communicatie meer moet afgestemd worden op de (verschillende) noden en interesses van de leden. Wat is uw mening? Waar komen deze verschillende appreciaties volgens u vandaan?
 - Ook wisselend beeld over de communicatie en afstemming tussen de politieke werkgroep, de actiewerkgroep en met het dagelijks bestuur. Wat is uw mening? Wat kan eventueel verbeteren?
- Kwaliteit lobbywerk
 - Wordt over het algemeen zeer positief gewaardeerd door de respondenten. Er zijn vragen over het nut van het memorandum. Wat zijn uw ervaringen met het werken met een memorandum? Wat vond u goed werken? Wat zou eventueel in de toekomst anders kunnen?
 - Hoe gaat de klimaatcoalitie om met de verschillende standpunten en ambitieniveaus? Er zijn verschillende meningen over de mate waarin standpunten voldoende concreet en haalbaar zijn. Vindt u dat de coördinatie voldoende rekening houdt met al de verschillende visies en meningen?
 - Wat vindt u van de strategische keuzes die gemaakt worden mbt focus, onderwerp en timing van het lobbywerk door de klimaatcoalitie?
- Doelen van de klimaatcoalitie
 - Moet de klimaatcoalitie ook bijdragen aan versterken van kennis en expertise van haar leden?

- Sommige respondenten zien de klimaatcoalitie graag als een platform voor het uitwisselen van ervaringen, kennis, moeilijkheden die organisaties ervaren bij lobbywerk of acties, ...
 - Is het doel vooral gecoördineerde lobby, ondersteund door acties/mobilisatie ?
 - Hoe verhoudt de klimaatcoalitie zich tot acties van leden (lobby zowel als mobilisaties)? Sommige vragen betere afstemming in timing/agenda? Andere vragen ondersteuning bij eigen acties, zowel kennisopbouw als steun bij het opzetten van mobilisaties.
 - Men kan verschillende verwachtingen hebben van de klimaatcoalitie. Wat zijn voor u de prioriteiten voor de klimaatcoalitie, rekening houdend met de huidige beschikbare capaciteit van mensen en middelen?
- Wat vindt u goed aan de coördinatie van de politieke werkgroep door 11.11.11 en CNCD/11.11.11? Wat zou u graag anders zien aan de coördinatie van de politieke werkgroep?
- Wat vindt u in het algemeen van het proces van besluitvormingsproces binnen de klimaatcoalitie?

Deel 2: inzoomen op eigen lobbywerk

- Rond welke thema's doet uw organisatie zelf actief aan beleidsbeïnvloeding mbt de positie van België inzake internationaal klimaatbeleid, standpunten rond emissiereductie, uitfasering fossiele brandstoffen, internationale klimaatfinanciering, just transition, gender en klimaat, Loss & Damage en mbt COP 26?
- Met betrekking tot deze thema's; wat zijn voor u belangrijke mijlpalen geweest in de periode 2020-2021?
- Specifieke vragen bij de tijdslijn:
 - Welke factoren hebben invloed gehad op de geïdentificeerde mijlpaal?
 - Welke lobby voert u samen met en/of in naam van de klimaatcoalitie en wat doet u in naam van de eigen organisatie?
 - Op basis waarvan beslist u om te lobbyen in naam van de klimaatcoalitie en/of in naam van de eigen organisatie?
 - Wat is de meerwaarde van de politieke werkgroep voor uw organisatie?

ANNEX 9: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Rapportageformulier

Naam interviewee:

Functie en partij interviewee:

Naam interviewer:

Datum interview:

Duurtijd interview: .

Suggesties andere personen te interviewen:

Inleiding: Hoe lang bent u al politiek actief op het thema klimaatrechtvaardigheid ?
.
Link met klimaatlobby: Over welke onderwerpen m.b.t. klimaatrechtvaardigheid werd u in het bijzonder geïnformeerd door organisaties uit het middenveld? Welke organisaties? Output 8
Klimaatcoalitie: Kent u de klimaatcoalitie? Indien ja : Met wie of met welke organisatie had u contact en op welke manier bent u in contact gekomen? Is het voor u duidelijk wanneer een individuele organisatie uit het middenveld de eigen standpunten verdedigt en wanneer dit gebeurt in naam van de klimaatcoalitie? Output 8
Output – kwaliteit lobbywerk: Wat vindt u van de kwaliteit en bruikbaarheid van de informatie aangeleverd door de klimaatcoalitie: Zijn de standpunten over klimaatrechtvaardigheid voor u duidelijk? Zijn de voorstellen/standpunten haalbaar? Zijn de analyses voldoende onderbouwd, evidence-based, betrouwbaar? Output 8
Invloed op beleid: Over welke onderwerpen heeft u informatie, verkregen van organisaties uit het middenveld, goed kunnen gebruiken in uw eigen beleidswerk? En welke acties heeft u genomen Outcome 3&4; Impact 1&2
Invloed op beleid: Welk informatiekanaal of informatiedrager is voor u het meest informatief: direct persoonlijk contact, telefonisch contact, mailing, nieuwsbrieven, conferenties, studiedagen, andere ... ?

Heeft u deelgenomen aan activiteiten (hoorzitting, studiedag, conferentie, ...), die door het middenveld georganiseerd werden over klimaatrechtvaardigheid? Indien ja, welke? In welke mate was deze activiteit zinvol voor uw werk? Outcome 3&4

Appreciatie werk NGOs: Hoe beoordeelt u in het algemeen het politieke werk van NGOs en de klimaatcoalitie met betrekking tot klimaatrechtvaardigheid? Wat zijn sterke kanten en wat kan verbeterd worden? Denk aan: Manier van contact nemen, framen van boodschap, expertise, legitimiteit, aanvoelen van de context van de beleidsmaker, aanpak en timing, samenwerking academici, rol van netwerken, ...

Kan u de aanpak van (leden van) klimaatcoalitie vergelijken met andere actoren die ook aan beleidsbeïnvloeding doen? Zijn er andere methoden van beleidsbeïnvloeding die u goed/beter vindt werken?

Wanneer en hoe kunnen NGO's het meeste wegen op uw standpuntbepaling?

-

Rival explanations: Welke organisaties of instellingen zijn uw voornaamste informatiebronnen? Welke organisaties of instellingen zijn de actiefste lobbyisten? Hoe situeert u de klimaatcoalitie ten opzichte van andere organisaties/personen wat betreft het belang dat ze hebben om u te informeren en/of invloed uit te oefenen?

(rival) explanations: Wat zijn voor u de belangrijkste evoluties m.b.t. het politiek debat over klimaat en klimaatrechtvaardigheid sinds de laatste verkiezingen van 2019? Welke factoren hebben hierin een rol gespeeld?

Analytical framework

Topic	Parlement en studiediensten		Kabinetten		Administratie
	Links (PVDA/PTB, Groen/Ecolo, Vooruit/PS)	Centrum-rechts (CD&V, Open VLD, NVA, MR, les engagées)	Links (Groen, Vooruit, Ecolo)	Centrum-rechts (CD&V, Open VLD, N-VA)	
Kwaliteit en bruikbaarheid input KC	-	-	-		-
Invloed KC op beleid/werk/acties van respondent	-	-	-	-	-
Rol KC rond COP26	-	-	-	-	-
Algemeen: wat werkt best?	-	-	-		-
Sterktes KC	-	-	-	-	-
Zwaktes KC	-	-	-	-	-

ANNEXE 10: E-SURVEY MEMBERS OF THE CLIMATE COALITION

See separate annex



ACE EUROPE bvba • www.ace-europe.be

Leopoldstraat 39 • B-2800 Mechelen • tel. +32(0)15 34 88 84 • fax +32(0)15 34 88 64 • info@ace-europe.be