

Impact evaluation of the coordination of CSO advocacy for climate justice in Belgium

Baseline study report

Impact evaluation of the coordination of CSO advocacy for climate justice in Belgium

Geert Phlix – ACE Europe

Huib Huyse – HIVA K.U. Leuven

Preface

The evaluation team would like to thank 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 for their constructive participation and operational support. The interest and openness for this evaluation displayed by both NGOs contributed to the quality of the evaluation process and facilitated the evaluators' work. We are looking forward to the next phase of the evaluation and the continued interaction with both organisations.

Geert Phlix (ACE Europe) Mechelen, Belgium. 2018



Executive summary

This baseline study is part of a large impact evaluation exercise on assessing impact of non-governmental development programmes, an exercise which is coordinated by the NGO federatie, with support of the Belgian ministry for development cooperation.

Subject of this impact evaluation are the policy influencing interventions implemented by the Climate Justice Platform, coordinated by 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11, and financed by the Belgian ministry for development cooperation. In the period 2017-2021, the programme aims at influencing Belgian decision makers to develop and implement an ambitious Belgian policy in favour of climate justice, to enhance European ambitions and to implement the Paris agreement. The Belgian climate justice platform (CJP) is composed by several CSOs advocating for climate justice and is coordinated by 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11. The policy influencing strategy combines campaigning, advocacy and formal and informal lobbying. The programme also aims at enhancing knowledge and expertise on climate justice of the platform members and to contribute to enhanced leverage and credibility of the climate justice platform and its members on the topic of climate justice.

A baseline study was conducted in the first half of 2018. A mid-term evaluation will be planned in 2020 and a final evaluation in 2021.

A mixed method approach was used for the baseline study, which consisted in the implementation of two online surveys targeting (1) Belgian decision makers and staff of administrations and (2) members of climate coalition (which include all members of the CJP), and a set of semi-structured interviews with direct policy contacts of CJP and members of CJP and the climate coalition.

Several methodological limitations are described in the report. Most important challenges relate to (1) the low response rate on the survey targeting policy makers and surprisingly also the CJP members, (2) the sensitivity of the policy topic, being the Belgian climate policy, and the hesitation of interviewees to speak out freely, (3) the difficulty to interview a large number of policy makers from ruling parties as compared to the opposition and (4) the complexity of evaluating a platform and assessing its relative contribution, compared to the contribution of the individual members to policy changes. The report elaborates answers to these challenges, which will guide the finetuning of the methodology for the mid-term and end evaluations. During mid-term and final evaluation process-tracing and contribution analysis will be applied.

Presentation of the main conclusions

It is clear that CJP climate advocacy takes place in a difficult and sensitive governance context in which CJP manages to position itself well. CJP has good knowledge of the policy context and the policy cycles at national and international level and aligns its actions to the key decision-making moments.

Not much policy progress could be evidenced yet with regard to the positions of CJP, but it has been proven that CJP managed to put certain topics on the policy agenda, in particular the need for Belgium to develop ambitious climate objectives at Belgian and at international level. All political parties share the analysis and principles of being ambitious, but there are differences in opinions regarding the definition of concrete and measurable ambitious targets. This results in a dichotomy, with policy makers from the opposition that share the positions of CJP and policy makers from the government parties that do not fully agree. CJP did not succeed yet in having effective influence on the final political decisions taken by the government parties. Furthermore, many sub-topics and demands from CJP are not yet visible in the policy debates.

CJP is perceived as an important information source and the quality and relevance of information from CJP is positively assessed. CJP is perceived as a legitimate advocate for climate advocacy. Policy makers interviewed value above all the direct contacts, formal and informally and would like to have more frequent contacts. Information received was used by policy makers (cabinets, administrations and parliament) while developing their own positions. Information was put next to other information resources that all together have an influence on final positions.

CJP mainly engages with stakeholders in the institutionalised fora. CJP combines a pro-active and re-active approach in engaging with policy makers. There are difficulties in establishing meaningful interactions with members of ruling parties or with people that do not agree with the positions of CJP. A comprehensive stakeholder analysis is lacking and as such a diversified strategy to approach different stakeholders as well. It became clear that within cabinets, political parties and parliaments there are allies and opponents with regard to the CJP's positions. Allies feel themselves strengthened by the actions of CJP. Opponents are hardly being reached.

The strategy of CJP balances between a value based and evidence-based approach, with a perceived orientation towards a value-based approach. CJP positions are perceived as "leftist" or too idealistic by opponents. As only final goals are proposed in the CJP communications, less information is provided on the strategies to achieve these goals. There is generally no analysis of the consequences of certain choices on the economy (be it positive or negative) or of the risks when ambitious action is not taken. To some extent, there is a risk that CJP interactions in support of parliamentary work of opposition parties tends to re-enforce ruling party views that there is a strong affiliation between CJP and the opposition. While difficult to avoid when cabinets and some political parties are limiting their interactions with civil society, CJP's creativity in formulating alternative strategies is limited up to now.

The choice of reaching out to members of parliament, in particular members participating in the inter-parliamentary commission, is a relevant and effective choice. However, no analysis is done of other stakeholders that can have an influence on the opinion of the members of parliament, like for example staff at political parties and their study services, the corporate sector and/or civic initiatives. No specific interventions are implemented or allies are looked for beyond the usual group. Limited use is made of the mobilisation of academics and their networks beyond the use of existing research outputs.

The collaboration with the climate coalition did not result yet in coordinated mobilisation actions in the period 2017 to date, but it is expected that policy influencing work and mobilisation will be aligned better in the near future. This issue can be linked with the limited uptake of CJP positions in the media in the period under review. This might be partially explained by the fact that CJP makes



use of insider approaches in its policy influencing work and uses institutionalised spaces to negotiate with diplomats and policy makers. As indicated, the outsider-track is largely taken-up by the climate coalition which coordinates the mobilisation campaigns.

The CJP platform is a strong platform that is well organised, what is not evident in the case of this kind of multi-stakeholder platform. The platform has created a joint identity, which is reflected in the communication materials, but this is not always visible to advocacy targets and other stakeholders, who do not necessarily manage to differentiate between CJP and its members. There is a strong secretariat/coordination, taken up by CNCD/11.11.11 and 11.11.11 who invest substantial time and resources in this coordination. Coordination is accepted by its members and assessed as being of high quality.

The CJP team is self-critical, reflective and sufficiently adaptive to adjust strategies as needs arise. However, most of these processes are informal and not well documented. Planning, monitoring and learning processes are basic. Monitoring happens, but both the depth and scope of the data collection is limited, and there are few spaces to systematise and discuss learning points from earlier actions.

Baseline data on the level of success of CJP influencing points of view of political decision makers

*Indicator 1a - **Outreach**: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who knowingly have received information from CJP*

- 52 direct contacts, of which 25 in administrations, 16 members of parliaments, 7 with cabinets (all but federal cabinet for development cooperation), 5 contacts with study services or assistants of members of parliament.
- CJP has direct contact with all lead thematic experts of all political parties (except extremist parties), but the number of contacts with opposition parties outnumber the number of contacts with ruling parties and the quality of interaction differs. There is a closer relation and more frequent interaction with opposition parties (also requesting CJP for advice) compared to the interactions with ruling parties.
- All 25 people interviewed confirmed having received information from CJP (9/25 administration, 9/16 members of parliament, 3/7 members of cabinet and 4/5 staff at study services).

*Indicator 1b - **Spaces for influencing**: Number of meetings with cabinets, ministers, parliamentarians, study services of political parties*

A list of meetings is presented in the report. The evaluators consider this number being less relevant as baseline data because the number of meetings does not explain the level of success of policy influencing interventions.

*Indicator 2a - **Appreciation of CJP's contributions:** Share of national policy makers reached by CJP, who view the information as (scale from 1 to 4: all / majority / minority / nobody) relevant, timely, qualitative and usable, and that perceive CJP members and 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 as legitimate and credible advocates for climate change*

- All people interviewed, without distinction to political parties, find the information provided by CJP relevant, usable and of high quality.
- CJP is an important information source for all interviewees for formulating their positions:
 - Opposition parties: for questioning the positions taken by the ruling parties
 - Ruling parties: to know the position of the opposition as CJP is considered to be “leftist”
 - Cabinets and administration: use the CJP information to strengthen their own positions (when deviating from the dominant discourse internally) and to enrich the debate
- All opposition parties and the majority of cabinets appreciate the ambitious character of the CJP positions as it calls for urgent action. One cabinet argues that the positions do not fully take into account the political sensitivity and room for manoeuvre as described by the government agreement.
- All ruling parties agree with the principles of the analyses and positions but do not agree with the concrete and ambitious targets proposed (as assessed not being feasible)

*Indicator 2b - **Agenda setting:** Number of parliamentary interpellations and questions, proposed resolutions, adopted; resolutions and motions introduced by CJP lobby targets that are in line with CJP positions; Number of amendments by parliamentarians in line with CJP positions; Number of interventions of the Belgian delegation of decision-makers at the next COPs in line with CJP positions.*

- Positions of CJP with regard to carbon taxation, climate refugees, Belgian climate ambitions (emission reduction), burden sharing and Belgian contribution to international climate financing are put on the political agenda during discussions in parliament.
- In principle all Belgian parties support the Paris Agreement and agree with the principle that Belgium needs to develop an ambitious climate policy. Only the opposition parties have formulated a set of amendments¹ that refer to the CJP positions and insist in putting concrete targets in the inter-parliamentary resolution that will set the boundaries for developing the Belgian climate policy.
- Mainly opposition parties are questioning the government on the Belgian climate policy (11 of the 14 parliamentary questions formulated by opposition parties)

*Indicator 3 - **Discursive change:** Number of political parties who take-up the CJP positions/terminology/ rhetoric/framing in their line of argumentation during the policy preparation phase*

- There are no base-line data on policy discourse on the Belgian climate policy of the main thematic experts in the different political parties, as this is currently not being tracked systematically by CJP coordinators.
- With regard to the European negotiations, under the current government, Belgium has lost its position of a constructive and progressive ally on climate policy topics.
- Under pressure of N-VA, Belgium is not lobbying for ambitious concrete targets with regard to emission reduction, stating that the lower targets are already not being achieved.

¹ Difficult to calculate the number of amendments. There are many drafts of the inter-parliamentary resolution, which is amended at several occasions. The evaluators do not have access to all amendments (only Groen/Ecolo) and can only track the discussion based on the minutes of the meetings of this commission.



Indicator 4 - Policy change: Belgian Policy in favour of climate justice

- At policy level:
 - Absence of a National Energy and Climate plan 2030. Policy development ongoing. Lack of political will so far to develop an ambitious national policy that also includes ambitious targets regarding burden sharing within Belgium.
 - Effort sharing regulations date from 2015 (only put in practice since 2017) but stay far below the targets asked by CJP. Effort sharing regulation horizon 2030 between the regions has not started. No indications that there is room for an increased Belgian and European ambition.
 - Draft inter-parliamentary resolution does not include concrete targets for emission reduction and international climate finance. 13 of the 24 CJP positions are being discussed.
 - Preparations for COP24 in Katowice: Belgium is not willing to take an active role at the European level to push for an increase of the European 2030 goals to -55% emission reduction and is, besides Italy, the only country in west-Europe that is not pushing for this ambition.
 - No tangible commitments for an annual increase in the Belgian contribution to climate finance; and contribution is not new or additional. Belgian contribution to climate finance mounted to 100 million in 2016 but CJP critique on the definition of climate financing number (no numbers yet for 2017)
 - No official government position to push for ambitious targets regarding emission reduction. Government does not want concrete targets and defends an emission reduction of maximum – 40% by 2020.
- All political decision makers understand the urgency for ambitious climate policy but differ in opinion regarding the need for concrete targets and commitments with regard to emission reduction and international climate finance.
- Ruling parties adopt a climate conservative approach whereas opposition parties push for concrete and ambitious targets that are in line with CJP positions.

Indicator 5 - Relevance of communication channels: Share of national policy makers reached by CJP, who view the communication channels applied as relevant

- All members of parliament reached (opposition and ruling parties) find direct contacts (both formal and informal) more relevant compared to indirect contact.
- All interviewees at cabinets agree that ministers want to be informed by civil society but that they also are sensitive for indirect actions like letters and civic actions.

Indicator 6 - Qualitative assessment of relevance of the different forms of communication channels and how they are embedded in the overall policy influencing strategy

Not done yet. Not relevant for baseline study.

Indicator 7 - Influence of CJP: Share of national policy makers who view the CJP platform as influential on their opinion-forming process, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change

- The large majority of the interviewees and 22 of the 31 respondents (online survey) recognise the CJP as a legitimate advocate for climate justice.

*Indicator 8 - **Influence of other actors**: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who name other actors than CJP as one of the more influential stakeholders on their opinion-forming process*

- The CJP is perceived by all interviewees as the most important information source and influencer from the civil society, on the topic of the Belgian position in the European and international negotiations.
- Other important influencers, from civil society, on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian position in international climate negotiations are Greenpeace, WWF, 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11

*Indicator 9 - **Knowing CJP**: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who know the CJP*

- All thematic experts of the different political parties and all relevant cabinets know the existence of the CJP platform.

*Indicator 10 - **Added value of composition**: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who view the specific composition of the CJP (with many different social organisations) as a comparative strength.*

- The majority of the policy makers also know the composition of the platform (they can name the different groups constituting the platform)
- All interviewees (parliament and cabinets) appreciate the fact that a wide variety of civil society organisations have joined one platform at Belgian level and support common positions. It enables an efficient dialogue with civil society.

Baseline data on the functioning of the CJP platform

Indicator 11 - % of CJP member who use other channels for their advocacy work on climate justice; % of CJP members who rank the CJP as their main channel for advocacy work

- The majority of the platform members do not have a policy officer or do not prioritise their policy influencing on the CJP topics and delegate the policy influencing on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian position in international negotiations to the platform.
- Those members that have a policy officer and that are actively influencing policy decision makers on climate issues combine their own policy influencing strategies with policy influencing strategies through the platform and often accompany the CJP coordinators during their meetings with decision makers. This is also the case of the CJP coordinators themselves who also relate with policy makers (directly and indirectly) on similar topics as defended by the platform.

Indicator 12 - % of CJP members who use the positions of the CJP in communication with national political decision makers

- CJP members that are actively involved in climate justice policy influencing use also CJP positions in their own interventions.



- Individual members of the platform most often defend more ambitious demands and positions as compared to the common positions of CJP, which are based on a consensus of a broad and diverse group of CSO.

Indicator 13 - Qualitative description of the strengths and weaknesses of the CJP by the members

- Diverse composition of the platform, which is unique in Europe. Including a North-South dimension in to the policy debates of the environmentalist group and trade unions
- CJP contributes to enhanced knowledge on climate issues, keeps the members up-to-date on actual climate debates at Belgian and international level and contributes to the internal policy debates within the members organisations
- Good knowledge of the CJP coordinators of the strengths, positions and sensitivity of each of the members and ability to propose positions that are acceptable for the entire group
- Different opinions are respected, transparent decision-making process. Consensus is being looked for
- Process and procedures in place to react quickly when needed
- Diversity of the platform members complicates the process of formulating ambitious positions
- It takes time to come to common positions shared by the large and diverse group

Indicator 14 and Indicator 15 - not relevant for baseline

Indicator 16 - Qualitative assessment of the quality of the delivered products by CJP

- The quality of the products delivered by CJP is assessed as good by all 11 members CJP interviewed and confirmed in the survey.

Indicator 17- Qualitative assessment by the members about the quality of the coordination of the CJP

- The functioning of CJP is assessed as good by all 11 CJP members interviewed: good quality of reports of the platform meetings, good facilitation of the meetings, good quality of the preparatory work, good frequency of meetings and the timely delivery of preparatory documents. The participatory approach is appreciated and members feel that their opinions are taken into account.
- The CJP coordinator manage to find a good balance in the different positions of CJP members.
- Active participation of CJP and communication of its positions in European and international networks is perceived by CJP members as limited.

Indicator 18 - Qualitative assessment of synergies between the climate coalition and CJP

- As there was not much synergy in action between CJP and the climate coalition before the merger, it is expected that synergy will improve after the merger of the CJP and the climate coalition.

List of Abbreviations

A&L	Advocacy and Lobbying
CAN	Climate Action Network
CD&V	Christen Democratische Volkspartij
CdH	Centre Démocrate Humaniste
CJP	Climate Justice Platform
CNC	Commission Nationale du Climat
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DBE	Dienst Bijzondere Evaluaties (special service for evaluation)
DGD	Directorat General for Development
ETS	Emission Trading System
EU	European Union
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MR	Mouvement Reformateur
NEKP	Nationaal Energy en Klimaat Plan (National Energy and Climate Plan)
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NKC	Nationale Klimaat Commissie
NGA	Niet Gouvernementele Actoren (non-governmental actors)
N-VA	Nieuwe Vaamse Alliantie
REDD	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SP.a	Socialistische Partij Anders
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
VLD	Vlaamse Liberale Democraten



Table of Content

1	Introduction	15
1.1	Subject of the evaluation	15
1.2	Objectives of the impact study	15
1.3	Methodology and approach of the evaluation	16
1.4	Limitations of the evaluations	23
2	Description of the context of climate justice advocacy	25
2.1	Policy context on climate justice	25
2.2	Brief description of the Climate Justice Platform – now political group of the Climate Coalition	30
2.3	Envisaged policy outcomes of CJP	32
2.4	Theory of Change for policy influencing for climate justice	39
2.5	Description of main outputs realised in 2017- mid 2018	40
3	Findings	43
3.1	Findings from the survey and interviews with policy makers	43
3.2	Findings from the interviews and survey among the members of the CJP platform	58
4	Preparation for the impact evaluation	63
4.1	Contribution analysis	63

4.2	Analysis of causal question 1	64
4.3	Analysis of causal question 2	68
4.4	Approach for the MTR and final evaluation	69
5	Conclusions	71
5	Annexes	74
	Annex 1: ToR	75
	Annex 2: Evaluation framework (revised version October 2018)	76
	Annex 3: List of people consulted	81
	Annex 4: list of documents consulted	84
	Annex 5: Reconstructed ToC	88
	Annex 6: Questionnaires and interview guidelines	89
	Annex 7: Interview guide	97
	Annex 8: Analytical framework	100
	Annex 9: Results of online survey	102



1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 SUBJECT OF THE EVALUATION

- ¹ Subject of this impact evaluation is a development cooperation programme, funded by the Belgian federal ministry for development cooperation, that involves the coordination of civil society organisation (CSO) advocacy efforts for climate justice in Belgium. In the period 2017-2021, 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 are implementing a programme on climate justice, aimed at influencing Belgian decision makers to develop and implement an ambitious Belgian policy in favour of climate justice, enhance European ambitions and to implement the Paris agreement. Important elements in the strategy are the activities implemented by the Belgian climate justice platform (CJP), composed by several CSOs advocating for climate justice and coordinated by 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11, and the collaboration with and participation inside the Climate Coalition. A policy influencing strategy has been developed that combines campaigning, advocacy and formal and informal lobbying. The programme also aims at enhancing knowledge and expertise on climate justice of the platform members and to contribute to enhanced leverage and credibility of the climate justice platform and its members on the topic of climate justice.
- ² An important change in CJP's institutional setting has been the decision in the second half of 2017 to merge the operations of CJP and the Climate Coalition. The CJP has evolved towards a political working group within the Climate Coalition (decision taken by the general assembly of the Climate Coalition in May 2018). In this report the name Climate Justice Platform will still be used, as the baseline covers the period until the completion of the merging process.

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE IMPACT STUDY

- ³ The objectives of the evaluation are twofold:
- (1) Accountability – measuring impact should enable 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 to account to DGD for the results achieved, including results at impact level.
 - (2) Learning – apart from identifying lessons learned from the intervention and the possibility to adapt the strategy during implementation, this assignment aims at providing insight in the set-up and implementation of impact evaluations of NGO-interventions. The objective is to draw lessons on the use of specific methodologies, on the feasibility of conducting impact studies of NGO interventions and to build experience in applying mixed methods evaluations. This

evaluation is part of a learning trajectory on impact evaluations that is steered by the three NGA federations, DGD and DBE.

- 4 The ToC, reconstructed by Syspons in collaboration with 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 and the assessment grid include several result levels (output, outcome and impact) and questions related to relevance (e.g. relevance of information received). The focus is put on the impact level but also the other results levels are being assessed (effectiveness), which evidently will contribute to explaining the level of impact achieved.

1.3 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH OF THE EVALUATION

- 5 A mixed method approach was used for the baseline study, which consisted in the implementation of two online surveys targeting (1) Belgian decision makers and staff of administrations and (2) members of climate coalition (which include all members of the CJP), and a set of semi-structured interviews with direct policy contacts of CJP and members of CJP and the climate coalition.

Online survey to policy makers

- 6 A questionnaire was developed consisting of 17 questions with regard to the topic of climate justice (see annex 6). The questionnaire was commented by the CJP coordinators and Syspons and tested by the researchers and two policy targets. The questionnaire was translated into French and launched via the online platform of Checkmarket. The questionnaire ran from May 28 till June 16, 2018. Two reminders were sent to the non-respondents. Only two reminders were sent because after the second reminder only two additional persons responded to the questionnaire. During telephone interviews and when the nature of the conversation allowed, interviewees were also encouraged to still answer the questionnaire.
- 7 The questionnaire consisted of the following sections: a set of general questions related to relations with NGOs, a set of questions related to output level (collaboration with NGOs, access to information and assessment of quality and relevance of information received), a set of questions on the CJP positions (level of agreement, feasibility and policy initiatives taken by the respondent) and a set of questions that ask the opinion on the legitimacy of CJP.
- 8 In the methodological note of Syspons it was suggested to apply a representative randomised sample for the online survey towards the Belgian decision makers. ACE Europe and HIVA-KU Leuven were of the opinion that a representative sample was not relevant as the population frame is rather limited, and decided to send the questionnaire to the entire population. The total number of the Federal, Flemish, Walloon and Brussels parliament amounts to 498 members of parliaments. The assumption was that it would be interesting to know also the opinion of the non-direct contacts of CJP and compare this with the people that had been informed by CJP. Also direct contacts within administrations and cabinets received the questionnaire. The questionnaire was finally sent to 595 persons.



- ⁹ As expected the response rate was very low, with 32 respondents (5.4%), of which 25 Dutch-speaking and 7 French-speaking respondents starting the questionnaire. Only 22 respondents finalised the questionnaire, of which 19 Dutch-speaking and 3 French-speaking respondents. This is in line with former experiences of the consultants in using online surveys for evaluating policy influencing interventions. Also the consultant who evaluated the former advocacy programme of 11.11.11 had a low response of only 27 persons for a questionnaire that was only sent to direct contacts (Camino, 2016). Because of the low response rate, the data-set is too small to do a complex statistical analysis (only univariate and bivariate analysis) and the results cannot be generalised for the entire population. Methodological implications for the next steps of the evaluation are discussed in section 1.4 (Limitations of the evaluation) and in the conclusions chapter.

Online survey to the members of the climate coalition

- ¹⁰ A second questionnaire was developed consisting of 20 questions to assess the functioning and relevancy of the CJP (see annex 7). Also this questionnaire was commented by CJP coordinators, the coordinator of the climate coalition, translated and tested (only internally) and launched through the platform of Checkmarket. The survey ran from May 31 till June 25, 2018. Three reminders were sent to non-respondents.
- ¹¹ The questionnaire consisted of the following sections: questions related to the level of involvement in CJP, importance of CJP for the own organisation, the positions of CJP (agreement and integration of positions in own advocacy work), assessment of the quality of the coordination and outputs of CJP, and the collaboration between CJP and the climate coalition.
- ¹² ACE Europe and HIVA-KU Leuven decided to send the questionnaire to all members of CJP (29 organisations, 48 contact persons) and all members of the climate coalition (70 organisations, 139 contact persons).² The assumption was that the information could serve as baseline information to assess the evolution of the merging of the CJP into the climate coalition. The questionnaire was sent to 153 persons.
- ¹³ It was not anticipated that also the response rate for this survey would be low, with only 22 respondents (14.4%) starting the survey, of which 16 finalised the survey. Only 13 of the 22 respondents were member of CJP. From the interviews it was learned that many members are rather passive members³ of CJP or the climate coalition and that several people had changed job or were not actively involved anymore in following climate policy advocacy. Moreover, all people interviewed had also responded the questionnaire. So the questionnaire does not provide much additional information. Because of the low response rate this dataset also does not allow to do complex

² Overlap between members of CJP and climate coalition

³ In the findings chapter, we discuss some of the implications of the different levels of engagement of the members of the platform. From this analysis we find that a more passive role in the platform does not necessarily imply a lack of interest. For quite some members it is because of capacity constraints that they limit their engagement. They trust the coordinators of the platform to take positions that are in line with their vision.

statistical manipulations (only univariate and bivariate analyses) and results can hardly be generalised for the entire population.

Qualitative interviews with policy makers

- 14 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a selection of Belgian decision makers and members of the CJP and climate coalition. An important element of the interviews were questions probing for what the respondents see as the important changes they have seen in their own situation or behaviour in relation to specific content areas or domains and to what extent the programme intervention or other factors or actors have contributed to this change. The interviewees received a short set of topics to prepare for the interview. The interviewers used a more elaborated set of questions (see annex 7). Because of the characteristics of these respondents (politicians and other policy makers with limited time), the interview was kept as short as possible and the narrative of the interview was guiding above the questionnaire. Interviews lasted between 20 minutes and 1 hour.
- 15 During the inception phase it was decided to conduct semi-structured interviews with the direct contacts of CJP. A sampling method was proposed in the inception note (February 2018).

Table 1: Suggested sample size for qualitative methods

Governance level	Members of parliaments			Members of cabinets			Staff in administrations		
	Direct contacts	sample	realised	Direct contacts	sample	realised	Direct contacts	sample	realised
Federal	6	3	5	2	1	/	11	6	6
Flemish	6	2	2	2	1	1	9	4	2
Walloon	2	1	1 (2) ⁴	1	1	1	5	2	1
Brussels	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	/
Total	16	7	9	7	4	3	26	13	9

- 16 As was suggested in the inception note, the evaluators also conducted four interviews with staff working at study departments of political parties (this implied lowering the number of interviewees from the administrations) and four resource persons (within the academic world and the Shift).
- 17 In total 29 interviews were conducted (see annex 3). At the start of the data collection phase a random sample was taken from the direct contacts within each of the categories. After having sent two to three reminders for the interview, invitations were sent to a reserve list of policy makers (having similar characteristics as the first sample). And finally, to obtain sufficient interviews, a third initiative was taken to invite the remaining contact persons for an interview. In the end, all 49 direct contacts have received an invitation for the interview, of which 21 have accepted the invitation. Analysing the population, the evaluators are of the opinion that the variety of direct contact persons is well covered in the list of interviewees, except the fact that nobody from the federal cabinet of environment (MR) and the federal cabinet for development cooperation (Open VLD) was willing to collaborate. The evaluators continued to set-up additional interviews until the interviews stopped providing new information or new positions. The evaluators are of the opinion that the information obtained from the interviews can be generalised⁵ as they cover a wide and diverse group of key

⁴ Two members of the federal parliament were also members of the Wallon parliament and the parliament of the federation Brussels-Wallonia

⁵ With some reservations taking into account the difficulty to access sufficient policy makers from ruling parties.



informants on the topic of climate policy in Belgium. The interviews were conducted from mid-May 2018 till the end of June 2018.

Qualitative interviews with members of the Climate Justice Platform and the Climate Coalition

- ¹⁸ In the inception report it was proposed to conduct 11 interviews with members of CJP (on the total of 29 members), with a mix of active and passive members and three interviews with members of the climate coalition (on the total of 70 members). The evaluators managed to interview 14 members of the CJP, of which the two coordinators, six active and six more passive members. Four interviews were conducted with members of the climate coalition. A purposefully sample was done of CJP members, taking into account the variety of the different groups of members and the balance between Flemish and Walloon members. Four contacts had to be replaced by a peer as people had left organisations or the organisation had left the platform or the coalition.

Analysis of qualitative interviews

- ¹⁹ A narrative report of each interview was drafted. No software was used for data analysis as the number of interviews was manageable for manual review and assessment. The analysis started with a re-reading of the individual interviews to gain a deep understanding of the individual narratives and maintain a view on the coherence of the individual interviews. This review involved a first marking of interesting aspects and insights, questions that it raises, and issues that might need follow-up. Secondly, for the coding of the interviews an analytical matrix was developed based on the evaluation framework. (see annex 8) For each of the evaluation questions and indicators excerpts were taken from the interviews and put in an analytical framework/matrix for further analysis (see table 2). In addition, the interviews were screened for unintended outcomes and effects, or for emerging themes, which were then included in the evaluation framework for further analysis. After the table was completed with the excerpts, a transversal analysis was done for each area of the analytical framework to highlight similarities and differences between interviews within a given group of respondents (for example parliamentarians), and between the three different groups. The findings emerging from this analysis were summarised/coded into specific concepts (timing issues, ...) or returning themes (relationships with opposition parties, ...) to be described in the report. For purposes of research triangulation, interview transcripts were analysed by two consultants. Findings were further discussed among the consultants involved in the evaluation to reach a consensus in interpretation and formulation of conclusions.

Table 2: simplified representation of analytical framework for analysis and coding, drawn from the evaluation framework

	parliament	cabinet	administration
Added value and relevance			
Strategy			
Quality			
Usage			
Platform			
Recommendations			

Document study

- 20 A document study was done on the documents developed by CJP, policy documents developed by the Belgian decision makers and of the M&E data collected by 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11. The evaluators analysed the content of the documents related to policy initiatives taken by the decision makers in order to identify the extent CJP's positions are included in these documents (see annex 4 for overview of documents analysed). The degree to which positions have been adopted by policy makers might vary from (1) clear 'signatures', where explicit written reference is made to inputs from the NGOs or when certain types of phrasing clearly refer to NGO inputs; (2) references by key informants in interviews about the influence of NGOs on their written positions; to (3) indications that the content of a position evolved in the direction of NGO positions (and where there are signs that the NGOs were actively pushing these specific positions in public or behind the scenes).
- 21 No separate M&E system has been developed at the level of the CJP but performance of the CJP is being monitored by 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 and as such integrated in the respective organisational M&E systems. For example 11.11.11 collects data (1) on the number and content of formal and informal contacts with decision makers (but not in a systematised manner, so difficult to generate quickly an overview), (2) on the outputs delivered such as the development of position papers, contributions to internal and external publications, actions, etc and (3) on the policy actions taken by decision makers such as resolutions, development of strategic policy documents, parliamentary questions, hearings, proposals of law, etc. (including an estimation of the contribution of 11.11.11 to these policy initiatives). CNCD/11.11.11 collects data on the number of formal and informal contacts and the output delivered. Monitoring is further being done applying the outcome mapping approach. The M&E data are however not systematised, complete or consolidated and no systematic analysis is being made yet of the number of positions that have been taken over (and to what extent).
- 22 Also, additional literature was explored that might provide insight in factors/actors having an influence on the policy debate regarding climate justice (for example, to gain more insight in the policy making process on climate justice at Belgian and European level, and to identify other possible rival explanations).

Approach of the baseline study

- 23 The baseline study was implemented in three phases. (1) During the inception phase the methodology was elaborated. This also included a workshop with the coordinators of CJP to discuss the reconstructed ToC and to gain more insight in the M&E system used. Additionally, semi-



structured interviews were held with CJP coordinators and some members of CJP. Finally, also programme documents studied. An evaluation framework was developed which is added in annex 2. The inception phase was implemented from January till March 2018. (2) The phase of data-collection has run from April till June 2018 (with some remaining interview in July 2018). This consisted of the development of questionnaires, testing of questionnaires and implementation of the survey and interviews. (3) A phase of analysis and reporting took place in June-July 2018, which included a sense-making workshop, which involved CNCD/11.11.11 and 11.11.11 coordinators to discuss the findings, and resulted in a draft and final evaluation report.

²⁴ Aside from collecting baseline data, the baseline evaluation also served as a test of the evaluation framework. The evaluation team concluded that a review of the evaluation framework, developed by Syspons and further refined during inception phase, was necessary in order to respond to a number of methodological limitations, additional information demands, and specificities of the context in which the advocacy work takes place. In particular it was seen as necessary to reformulate several indicators in order to provide meaningful baseline data. The reviewed framework can be found in annex 2. The main revisions are summarised in the table below.

Applies to	Issue to be addressed	Revisions in the evaluation framework
All indicators	Low response rate on online survey (see also further)	Indicators which are phrased as “% of national policy makers who ...” are not meaningful because the survey is not representative, but also because only a rather small group engages actively with the topic of climate change. This is adjusted to: “Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who...”
	Topic specialisation of policy makers: topics such as climate change are followed-up by only a limited number of policy makers (40-50). When others are probed, they refer to the specialists in their party.	
Most indicators	Differentiation between Belgian national policy, European policy and international policy: (1) main action is at the national level, difference between the three levels cannot be disentangled; (2) aggregated response at national level is not useful since there are strong differences between members of the opposition and ruling party.	Differentiation is now revised and not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition parties - ruling parties - administration & diplomats
Output 8	Output indicators are missing which map the possibilities for influencing	Indicator added: Spaces for influencing: Number of meetings with cabinets, ministers, parliamentarians, study services of political parties
	Appreciation of information lacks timing and quality issues	Indicator revised:

Outcome 3 & 4	Sample is too small to use % scales for number of policy makers: changed to 4-level scale	<p>Appreciation of CJP's contributions: Share of national policy makers reached by CJP, who view the information as (scale from 1 to 4: all / majority / minority / nobody)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – relevant – timely – qualitative – usable <p>and perceive CJP members and 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 as legitimate and credible advocates for climate change</p>
Impact 1 & 2	Refined concept of 'policy makers take-up' through concept of 'discursive change'	Rephrased take-up indicator: " Discursive change ^[1] : Number of political parties who take-up the CJP positions/terminology/ rhetoric/framing in their line of argumentation during the policy preparation phase"
Impact 3	Added indicator which refers to 'procedural change'	Procedural change ^[2] : Certain institutional procedures are adjusted in line with CJP's priorities
	Prioritisation in policy demands is missing	Will be differentiated between expect to see/like to see/love to see in dialogue with CJP
Outcome 3 & 4	Old indicator 6: duplication with other indicator; and division between indirect, direct formal and direct informal is not feasible	Removed
	Old indicator 7: indicator was missing aspects of coherence with the overall policy influencing strategy	Rephrased: Qualitative assessment of the different forms of communication channels and how they are embedded in the overall policy influencing strategy
Outcome 3	Old indicator 9: moved to next evaluation question (To what extent is CJP recognised as ...)	Moved
	Old indicator 11: question cannot be made operational in useful way (only few number of topic specialists, and often it is not know if someone is 'influenced').	Removed
	Old indicator 13: Low relevance of knowing the exact composition and coordination modalities of the CJP, also very difficult to probe (takes too much time)	Indicator rephrased to capture essence of outcome 3: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who view the specific composition of the CJP (with many different social organisations) as a comparative strength.
Survey 2: for CJP members: outcome 2	Indicator 20: second indicator obsolete as not applicable.	Removal of "% of members which use the CJP to initiate proposals or actions"

^[1] Advocacy targets adopt terminology, rhetoric, and/or framing (Kamstra, 2017)

^[2] Influencing institutional (decision-making) procedures (Kamstra, 2017)



The description of the findings in chapter three will be structured according to the adapted evaluation framework.

1.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE EVALUATIONS

- ³⁴ The baseline study was implemented as planned, though with some unforeseen delays. The process of developing, testing and translating the questionnaire took more time as planned. Also the planning of the interviews required quite some time. Policy makers were approached through email, including several reminders. Interviews were set and often changed multiple times, due to the unpredictable agenda of policy makers. Also several telephone contacts were needed with secretariats of policy makers to find an appropriate moment. But the evaluation team managed to conduct more interviews as planned and was able to finalise the data-collection within the given period.
- ³⁵ There are some limitations to this baseline, based on which lessons will be drawn for the MTR and final evaluation (is further elaborated in chapter 4).
- ³⁶ As expected the response rate of the survey to policy makers is very low, which results in a lack of representativity for the entire population. The survey results can only be seen as “indicative”. More interviews were done as compared to the number of respondents that completed the survey. By consequence, the analysis is mainly based on the results of the interviews. The response rate of the survey among the members of the climate coalition was also surprisingly low, but demonstrates the characteristics of this coalition, namely that it is led by a small number of active organisations, receiving (moral) support by a larger group of more passive members, as was confirmed by the interviews. Many member organisations do not have staff available for policy influencing work and several organisations only rely on volunteers. Furthermore, there were/are multiple staff changes within member organisations. Answering an online survey (even being very short) seemed not to be on the priority list of the member organisations (also often having a high workload). A motivational introduction mail was sent by the CJP coordinators but has not had the expected impact. The lack of response was, according to the evaluators, sufficiently compensated by the number of interviews conducted with members of CJP and the coalition, including the most active members and some passive or more critical members. The evaluators are of the opinion that sufficient information could be obtained through the interviews. It needs to be reconsidered whether or not an online survey would be relevant for the final evaluation.
- ³⁷ Climate policy in Belgium is a sensitive policy topic. In order to motivate interviewees to speak out freely, anonymity was guaranteed. By consequence, for the presentation of results, the evaluators had to be careful in presenting statements or facts related to certain groups (e.g. referring to a specific cabinet or administration), when only one resource person was interviewed from the

respective group. With regard to cabinets and administrations, it was often not possible to interview several people. For example: people contacted sometimes did not want to participate themselves and referred to a colleague or a supervisor. In one occasion, persons contacted of a specific administration referred to the director of the service as, because of the sensitivity of the topic, there was an agreement that one person would speak out (which made it not possible to identify differences in opinion and appreciation of the work of CJP, within the administration).

- ³⁸ The evaluators used the list of direct contact persons provided by CJP. Evidently for policy influencers, it is easier to get in contact with allies compared to opponents. This was also visible in the list of direct contacts provided by CJP. Policy makers interviewed from the political groups in the opposition outnumber the decision makers within the ruling parties. Moreover, several ruling parties are not actively engaging with civil society, which complicates the work of policy influencers from civil society. The evaluators tried to gain access to as much as possible policy makers from the ruling parties, by using also alternative networks and contacts. However, the list of interviewees of the ruling parties remained short and no contacts could be established with the person in charge of climate justice at the federal cabinet for development cooperation (Open VLD)⁶ or the federal cabinet for environment (MR). In the MTR and final evaluation, the evaluators will try to look for creative solutions on how to approach more resources persons within the ruling parties (also depending on the results of the next federal elections of 2019).
- ³⁹ A last limitation is related to the complexity of evaluating a platform that is engaged in policy influencing work and assessing its relative contribution, compared to the contribution of the individual members. During the inception phase, it was understood that there was a clear division in tasks, topics and policy targets between the CJP and the respective members, for example CJP lobbying the federal government level on the Belgian position in the European and international climate policy negotiations, while the members lobby the regional government levels and lobby on specific topics related to their specific domains (environment, just transition, education, etc.). The different focus and approaches between the environmental movement, the labour movement and the North-South movement are clear. However, within the North-South movement, individual CJP members (including the coordinating organisations 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11) also conduct direct policy influencing activities addressing the same policy makers, on the same topics as CJP. This became clearer during the data-collection phase. But as no time was foreseen to reconstruct and assess individual actions of members organisations from the North-South movement that are member of CJP (like the two coordinating organisations and Oxfam Solidarity), the evaluators did not obtain a comprehensive overview of these respective actions in order to be able to assess their relative contributions to the policy debate. This was further complicated by the fact that some interviewees did not know in which capacity the CJP coordinators contacted them. In some cases, the assumption was that they represented the position of 11.11.11 or CNCD/11.11.11, not the CJP. This will need to be taken into account in the MTR and final evaluation.

⁶ CJP is above all focusing the federal and regional cabinets for environment and not the federal cabinet for development cooperation. Relationships are also difficult with the people involved in climate within this cabinet.



2 DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE JUSTICE ADVOCACY

2.1 POLICY CONTEXT ON CLIMATE JUSTICE

Governance structure

- ⁴⁰ Climate policy development in Belgium is complicated by the complex governance structure and the fact that climate policy belongs to the competencies of the regional governments and the federal government, which have also different types of government coalitions. As a consequence, parliaments, administrations and cabinets at all these level are involved in climate policy development.
- ⁴¹ To organise policy coherence several initiatives have been taken to stimulate the dialogue between governance levels. The national climate commission⁷ coordinates the policy preparation work and the development of the national climate policy. It is constituted by representatives of the different cabinets. Interviewees confirmed that policy processes in this commission are slow and decision-making processes not transparent. At parliamentary level, the initiative was taken by the senate (after the COP21 in Paris) to create an inter-parliamentary commission (special commission on climate and sustainable development) where representatives of the four regional parliaments (Flemish, Walloon, Brussels regional capital, federation Brussels-Wallonia) and the federal parliament meet (with the German parliament as observer).⁸ This commission was given the mandate to prepare the Belgian position in European and international climate negotiations (with focus on COP meetings).
- ⁴² At parliamentary level, at all governance level specific commissions exist where climate policy development is being discussed. According to the interviewees, the level of transparency in decision making processes varies among these parliamentary commissions, with the federal and Flemish commissions being the most transparent (as also experienced by the evaluators, with regard to the access to policy documents and minutes of meetings on the respective websites). In these parliaments the regional climate policies are being discussed. Seven relevant commissions were identified by the CJP:⁹
- Federal level: the special commission on climate and sustainable development and the commission on foreign affairs;

⁷ www.cnc-nkc.be

⁸ CJP (Februari 2018) Beleidscontext Platform klimaatrechtvaardigheid.

⁹ www.dekamer.be; www.vlaamsparlement.be/commissies; www.parlement-wallonie.be/composition

- Flemish level: the commission on climate and the commission on environment, nature, spatial planning, energy and animal welfare;
- Walloon level: the commission on environment, regional planning and public works and the commission on budget, energy and climate;
- Brussels level: the commission on environment and energy.

⁴³ At the international level, Belgium is alternately represented by one of the regional or federal ministers responsible for environment. Although the focus of CJP is on the federal level, actions of CJP are also targeting the regional governments as regions take up alternately the role of president of the National Climate Commission or when they represent Belgium at the European level.

⁴⁴ The federal and regional ministers for environment are responsible for the respective regional climate policies.

Policy discourse

⁴⁵ In principle all political parties agree with the need for urgent action and an ambitious climate policy. Also in the current government agreement (2015-2019) the ambition is included to commit to the Paris agreement and to European ambitious objectives (though no concrete targets are mentioned).¹⁰

⁴⁶ Although Belgium has ratified -in April 2017- the Paris declaration of 2015, implementation of the declaration is slow (documented by 11.11.11 and confirmed by many interviewees and press-articles).¹¹ One of the main bottlenecks is the difficulty in translating the EU objectives set for Belgium to the Belgian institutional set-up (for example with regard to greenhouse gas emission reduction, increase in renewable energy and energy-efficiency). Because of the shared competencies over different governance levels, the Belgian objectives need to be divided over these levels, under the so-called mechanism of 'burden sharing' or effort sharing.

⁴⁷ The COP21 in Paris was used as a leverage to increase pressure on Belgium to find a solution for the burden sharing issue and to make an agreement on the burden sharing arrangement for 2013-2020. During the COP21 in Paris a shared agreement could be established between the respective ministers, which was approved in December 2015.¹² It took however till May 2018 before a legal framework was developed to implement this agreement (discussion kept ongoing mainly on the solidarity mechanism regarding the objectives for renewable energy and the role of the federal government to that end).¹³

⁴⁸ Till to date discussions are difficult, as political parties have different opinions and are committed to different levels of ambitions. Interviewees from the opposition parties and resource persons mentioned that there is a lack of political will for ambitious policy objectives. While Belgium was known as a frontrunner in European and international negotiations, this image was damaged since Belgium did not achieve a consensus on ambitions in emission reduction at the COP21 in Paris in 2015 and the conservative position taken by Belgium at following COP meetings. In 2018 the federal

¹⁰ www.Belgium.be/nl/over_belgie/overheid/federale_overheid/federale_regering/beleid/regeerakkoord

¹¹ Among others documented by researcher of Klimos (Bruno Verbist, Romain Weikmans) and HIVA-KULeuven (Kris Bachus) and by CJP (februari 2018) Beleidscontext Platform klimaatrechtvaardigheid;

¹² Beleidsakkoord over de intrabelgische Burden Sharing. 4 december 2015

¹³ CJP (February 2018) Beleidscontext Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid.



administration for environment, in collaboration with the universities, is analysing the Belgian climate governance processes and is expected to formulate recommendations.

- ⁴⁹ Because of the difficult debate on burden sharing, no national climate policy for 2013-2020 could be drafted. A national climate policy 2030 is currently being discussed in the national climate commission. At regional level, regional climate policies were developed (see further) and new regional policies 2030 are currently being prepared.

State of affairs with regard to climate policy development at Belgian level at the moment of the baseline study

- ⁵⁰ *Climate policies: Flemish climate policy plan 2013-2020; Walloon climate policy plan 2016-2022, Brussels climate policy plan 2016.* These policies are currently under revision as all governments are preparing policies for the period 2021-2030 (be finalised in June 2018). Different members of CJP are lobbying the different governments to include ambitious goals in these plans and to achieve an agreement on burden sharing before the next election in 2019. The coordinators of CJP focus rather on the national climate policy.
- ⁵¹ *The Flemish parliament developed a Flemish climate resolution in November 2016¹⁴* but no ambitious goals or clear ambitious targets are formulated. The parliament shares the principles of a transition towards a low-carbon society, takes a clear engagement for international climate finance (without targets) and shares the principle of the urgency to decrease CO₂ emission (contributing to the target of -35% in 2030) and to develop a reduction trajectory towards achieving the goals set by the European Union for 2050 (between -80% and 95%).
- ⁵² *Walloon climate policy 2016-2022:¹⁵* refers to the European target of -40% emission reduction by 2030 and the long-term goal of -80 % by 2050. The Walloon government has formulated concrete targets regarding their contribution to international climate financing and considers these contributions as additional.
- ⁵³ *Regional Air Climate and Energy plan for the Brussels capital region (June 2016):¹⁶* refers in general terms to the Paris declaration and to an emission reduction target of 30% by 2025 and between 50% and 80% in 2050. The plan also refers to the international commitments of international climate finance up to 100 billion USD by 2020. The plan describes the commitment to contribute annually

¹⁴ Voorstel van resolutie betreffende een sterk Vlaams klimaatbeleid, van Robrecht Bothuyne, Wilfried Vandaele, Willem-Frederik Schiltz, Bruno Tobback en Johan Danen (ingediend 23 november 2016)

¹⁵ <https://www.leswallonsnemanquentpasdair.be/le-pace>

¹⁶ <https://environnement.brussels/guichet/plans-et-programmes>

2.25 million EUR to the Belgian international climate finance, as agreed in the agreement on the intra-Belgian burden sharing (2015).

- ⁵⁴ *Policy declaration 2018 on energy-climate and sustainable development (federal cabinet environment)*:¹⁷ The minister is committed to implement the declaration of Paris (2015) and supports the idea of an ambitious agenda (no clear targets), agrees with the transition towards a low-carbon society, investments in renewable energy and is committed to develop a national climate and energy plan that is coherent with the European objectives for 2030 by the end of 2018.
- ⁵⁵ *Policy declarations 2017 and 2018 for international collaboration (federal cabinet)*:¹⁸ The minister for development cooperation is committed to contribute to the implementation of the Paris declaration and acknowledges that measures need to be taken to stay below 1.5°C climate warming, and that African countries are more vulnerable for climate change. He has included climate as one of the priority areas. The minister has a specific budget for financing interventions in partner countries related to climate adaptation and mitigation (67 million in 2016 was spent) and is committed to spend annually 25 million EUR for international climate financing. This amount contributes for 50% to the total contribution Belgium committed to international climate financing (50 million EUR). The policy declaration stipulated that part of this budget needed to be financed by revenues from the Emissions Trading System (ETS). In 2017 there were no revenues of ETS and as such ODA budget was used. The minister also expanded the role of BIO (Belgian Investment Company for Development Countries) to invest in climate initiatives.
- ⁵⁶ *The policy agreement on the intra-Belgian burden sharing* from December 2015 was only recently formally approved by the federal parliament (17 May 2018)¹⁹ so that the agreement can be put into practice finally, just 1.5 year before the deadline. Not much time is left to effectively take appropriate actions to achieving the objective set of -40% emission reduction²⁰ by 2020 for Belgium. Moreover, in 2017 CJP claimed that emissions had increased since 2017, instead of decreased.²¹ Members of parliament realise that these actions will not be sufficient to stay below a 2°C and even 1.5 °C global warming as stipulated in the Paris declaration. The agreement also decided on the division of the contributions of each region to international climate financing, up to 50 million/year till 2020.²²

State of affairs with regard to the Belgian position in European and international negotiations

- ⁵⁷ The Belgian negotiators at European and international level are hampered by the lack of an ambitious Belgian climate policy and lack of an ambitious agreement between the different government levels (burden sharing). To avoid the same problems as in Paris 2015, the senate

¹⁷ Beleidsnota energie, leefmilieu en duurzame ontwikkeling 2018

¹⁸ Kabinet minister de Croo, Beleidsnota's internationale samenwerking 2017 en 2018

¹⁹ Wetsontwerp houdende instemming met het samenwerkingsakkoord van 12 februari 2018 tussen de Federale Staat, het Vlaamse Gewest, het Waalse Gewest en het Brusselse Hoofdstedelijke Gewest betreffende de verdeling van de Belgische klimaat- en energiedoelstellingen voor de periode 2013-2020

²⁰ Commitment of greenhouse gas emission reduction by 2020: -15.7% for Flemish region; -14.7% for the Walloon region, -8.8% for the Brussel capital region.

²¹ CJP claimed that emission is increasing since 2014, based on the data available till 2016 (www.klimaat.be/nl-be/klimaatverandering/belgie/belgische-uitstoot/evolutie-van-de-uitstoot/). More recent data demonstrate that emission decreased again slightly in 2017.

²² Commitment for international climate financing: 25 million EUR by the federal government, 14.5 million EUR by the Flemish region, 8.25 million EUR by the Walloon region and 2.25 million EUR by the Brussels capital region.



recommended the creation of an inter-parliamentary commission, urging the different parliaments in Belgium to enter into an inter-parliamentary dialogue to prepare for joint Belgian positions to be defended at European and international level. The commission met four times in 2017 and already three times in 2018.

⁵⁸ *In 2017 an inter-parliamentary declaration was signed in the framework of the COP23 preparations (2017).*²³ Members of the commission agreed:

- that structural measures are needed towards a low-carbon transition and ask for study work to underpin realistic objectives that can be set for 2030 and 2050;
- to set a target of -40% emission reduction in 2030 (compared to 1990) and between -80% to -95% in 2050 (with the remark to monitor competitiveness);
- to increase the Belgian contribution to international climate finance (without setting clear targets)
- to prepare a resolution in perspective of the preparations of the COP24 in Poland (December 2018). This resolution will also be guiding for the discussions on the Belgian energy and climate policy 2030.

⁵⁹ *Belgian position in European negotiations:* On June 25th 2018 environment ministers of 14 EU countries, including Belgium, agreed on a common statement on the long-term strategy and the climate ambition of the EU.²⁴ They called upon the European Commission to ensure that its new long-term climate strategy contains both a pathway to reduce greenhouse gas emissions towards net zero in the EU by 2050 and a pathway to limit temperature rise to 1.5 °C, which would need to be even more ambitious. The statement refers to the position of some members states, like the Netherlands and Sweden, to raise this target to at least -55%. Complementary, higher 2030 renewable energy and energy efficiency targets adopted in June 2018 under the Clean Energy Package, mean that EU can surpass its 2030 climate target and cut carbon emission by 45% instead of 40%. Although Belgium was among the signatories of the abovementioned statement (represented by the Brussels minister for environment), it abstained (represented by the permanent representation of Belgium towards the EU) during the voting in the European council of the European climate agreement between the European council, the commission and the European parliament (that - among other - sets the target of -40% emission reduction by 2030 but also the target of increasing the share of renewable energy up to 32%).

⁶⁰ *Belgian technical negotiators* operate within the boundaries set by the politics. Interviewees state that in the European group Belgium has lost its position of a constructive and progressive ally, under the current government. Belgium is currently being consulted less by other European countries.

²³ Interparlementair klimaatoverleg. 13 november 2017, Brussel. Gemeenschappelijke verklaring over het klimaatbeleid in België

²⁴ Green Growth Group (16 EU member states + Norway) Common statement on the long-term strategy and the climate ambition of the EU. Luxembourg, Monday 25th of June 2018.

Belgian negotiators experience some room of manoeuvre. The Belgian decision makers agree with the principles and intentions and are only reluctant for committing to concrete ambitious targets.

2.2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CLIMATE JUSTICE PLATFORM – NOW POLITICAL GROUP OF THE CLIMATE COALITION

⁶¹ The *Climate Justice Platform (CJP)* is a Belgian national platform coordinated by 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11. The CJP was created in 2011 by organisations from the North-South Movement, trade unions and environmental organisations. In 2016 youth organisations also joined the platform. The current members (#29) of the platform are: Vlaamse Jeugdraad, Bond Beter Leefmilieu (BBL), Associations21, Entraide & Fraternité, Conseil de la Jeunesse, IEW, Climate Express, Ambrassade, Beweging.net-CSC, Climaxi, Vredeseilanden, Médecine pour le Tiers Monde, ABVV-FGTB, Protos, Oxfam Solidariteit, APERE, Natuurpunt CVN, EcoKerk/Broederlijk Delen, ADG, CGSLB-ACLVB, 11.11.11, CNCD/11.11.11, Université de Liège, Greenpeace, Oxfam Wereldwinkels, Natuurpunt, Klimaatcoalitie, WWF, CADTM and SOS faim.²⁵

⁶² In **2012** the platform published a political basic text which presented 11 common positions and demands towards the Belgian and European policy makers.²⁶ As it is outdated, it no longer actively serves as a guiding document for concrete lobby targets for the period under evaluation. However, it can still be seen as the broad framework in which the platform operates.

1. Ambitious and just international climate agreement
2. Ambitious emission reduction (at least -40% by 2020)
3. Just transition toward a zero-carbon society
4. Contribution to international climate finance (Belgium contributing 1 billion EUR/year and Europe 35 billion euro)
5. Look for solution for the management of sweet water reserves
6. Develop an international REDD-mechanism
7. Support small-scale farmers, guarantee food security and give a mandate to the World committee on Food security to strengthen the coherence between international climate policies and agricultural policies
8. Implement a technology transfer policy, based on solidarity
9. Evaluate mechanisms such as the Clean development mechanism. Nuclear energy, carbon capture and carbon storage are no sustainable solution to reduce carbon emissions
10. Look for coherence between different policies related to land use food production, trade, bio fuels and development cooperation
11. Achieve a global consensus on sustainable development

⁶³ Staff from 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 jointly coordinate the platform. The coordination of the CJP is part of the current DGD-funded programmes of 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 that run from 2017 until 2021. It is difficult to provide the budget for the coordination of the CJP platform by 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11. as this coordination is part of the entire budget for policy influencing interventions of both organisations, which is further divided over several thematic subjects. At

²⁵ Situation in November 2017.

²⁶ CJP (2012) Onze eisen-nos revendications



11.11.11 0,5 FTE is foreseen for lobbying climate policies (at 24,332 EUR, 2017), at CNCD/11.11.11 0,75 FTE (34,984 EUR, 2017). However, these staff members are also implementing organisation specific interventions on climate justice policy, and are only partially involved in the coordination of the platform. Both organisations also pay membership contribution to CAN Europe (respectively 500 EUR for CNCD/11.11.11 and 110 EUR for 11.11.11). It is not possible to provide specific information on working resources and direct costs (meeting costs, communication materials, transportation costs of staff members to attend meetings, etc.) as it is not possible to make a distinction between activities conducted on behalf of the platform or for the organisation itself. CNCD/11.11.11 and 11.11.11 declared that on average they spend 5000 EUR for costs related to the coordination of CJP. 2017. The main activities of the CJP are the following:²⁷

- 1) *Policy monitoring*: follow-up on political issues on relevant topics for the CJP. The two coordinators monitor policy initiatives and changes taken by decision makers at national and European level, the CJP member organisations follow-up the regional level, whereby the environmental organisations focus on initiatives taken with regard to emission reductions and the transition to a zero carbon society, the labour unions monitor social aspects and just transition and the north-south movement focuses on international aspects such as international climate finance, equity and the role of land use change.
- 2) *Research on climate justice topics*: activity foreseen in the ToC and in the general policy influencing strategies of 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 but no specific research activities on the topic of climate justice have been initiated up till now. Currently the coordinators follow-up relevant policy evolutions by consulting existing research reports. The individual member organisations at their turn implement research on certain topics, but this is not coordinated.
- 3) *Drafting and facilitating common positions*: common positions are discussed at the CJP meetings and are communicated to decision-makers. There is no elaborated comprehensive advocacy plan for the interventions of the CJP.
- 4) *Study days for platform members and CSOs*: no study days have been organised so far.
- 5) *Meetings of platform members organisations and CSOs*: the coordinators organise the meetings of the platform, which take place on an ad hoc base to discuss joint statements and positions that are prepared by the coordinators. The platform meets several times per year, with additional meetings in case of specific events or policy developments. Sometimes the consultation process is done through email communication.
- 6) *External representation of the platform*: this relates to indirect and direct communication to political decision-makers and active participation and communication of positions in European and international networks. In practice most efforts go to advocacy and this is mainly done by formulating and disseminating common positions via short texts. Exceptionally, the platform also provides advisory services, for example, to the study services of political parties. Lobbying (formal and informal) takes place during info sessions or meetings for/with Belgian decision-makers. Platform members are invited to participate in these meetings. Most of the outputs of the platform are focused on outlining general principles decision-makers should take into

²⁷ Activities are categorised according to the reconstructed ToC and the interview with both coordinators of the platform on 12 January 2018.

account, more than detailed technical suggestions or demands. The CJP plays the role of watchdog at the Federal and European level while the individual member organisations are engaged in policy influencing on more technical issues or specific themes.

- ⁶⁴ During the period before the baseline study (before 2017), CJP always has been lobbying the Belgian position to be taken at international climate negotiations. The strategy was very similar as the current strategy. Before, during and after the COP conferences, CJP formulated recommendations, shared their opinion, assessed the results of the COPs and formulated recommendations for the next COP. Advocacy and lobbying interventions were supported by campaigns, conducted by the Climate Coalition, like the climate mobilisation in Ostend in 2015 (before COP21 Paris).
- ⁶⁵ During the second half of 2017 the CJP and the Climate Coalition decided to merge. The 20th of March 2018 the General Assembly formally approved this merger and the CJP will be integrated in the Climate Coalition. The need for separate structures disappeared when it turned out that all the members of the Climate Coalition agreed to also work jointly on advocacy issues. In the new constellation, the CJP operates as a political working group of the Climate Coalition with the aim to better align campaign work to the policy influencing work. The term “climate justice platform” will not be used any-more in the further evaluation process and replaced by the “policy group of the climate coalition”. In communication towards political decision makers, the members of CJP and the climate coalition decided to use the term “climate coalition”.
- ⁶⁶ The *Climate Coalition* is a national platform which unites 70 organisations from the environmental movement, the North-South movement, the trade unions and socio-cultural organisations. It was created in 2008 and organises campaigns in order to mobilise citizens in the discussion on climate change. The topic is not only approached as an ecological problem, but also looks at implications for social cohesion and the impact on vulnerable populations in the South and North.

2.3 ENVISAGED POLICY OUTCOMES OF CJP

- ⁶⁷ CJP still uses the framework of the 11 common positions as developed in 2012 for the orientation of its policy influencing work. These common positions must rather be seen as the “driving narrative” for policy influencing on climate justice. Concrete, measurable targets are not always being proposed for the demands formulated, a “scale of ambitions” could be further elaborated, for example by making a distinction between change to be expected as a minimum and/or a short term (like to see) and changes that are less easy to achieve or to be expected at medium or longer term (love to see, hope to see).
- ⁶⁸ For the period under revision (2017-2021) CJP has defined its ambitions in relation to three major topics: (1) Belgian ambitions regarding emissions reduction, (2) Belgian contribution to climate finance and (3) just transition to a zero-carbon society.²⁸ Following table provides a detailed overview of this set of demands.

²⁸ Source: CJP’s policy context document of February 2018 and the interviews conducted during the inception phase.



Table 3: Summary of concrete demands of CJP for 2017-2018

Distribution of climate goals	1. The effort sharing regulation between the regions of Belgium starts before the 2019 elections, is finished before 2020, and leaves room for a possible increase of the European (and Belgian) ambition. ²⁹
Ambition	2. The Talanoa Dialogue at the COP24 (Poland, 2018) gives a strong impulse to an increase of ambition of all National Determined Contributions (NDCs).
	3. Europe increases its 2030-goals to -55% emission reduction compared to 1990. Belgium takes an active role at the European level to push for this increase.
National policy	4. The National Energy and Climate Plan 2030 reflects a Belgian vision on climate policy, where complementarity is key and clear goals are being pursued such as on emission reduction (deadline first draft December 31, 2018).
Inter-parliamentary resolution	5. The Inter-parliamentary resolution adopts a large part of the positions of the CJP and actively pushes for more cooperation between the entities. It pushes for an increase in Belgian and European ambitions. The resolution is voted by all parties in all parliaments.
International climate finance	6. Belgian contributions to climate finance do not drop below 100 million euro a year and Belgium agrees upon a structural increase of these resources to 500 million euro a year by 2020.
	7. The financial resources are new and additional.
International negotiations (COP24, Poland, 2018)	8. The 2018 Talanoa Dialogue builds on the conclusions of the IPCC report on 1,5°C goal and leads to more ambition. Europe takes the lead for an increase of the 2030-goals and Belgium actively urges for that.
	9. A clear Paris Rulebook is agreed upon at the COP24 which includes agreements on all necessary issues, e.g. on the definition and reporting on climate finance.

⁶⁹ Between CJP and its members it was agreed that CJP is focussing on policy development at Belgian level (focus on emission reduction ambitions and (long term) climate plans and climate governance) and in relation to the Belgian position in European and international climate negotiations. However, when relevant, all members agreed that common positions could also be developed on other related topics.

⁷⁰ At the moment of the baseline study, CJP focuses on influencing three dominant policy development processes that are currently running, namely (1) the development of the inter-parliamentary resolution that will set the boundaries of a Belgian climate policy and that will guide the Belgian position in European and international climate negotiations; (2) the international climate

²⁹ A concrete target for 2020 is not mentioned in the policy briefs (for strategic reasons) but an increase up to at least -40% emission reduction is wanted.

negotiations (COP level); and (3) the development of the National Energy and Climate policy 2030, directed by the National Climate Commission.

⁷¹ CJP targets members of parliament (members of the different parliamentary climate and/or environmental commissions and in particular the inter-parliamentary climate commission) and the executive power, in particular the cabinets for environment. CJP also advocates for enhancing transparency in the policy making process as conducted by the National Climate Commission, that is constituted by the different cabinets responsible for environment and/or climate and development cooperation.

Inter-parliamentary climate resolution

⁷² In November 2017 an inter-parliamentary declaration was signed in the framework of the COP23 preparations (see 2.1. policy context). According to CJP the inter-parliamentary declaration is a good starting point and includes already some good elements but pushes for more ambition (7 suggestions). CJP also formulated concrete suggestions to adapt certain sentences and paragraphs to make them more precise or concrete (9 suggestions), and another 6 suggestions to add topics (like on border tax adjustments, climate refugees, biofuels, biodiversity, carbon taxing, emission reduction in air and sea traffic), and finally demands for more transparency in the policy making process.³⁰ Table 4 gives a detailed overview of the concrete demands. As table 4 shows, these demands include the positions of the different members of the climate coalition that go beyond the focus of the climate justice platform on the Belgian and European ambitions regarding emission reduction and international climate financing. It was agreed upon that policy influencing would be stronger and more effective when the other topics would also be defended by the CJP platform, representing common positions of the different members of the climate coalition, being environmentalists, representatives of the workers movement or youth movement.³¹

Table 4: Summary of the concrete demands regarding the inter-parliamentary climate resolution

Points to develop further – demands to further refine articles of the existing joint declaration	
Climate law (§12) and climate test (§4) regarding the implementation of the Paris Agreement	1. The installation of an independent group, constituted of (academic) experts, with the mandate to implement the foreseen climate “check” and to evaluate the implementation of the law, and with an advisory function towards the parliament
Shared long term climate vision 2030 and 2050 (§6)	2. All short-term measures need to be aligned to the long-term vision regarding decarbonisation
Ambition 2030-2050 (§7 and §8))	3. The inter-parliamentary resolution pushes for higher ambitions at European level. Europe increases its 2030-goals towards achieving in 2020 -55% emission reduction compared to 1990, with at least 45% renewable energy and 40% energy-efficiency.

³⁰ CJP (April 2018) Analysis of the inter-parliamentary declaration. Input for the inter-parliamentary climate commission.

³¹ Klimaatcoalitie (April 2018) Analyse interparlementaire verklaring. Input voor het interparlementair klimaatoverleg in 2018



Nuclear energy exit strategy (§13)	4. The nuclear phasing out needs to be realised by 2025.
Transportation tax system (§18)	5. Reform of the company-car system
	6. Install a smart system of toll charge, including environmental criteria
	7. Install a carbon tax on fossil fuel used in transport sector
Demands to adapt existing articles	
Role of workers and job creation (§5)	8. Include an explicit reference to the need for a just transition towards a carbon-low society, that will also be discussed in the social dialogue
International climate finance (§9)	9. Belgian contributions to climate finance do not drop below 100 million euro a year and Belgium agrees upon a structural increase of these resources to 500 million euro a year by 2020. At least half of this amount needs to be spent on climate adaptation and the financial resources are new and additional. Revenues from the European emission trade can contribute to this.
Divestment – decrease of financial support to fossil fuel (§15)	10. Divestment is need at short term, by 2020 and should also include indirect subsidies (e.g. company cars system)
	11. All public financing should be in line with the climate objectives as agreed upon in de Paris declaration (Art.2)
	12. The national bank of Belgium should receive the role to monitor and publicize financial risks due to climate change
Mobility policy (§17)	13. Phasing out for combustion engines by 2030 instead of the planned date of 2050
	14. Invest in alternative transportation, like emission free public transport, bicycle infrastructure and electric car sharing systems, and make them accessible by offering an integrated mobility service package
Role of education (§2 and §26)	15. More attention for education, not only to achieve behaviour change and change of consumption patterns but also for technological education to support the transition towards a carbon-free society
	16. Foresee in mechanisms to enhance youth participation in policy development
Food, agriculture and livestock (§6, §26, §26)	17. Make policy solutions more concrete, e.g. promote agro-ecological farming; promote a comprehensive package of measures to change consumption patterns (consumer less, consume more locally), reduce food wastages.
Additional demands	

Border tax adjustments (§7)	18. Install border tax adjustments on products imported from countries that did not ratify the Paris Declaration
Climate refugees	19. Recognise the existence of climate refugees and ask for a commitment of Belgium to pro-actively contribute to the international debates to this regard, among others with regard to the Global Compacts on Migration that will be finalised by the end of 2018
Bio-fuel and bio-energy	20. Include a statement that bio-energy that is based on food and agricultural crops or that contributes to deforestation, should be excluded, at European level (renewable energy directive) and in Belgium
Biodiversity	21. Include measurements to protect biodiversity in the national energy and climate plan 2030
Carbon tax	22. Include a carbon tax in a comprehensive package of measurements targeting among others housing and transport sector and include social correction mechanisms to protect the most vulnerable
Air and maritime transport	23. Lobby for the inclusion of air and maritime transport in the emission reduction strategy of the European Union and in international climate policy negotiations
Transparency	24. Enhance transparency of the decision-making process of the national climate commission, for example by demanding detailed reports of the meetings of the national climate commission, reporting of the NCC in the different parliamentary climate commissions or in a public, inter-parliamentary meeting

⁷³ In the framework of the international negotiations following concrete demands were formulated by CJP in 2017³² and 2018.³³ These demands are put forward during the preparatory stakeholder meetings that are organised by the federal minister for environment, in the formal and informal meetings with Belgian negotiators during the COPs, accompanied by ongoing formal and informal, direct and indirect contacts with members of parliament and their advisors.

⁷⁴ As the position taken by Belgium in international negotiations is strongly influenced by the Belgian climate policy, CJP also intends to influence the development process of the national energy and climate plan 2030, as such specific demands also refer to the Belgian level. These are complementary to the concrete demands advocated by all members of the climate coalition, targeting the Belgian decision makers and in particularly the inter-parliamentary climate commission (see in the above).

Table 5: Summary of the concrete demands regarding the COP meetings in 2017 and 2018

	2017	2018

³² CJP (2017) Analyse van de klimaattop in Marrakesh (COP22), aanbevelingen voor 2017

³³ CJP (2018) Analyse van de klimaattop in Bonn (COP23), aanbevelingen voor 2018



Distribution of climate goals	1. Include in the national climate and energy plan 2030 an effort sharing regulation between the regions of Belgium with regard to the 2030 ambitions	Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission
Ambition	2. Increase the ambition of all NDCs during the facilitative dialogue in 2018	Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission
	3. Europe increase its 2030 goals regarding emission reduction and refuse false solutions	
	4. Prioritise drastic emission reduction in the most polluting sectors	
	5. Promote a European policy to phase out fossil fuels and nuclear energy and to set the goal of 100% renewable energy in 2050, taking into account a just transition process	
National policy	6. Develop an ambitious and just national climate and energy plan 2030, that includes an effort sharing regulation, phasing out of fossil fuels by 2020, implementation strategy towards a just transition (and included in the social dialogue), policy coherence, education to accompany a just transition to a carbon-zero society and is aligned to the objectives set in the Paris agreement	1. Develop an ambitious and just national climate and energy plan 2030 that includes a decrease of energy consumption and 100% renewable energy by 2050, a coherent vision, phasing out of fossil fuel by 2050, a vision on a just transition.
		2. Guarantee coherence of all political decisions with the international climate objectives, which include the abolition of the structural dependency on fossil fuels and alignment of the National Pact for Strategic Investments with the Paris Agreement.
International climate finance	7. Belgian contribution for international climate finance should be at least 50 million EUR/year and develop a pathway to increase these resources to 500 million euro/year by 2020. These resources should be new and additional. Look for innovative financial sources.	3. Belgium agrees upon a structural increase towards 500 million euro a year by 2020 (and not 50 million euro/year). Look for innovative financial sources. ³⁴
	8. Harmonise the methods applied by the Belgian regions and the federal government when reporting on their contribution to	

³⁴ Like a financial transaction tax, carbon and revenues from the European emission trade (ETS), carbon taxation

	international climate finance and optimise transparency	
	9. Guarantee that resources are being used for climate adaptation for the most vulnerable countries	
International negotiations	COP23 Bonn 10. Increase the European 2030 climate ambition (-55% greenhouse gas reduction, 45% renewable energy and 40% energy-efficiency)	COP24 Katowice 4. Increase the European 2030 climate ambition. Belgian has to support the initiative taken by the Netherlands that plead for an emission reduction of 55%
	11. Guarantee that the facilitative dialogue (2018) results in an increase of NDCs by 2020	
	12. Enhance political pressure on countries that want to withdraw from the Paris agreement	
	13. Propose border tax adjustment measures on products imported from countries that do not respect social and environmental European regulations	Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission
	14. Support educational programmes to fight climate change within Europe and in the World	Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission
	15. Plead for a balance between financing for mitigation and adaptation	
	16. Put the increase of European climate finance on the agenda of the COP24	
	17. Accelerate the implementation of the Warsaw International mechanism for Loss and damage, and plead for the need for a new financing mechanism	
	18. Look for solutions for climate refugees and include them in the new UN Global Compact on refugees and the UN Global Compact on safe and Regular Migration (by end 2018)	Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission
	19. Develop a programme to promote sustainable food production systems and food security, to enhance human rights and protect the environment	Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission
		5. Support the development of an action plan towards a just transition
	6. A clear Paris Rulebook is agreed upon which includes agreements on all necessary issues, e.g. the definition and reporting on climate finance	



2.4 THEORY OF CHANGE FOR POLICY INFLUENCING FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE

- ⁷⁵ For this impact evaluation a theory of change (ToC) has been reconstructed in June 2017, in preparation of the Terms of Reference, during a workshop with Syspons and with participation of 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11, before the merger of the CJP and the Climate Coalition. During the inception phase the ToC was further discussed with the people interviewed. Only some minor changes were made to the original ToC by the evaluators based on these interviews, mainly a slight rephrasing of some of the result-areas, in order to offer a better understanding of the intervention logic. The reconstructed ToC is added in annex 5.
- ⁷⁶ The first pathway of change of the ToC specifically addresses the dialogue between the CJP and the climate coalition aiming at mobilisation and the organisation of one-off actions (output 1). This output is assumed to contribute to generate visible support for demands in favour of climate justice. According to the ToR and the assessment grid proposed by Syspons, the evaluation of the mobilisation capacity and its results are not within the scope of this impact evaluation. The focus is rather on the evaluation of the importance of having a (large) support base to convince policy makers and on the assessment of the possible synergies between the climate coalition (mobilisation and campaigning) and the CJP (policy influencing). The upcoming merger of the CJP and the Climate Coalition will have an influence on the level of synergy and complementarity. The evaluation will not evaluate the merger process as such, but it will consider it as a context factor which possibly influences the orientation and content of the CJP interventions and the relationships with the Climate Coalition (and its members).

When looking at the other outputs, we can distinguish two groups.

- ⁷⁷ The first group of outputs are situated at the **internal level of the CJP**: practices and knowledge on climate justice are developed and exchanged (output 2), the platform members are up-to-date on current climate justice issues (output 3) and coordinated positions on climate justice issues are adopted (output 4). Following the causal logic of the ToC these outputs should lead to a visible social support for demands in favour of climate justice (outcome 1) and high-quality knowledge on climate justice within the platform (outcome 2), which then would contribute to an increase in the leverage and credibility of the platform members and civil society organisations (CSOs) (outcome 3).
- ⁷⁸ A second group of outputs is situated at the **external level**, including direct (formal and informal) and indirect (through media) communication to political decision makers (outputs 5 and 6) and an active participation and communication of the CJP positions in European and international networks (output 7). Output 5 also relates to the internal functioning of the platform, and contributes to an increase in leverage and credibility of the platform members and CSOs (outcome 3). Outputs 5, 6 and 7 combined have as a result that political decision makers receive information, positions and policy advice on climate justice (output 8), which then should contribute to the sensitisation and education on climate justice of these decision makers (outcome 4).

⁷⁹ At the impact level, both outcomes 3 and 4 should lead to Belgian decision makers taking over positions of the platform and incorporating them in their decisions on national, European and international policy (impact 1 and 2), which would then lead to the adoption of a Belgian policy in favour of climate justice (impact 3).

⁸⁰ In the impact evaluation the focus will pre-dominantly be on the impact of the policy influencing interventions of the climate justice platform, i.e. on the external level. However, the internal level will also be part of the evaluation study to avoid a black-box situation where the link between observed changes at outcome and impact level and inputs cannot be established.

2.5 DESCRIPTION OF MAIN OUTPUTS REALISED IN 2017- MID 2018

⁸¹ For each pathway of change the ToC (see 5) refers to several outputs. With regard to the strengthening of a visual support base for demands in favour of climate justice, outputs relate to the development and exchange of knowledge within the Climate Justice Platform and the development of coordinated positions on climate justice issues. Not all activities as described in the ToC have been implemented in the period 2017 to date. Main activities related to policy monitoring, the drafting of common positions of the platform and meetings of the platform. Members of the platform did not request to organise specific study days or to do research on climate justice topics. Following coordinated position papers have been drafted and distributed among policy makers:

- Position paper (2-pager): Analyse van de klimaattop in Marrakesh (COP22). Aanbevelingen voor 2017
- Position paper (2-pager): Aanbevelingen voor reactie België & EU op de terugtrekking Verenigde Staten uit akkoord van Parijs
- Position paper (2-pager): Recommandations pour la conference Climat Bonn (COP23)
- Press release: Après la “COP23 des petits pas”, la Belgique doit enfile ses bottes de 7 lieues (18/11/2017)
- Letter to the prime minister Charles Michel on the Belgian role at the “One Planet Summit”
- Position paper (3-pager): Analyse van de klimaattop in Bonn (COP23). Aanbevelingen voor 2018 (February 2018)
- Dossier: Analyse de la déclaration interparlementaire. Input pour le dialogue interparlementaire climat en 2018 (April 2018)

⁸² With regard to the external representation of the platform, the main outputs relate to the CJP coordinators, accompanied with some CJP members, engaging with policy decision makers, through indirect and direct communication (formal and informal). CJP, always represented by the coordinators and representatives of the different constituting ‘families’ (North-South movement, environmental groups, trade unions), participates in institutionalised dialogues that are organised by the federal administration for environment before and after the COP-meetings (3 in 2017 and already 1 in 2018). CJP coordinators and several CJP members are included in the Belgian delegation at the COP meetings and meet daily with the negotiators. In the margin of the COP-negotiations there are plenty spaces to meet also informally members of parliament and ministers.

⁸³ CJP coordinators and members are invited to participate in debates, like the national debate on carbon pricing, organised by the federal administration for environment and the workshop on Air,



Climate and Energy, organised by the Walloon administration for environment, and to meet representatives of cabinets (only at regional level, once a year).

- ⁸⁴ CNCD/11.11.11 and 11.11.11 also participate in the Federal Council for Sustainable Development (FRDO) where the different actors of the civil society (including workers organisations) and employers' organisations meet with representatives of the federal ministers. Yearly, the FRDO organises a round table with the federal minister for environment in preparation of the COP. In 2017 a round table was organised during the COP (November 2017). During the same 2017 COP, CJP also organised a roundtable with all members of parliament that were present to discuss the interparliamentary declaration and the positions of CJP. Furthermore, CJP coordinators and representatives follow-up regularly the meetings of the regional and federal parliamentary commissions (on environment and on climate), which also provide space for informal meetings.
- ⁸⁵ In the period 2017 till to date, one campaign was organised by the climate coalition, namely the divestment campaign – www.bankroute.be, but the alignment between this campaign and the policy influencing work of CJP was limited (CJP was mainly focusing on other policy targets as the divestment campaign, but included divestment in the list of positions that are shared with policy makers)³⁵.
- ⁸⁶ The presence in the media by CJP is limited to one press release in 2017. However, CJP coordinators and several members are active on twitter and publish articles on their respective websites, strengthening the positions taken by CJP (but not coordinated by CJP). As during this baseline the evaluators remained within the boundaries of the evaluation subject, i.e. the CJP coordination, no analysis was done of presence in media (print media and social media) of the different members of CJP, including the coordinating NGOs, who publish statements signed by their respective organisations (but not as CJP).
- ⁸⁷ The following visuals provide an overview of the main output delivered by CJP, linked to the policy making process and the most important milestones in this decision-making process so far. The figure does not include non-formal (direct and indirect) communication with the different policy targets as these are not systematically documented by the CJP coordinators.

Figure 1: Main outputs and outcomes for 2017

³⁵ CJP (April 2018) Analyse interparlementaire verklaring. Input voor interparlementaire klimaatoverleg in 2018.





Figure 2: Main outputs and outcomes for 2018





3 FINDINGS

- ⁸⁸ The baseline data for each of the indicators of the evaluation framework are described in this chapter. However, acknowledging the fact that the programme was already running for more than a year when the baseline was executed, the evaluation team decided to already collect as much as possible relevant data on some of the 'evaluative' indicators. This was done as research on advocacy programmes shows that the more time there is in between the advocacy events evaluated and the actual data collection, the less likely it is that policy makers (advocacy targets) will still remember how the change process happened and which role was played by which stakeholder. Some of the evaluative data collected has already been used in the baseline report, the rest will be integrated in the MTR report.
- ⁸⁹ The chapter is structured in two parts. A first part describes the findings from the survey and interviews with policy makers and addresses the first four evaluation questions of the evaluation framework. The second part relates to the assessment of the CJP platform itself and addresses two of the three evaluation questions of the evaluation framework. For each indicator the baseline data are summarised in a box.

3.1 FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY AND INTERVIEWS WITH POLICY MAKERS

3.1.1. TO WHAT EXTENT WAS CJP SUCCESSFUL IN INFLUENCING POINTS OF VIEW OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS?

- ⁹⁰ For this evaluation question, 4 sets of indicators have been identified that are related to the output, outcome and impact as defined on the reconstructed ToC.

Share of national policy makers (from the total pool of policy makers engaged in the topic of climate change), who knowingly have received information from CJP (output 8, indicator 1)

- ⁹¹ *Direct contacts:* As described in chapter two, the CJP has been actively informing Belgian decision makers and members of administrations at Belgian and at regional level throughout the year. CJP

operates with a list of direct contacts³⁶ with whom they frequently meet formally and informally (52 persons):

- The majority of direct contacts are situated within the administrations responsible for “Environment” (25 officers of which 10 at the federal administration Health, Food Safety and Environment and 1 at the administration for development cooperation; 14 working at regional administration and agencies)
- The list refers to 16 members of parliaments of which 10 members of regional parliaments and 6 of the federal parliament, the majority belonging to political parties from the opposition (#12)
- There are seven direct contacts within cabinets responsible for environment, of which five at regional cabinets and two contacts within the federal cabinet responsible for environment. No direct contact was given for the federal cabinet responsible for development cooperation.
- Five contacts with parliamentary assistants or staff of study services (all belonging to parties from the opposition).

⁹² The evaluators observed that a comprehensive stakeholder analysis does not exist at CJP level, diversifying also between allies and opponents within political parties and cabinets. Recently CJP started to take more pro-active action in contacting (study services of) political parties. From the list with direct contacts it becomes clear that CJP has contact with all lead thematic experts involved in climate policy of the different parties, both opposition and ruling parties (with exception of extremist parties on the left and right side of the political spectrum), which is shown in following table that gives an overview of the number of direct contacts of CJP with members of parliament that participate in the inter-parliamentary climate commission and who participate actively in the debates. Direct contacts with opposition parties outnumber the contacts with the ruling parties, but CJP also has direct contact with the lead thematic experts in the ruling parties, including the president of the inter-parliamentary commission.

Table 6: Number of direct contacts with members of parliament of CJP, differentiated by political party

Political party	Direct contacts members of parliaments 2017/2018	Direct contact members inter- parliamentary commission November 2017 (n=29)	Direct contact members inter- parliamentary commission 25/05 2018 (n=16 speakers)	Direct contact members inter- parliamentary commission 29/05 2017
CD&V	1	/	1	/
CDH	1	1	1	1
Ecolo	3	2	2	2
Groen	3	2	1	1
N-VA	1	/	1	1
Open VLD	1	1	1	/
PS	3	/	1	/
SP.a	2	/	1	1
Onafhankelijk	1	/	/	/
Total	16	6	9	6

³⁶ The list received is not up-to-date. During the organisation of the interviews, the evaluators received names of colleagues of interviewees that also had had contacts with CJP. The evaluators tried to talk sufficiently to people from the ruling parties and got also in contact with people that were not on the list of direct contacts.



- ⁹³ It is not possible to describe the number of formal and informal meetings with these direct contacts as these are not recorded in a systematic manner by CJP coordinators and no consolidated overview is available. Partial data received from CJP coordinators show that CJP has had at least once a year direct contact with all cabinets involved in climate policy (Flemish, French, Walloon, Brussels Capital Region, federal cabinet for environment) (a total of 6 meetings in 2017). Contacts with the federal cabinet for environment are difficult. The latter could only be met at the round table organised by the administration. Further CJP can meet the members of parliament and Belgian negotiators involved in the COP processes during the stakeholder meetings. In 2017 there were three of these stakeholder meetings. The evaluators had no access to information on the number of participants at the round table and in the stakeholder meetings. In 2017 CJP has started to contact the study services of the political parties, with one meeting with the study service of the PS.
- ⁹⁴ *Indirect contacts*: no consolidated overview is available of the list of indirect contacts. Policy briefs are sent by mail to all members of the relevant parliamentary commissions (at all levels) and to the relevant cabinets (see overview in chapter 2). CJP as a platform is almost not visible in social media. On the other hand, CJP coordinating organisations and their members are active on social media and in the press. No consolidated overview exists of media presence.

Baseline data:

- 52 direct contacts, of which 25 in administrations, 16 members of parliaments, 7 with cabinets (all but federal cabinet for development cooperation), 5 contacts with study services or assistants of members of parliament.
- CJP has direct contact with all lead thematic experts of all political parties (except extremist parties), but the number of contacts with opposition parties outnumber the number of contacts with ruling parties and the quality of interaction differs. There is a closer relation and more frequent interaction with opposition parties (also requesting CJP for advice) compared to the interactions with ruling parties.
- All 25 people interviewed confirmed having received information from CJP (9/25 administration, 9/16 members of parliament, 3/7 members of cabinet and 4/5 staff at study services, see annex 3).

Share of national policy makers that have been reached who assess the information received from CJP as relevant, timely, qualitative and usable and that perceive CJP as a legitimate and credible advocate for climate justice (outcome 3&4)

- ⁹⁵ *Relevance* - All 25 interviewees (parliaments, cabinets, administrations, study services) find the information provided by CJP as relevant.
- *Members of parliament* (both from ruling parties and from the opposition) see CJP as an important information source, in particular those from the opposition as they have less to no direct access to information from the respective administrations. CJP is often more and better informed than the members of parliament, and also provides information from their

international networks and contacts. CJP adds other perspectives and positions to the ongoing debate, in particular on climate justice, the issues of just transition towards a zero-carbon society and the topic of climate refugees, and keeps on pushing for more ambitious goals.

- *Staff at the cabinets* are interested to know different opinions and positions from all stakeholders, including civil society, represented by CJP. Cabinets at regional level invite CJP representatives at least once a year. CJP provides additional and new information and positions that counterbalance positions of sectoral organisations from the corporate sector. Positions of CJP are taken into account during the decision-making process and force the cabinet to justify what decisions are being taken. It must be noted that no dialogue could be established yet with the federal cabinet responsible for environment, apart from the round table that was organised upon initiative of the federal administration for environment and FRDO.
- *Officers at administrations* use the CJP as an important information source. Public officers are all responsible for specific sub-themes and use the information from CJP to situate their respective subjects in the wider Belgian and international debates. As for the members of parliaments, administrators appreciate the new dimensions added by CJP to the ongoing debates such as climate justice, attention for vulnerable groups and just transition. CJP provides access to relevant national and international studies that are relevant for the administration. It was mentioned that public officers often lack sufficient time for study work and analysis of available information resources. New information can be shared with the respective ministers. During the negotiations at the COP, CJP is able to provide information obtained from their international contacts, in particular from representatives of development countries. Furthermore, it is important to know the positions of the civil society.
- *Staff of political parties* have been less targeted by CJP. Staff at study services of SP.a, PS and CD&V have been approached upon initiative of CJP. They also use CJP as an important information source and would like to collaborate more with CJP.

⁹⁶ *Quality* - With regard to the quality of the information provided, all 25 interviewees agree that the information is of high quality: information is correct and reliable, well-structured and presented, and understandable. The thematic expertise of CJP is widely acknowledged, including their knowledge of the technicality of the national, European and international negotiation processes. CJP refers to interesting sources and studies. The documents have a good balance between being too technical and too generalist. All interviewees refer to the high ambition level as formulated in the positions proposed but agree that it is the task of civil society to be ambitious and to keep on putting pressure. The positive appreciation of the relevance and quality of the information provided by CJP is confirmed in the online survey. Respondents agree with the fact that the information is correct, aligns with ongoing policy debates and is provided at relevant moments.

⁹⁷ Three interviewees formulated some critique on the quality of the information: (1) one member of parliament referred to the absence of reference to a source that had been used, (2) one member of parliament mentioned a quote that was wrongly referring to an IPCC document and as such had a slightly undermined their position during negotiations (in both cases the information was corrected after having contacted CJP coordinators), and (3) an administration that shared information with CJP which was wrongly used afterwards by 11.11.11 in a press release, which influenced temporarily the trust relation between the administration and its minister.



- ⁹⁸ *Usability* – all 25 interviewees perceive CJP as an important information source, which is also recognised for its expertise, as shown by the fact that CJP is regularly invited by all stakeholders (parliament, cabinets and administration) to provide their information and opinion. According to all interviewees, information from CJP is used to formulate their positions (using information from different sources, among them CJP). Interviewees from cabinets and administration also mentioned that the CJP information was conducive for strengthen their position within the cabinets or administrations, where they also often have to look for allies internally to defend certain positions.
- ⁹⁹ At cabinets the information from CJP enriches the internal debates and contributes to the debate on the feasibility of positions the Belgian government can defend at European and international level. The information is seen as complementary to the information received from other resources and from the administrations. The added value of the positions of CJP compared to the information received from the administration, is the fact that the civil society can be more ambitious and is not bound by the boundaries of the government agreement (regeerakkoord).
- ¹⁰⁰ Information provided by CJP is mainly used (i) during the negotiations at the COP (COP23 in 2017, as was done during the previous COPs) by the members of the delegation, (ii) by members of parliament (opposition) when questioning the government’s policy (at different levels) and (iii) during the discussions on the inter-parliamentary resolution on climate. Members of parliament (opposition parties) have shared their draft texts and proposals for amendments with CJP coordinators and asked for advice. (iv) Also draft policies at regional level were shared with CJP coordinators by members of opposition parties and feedback was requested (examples given of the climate policy of the Brussels capital region – other examples date from before 2017).
- ¹⁰¹ From the interviews and analysis of documents it is clear that the political parties of the opposition strongly agree with the positions from CJP and rely on their expertise, information sources and arguments to defend their positions in the parliamentary debates. The members of the ruling parties interviewed (CD&V and Open VLD) agree with the principles of the analysis and positions presented by CJP (e.g. the need to be have ambitious goals with regard to emission reduction and climate financing) but do not agree with all positions (e.g. concrete targets). They find it important to know the positions of CJP but consider the positions as “leftist’ and not feasible within the agreed period of time (e.g. 2030). This is also reflected in results of the online survey (only 30 respondents).
- ¹⁰² All interviewees confirm that CJP positions are ambitious but the appreciation differs between type of interviewee. Members of the ruling parties consider the positions of CJP too ambitions. They share the principles but argue that many of them are not feasible. Members of the opposition agree with the ambitious character but argue that ambitious targets are needed to be set in order to urge for action (nonetheless the fact that lower targets have not been achieved yet).
- ¹⁰³ Members of cabinets argue that the positions do not fully take into account the political sensitivity and room for manoeuvre as described by the government agreement. But at the same time,

interviewees at cabinets said that although ambitious positions have not much impact on the current policy making process, it stimulates the debate, which will have effect on the longer term.

- ¹⁰⁴ Interviewees from the opposition parties and some resource persons also call upon a more confrontational action of the civil society, asking them to clearly describe the risks and consequences of not taking action and being ambitious and to describe why progress is slow (referring to the lack of political will among some government parties).

Baseline data:

- All people interviewed, without distinction to political parties, find the information provided by CJP relevant, usable and of high quality.
- CJP is an important information source for all interviewees for formulating their positions:
 - Opposition parties: for questioning the positions taken by the ruling parties
 - Ruling parties: to know the position of the opposition as CJP is considered to be “leftist”
 - Cabinets and administration: use the CJP information to strengthen their own positions (when deviating from the dominant discourse internally) and to enrich the debate
- All opposition parties and the majority of cabinets appreciate the ambitious character of the CJP positions as it calls for urgent action. One cabinet argues that the positions do not fully take into account the political sensitivity and room for manoeuvre as described by the government agreement.
- All ruling parties agree with the principles of the analyses and positions but do not agree with the concrete and ambitious targets proposed (as assessed not being feasible)

Level of agenda-setting with regard to climate justice (outcome 3&4, indicator 2b)

- ¹⁰⁵ This indicator refers to the number of parliamentary interpellations and questions, proposed resolutions, amendments taken by members of parliament that are in line with CJP positions and hence contribute to putting the CJP positions on the policy agenda. Two main policy spaces for agenda setting were analysed, namely the discussions in parliament and the discussions in the inter-parliamentary climate commission. As baseline data we refer to the situation in 2017 till mid 2018.

- ¹⁰⁶ *Discussions in parliament:* There is evidence from the document study (parliamentary questions and discussions in the respective commissions of foreign affairs and on environment), confirmed by the interviews with members of parliament, that several CJP’s positions are being taken over in the parliamentary debates. In 2017 nine parliamentary questions were posed in the federal parliament:

- 1 question of N-VA on sales of BIO-participation
- 1 question from Groen and one from N-VA on carbon taxation on American products
- 1 question from Ecolo on climate refugees
- 4 questions on Belgian climate ambition: from PS, SP.a, Ecolo and CD&V
- 1 question from Défi on the implications of US withdrawing from the Paris declaration
- 1 question from Ecolo on international climate financing

- ¹⁰⁷ In 2018 (till June 2018) five parliamentary questions were posed in the federal parliament:

- 4 questions of the same parliamentarian belonging to Ecolo on the greenhouse gas emission in Belgium, the Belgian climate ambitions, the recognition of climate refugees and on burden sharing.
- 1 question from PS on burden sharing



¹⁰⁸ Only 3 of the 14 parliamentary questions were formulated by the ruling parties. Evidently the opposition is more active in questioning the government on the climate policy. The questions of the opposition parties (Groen, Ecolo, PS, SP.a) reflect the CJP positions and it was confirmed by all the interviewees from these parties that the information received from CJP contributed to the debates in the parliament, above all on the international climate financing objectives and emission reduction. Interviewees also confirmed that their attention was drawn to other topics such as just transition and climate refugees.

¹⁰⁹ *Amendments on the inter-parliamentary resolution (process running in 2018)*: Both interviewees from opposition and from ruling parties have used the information from CJP to prepare their respective positions and amendments. The interviewees from ruling parties acknowledge that the information was relevant to know the wider context of the policy debate and the urgency to be ambitious. This sense of urgency and the need to be ambitious are included in the text, but they did not want to include concrete and measurable ambitious targets in the policy document. The interviewees from the opposition parties insisted in including ambitious targets, copied from the positions of CJP, in the resolution. In several meetings of the commission discussions are being organised on the targets with regard to emission reduction and the Belgian contribution to international climate finance.

Baseline data:

- Positions of CJP with regard to carbon taxation, climate refugees, Belgian climate ambitions (emission reduction), burden sharing and Belgian contribution to international climate financing are put on the political agenda during discussions in parliament.
- In principle all Belgian parties support the Paris Agreement and agree with the principle that Belgium needs to develop an ambitious climate policy. Only the opposition parties have formulated a set of amendments³⁷ that refer to the CJP positions and insist in putting concrete targets in the inter-parliamentary resolution that will set the boundaries for developing the Belgian climate policy.
- Mainly opposition parties are questioning the government on the Belgian climate policy (11 of the 14 parliamentary questions formulated by opposition parties)

Discursive change with regard to climate policy (impact 1, indicator 3)

¹¹⁰ Assessing the impact of policy influencing also can include an assessment of the extent CJP positions are visible in the policy discourse. This relates to the extent policy makers defend CJP positions in public hearings, debates, public events, media (television, print media, social media) and in policy negotiations.

³⁷ Difficult to calculate the number of amendments. There are many drafts of the inter-parliamentary resolution, which is amended at several occasions. The evaluators do not have access to all amendments (only Groen/Ecolo) and can only track the discussion based on the minutes of the meetings of this commission.

- ¹¹¹ No baseline data are available on the policy discourse of the thematic experts within each of the political parties and of the cabinets, as this requires consistently tracking of the policy discourses which is not being done in a systematic manner by the CJP coordinators.
- ¹¹² Also, the process at the COP is currently a black box for the evaluators. It was not possible to track the positions taken by the Belgian negotiators.
- ¹¹³ The analysis of the results of the COP in Bonn, done by CJP, refers to the fact that Belgium was among the countries that proposed a Powering Past Coal coalition to accompany a transition towards a zero-carbon society.
- ¹¹⁴ The Belgian negotiators were bound by the inter-parliamentary declaration of November 2017 which is not as ambitious as CJP. The declaration sets the target of an emission reduction of -40% by 2030 and minimum -80% by 2050 (but reference is made to the call by the IPCC to reduce emission reduction with -55% by 2030 and with -95% by 2050); pleads for a gradual increase of the Belgian contribution to international climate finance but no targets are set; it calls for a decrease of investments in fossil fuels and the development of a long term strategy for the transition towards a zero-carbon society; it calls for an ambitious mobility policy, to look for synergy between different sectoral policies, to reform food production systems and invest in education and sensitization.
- ¹¹⁵ Two interviewees stated that under the current government Belgium has lost its position of a constructive and progressive ally in the European group. Belgium is currently being consulted less by other European countries. However, two interviewees from the administration said that Belgian negotiators experience some room of manoeuvre as at policy level, the government agrees with the principles and intentions for an ambitious climate policy but are only reluctant for committing to concrete ambitious targets.
- ¹¹⁶ To conclude, the COP 21 in Paris of 2015 had created a momentum for ambitious declarations. During and after the COP several policy initiatives have been taken (e.g. the initiative to install an inter-parliamentary climate commission). From 2017 the momentum seems to be lost. At the moment of the baseline study, not many policy initiatives have been taken that align to the demands of CJP.

Baseline data:

- There are no base-line data on policy discourse on the Belgian climate policy of the main thematic experts in the different political parties, as this is currently not being tracked systematically by CJP coordinators.
- With regard to the European negotiations, under the current government, Belgium has lost its position of a constructive and progressive ally on climate policy topics.
- Under pressure of N-VA, Belgium is not lobbying for ambitious concrete targets with regard to emission reduction, stating that the lower targets are already not being achieved.



Belgian policy in favour of climate justice (impact 3, indicator 4)

- ¹¹⁷ *Procedural change* - One element in the chain of policy changes resulting from policy influencing interventions can relate to advocating for procedural change. CJP has one specific demand that is related to procedural changes. CJP demands more transparency in the functioning of the national climate commission. No changes to that regard can be noticed so far.
- ¹¹⁸ *Policy change* – CJP wants to see changes of ambition and quality of climate policy in four inter-related policy development processes : (1) the effort sharing regulation between the regions of Belgium (to be started before the 2019 elections), (2) the inter-parliamentary climate resolution, (3) the national Energy and Climate Plan 2030, (4) Belgian position in the international negotiations. The ambitions as demanded by CJP are:
1. An emission reduction of -55% compared to 1990 in 2020 (with at least 45% renewable energy and 40% energy-efficiency).
 2. Increase of the Belgian contribution to international climate finance of 500 million/year by 2020, that is new and additional, and at least half of the amount should be spent on climate adaptation.
- ¹¹⁹ A set of more concrete demands (operationalising the quality of the climate policies) are formulated that will contribute to the emission reduction targets (see chapter 2).
- ¹²⁰ The baseline data refer to the state of affairs regarding policy development by mid-2018 and shows the following picture.

Table 7: Description of the state of affairs regarding climate policy development processes

Policy development processes	State of affairs mid 2018 ³⁸
The effort sharing regulation between the regions of Belgium	The effort sharing regulation horizon 2030 between the regions has not started. There are no indications for an increased Belgian and European ambition.
The inter-parliamentary climate resolution	The draft resolution was being discussed at the moment of the baseline. CJP positions with regard to emission reduction targets and international climate finance (without targets) will only be dealt with as minority amendments. The draft of June 2018 does not reflect any of the CJP ambitions and refers only to some principles of the urgency of a need for an ambitious climate policy.
The National Energy and Climate Plan 2030	Policy development process is ongoing and guided by the NCC. No drafts are available yet. From the interviews it appears that there is a lack of political will to develop a national policy with clear ambitious targets.

³⁸ Based on CJP (Februari 2018) beleidscontext Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid. And CJP (s.d.) Analyse van de klimaattop in Bonn (COP23) Aanbevelingen voor 2018. And minutes from the inter-parliamentary climate commission. And Interviews conducted during baseline study.

<p>The Belgian position in the international negotiations</p>	<p>The COP24 In Katowice is the next milestone (end 2018) Belgium has not shown yet commitment to take an ambitious position in the international negotiations. Room for manoeuvre for the negotiators is stipulated by the inter-parliamentary resolution.</p> <p>Indications that the Belgian delegation will ask for a clear Paris Rulebook, which includes agreements on all necessary issues, such as on the definition and reporting on climate finance (as defended by Belgian at COP23 in Bonn). But discussions ongoing at federal and regional level about the definition of climate finance.</p> <p>The permanent representation of Belgium towards the EU abstained during the voting (June 2018) in the European council, of the European climate agreement between the European council, the commission and the European parliament, not wanting a commitment to increase emission reduction up to -40% by 2030.</p>
---	--

¹²¹ *The inter-parliamentary resolution* is an important step in the climate policy development process as it sets the framework for further policy development. From the document study (see list in annex) it becomes clear that all parties (government and opposition) understand the urgency of taking actions needed to stay below 2°C degree and agree with the principle of an ambitious climate policy at Belgian, European and international level. The main discussions are related to whether or not committing Belgium to concrete ambitious targets (in particularly regarding emission reduction by 2030). Only members of parliament from political parties in the opposition agree with setting concrete ambitious tangible targets such as -55% emission reduction and targets related to the contribution of Belgium to international climate finance (500 million EUR annually from 2020 onwards). In particular members of the ecologist political group, the socialist political group and CdH appear to be active in the debate and are defending CJP positions.

¹²² The arguments from the ruling parties refer to the fact that (i) goals are not yet being realised making it not relevant to set even more ambitious goals, (ii) studies are lacking that justify the goal of -55% emission reduction by 2030, (iii) there is a risk of reducing competitiveness of the Belgian corporate sector, and (iv) it is more relevant to discuss on how emission reduction will be realised. The opposition parties argue that nonetheless targets are not being realised, a clear goal is needed to call for urgent action.³⁹ With regard to international climate financing, in particularly N-VA is opposing, not wanting to set annual targets for the contribution to international climate financing.⁴⁰

¹²³ The Climate Coalition has formulated a set of 24 specific and concrete demands (see list in chapter 2). From the reports of the commission meetings it can be learned that 13 out of 24 CJP positions are subject of the discussions (demands with number 1;3;4;5;6;7;9;14;15;17;18;20;21 see list in chapter 2), with a focus on the targets for emission reduction and international climate financing. In particularly, the ecologist political group (Groen and Ecolo) is taking over the CJP positions regarding (i) ambition of emission reduction of -55% by 2030 and -95% by 2050; (ii) annual increase of the

³⁹ Minutes of the Special commission on climate and sustainable development (session 15 May 2018)

⁴⁰ Minutes of the Special commission on climate and sustainable development (session 29 May 2018)



Belgian contribution to climate finance (but no targets set); (iii) transition towards a low-carbon society, (iv) other CJP proposed topics like the urgency to have a national climate policy, the need for an independent control mechanism, phasing out of nuclear energy, transport taxation.⁴¹ The socialist parties also asked for a Carbon Border Adjustment Tax.⁴² During MTR it will be analysed what positions eventually are included in the final text of the resolution.

- ¹²⁴ In the discussions in parliament it also becomes clear that all members of parliament involved in the discussions on climate policy, want to disconnect the discussions on the Belgian position at European and international level from the discussions on the national energy and climate policy and related burden sharing discussions, which shows the sensitivity of the national climate policy debate.
- ¹²⁵ *With regard to the international negotiations*, the COP24 Karowice is a crucial moment in the international climate negotiations and will be an interesting case to assess to what extent the positions of CJP are included in the debates and finally in the official declaration. The COP23 in Bonn, 2017 must be seen as an intermediary step in the preparation towards the COP in Karowice. For the COP23 CJP had formulated 10 concrete demands (see list in chapter 2, page, demands numbered from 10 till 19).
- ¹²⁶ Achievements of the COP23 relate to (1) the start of the Talanoa dialogue (to formulate more ambitious NDC by 2020); (2) instalment of a working group on agriculture; (3) official acceptance of representatives of indigenous people in the negotiations; (4) the approval of a gender action plan; (5) initiatives to develop educational strategies. Further not much progress was achieved regarding commitments to international climate finance, or to mobilise sufficient funding for “loss and damage”.⁴³ As the COP23 in Bonn must be seen as an intermediary step towards the COP24 in Karowice, debates concentrated more on the organisation of processes and procedures for further negotiations. For example, an agreement was achieved to organise the Talanoa dialogue in 2018 to come to an agreement of the new NDC. The result of this dialogue will be discussed at Karowice. The dialogue is ongoing. During MTR an assessment will be done of the level of adoption of the CJP demands in the Karowice declaration and of the extent the Belgian delegation has defended the CJP positions.
- ¹²⁷ The evaluators have no information on the topics that were defended by the Belgian negotiators. However, as these negotiators had to operate within the boundaries of the inter-parliamentary declaration (as no resolution was finished yet), it is clear that no ambitious targets have been

⁴¹ Minutes from the Special commission on climate and sustainable development. Session of 15 March 2018 and draft document with amendments of ecologist political group.

⁴² Minutes from the Special commission on climate and sustainable development. Session of 29 March 2018.

⁴³ CJP (s.d.) Analyse van de klimaattop in Bonn (COP23) Aanbevelingen voor 2018. ; FCCC (february 2018) report of the Conference of the Parties on its 23 session held in Bonn 2017

defended. CJP refers to one positive contribution of Belgium, namely its support for a “Powering Past Coal” coalition to prepare the transition towards a zero-carbon society.

¹²⁸ Resource persons and interviewees (and confirmed by the minutes of the special commission on climate and sustainable development) refer to the hesitation of the political party N-VA on the feasibility of these targets, stating that lower targets are already not being realised. But also, within the other ruling parties there are internally tensions between more progressive and more conservative opinions. N-VA commissioned an impact study on the transition towards renewable energy for Belgium.

¹²⁹ *Other effects:* Besides effects at policy level, CJP contributed to some debates within the administrations. The interaction with CJP on topics such as international climate finance, prompted the Flemish administration to provide more accurate figures on the contribution to international climate finance. The discussions on the definition of what can be calculated as contributing to international climate finance are ongoing, also in Belgium, and will be part of the discussion on the Paris Rulebook that will take place during the COP24 in 2018. Administrations are aware of the “watchdog” role of CJP, when they provide their numbers.

Baseline data:

- At procedural level: lack of transparency of the decision-making process of the national climate commission
- At policy level:
 - Absence of a National Energy and Climate plan 2030. Policy development ongoing. Lack of political will so far to develop an ambitious national policy that also includes ambitious targets regarding burden sharing within Belgium.
 - Effort sharing regulations date from 2015 (only put in practice since 2017) but stay far below the targets asked by CJP. Effort sharing regulation horizon 2030 between the regions has not started. No indications that there is room for an increased Belgian and European ambition.
 - Draft inter-parliamentary resolution does not include concrete targets for emission reduction and international climate finance. 13 of the 24 CJP positions are being discussed.
 - Preparations for COP24 in Katowice: Belgium is not willing to take an active role at the European level to push for an increase of the European 2030 goals to -55% emission reduction and is, besides Italy, the only country in west-Europe that is not pushing for this ambition.
 - No tangible commitments for an annual increase in the Belgian contribution to climate finance; and contribution is not new or additional. Belgian contribution to climate finance mounted to 100 million in 2016 but CJP critique on the definition of climate financing number (no numbers yet for 2017)
 - No official government position to push for ambitious targets regarding emission reduction. Government does not want concrete targets and defends an emission reduction of maximum – 40% by 2020.
- All political decision makers understand the urgency for ambitious climate policy but differ in opinion regarding the need for concrete targets and commitments with regard to emission reduction and international climate finance.
- Ruling parties adopt a climate conservative approach whereas opposition parties push for concrete and ambitious targets that are in line with CJP positions.



3.1.2. WHAT ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS FOR INFLUENCING POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS?

Share of national policy makers reached by CJP, who view information channels (direct formal, direct non-formal and indirect communication) as relevant. (output 8, indicator 5)

- ¹³⁰ All interviewees agreed that the most effective way of communication is through direct contacts (formal and informal) and through personalised mails and highlighted the importance of having frequent and continuous contact, formal and informally. All interviewees from opposition parties also mentioned that they frequently contact CJP coordinators and some of the CJP members for advice (by mail or by phone). All interviewees value the combination of formal and informal contacts with CJP coordinators and some of their members. General mailings, messages in social media, press releases or the websites of 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 are perceived by all interviewees as being less relevant (not adding information to the other communication received and not relevant to accelerate the ongoing discussions).
- ¹³¹ Interviewees at cabinets argue that civil society can have more influence on the policy debates when approaching members of parliament and directly the minister. Also within the cabinet different opinions regarding the topics exist and staff have to balance between their personal opinion and ambitious and the policy decisions taken by the government. They point out to the fact that their ministers are sensitive for the opinion of the general public. Ministers receive letters (questions and comments) from citizens and are sensitive to civic actions (like currently is taken place on air quality). But ministers also want to know the opinion of the civil society, in this case represented by CJP. Ministers are sensitive for both information sources (direct and indirect).
- ¹³² A qualitative assessment of the different forms of communication channels and how they are embedded in the overall policy influencing strategy (indicator 6) will be done during the process tracing and contribution analysis, foreseen for the MTR and final evaluation.

Baseline data:

- All members of parliament reached (opposition and ruling parties) find direct contacts (both formal and informal) more relevant compared to indirect contact.
- All interviewees at cabinets agree that ministers want to be informed by civil society but that they also are sensitive for indirect actions like letters and civic actions.

3.1.3. TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS RECOGNIZE THE INFLUENCE OF THE CJP?

Share of national policy makers, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who view the CJP platform as influential on their opinion forming process (outcome 3, indicator 7)

¹³³ A large majority of the interviewees and 22 of the 31 respondents⁴⁴ (online survey) recognise the CJP as a legitimate advocate for climate justice.

Share of national policy makers, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who name other actors as one of the more influential stakeholders on their opinion-forming process (outcome 3, indicator 8)

¹³⁴ The CJP is perceived by the interviewees as the most important information source on the topic of the Belgian position in the European and international negotiations from the civil society side. The survey demonstrates that also individual NGOs like 11.11.11, CNCD/11.11.11, WWF, Oxfam Solidarity, Greenpeace and BBL are equally important information sources. The top three of important influencing organisations on national climate policy and the position of Belgium in the European and international policy debates (based on survey results) is composed by: (1) Greenpeace for 50% of the respondents (#10 persons); (2) CJP, 11.11.11 and WWF for 45% and (3) CNCD/11.11.11 for 35%.⁴⁵

¹³⁵ Individual members of CJP, like BBL, WWF and Greenpeace and the trade unions, directly lobby the different governments on their respective regional climate policies and ambitions, focusing on their topics of interest (ex. BBL on emission reduction, Greenpeace on clean air, trade unions on just transition). Additionally, also development NGOs lobby directly on topics related to the CJP advocacy agenda, like 11.11.11, Oxfam Solidarity and CNCD/11.11.11. The individual organisations tend to lobby for more ambitious positions compared to the common positions of CJP.

Baseline data:

- The large majority of the interviewees and 22 of the 31 respondents (online survey) recognise the CJP as a legitimate advocate for climate justice.
- The CJP is perceived by all interviewees as the most important information source and influencer from the civil society, on the topic of the Belgian position in the European and international negotiations.
- Other important influencers, from civil society, on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian position in international climate negotiations are Greenpeace, WWF, 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11

⁴⁴ Other respondents having no opinion

⁴⁵ One should take into account that there was an under-representation of the French respondents.



3.1.4. TO WHAT EXTENT IS CJP RECOGNISED AS A PLATFORM WITH A BROAD SOCIAL BASIS?

Share of national policy makers form the total pool of policy makers engaged in the topic of climate change, who know the CJP (outcome 3, indicator 9)

¹³⁶ The CJP is well known by all policy makers interviewed and respondents of the survey (those who had received information on the Belgian climate policy and its position in European and international negotiations). The majority of the interviewees and survey respondents also know the composition of the platform and the spokespersons/coordinators of the platform.

Share of national policy makers form the total pool of policy makers engaged in the topic of climate change, who vied the specific composition of the CJP as a comparative strength. (outcome 3, indicator 10)

¹³⁷ All interviewees appreciate the fact that a wide variety of civil society organisations have joined one platform at Belgian level (including Flemish and Walloon organisations) and support common positions. It facilitates the dialogue with the civil society. Interviewees appreciate the variety of expertise that is present in the platform. There is no misunderstanding among policy makers of the positions and advocacy agendas of the platform and of its separate members, except the fact that it is for many policy makers difficult to separate the positions defended by 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 directly from the positions brought forward as spokesperson and coordinator of the platform (as they often relate to the same topic).

Baseline data:

- All thematic experts of the different political parties and all relevant cabinets know the existence of the CJP platform.
- The majority of the policy makers also know the composition of the platform (they can name the different groups constituting the platform)
- All interviewees (parliament and cabinets) appreciate the fact that a wide variety of civil society organisations have joined one platform at Belgian level and support common positions. It enables an efficient dialogue with civil society.

3.2 FINDINGS FROM THE INTERVIEWS AND SURVEY AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE CJP PLATFORM

¹³⁸ The following three evaluation questions are related to the group of outputs as defined at internal level of the CJP platform in the Theory of Change: practices and knowledge on climate justice are developed and exchanged (output 2), the platform members are up-to-date on current climate justice issues (output 3) and coordinated positions on climate justice issues are adopted (output 4). Following the causal logic of the ToC these outputs should lead to a visible social support for demands in favour of climate justice (outcome 1) and high-quality knowledge on climate justice within the platform (outcome 2), which then would contribute to an increase in the leverage and credibility of the platform members and civil society organisations (CSOs) (outcome 3).⁴⁶

¹³⁹ Not all activities as described in the ToC have been implemented in the period 2017 to date. Main activities relate to policy monitoring, the drafting of common positions of the platform and meetings of the platform (see chapter 2). Members of the platform did not request to organise specific study days or to do research on climate justice topics.

3.2.1. TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE MEMBERS OF CJP VIEW CJP AS THEIR MAIN CHANNEL FOR ADVOCACY ON CLIMATE JUSTICE

Share of CJP members who use other channels for their advocacy work on climate justice (success factor, indicator 11)

¹⁴⁰ Although the CJP has 29 member organisations, only a minority (about 7 to 10 organisations) can be considered as an active member, taking the lead in some discussions, joining the coordinators in meetings with policy makers, and alike. The majority of the platform members have delegated the policy influencing to the coordination of the platform and see the platform as an important information source on climate policy. Organisations remain members as they realise it is important to support lobby work with a large support base from civil society.

Baseline data:

- The majority of the platform members do not have a policy officer or do not prioritise their policy influencing on the CJP topics and delegate the policy influencing on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian position in international negotiations to the platform.
- Those members that have a policy officer and that are actively influencing policy decision makers on climate issues combine their own policy influencing strategies with policy influencing strategies through the platform and often accompany the CJP coordinators during their meetings with decision makers. This is also the case of the CJP coordinators themselves who also relate with policy makers (directly and indirectly) on similar topics as defended by the platform.

⁴⁶ Outcome 3 is assessed in the chapter 3.1.3. and 3.1.4.



Share of CJP members who use the positions of CJP in communication with national policy makers (success factor, indicator 12)

¹⁴¹ See in the above. Members of the CJP interviewed confirmed that they support joint advocacy on the topics taken forward by the platform, which is complementary to their own theme-specific advocacy and as such mutually strengthening the lobby work of the platform and the individual members. The majority of the CJP members do not have staff available for this kind of lobbying work and delegate the policy influencing work to the CJP coordinators.

Baseline data:

- CJP members that are actively involved in climate justice policy influencing use also CJP positions in their own interventions.
- Individual members of the platform most often defend more ambitious demands and positions as compared to the common positions of CJP, which are based on a consensus of a broad and diverse group of CSO.

Qualitative description of the strengths and weaknesses of the CJP by the members (success factor, indicator 13)

¹⁴² As the platform counts 29 members, from different backgrounds, it often takes time to arrive to coordinated positions. The interviewees confirm that this process is well organised by the CJP coordinators. Over the years the positions of the different groups are well known and CJP coordinators are sensitive to the variety of opinions and have learned how to formulate positions that are acceptable for the whole group. In the recent past, procedures have been established on how to arrive quickly to joint positions in the occasion that a quick reaction of CJP is required, which seems to function well. This evidently is easier with regard to positions that are in line with former positions. Also priority topics have been identified for which urgent action can be taken when needed. The role of a strong coordination is acknowledged by the interviewees and the investment of CNCD/11.11.11 and 11.11.11 are very much appreciated. Interviewees expressed the desire that a similar level of engagement can be maintained.

¹⁴³ The agenda of CJP is relevant for the members. Interviewees and survey respondents agree that different opinions are being respected, that there is sufficient transparency in decision making processes and consensus is always being looked for. Interviewees and respondents are satisfied with the quality of the positions taken by the platform and the communication sent to political decision makers.

¹⁴⁴ Being a member of the platform contributed to enhancing knowledge on climate issues and keep platform members up-to-date on actual climate debates. Moreover, several interviewees also state that the positions taken by the platform also contributes to the position taking process within their

own organisations (also confirmed by some respondents in the survey). Interviewees from organisations that are less involved in climate advocacy expressed the need for specific training on the technicalities of the Belgian and international debates. On the other hand, coordinators stated that in the past participation in such trainings was often low.

¹⁴⁵ Although not all CJP members are very active in the platform, all CJP members interviewed confirm the relevance of having a multi-stakeholder platform that represents diverse groups of the civil society: NGOs for development cooperation, environmentalist organisations, trade unions, youth and women organisations. Members interviewed referred also to the added value of linking the North-South dimension to the environmentalist movement and to be able to formulate common positions (which appears to be unique in Europe). This multi-stakeholder dimension is also visualised in the contacts with policy makers as the coordinators are always accompanied by – by preference – representatives of each of these groups. This is also acknowledged by the policy makers.

Baseline data:

Strengths:

- Diverse composition of the platform, which is unique in Europe. Including a North-South dimension in to the policy debates of the environmentalist group and trade unions
- CJP contributes to enhanced knowledge on climate issues, keeps the members up-to-date on actual climate debates at Belgian and international level and contributes to the internal policy debates within the members organisations
- Good knowledge of the CJP coordinators of the strengths, positions and sensitivity of each of the members and ability to propose positions that are acceptable for the entire group
- Different opinions are respected, transparent decision-making process. Consensus is being looked for
- Process and procedures in place to react quickly when needed

Weaknesses:

- Diversity of the platform members complicates the process of formulating ambitious positions
- It takes time to come to common positions shared by the large and diverse group

3.2.2. TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE CJP AND ITS MEMBERS ABLE TO ADJUST AND CAPITALISE ON THE CHANGING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT?

¹⁴⁶ This information is not available yet and will be assessed when analysing the contribution of CJP to policy changes, measured during MTR and final evaluation.



3.2.3. HOW ARE THE MEMBERS OF CJP AND THE CLIMATE COALITION COOPERATING WITH EACH OTHER?

Qualitative assessment of the quality of the delivered products by CJP and quality of the coordination (outcome 2, indicators 16 and 17)

- ¹⁴⁷ The functioning of the platform and the quality of the coordination is positively assessed by all interviewees (members of CJP, not members of the coalition) and confirmed by the online survey (but only 11 of the 22 respondents being member of the CJP). Interviewees and respondents are positive about the quality of reports of the platform meetings, the facilitation of the meetings, the quality of the preparatory work, the frequency of meetings and the timely delivery of preparatory documents.
- ¹⁴⁸ The participatory approach is appreciated and members feel that their opinions are taken into account. All members of CJP interviewed share the opinion that it is evident in this kind of multi-stakeholder platforms that the coordinated positions are usually less ambitious, as being a result of a compromise. The group of environmentalist are usually more ambitious and the group of trade unions much less. The CJP coordinator manage to find a good balance in these positions.
- ¹⁴⁹ Communication flows within the platform are positively assessed by the interviewees (and survey respondents). All interviewees shared the opinion that there are efficiency gains in the communication flow. They suggested to make a distinction between information that is relevant for the whole group and that is relevant for thematic groups. At the website, specific pages could be created to enable access to information that is the most relevant for each specific group of members and/or related to the specific topics.
- ¹⁵⁰ Some interviewees made the remark that the output 7 as formulated in the ToC "*active participation and communication of positions in European and international network*" is very limited. They regret that CJP does not take sufficiently advantages of the presence of their members that are embedded within European and international organisations or networks to also lobby directly European stakeholders, like the European council and the parliament. It is clear that CJP focuses above all on lobbying the Belgian position in international negotiations.

Qualitative assessment of synergies between the climate coalition and CJP (outcome 1, indicator 18)

- ¹⁵¹ The merge of the platform and the climate coalition is perceived by all interviewees (including members interviewed form the coalition) as positive. It is assumed that there will be more alignment between lobbying and mobilisation. It happened in the past that the climate coalition was launching a press release on a topic that was still being negotiated by the platform.

¹⁵² As for the development of the coordinated position, also the decision on mobilisation will require sufficient balancing between more activists/ confrontational groups versus groups that look for dialogue and bridge building. Interviewees stated that most of the member organisations lack sufficient resources for mobilisation, which will require a good reflection and prioritisation of possible actions. Many interviewees however stated that it is time for more confrontational action as lobbying activities have not been successful, the dialogue with the government parties is closed and ministers of environment are not very responsive to the CJP demands. Within the climate coalition there are differences among members regarding the kind of mobilisation and campaigning that is needed (from awareness raising to very confrontational) and the relevancy of direct policy influencing (e.g. one members interviewed not believing in the relevancy of the current policy influencing and looking for more fundamental transformative change).

¹⁵³ From the interviews with the members of the climate coalition it becomes clear that they have not much information on the work and results of the policy influencing work that was executed by CJP and expect that this will improve since the merge of CJP and the climate coalition.

Baseline data:

- The quality of the products delivered by CJP is assessed as good by all 11 members CJP interviewed and confirmed in the survey
- The functioning of CJP is assessed as good by all 11 CJP members interviewed: good quality of reports of the platform meetings, good facilitation of the meetings, good quality of the preparatory work, good frequency of meetings and the timely delivery of preparatory documents. The participatory approach is appreciated and members feel that their opinions are taken into account.
- The CJP coordinator manage to find a good balance in the different positions of CJP members.
- Active participation of CJP and communication of its positions in European and international networks is perceived by CJP members as limited.
- As there was not much synergy in action between CJP and the climate coalition before the merger, it is expected that synergy will improve after the merger of the CJP and the climate coalition.

4 PREPARATION FOR THE IMPACT EVALUATION

4.1 CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS

¹⁵⁴ The causal analysis for the evaluation is supported through the combination of two methodologies: contribution analysis and process tracing (see following figure). Step 1 and 2 were done in the baseline phase. The other steps, the actual contribution analysis, will be executed during the mid-term and the final evaluation. The baseline study provided data regarding the state of affairs of climate justice policy development, and already some evidence that populate the ToC, which will enable the evaluators to finetune causal relationships and elaborate further relevant hypotheses and rival explanations.




Figure 3: operationalization of main steps of the contribution analysis

Step 1: Clarifying the attribution problem to be addressed

¹⁵⁵ The two main overall causal questions suggested in the inception report remain valid. One question relates to the impact of the CJP on the positions of relevant policy makers and on formal policy initiatives. The second question looks at the effect of internal coordination and capacity building efforts by the CJP on the credibility, leverage, and capacity of the CJP and its members:

- **Causal question 1:** To what extent does the CJP influence the points of view of Belgian decision makers and the policy positions on climate justice-related topics and other topics covered by the CJP?

- **Causal question 2:** To what extent do CJP’s internal coordination and capacity building efforts (knowledge-sharing, maintaining members up-to-date on climate justice issues and adopting coordinated positions) strengthen the leverage, credibility and capacity of the CJP and its members?

Step 2: Further elaborate the intervention’s theory of change

¹⁵⁶ During the inception phase, the ToC of the programme was further developed (see annex 5 and chapter 2.4), describing how the causal mechanisms are expected to work, what specific changes are expected to be seen in relation to the outcome, and finally document assumptions, rival explanations and risks (see inception report and chapter 2 of this report). This updated ToC does not require further changes on the basis of the baseline process. Only the ‘wording’ of some impact indicators have been changed/improved to make them more context specific. The baseline study provided more detailed information on the changes that are expected, assumptions and rival explanations.

4.2 ANALYSIS OF CAUSAL QUESTION 1

Causal question 1: To what extent does the CJP influence the points of view of Belgian decision makers and the policy positions on climate justice-related topics and other topics covered by the CJP?

¹⁵⁷ *Specific changes expected:* based on the baseline data the evaluators proposed to refine the indicators at impact level,⁴⁷ making a distinction in levels of engagement that can be expected from political decision makers, and to identify clear targets.

- Agenda setting (outcome 4):
 - Number of parliamentary interpellations, amendments and questions in relation to the (1) inter-parliamentary climate resolution, (2) the development of regional and Belgian climate policies, (3) the development of the burden sharing regulation, (4) the Belgian position at European and international level, that are in line with CJP positions
- Discursive change (impact 1 and 2)
 - Political parties and thematic political experts take up CJP positions in their argumentation during debates, public events, in media, etc.
- Procedural change (impact 3)
 - There is more transparency in the decision-making process of the national climate commission with regard to the development of the Belgian National Energy and Climate Plan 2030
- Policy change at Belgian level (impact 3)
 - An ambitious interparliamentary resolution includes positions of the CJP
 - Effort sharing regulation, with regard to emissions reduction at the national level (between the regions of Belgium) already takes place before the elections of 2019, is finished by 2020 and leaves room for a possible increase in EU (and Belgian) ambition
 - Ambitious National Energy- and Climate Plan 2030 (NEKP 2030) which leaves room for a possible increase in EU (and Belgian) ambition, with regard to emissions reduction

⁴⁷ Outcome 4: political decision makers are sensitized and educated on climate justice; Impact 1; Belgian decision makers take over positions of the platform and incorporate these in their decisions on national policies; impact 2: take over positions of platform and incorporate these in their decision on European and International policy and impact 2: Belgian policy in favour of climate justice adopted.



- Belgian financial resources for climate finance are increased and ‘additional’
- Policy change regarding the Belgian position at European/international level (impact 2):
 - Belgium strives for an increase of the European 2030-goals with regard to emissions reduction up to -55% emission reduction compared to 1990
 - Paris Rulebook contains CJP positions on definitions and clear agreements on reporting on climate finance.

CJP coordinators have been asked by the evaluators to develop concrete targets for each of these envisaged changes. The outcome mapping methodology can be used to that end (distinction between expert to see, like to see and love to see). This will enable the evaluators to assess the level of effectiveness during the MTR and final evaluation.

A set of assumptions were identified during inception phase. The baseline data provided confirmation for most of these assumptions, as shown by following table.

Table 8: Baseline data for identified assumptions

Assumptions as formulated in the inception report	Results of baseline data
There are spaces for dialogue between policy makers and the CJP on climate justice issues, and CJP manages to access those spaces.	Confirmed. Consultation of civil society is institutionalised (see multi-stakeholder dialogues) and there are ample formal and non-formal meetings with policy makers. Dialogue with opposition parties is more fluid compared to dialogue with some ruling parties.
The CJP is able to generate relevant (from a decision-maker perspective) policy input on its coordinated positions.	Confirmed. Positive assessment of the relevance, quality and usability of the CJP information. Positions are perceived as ambitious. Different opinions between opposition and ruling parties about feasibility of the CJP’s positions.
CJP is correctly identifying and targeting influential policymakers.	Partially confirmed. CJP is targeting all relevant and thematic experts within all political parties (except extremist parties) and has contacts with all relevant cabinets. Contact with the federal ministry for environment are more difficult. A comprehensive stakeholder analysis is lacking and no information is available on who are the opponents and allies within each political party and at cabinets. MTR and final evaluation need to provide more information on the appropriate mix of interventions to target policy makers.
Policy makers at the federal level can be influenced directly but also via their counterparts at the regional level.	Partially confirmed. In particular the inter-parliamentary climate commission provides a space where the different government levels meet, which justifies the fact that policy influencing is targeting all these levels. The interaction between the regional and federal governance

	levels need to be further confirmed during MTR and final evaluation.
CJP's structure and governance allow CJP members to work together in ways that maximize their influence.	Confirmed. Via the contribution analysis more detailed information will become available.
CJP quickly recognizes changes in the political environment and adapts the strategy for greater impact.	Confirmed. CJP has good knowledge of the political environment and adapts its strategy accordingly. For example, with the installation of the inter-parliamentary climate commission it was decided to lobby a broader package of demands on behalf of the CJP platform, to have more influence (instead of all members lobbying for their own specific points of interest). This assumption needs to be reconfirmed during MTR and final evaluation.
Decision makers take informed decisions, based on the information provided by -among others – CJP.	Confirmed. CJP is an important information source for policy makers, both opposition and ruling parties but information is used in different ways by opposition and ruling parties.
A visible support base strengthens the legitimacy and leverage of the CJP interventions.	Not confirmed yet. Policy makers acknowledged the variety of the CJP composition as a strength and appreciate the fact that they have one counterpart within civil society to interact with. The interviewees did not provide confirmation explicitly on the importance of a visible support base of CJP but recognize CJP platform as a legitimate advocate for climate justice.
If the CJP's advocacy actions are more aligned with the mobilisation and campaign work on climate justice, thanks to the merger of the CJP and the climate coalition, the leverage and credibility of the CJP will increase.	Not confirmed yet. During baseline there were no large mobilisations and campaigns implemented.

¹⁵⁸ A set of rival explanations (direct and commingled) were identified during the inception phase:

- Specific publications, formal or informal advice, and/or events from other think tanks and/or lobby groups have more influence on the policy positions on climate issues of Belgian decision makers.
- One or several CJP platform members are more influential and contribute to the outcome independently from the platform.

¹⁵⁹ During the baseline study these rival explanations could be made more concrete and will be included in the process tracing analyses that will be conducted during MTR and final evaluation.

¹⁶⁰ It is difficult to distinguish between the influence of CJP and the contributions of the individual members, also with regard to the policy influencing on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian position at European and international level. NGOs like Oxfam Solidarity but also 11.11.11. and CNCD/11.11.11 advocate directly on more ambitious positions as compared to the CJP's positions. For policy makers the distinction between the lobby done on behalf of the individual organisations or on behalf of CJP could not be made (but they do for the work of the organisations belonging to the other groups like the environmental NGOs, the trade unions and the youth organisations).



- ¹⁶¹ Staff of cabinets and from administrations also perceive CJP as an informative source in particularly regarding the Belgian position at European and international level and the Belgian policy, next to other sources. Other important information sources are the World Resource Institute that executes comprehensive studies, organises events and publishes papers; and Carbon Watch. These institutions however provide more international background information and do not focus much on the Belgian situation.
- ¹⁶² Another important actor that contributes to the policy debate is the Federal Council for Sustainable Development (FRDO), in which 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 take place and other CJP members such as Oxfam solidarity, BBL, WWF, IEW and the trade unions. Its focus is on the Belgian policy level. In 2018 three policy recommendations/advice have been formulated related to (1) financing transition towards a zero-carbon economy (30 May 2018), (2) the federal contribution to the national energy and climate plan (30 May 2018), and (3) advice on the royal decision regarding the decrease of greenhouse gas emission in the transport sector (Febr. 2018); all advices also approved by 11.11.11 and CNCD (and Oxfam Solidarity). These policy recommendations are not very ambitious or explicit and the result of a consensus between civil society and corporate sector. Interviewees confirm that these policy recommendations are also taken into account in parliamentary discussions.
- ¹⁶³ Interviewees did not refer yet to more activist and confrontational actions, taken by civil society (ex. Climate express) or civilians (ex. Klimaatzaak in Flanders that started a legal case against the minister for environment) as being influential. During MTR or final evaluation, the outcome of the Klimaatzaak will have to be taken into account. Interviewees did refer to the civic actions that are currently taking place in Belgium on air quality and suggested to link the international climate discourse to these actions. Ministers are sensitive to these civic actions.
- ¹⁶⁴ Resource persons and some staff of administrations assume that a new momentum will be created at the next COP24 in Poland (December 2018) that will push for more ambitious actions and will call ministers to take more ambitious commitments, which will be underpinned by the expected new report of the IPCC calling upon urgent action (expected October 2018).
- ¹⁶⁵ Finally, sectoral federations from the corporate sector and individual companies evidently also have influence on policy decision makers, as confirmed by the interviewees. Within these sectoral federations and employers' organisations the debate is also ongoing regarding ambitions for emission reduction at Belgian and European level. Within these groups there are allies for CJP, progressive entrepreneurs, and opponents, the more conservative entrepreneurs. VOKA, has developed a charter on sustainable entrepreneurship, which is based on the 2030 agenda on sustainable development goals, of which climate is one. Corporate actors that are member of the Shift, are also preparing advocacy actions to call policy makers for action. In 2015, for example, 75 CEOs (members of the Shift) already developed a climate resolution addressing the policy makers to be ambitious. From the interviews and study of documents it becomes clear that the government parties refer to arguments of competitiveness, which are in the interest of private companies. As it

was impossible to talk to the main government parties, such as N-VA and MR, it was not yet possible to gain insight in the level of influence the corporate sector had above the civil society. Interviewees and resource persons assume that these parties are more eager to listen to the voices of the conservative private sector actors that do not defend an ambitious climate policy agenda.

4.3 ANALYSIS OF CAUSAL QUESTION 2

Causal question 2: To what extent do CJP’s internal coordination and capacity building efforts (knowledge-sharing, maintaining members up-to-date on climate justice issues and adopting coordinated positions) strengthen the leverage, credibility and capacity of the CJP and its members?

¹⁶⁶ **Specific changes expected:** In the causal logic of the intervention the activities and their output at internal level of the CJP platform would generate following outcome: (1) a visible support for demands in favour of climate justice at the level of the platform and (2) a high-quality knowledge on climate justice within the platform itself. This will also contribute to an increase of the leverage and credibility of CJP (outcome 3) and to the expected impact as formulated under causal question 1. The envisaged changes as formulated in the inception phase are still valid:

- Political decision makers actively contact the CJP platform for policy advice/input.
- Political decision makers consider the CJP platform as a reference for climate policy from the civil society.
- CJP members use the platform for their advocacy and lobby work and use CJP positions in communication towards political decision makers.

¹⁶⁷ The use of the CJP platform by policy makers was confirmed during the baseline study. With regard to the internal functioning of the platform, it has become clear that only a minority of the platform members are active members (7 to 10 members), that also actively lobby policy makers. The other members have assigned the mandate to the platform for doing so. Hence, the relevance and impact of the CJP platform differs between the active and passive members. Moreover, the lobby conducted by the individual members often is more ambitious compared to the positions defended by the platform. During MTR and final evaluation it will be more relevant to assess to what extent CJP is strengthening (or fragilizing) the lobby work of the active platform members and vice versa, when and why decision are taken to act jointly or separately.

A set of assumptions were identified during inception phase.

Table 9: Baseline data for identified assumptions

Assumptions as formulated in the inception report	Results of baseline data
CJP members are able to reach common positions on climate justice issues	Confirmed. CJP operates with a set of 11 common positions identified in 2012 and has good procedures and processes to develop (quickly) joint positions. CJP coordinators having good knowledge of the sensitivity within the platform and manage well the diversity.
Individual members of the CJP are able to transcend their individual interests	Partially confirmed. Individual members continue policy influencing independently from the platform so there is no conflict of interests. Contribution analysis will provide more information on the interplay between platform and



	the policy influencing implemented by the individual members.
CJP member organisations combine sufficient expertise in order to generate high quality knowledge in the platform	Confirmed implicitly and can be double checked during MTR and final evaluation. CJP is recognised by policy makers as experts that provide good quality and correct information.

¹⁶⁸ A set of rival explanations (direct and commingled) were identified during the inception phase:

- CJP members use other sources of information (instead of the CJP), such as other networks/platforms they are part of, research outputs and/or resource persons, to build expertise on climate justice-related themes and other topics of the CJP.
- External factors, events or political evolutions push the climate coalition to take action for mass-mobilisation contributing to enhanced leverage and credibility of the CJP and its members.

¹⁶⁹ This set of rival explanations still are valid. To gain insight in these rival explanations, more in-depth assessment will need to be conducted among some of the most active members of the platform during MTR and final evaluation.

4.4 APPROACH FOR THE MTR AND FINAL EVALUATION

In this chapter some points of attention are described to take into consideration when further elaborating the methodology for the MTR and final evaluation.

¹⁷⁰ *Improving the M&E for policy influencing* – CJP coordinators have been asked to improve M&E practice, among others to improve indicators for measuring progress towards policy change (for exemple by applying the outcome mapping methodology, identifying progress markers at levels of expect to see, like to see and love to see), to improve data-collection tools so that tracking and analysis is possible of media presence, discours of policy makers, and alike.

¹⁷¹ *Process tracing* – In order to assess the contribution of CJP to the envisaged changes and to find evidence of rival explanations, the methodology of process tracing will be applied. This methodology starts with a clear description of the case(s) to be assessed and a reconstruction of a timeline. This timeline will be reconstructed in a workshop with the active members of the CJP (now called political working group of the climate coalition). Similar timeline workshops will need to be reconstructed for the policy influencing interventions of some of the individual members of CJP, for exemple for Oxfam Solidariteit, BBL and Greenpeace and the group of the trade unions.

- ¹⁷² *Outcome harvesting* – In a participatory session with the CJP coordinators (to the extent possible complemented with other members of the platform) the methodology of outcome harvesting can be applied. This methodology entails three steps: (1) identification of outcome statements: these are changes in activities, discourse, actions and policy initiatives of the most important policy makers observed by the CJP coordinators; (2) description of the significance of these outcome statements and (3) an estimation of the contribution of CJP to these outcome statements.
- ¹⁷³ *Collection of evidence and development of performance stories* - As an electronic survey was not successful, the evaluators propose to not repeat the survey for the policy makers. Semi-structured interviews proved to be more informative. To the extent possible the same thematic experts will be interviewed again. The consultants do not expect that many of these thematic experts in the political parties will change. Their mandates might change but most probably they will remain active at parliamentary level (although at a different level). As all governance levels are within the scope of this study, this is not problematic. Ministers and staff at cabinets will change and most probably will be new policy makers. In order to improve triangulation of information, interviews will be organised in two rounds. In a second round information received from the first round will be more systematically checked among stakeholders of the same group of interviewees (same political parties, same cabinet). If the platform improves its stakeholder analysis, it might become more clear who are the opponents and allies within political parties and cabinets, which will enable a more purposeful selection of interviewees.
- ¹⁷⁴ Based on available literature of causal relations in policy influencing programme, the evaluation team assumes that both of the causal relationships will be of the **INUS type**. This implies that the intervention itself will not be sufficient to bring about change on its own (it is part of a wider causal package), but that in the case positive change is observed, the main question to be answered is the 'necessary' question (aside from the question about rival explanations). In other words, was the intervention a 'necessary component' of the causal package that brought change?
- ¹⁷⁵ An electronic survey targeting the members of the climate coalition can be repeated when time will be foreseen to make sufficient recall phone calls to ask members to participate in the survey. The consultants suggest to repeat this survey during the final evaluation.
- ¹⁷⁶ *Case studies* – during MTR and final evaluation specific cases will be identified for the process tracing and contribution analysis. For the MTR, following cases might be relevant (but can be changed if the political context calls for other more interesting cases at that moment): (1) The effort sharing regulation that needs to have started before the 2019 elections; (2) the results of COP24 in Katowice and the Belgian and European positions taken during this COP (December 2018), (3) the inter-parliamentary resolution, to be voted by the end of 2018 (and in preparation of COP24) and (4) the first draft of the national Energy and Climate Plan 2030 that is to be expected by the end of 2018 (the latter only relevant if progress can be noticed).
- ¹⁷⁷ *Timing of the evaluation* – in May 2019 federal elections will take place in Belgium. The MTR was foreseen to be conducted in the last quarter of 2019. Most probably that period will not be suitable for an evaluation as the new parliament and government is just getting started. Moreover, in the occasion the formation of the new government lasts longer, there is no new government and the political climate will be very hectic. The evaluators see two options:



- Option 1: MTR conducted in 2019: The MTR focuses on the work of the parliament till that date. Possible cases: (1) inter parliamentary resolution, (2) Belgian position taken at COP24 in Katowice and (3) the extent CJP positions were included in the electoral programmes. Only members of parliament will/can be interviewed.
- Option 2: MTR conducted in fall 2020: the new governments might be in place and have been working one year. All types of policy makers can be interviewed. The final evaluation still can take place in the third and fourth quarter of 2021.

5 CONCLUSIONS

¹⁷⁸ It is clear that CJP climate advocacy takes place in a difficult and sensitive governance context in which CJP manages to position itself well. CJP has good knowledge of the policy context and the policy cycles at national and international level and aligns its actions to the key decision-making moments.

¹⁷⁹ Not much policy progress could be evidenced yet with regard to the positions of CJP, but it has been proven that CJP managed to put certain topics on the policy agenda, in particular the need for Belgium to develop ambitious climate objectives at Belgian and at international level. All political parties share the analysis and principles of being ambitious, but there are differences in opinions regarding the definition of concrete and measurable ambitious targets. This results in a dichotomy, with policy makers from the opposition that share the positions of CJP and policy makers from the government parties that do not fully agree. CJP did not succeed yet in having effective influence on the final political decisions taken by the government parties. Furthermore, many sub-topics and demands from CJP are not yet visible in the policy debates.

¹⁸⁰ CJP is perceived as an important and relevant information source and the quality and relevance of information from CJP is positively assessed. CJP is perceived as a legitimate advocate for climate advocacy. Policy makers value above all the direct contacts, formal and informally and would like to have more frequent contacts. Information received was used by policy makers (cabinets, administrations and parliament) while developing their own positions. Information was put next to other information resources that all together have an influence on final positions.

¹⁸¹ CJP mainly engages with stakeholders in the institutionalised fora. CJP combines a pro-active and reactive approach in engaging with policy makers. There are difficulties in establishing contacts with members of ruling parties or with people that do not agree with the positions of CJP. A

comprehensive stakeholder analysis is lacking and as such a diversified strategy to approach different stakeholders as well. It became clear that within cabinets, political parties and parliaments there are allies and opponents with regard to the CJP's positions. Allies feel themselves strengthened by the actions of CJP. Opponents are hardly being reached.

¹⁸² The strategy of CJP balances between a value based and evidence-based approach, with a perceived orientation towards a value-based approach. CJP positions are perceived as "leftist" or too idealistic, because only final goals are proposed, less information is provided on the strategy towards these goals and analyses of the consequences of certain choices on the economy (be it positive or negative) or of the risks when not taking ambitious action. To some extent, there is a risk that CJP interactions in support of parliamentary work of opposition parties tends to re-enforce ruling party views that there is a strong affiliation between CJP and the opposition. While difficult to avoid when cabinets and some political parties are limiting their interactions with civil society, CJP's creativity in formulating alternative strategies is limited up to now.

¹⁸³ The choice of reaching out to members of parliament, in particularly members participating in the inter-parliamentary commission, is a relevant and effective choice. However, no analysis is done of other stakeholders that can have an influence on the opinion of the members of parliament, like for example staff at political parties and their study services, the corporate sector and/or civic initiatives and as such no specific interventions are implemented or allies are looked for. Limited use is made of the mobilisation of academics and their networks beyond the use of existing research outputs.

¹⁸⁴ The collaboration with the climate coalition did not result yet in coordinated mobilisation actions in the period 2017 to date, but it is expected that policy influencing work and mobilisation will be aligned better in the near future. This issue can be linked with the limited uptake of CJP positions in the media in the period under review. This might be partially explained by the fact that CJP makes use of insider approaches in its policy influencing work and uses institutionalised spaces to negotiate with diplomats and policy makers. As indicated, the outsider-track is largely taken-up by the climate coalition which coordinates the mobilisation campaigns.

¹⁸⁵ The CJP platform is a strong platform that is well organised, what is not evident in the case of this kind of multi-stakeholder platform. Several factors can explain the strength of this platform:

- The platform has created a joint identity, which is reflected in the communication materials
- There is a strong secretariat/coordination, taken up by CNCD/11.11.11 and 11.11.11 who invest substantial time and resources in this coordination. Coordination is accepted by its members and assessed as being of high quality.
- The coordinators manage to balance diversity.
- The mission of the platform is clear, namely joint lobbying on climate policy with a focus on the Belgian position in the European and international negotiations. Boundaries of its operations are set, known and accepted by all members.
- Relevant expertise is delivered by a variety of members. This combined expertise is an added value of the platform and recognised by the policy makers interviewed.
- There are clear operational guidelines.

¹⁸⁶ The CJP platform contributes to information sharing and knowledge building of its members and the policy influencing activities of CJP and from the individual members are mutually strengthening.



The CJP team is self-critical, reflective and sufficiently adaptive to adjust strategies as needs arise. However, most of these processes are informal and not well documented. Planning, monitoring and learning processes are basic. Monitoring happens, but both the depth and scope of the data collection is limited, and there are few spaces to systematise and discuss learning points from earlier actions.

6 ANNEXES

- Annex 1: Terms of Reference
- Annex 2: Adapted Evaluation framework
- Annex 3: List of people consulted
- Annex 4: List of documents consulted
- Annex 5: Reconstructed ToC
- Annex 6: Questionnaires
- Annex 7: Interview guidelines
- Annex 8: Analytical framework
- Annex 9: Results of online survey



ANNEX 1: TOR

See separate file

ANNEX 2: EVALUATION FRAMEWORK (REVISED VERSION OCTOBER 2018)

Revised version of the evaluation framework (October 2018)				
Evaluation question	Reference	Indicators / descriptors	Differentiation	
Online survey and narrative interviews with policy makers				
To what extent was the CJP successful in influencing points of view of political decision makers?	Output 8	1a	Outreach: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who knowingly have received information from CJP	Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition parties - ruling parties - administration & diplomats
		1b	Spaces for influencing: Number of meetings with cabinets, ministers, parliamentarians, study services of political parties	
	Outcome 3 & 4	2a	Appreciation of CJP's contributions: Share of national policy makers reached by CJP, who view the information as (scale from 1 to 4: all / majority / minority / nobody) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - relevant - timely - qualitative - usable and perceive CJP members and 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 as legitimate and credible advocates for climate change	Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition parties - ruling parties - administration & diplomats
		2b	Agenda setting⁴⁸: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number of parliamentary interpellations and questions, proposed resolutions, adopted resolutions and motions introduced by CJP lobby targets that are in line with CJP positions. - Number of amendments by parliamentarians in line with CJP positions. 	Differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - interpellations, resolutions, and motions - amendments - interventions during COPs

⁴⁸ Awareness raising, getting issues on the political agenda (Kamstra, 2017)



			– Number of interventions of the Belgian delegation of decision-makers at the next COPs in line with CJP positions	
	Impact 1 & 2	3	Discursive change ⁴⁹ : Number of political parties who take-up the CJP positions/terminology/ rhetoric/framing in their line of argumentation during the policy preparation phase	Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together): - opposition parties - ruling parties
	Impact 3	4	Procedural change ⁵⁰ : Certain institutional procedures are adjusted in line with CJP's priorities Policy change ⁵¹ : Belgian Policy in favour of climate justice ⁵² <i>Demands related to the following 4 areas (to be differentiated between expect to see/like to see/love to see)</i> – Ambition and quality of the national energy and climate plan 2030 ⁵³ – Ambition and quality of the interparliamentary climate resolution – Effort sharing ⁵⁴ regulation adopted with room for increase in EU ambition	– Belgian national policy – Belgian position in European policy – Belgian position on international policy

⁴⁹ Advocacy targets adopt terminology, rhetoric, and/or framing (Kamstra, 2017)

⁵⁰ Influencing institutional (decision-making) procedures (Kamstra, 2017)

⁵¹ Actors change their policies related to climate change

⁵² Impact three is added in the baseline study to document the current state of affairs. Policy change to be measured at mid-term and endline measurement.

⁵³ To be further elaborated: what ambition and what quality

⁵⁴ This relates to the agreement between the different regional governments with regard to climate ambitions and measure that will be taken and targets set at each of the governance levels. The CJP advocates for an ambitious agenda, which includes that the agreement around this “effort sharing” also is ambitious. CJP does not formulate minimum or maximum expectations regarding this effort sharing.

			– Belgian financial resources for climate finance increase and are ‘additional’ ⁵⁵	
What are the most effective means for influencing political decision makers?	Output 8	5	Relevance of communication channels: Share of national policy makers reached by CJP, who view the following communication channels as relevant (all / majority / minority / nobody): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Indirect communication (media & social media⁵⁶) - Direct formal communication - Direct informal communication 	Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition parties - ruling parties - administration & diplomats
	Outcome 3 & 4	6	Qualitative assessment of relevance of the different forms of communication channels and how they are embedded in the overall policy influencing strategy	– In mid-term evaluation
To what extent do the political decision makers recognize influence of the CJP?	Outcome 3	7	Influence of CJP:- Share of national policy makers who view the CJP platform as influential on their opinion-forming process, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change	Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats – (cabinet & parliament)
		8	Influence of other actors: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who name other actors than CJP as one of the more influential stakeholders on their opinion-forming process	Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats – (cabinet & parliament)
To what extent is CJP recognised as a platform with a broad social basis, encompassing trade unions, etc.?	Outcome 3	9	Knowing CJP: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who know the CJP	Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats

⁵⁵ Additional refers to the fact that extra budget for climate finance is foreseen and not taken from the budget for development cooperation.

⁵⁶ Data to be collected & analysed by CJP/11.11.11



				– (cabinet & parliament)
		10	Added value of composition: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who view the specific composition of the CJP (with many different social organisations) as a comparative strength.	Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats – (cabinet & parliament)

		Online survey and narrative interviews with CJP members and members of the climate coalition:		
To what extent do the members of CJP view the CJP as their main channel for advocacy on climate justice?	Success factors	11	% of CJP member who use other channels for their advocacy work on climate justice % of CJP members who rank the CJP as their main channel for advocacy work	/ /
		12	% of CJP members who use the positions of the CJP in communication with national political decision makers	– Members which have a policy officer with dedicated time to do climate policy work – Members which do not have a policy officer with dedicated time to do climate policy work
		13	Qualitative description of the strengths and weaknesses of the CJP by the members	/
To what extent are the CJP and its members able to adjust and capitalise	Success factors	14	Qualitative analysis of success and non-success cases (change in policy decision makers' view points) with regard to:	– The influence of CJP – Influence of external factors (e.g. Trump decision)

on the changing political and social context?				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The influence of internal factors (e.g. party politics)
		15	Qualitative analysis of the CJP’s activities with regard to the timely internalisation of external events into their activities, especially with regard to the following themes:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Belgian contribution to climate finance – Belgian emissions reduction – Just transition to a zero-carbon society
How are the members of the CJP <i>and the climate coalition</i> cooperating with each other	Outcome 2	16	Qualitative assessment of the quality of the delivered products by CJP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Coordinated positions – Information materials – Events & actions – Created communication channels within the platform
		17	Qualitative assessment by the members about the quality of the coordination of the CJP	/
	Outcome 1	18	Qualitative assessment of synergies between the climate coalition and CJP	/



ANNEX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

Political decision makers and resource persons

	Dutch	Function	French	Function
Administration #9 (planned 13/26)	Geert Fremout Patricia Grobben Bert Van loon Bob Nieuwejaers Simon Calcoen Ulrik Lenaerts	FOD health, Food Safety and Environment FOD health, Food Safety and Environment FOD health, Food Safety and Environment Flemish Agency Environment, department energy, climate and green energy Department Flanders International DGD	Lucas De Meulenaere Fanny Mertz Marie Schippers	FOD Health, Food Safety and environment Walloon Agency for Air and Climate FOD Health, Food Safety and environment (till July 2017 Walloon Cabinet energy-climate)
Cabinet # 3 (planned 4/7)	Filip Smet	Flemish Cabinet Schauwvlieghe CD&V (cabinet responsible for environment) + president national climate commission	Julien Guillaume Sylviane Bilgischer	Brussels cabinet Céline Fremault CdH (responsible for environment) Walloon Cabinet J-Luc Crucke MR (environment)
Parliament # 9 (planned 7/16)	Kristof Calvo Annemie Maes Robrecht Bothuyne Willem-Frederik Schiltz	Federal parliament – Groen Federal parliament (senate) - Groen Flemish parliament – CD&V Flemish parliament – Open VLD	Véronique Waroux Hélène Ryckmans Jean-Marc Nollet Evelyne Huytebroeck Philippe Henri	Three parliaments: Walloon, federation Brussels-Wallonia and federal (senate) – CdH Three parliaments: Walloon, federation Brussels-Wallonia and federal (senate) – Ecolo Federal parliament - Ecolo Walloon parliament - Ecolo Walloon parliament - Ecolo
Study service #4	Sabine Vanbelle Sofie Defour	Parliamentary assistant of parliamentary group Groen (federal parliament) Study service SP.a	/	

	Amaury Defrère Sebastiaan Mariën	Parliamentary assistant of parliamentary group CD&V (Flemish parliament) Parliamentary assistant of parliamentary group CD&V (Flemish parliament)		
Resource persons #4	Bruno Verbist Peter Wollaert Bart Corijn	Researcher at KU Leuven – KLIMOS Former director The Shift, now CIFAL-UNITAR Programme manager Change, The Shift	Romain Weikmans	Researcher at centre for studies on sustainable development at ULB



Members of the Climate Justice Platform and Climate coalition

Lien Vandamme	Coordinator CJP – policy advisor 11.11.11
Véronique Grigot	Coordinator CJP – CNCD/11.11.11
Brigitte Gloire	Member CJP – staff officer Oxfam Solidarity
Karel Malfliet	member CJP – staff officer Ecokerk
Dirk Glas	Member CJP – programme coordinator Protos
Bert De Wel	Member CJP – Advisor climate at ACV
Sebastien Storme	member CJP – Advisor climate ABVV-FGTB
Juliette Boulet	Member CJP – Spokesperson Greenpeace and line manager climate
Noé Lecocq	Member CJP – Staff officer IEW
Julie Vandenberghe	Member CJP – Staff officer WWF
Laurien Spruyt	member CJP – Staff officer BBL
Sofie Defour	Member CJP – volunteer at Climate Express (also SP.a study service)
Herlinde Baeyens	member CJP - Volunteer at Jeugdraad
Clémence Jansens	Member of CJP – Volunteer at Conseil de la Jeunesse (info complemented by Simon Lalieu)
Julie Van Houtryve	Coordinator Climate Coalition
Anaïs Trigolet	Member Climate Coalition – staff officer MOC
Maggy Poppe	Member Climate Coalition – Staff member NVR
Francis Taylor	Member of Climate Coalition – volunteer at Climat et Justice Sociale

ANNEX 4: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Beleidsdocumenten

- Beleidsnota internationale samenwerking 2017
- Beleidsnota internationale samenwerking 2018
- Beleidsnota energie, leefmilieu en duurzame ontwikkeling 2018
- Beknopt Verslag Bijzondere Commissie Klimaat en Duurzame Ontwikkeling (5 maart 2018)
- Beknopt Verslag Bijzondere Commissie Klimaat en Duurzame Ontwikkeling (15 mei 2018)
- Beknopt Verslag Bijzondere Commissie Klimaat en Duurzame Ontwikkeling (29 mei 2018)
- Green Growth Group (16EU member states + Norway) Common statement on the long-term strategy and the climate ambition of the EU. Luxembourg, Monday 25th of June 2018.
- Interparlementair klimaatoverleg. 13 november 2017, Brussel. Gemeenschappelijke verklaring over het klimaatbeleid in België
- Wetsontwerp houdende instemming met het samenwerkingsakkoord van 12 februari 2018 tussen de Federale Staat, het Vlaamse Gewest, het Waalse Gewest en het Brusselse Hoofdstedelijke Gewest betreffende de verdeling van de Belgische klimaat- en energiedoelstellingen voor de periode 2013-2020

Parlementaire vragen

- Vraag van mevrouw Rita Bellens aan de vice eerste minister en minister van Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Digitale Agenda, Telecommunicatie en Post over "de verkoop van BIO-participaties" (nr. 17796), in *Beknopt Verslag van de Commissie Buitenlandse Betrekkingen* (9 mei 2017)
- Samengevoegde vragen van - de heer Wouter De Vriendt aan de staatssecretaris voor Buitenlandse Handel, toegevoegd aan de minister belast met Buitenlandse Handel, over "een mogelijke CO2-taks op Amerikaanse producten" (nr. 19205) - de heer Werner Janssen aan de staatssecretaris voor Buitenlandse Handel, toegevoegd aan de minister belast met Buitenlandse Handel, over "een CO2-taks op Amerikaanse producten" (nr. 19276), in *Beknopt Verslag van de Commissie Buitenlandse Betrekkingen* (5 juli 2017)
- Vraag van de heer Jean-Marc Nollet aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "de Belgische deelname aan de lopende denkoefening over klimaatvluchtelingen" (nr. 17747), in *Beknopt Verslag van de Commissie voor de volksgezondheid, het leefmilieu en de maatschappelijke hernieuwing* (15 mei 2017)
- Samengevoegde vragen van - de heer Daniel Senesael aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "de Belgische klimaatdoelstellingen" (nr. 19108) - mevrouw Karin



Temmerman aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "het terugschroeven van de Belgische klimaatdoelstellingen" (nr. 19116) - de heer Jean-Marc Nollet aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "het voornemen van de minister om de Belgische klimaatdoelstellingen naar beneden bij te stellen" (nr. 19167) - mevrouw Leen Dierick aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "de reductiedoelstelling voor broeikasgassen voor België" (nr. 19237) - mevrouw Véronique Caprasse aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "de implicaties van de terugtrekking van de Verenigde Staten uit het klimaatakkoord van Parijs" (nr. 19741), in *Beknopt Verslag van de Commissie voor de volksgezondheid, het leefmilieu en de maatschappelijke hernieuwing* (5 juli 2017)

- Vraag van de heer Jean-Marc Nollet aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "de klimaatfinanciering" (nr. 20446), in *Beknopt Verslag van de Commissie voor de volksgezondheid, het leefmilieu en de maatschappelijke hernieuwing* (4 oktober 2017)
- Vraag van de heer Jean-Marc Nollet aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "de vastgestelde ontsparing van de broeikasgasemissies in ons land" (nr. 23668), in *Beknopt Verslag van de Commissie voor de volksgezondheid, het leefmilieu en de maatschappelijke hernieuwing* (27 februari 2018)
- Vraag van de heer Jean-Marc Nollet aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "het verhogen van de klimaatambities van België" (nr. 23685), in *Beknopt Verslag van de Commissie voor de volksgezondheid, het leefmilieu en de maatschappelijke hernieuwing* (27 februari 2018)
- Vraag van de heer Jean-Marc Nollet aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "de erkenning van de status van klimaatvluchteling" (nr. 23816), in *Beknopt Verslag van de Commissie voor de volksgezondheid, het leefmilieu en de maatschappelijke hernieuwing* (27 februari 2018)
- Samengevoegde vragen van de heer Daniel Senesael aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "de burden sharing 2021-2030" (nr. 24632) - de heer Jean-Marc Nollet aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "het klimaatresponsabiliseringsmechanisme" (nr. 25961), in *Beknopt Verslag van de Commissie voor de volksgezondheid, het leefmilieu en de maatschappelijke hernieuwing* (15 juni 2018)

Opinies, artikels en andere rapporten

- 11.be: several articles published on climate in the period 2017-2018
- 11.11.11 resultaten ledenbevraging 2018

- Jaspers, N. (maart 2016) *Bevraging resultaten politiek werk beleidsdienst 11.11.11*. Draft rapport
- Weikmans, R., & Roberts, J.T. (2017), *The International Climate Finance Accounting Muddle: Is There Hope on the Horizon?*, *Climate and Development*, DOI:10.1080/17565529.2017.1410087.
- Van brempt, K. en Tobback, B. Opiniestuk in De Standaard van 14/06/2018 België en klimaatontkenners: één strijd?

Websites

- https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2018.06.25_statement_ggg_climat.pdf
- www.caneurope.org/publications/press-releases/1631-xx-eu-countries-call-for-strong-action-to-limit-warming-to-1-5-c
- <https://www.frdo-cfdd.be>
- www.11.be
- www.cncd.be
- ww.lne.be/vlaams-klimaatbeleidsplan-2013-2020
- document.environnement.brussels/opac_css/elecfile/PLAN_AIR_CLIMAT_ENERGIE_FR_DEF.pdf
- <https://energie.wallonie.be/fr/plan-air-climat-energie-2030-deuxieme-phase-de-consultation.html?IDC=6238&IDD=127763>
- ww.vlaamseklimaattop.be/hoe-worden-de-2020-doelstellingen-verdeeld-binnen-belgie

Documenten CJP, 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11


- Programma DGD 2017-2021 11.11.11
- Programme DGD 2017-2021 CNCD/11.11.11
- Note stratégique 2017-2021 CNCD/11.11.11
- Note plate-formes 2017 CNCD/11.11.11
- Verslag vergaderingen CJP 10/01/2017 en 12/09/2017
- CJP Analyse van de klimaattop in Marrakesh (COP22). Aanbevelingen voor 2017.
- CJP Analyse van de klimaattop in Bonn (COP23). Aanbevelingen voor 2018
- CJP Aanbevelingen voor de klimaattop in Bonn (COP23)
- 11.11.11, Oxfam en CNCD/11.11.11 COP23: prioriteiten van de Noord-Zuidorganisaties
- Beleidscontext speerpunten platform klimaatrechtvaardigheid
- Persbericht (18 november 2017) CJP Trage vooruitgang op COP23, België moet nu een versnelling hoger schakelen
- CJP Aanbevelingen. Reactie België en EU op de terugtrekking Verenigde Staten uit akkoord van Parijs
- CJP (Februari 2018) Beleidscontext Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid



- CJP (April 2018) Analyse interparlementaire verklaring. Input voor het interparlementair klimaatoverleg in 2018.
- 11.11.11 (April 2018) Verkiezingsfiche 2019. Klimaatrechtvaardigheid

ANNEX 5: RECONSTRUCTED TOC

Theory of Change:
Climate Justice Platform 11.11.11 en
CNCD/11.11.11



Sphere of control
Inputs:
The financial, human, and material resources used for the development intervention (DAC/OECD)

Sphere of control
Activities:
Actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, technical assistance and other types of resources are mobilized to produce specific outputs (DAC/OECD)

Sphere of control
Outputs:
The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention (DAC/OECD)

Sphere of influence
Outcomes:
The direct benefits on the level of the beneficiaries realized through the intervention objectives (European Commission)

Sphere of interest
Impacts:
Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended (DAC/OECD)

ANNEX 6: QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

A1: Met welke van volgende organisaties kwam u beroepshalve in contact in de periode 2017 tot nu, en op welke manier? Meerdere antwoorden mogelijk (meerkeuzevraag)

	Ik heb hen persoonlijk gecontacteerd	De organisatie heeft mij persoonlijk aangesproken	Via een mailing (nieuwsbrief, e.d.)	Sociale media (facebook, twitter, website)	Via vrienden en/of collega's	Via een debat/rondetafelgesprek, hoorzitting in het parlement	Niet
11.11.11							
CNCD/11.11.11							
Broederlijk Delen							
Oxfam Solidariteit							
Klimaatcoalitie/ Klimaatplatform							
Caritas							

A2: Wanneer zijn organisaties uit het middenveld voor u een legitieme en geloofwaardige actor om invloed uit te oefenen op uw standpuntbepaling over Noord-zuidthema's? (keuzelijst, meerdere antwoorden mogelijk)

- Als de organisatie een brede supporters basis heeft die zichtbaar is.
- Als de organisatie effectief samenwerkt met partners in het Zuiden.
- Als de organisatie voldoende media-aandacht kan genereren
- Als de organisatie samenwerkt met andere organisaties in België en gezamenlijk actie voeren en/of gezamenlijk beleidsmakers contacteren
- Als de organisatie over voldoende thematische expertise beschikt

A3. In welke mate bent u beroepsmatig zelf sterk bezig met Noord-zuidthema's?

(keuzelijst: heel beperkt, beperkt, eerder sterk, sterk, geen mening)

A4: In welke mate spelen volgende factoren een rol in uw standpuntbepaling over Noord-Zuid thema's, zoals klimaat, migratie, ontwikkelingsbeleid, Midden-Oosten, enz.? (waarderingsvraag, schaal: helemaal niet, eerder niet, in beperkte mate, in belangrijke mate, zeer belangrijk, en optie 'geen mening')

- Politieke debatten in het parlement (interpellaties, parlementaire vragen, resoluties, etc.)
- Publiek debat (opiniestukken, massamobilisatie)
- Berichtgeving in de traditionele media (krant, TV, radio, tijdschriften)
- Berichtgeving in de sociale media (facebook, twitter)
- Academisch onderzoek
- Onderzoek en aanbevelingen van de studiedienst van uw partij
- Internationale evenementen die rechtstreeks of onrechtstreeks te maken hebben met Noord-Zuidthema's (vb. dodelijke slachtoffers op migratieroutes, schandaal rond belastingontduiking, grote natuurramp)
- Informatie ontvangen van een think-tank of studiecentrum
- Informatie ontvangen van de federale administraties
- Informatie ontvangen van middenveld organisaties
- Informatie opgepikt uit mijn sociaal netwerk/omgeving

schiftingsvraag

S1: Ontving u in de periode 2017 tot nu informatie over het Belgische klimaatbeleid en/of de positie van België in Europees en internationaal klimaatbeleid van een organisatie uit het maatschappelijk middenveld. Dit kan via formele weg (mails, brieven, dossiers), informele weg (gesprekken) en/of publieke weg (diverse media, acties, debatten)?

- Ja
- Nee (ga naar vraag M1, volgend thema: volgorde thema's klimaat, migratie, rechtvaardige fiscaliteit, Israël-Palestina en Syrië, ODA)

Luik Klimaatrechtvaardigheid

K1: Welke organisaties uit het maatschappelijk middenveld informeren u over thema's m.b.t. nationaal klimaatbeleid en de positie van België in het Europees en internationaal klimaatbeleid? (1) meerder antwoorden mogelijk (keuzelijst, meerdere antwoorden mogelijk)

- 11.11.11.
- ABVV-FGTB
- ACLVB-CGSLB
- ACV-CSC
- Beweging.net
- Bond Beter Leefmilieu (BBL)
- Climate Express
- CNC/11.11.11.
- Ecolink
- Entraide et Fraternité
- Greenpeace
- Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (sinds 2018 opererend onder de naam klimaatcoalitie)
- Natuurpunt
- Oxfam Solidariteit
- SOS Faim
- WWF
- Andere

K2: Duid aan hoe invloedrijk (= ik houd rekening met hun voorstellen en standpunten) onderstaande organisaties uit het maatschappelijk middenveld zijn voor uw standpuntbepaling omtrent nationaal klimaatbeleid en de positie van België in internationaal klimaatbeleid? (waarderingsvraag, schaal: niet van toepassing, 1= helemaal niet invloedrijk tot 5 = heel invloedrijk) (10 + 12)

- 11.11.11.
- ABVV-FGTB
- ACLVB-CGSLB
- ACV-CSC
- Beweging.net
- Bond Beter Leefmilieu (BBL)
- Climate Express
- CNCD/11.11.11.
- Ecolier
- Entraide et Fraternité
- Greenpeace
- Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (sinds 2018 opererend onder de naam klimaatcoalitie)
- Natuurpunt
- Oxfam Solidariteit
- SOS Faim
- WWF
- Andere

K3: Heeft u in de periode 2017 tot heden informatie gekregen van of contact gehad met het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu opererend onder de naam klimaatcoalitie)? (keuzelijst, één antwoord mogelijk)

- Ja
- Nee, maar ik ken het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid en weet wat ze doen (ga naar vraag S2)
- Nee, en ik ken Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid niet (ga naar vraag S2)

K4: Over welke onderwerpen heeft u in de periode 2017 tot nu informatie (zowel schriftelijk als mondeling, direct en indirect) ontvangen van het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu klimaatcoalitie)? (1) (keuzelijst, meerdere antwoorden mogelijk)

- Nationally Determined Contributions en Belgische ambitie inzake emissiereductie
- Nationaal energie- en klimaatplan
- Belgische standpunten mbt Europees klimaatbeleid (o.a. ambitie voor emissiereductie van 55% tegen 2030)
- Internationale klimaatfinanciering
- Internationale onderhandelingen (COP21 Parijs, COP22 Marrakesh, COP23 Bonn)
- Rechtvaardige transitie naar een koolstofarme samenleving
- Andere: ...

- Geen informatie gekregen (schiftingsantwoord, ga naar K7)

K5: Welke van volgende documenten heeft u van het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu klimaatcoalitie) ontvangen en gelezen in de periode 2017 tot nu? (meerkeuzevraag, meerdere antwoorden mogelijk: Ontvangen: ja/nee/weet ik niet (meer)/nvt – Gelezen: ja/nee/weet ik niet /nvt (meer)

- Analyse van de klimaatop in Marrakesh (COP22), aanbevelingen voor 2017 (2-pager)
- Aanbevelingen voor de klimaatop in Bonn (COP23) (2-pager)
- Persbericht “Trage vooruitgang op COP23, België moet een versnelling hoger schakelen” (november 2017)
- Reactie België & EU op terugtrekking VS uit akkoord van Parijs (2 pager)
- Brief aan Premier Michel over de rol van België op de "One Planet Summit" (1 december 2017)
- Analyse van de klimaatop Bonn (COP23) en aanbevelingen voor 2018 (februari 2018)
- Analyse interparlementaire verklaring. Input voor het interparlementair klimaatoverleg (april 2018)

K6: Hoe beoordeelt u de informatie (formeel en informeel, direct en indirect) ontvangen van het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu klimaatcoalitie)? (2, 5, 7) (waarderingsvraag, schaal: niet akkoord; min of meer akkoord; helemaal akkoord; geen mening/weet niet)

- De informatie en beleidsaanbevelingen waren relevant en bruikbaar
- De informatie en beleidsaanbevelingen waren technisch en inhoudelijk correct
- De informatie en beleidsaanbevelingen werden op relevante tijdstippen aangeleverd
- De informatie en beleidsaanbevelingen was ingebod in het huidige politieke kader (regerakkoord, beleidsnota's, agenda van de commissie, ...)
- De informatie en beleidsaanbevelingen houden rekening met onze gevoeligheden en noden
- De informatie en beleidsaanbevelingen gaven duidelijk aan waar eventuele risico's liggen indien deze niet zou worden opgenomen in het beleid
- De informatie en beleidsaanbevelingen gaven duidelijk aan waar de opportunities voor mijn beleidswerk lagen

K7: Hieronder vindt u een lijst van standpunten over het Belgische en Europese klimaatbeleid. Geef aan in welke mate u akkoord gaat met volgende standpunten (waarderingsvraag) (8)

	Niet akkoord	Gedeeltelijk akkoord	Helemaal akkoord	Ik wens me hier niet over uit te spreken
1. Europa moet de ambitie verhogen om emissies te verminderen met 55% tegen 2030				
2. Het Belgisch Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan 2030 moet ruimte laten voor een verhoging van de emissiereductie tot -55%.				
3. Het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan dat België indient bij de Europese Unie is geïntegreerd en coherent over bevoegdheden en entiteiten heen.				
4. Vanaf 2018 moeten de emissies van België afnemen.				

5. België engageert zich tot een jaarlijkse verhoging van de bijdragen aan de internationale klimaatfinanciering				
6. Vanaf 2020 geeft België jaarlijks minstens 500 miljoen EUR aan de internationale klimaatfinanciering				
7. Klimaatfinanciering wordt niet betaald vanuit het budget voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking				
8. Op de COP 24 moet een internationaal actieplan voor een rechtvaardige transitie naar een koolstofarme samenleving aangenomen worden				
9. Op de COP 24 moet een Paris Rule Book aangenomen worden met akkoorden over alle klimaatthema's, o.a. de definitie en rapportering over klimaatfinanciering				
10. De Talano Dialoog tijdens de COP24 mondt uit in de beslissing dat alle NCD's tegen 2020 ambitieuzer moeten zijn				

K8: Hieronder vindt u een lijst van standpunten over het Belgische en Europese klimaatbeleid. Geef aan in welke mate u het standpunt haalbaar vindt (los van het feit dat u al dan niet akkoord bent) en. (waarderingsvraag) (8)

	Niet haalbaar	Beperkt haalbaar	Zeker haalbaar	Ik wens me hier niet over uit te spreken
1. Europa moet de ambitie verhogen om emissies te verminderen met 55% tegen 2030				
2. Het Belgisch Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan 2030 moet ruimte laten voor een verhoging van de emissiereductie tot -55%.				
3. Het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan dat België indient bij de Europese Unie is geïntegreerd en coherent over bevoegdheden en entiteiten heen.				
4. Vanaf 2018 moeten de emissies van België afnemen.				
5. België engageert zich tot een jaarlijkse verhoging van de bijdragen aan de internationale klimaatfinanciering				
6. Vanaf 2020 geeft België jaarlijks minstens 500 miljoen EUR aan de internationale klimaatfinanciering				
7. Klimaatfinanciering wordt niet betaald vanuit het budget voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking				

8. Op de COP 24 moet een internationaal actieplan voor een rechtvaardige transitie naar een koolstofarme samenleving aangenomen worden				
9. Op de COP 24 moet een Paris Rule Book aangenomen worden met akkoorden over alle klimaatthema's, o.a. de definitie en rapportering over klimaatfinanciering				
10. De Talano Dialoog tijdens de COP24 mondt uit in de beslissing dat alle NCD's tegen 2020 ambitieuzer moeten zijn				

K9: Hieronder vindt u een lijst van standpunten over klimaatbeleid. Geef aan in welke mate u deze standpunten opneemt in uw beleidswerk? (meerkeuzevraag, meerdere antwoorden mogelijk). (3, 6, 8)

	Niet opgenomen en niet van plan	Nog niet opgenomen, wel van plan	Opgenomen voor interne discussies	Opgenomen in publieke gelegenheden	Concrete beleidsinitiatieven genomen	Nog geen standpunt bepaald
Europa moet de ambitie verhogen om emissies te verminderen met 55% tegen 2030						
Het Belgisch Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan 2030 moet ruimte laten voor een verhoging van de emissiereductie tot -55%.						
Het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan dat België indient bij de Europese Unie is geïntegreerd en coherent over bevoegdheden en entiteiten heen.						
Vanaf 2018 moeten de emissies van België afnemen.						
België engageert zich tot een jaarlijkse verhoging van de bijdragen aan de internationale klimaatfinanciering						

Vanaf 2020 geeft België jaarlijks minstens 500 miljoen EUR aan de internationale klimaatfinanciering						
Klimaatfinanciering wordt niet betaald vanuit het budget voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking						
Op de COP 24 moet een internationaal actieplan voor een rechtvaardige transitie naar een koolstofarme samenleving aangenomen worden						
Op de COP 24 moet een Paris Rule Book aangenomen worden met akkoorden over alle klimaatthema's, o.a. de definitie en rapportering over klimaatfinanciering						
De Talano Dialoog tijdens de COP24 mondt uit in de beslissing dat alle NCD's tegen 2020 ambitieuzer moeten zijn						

K9b: Welke acties heeft u ondernomen sinds 2017 mbt klimaatbeleid (keuzelijst, meerdere antwoorden mogelijk)

- Parlementaire vraag gesteld (mondeling en/of schriftelijk) in plenaire sessie
- Parlementaire vraag gesteld (mondeling en/of schriftelijk) in een relevante parlementaire commissie waar klimaatbeleid wordt besproken
- Een interpellatie gedaan
- Een motie ingediend

- Een voorstel van resolutie ingediend
- Een wetsvoorstel ingediend (of voorstel van decreet of voorstel van ordonnantie)
- Een amendement ingediend
- Een wetsontwerp voorbereid (of ontwerp-decreet of ontwerp-ordonnantie)
- Teksten voorbereid voor de Belgische delegatie van onderhandelaars op de COP23 in Bonn
- Lid van de delegatie op COP 23
- Meegewerkt aan beleidsdossiers
- Meegewerkt aan voorbereiding van parlementaire vragen
- Meegewerkt aan beleidsnota's
- Eigen studie gedaan
- Andere, ...

K10: Heeft u in de periode 2017 tot nu informatie van het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu klimaatcoalitie) gebruikt in uw beleidswerk? (6) (keuzelijst, één antwoord)

- Ja
- Nog niet, maar ben ik wel van plan
- Nee

K11: Hebben uw collega's in de periode 2017 tot nu gebruik gemaakt van de informatie van het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu klimaatcoalitie)? (11):

- Ja
- Nee
- Weet ik niet

K12: Vindt u dat u in voldoende mate de samenstelling kent van het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu klimaatcoalitie)? (keuzelijst)

- Ja, ik weet wie de leden zijn van het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu klimaatcoalitie)
- Ja, ik ken de belangrijkste leden van het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu klimaatcoalitie)
- Nee, ik heb maar een beperkte kennis van de samenstelling van het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu klimaatcoalitie)
- Nee, ik ken het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu klimaatcoalitie) bij naam maar weet niet wie de leden zijn

K13: In welke mate erkent u het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid (nu klimaatcoalitie) als legitieme en geloofwaardige pleitbezorger van politieke eisen voor klimaatbeleid? (2) (waarderingsvraag: helemaal niet, eerder niet, eerder wel, zeer zeker, geen mening)

ANNEX 7: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Policy makers

- In welke mate bent u actief bezig met het thema ?
- Welke NGOs informeren u over klimaat?
- Kent u het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid
- Op welke manier bent u in contact gekomen (naam NGO en/of het platform klimaatrechtvaardigheid)?
- Over welke onderwerpen werd u in het bijzonder geïnformeerd?
 - a. *Indien nodig hulpvraag: lijst van onderwerpen opsommen*
- Welke informatie heeft u gekregen en/of aan welke activiteiten heeft u deelgenomen die door (naam NGO) georganiseerd werden over (thema)?
 - a. *Doorvragen naar kwaliteit en bruikbaarheid van de info/actie*
- Zijn de standpunten van de (naam NGO) over (thema) voor u duidelijk?
- Wat vindt u van de analyses en standpunten van (naam NGO) over (thema)?
 - a. *doorvragen op kwaliteit van analyses, haalbaarheid van de voorstellen*
 - b. *doorvragen op de mate waarin de interviewee met een aantal standpunten akkoord gaat; wat hij/zij ervan denkt (wat deelt de interviewee met de NGO en waarin verschilt zijn/haar standpunt)*
- Welke (beleids)acties heeft u zelf al genomen mbt (thema)?
 - a. *doorvragen naar niveaus van engagement: interne discussies, publiek uitgesproken, thema op de agenda gezet, concrete beleidsacties, ...*
 - b. *Vragen waar we bewijs vinden van beleidsacties (parlementaire vraag, verslag van een commissie, e.d.)*
- Wat heeft hiertoe aanleiding gegeven of welke factoren hebben hierin een rol gespeeld?
 - a. *Doorvragen naar mechanismen zoals beschreven in de ToC*
- In welke mate heeft u de informatie en standpunten van (NGO) over (thema) hierbij een rol gespeeld? Kan u concrete voorbeelden geven?
- Hoe beoordeelt u in het algemeen het politieke werk van (NGO)mbt (thema)? Wat zijn sterke kanten en wat kan verbeterd worden?

- a. *Eventueel hulpvraag: kijken naar manier van contactname, framen van boodschap, expertise, legitimiteit, aanvoelen van de context van de beleidsmaker, hun aanpak en timeliness, samenwerking academici, rol van netwerken, ...*
- Wanneer en hoe kunnen volgens u NGOs best wegen op uw standpuntbepaling?
 - a. *Indien nodig hulpvragen: voorbeelden geven zoals brieven schrijven nav specifieke events, concrete aanbevelingen doen, ad-hoc overleg organiseren, infosessie, hoorzittingen, voorstel van resolutie voorbereiden, informele contacten, enz.*
 - b. *Wat is het belang van een grote mobilisatie van de achterban van de NGO in het ondersteunen van haar standpunten*
- Hoe situeert u de (NGO) tov andere organisaties/personen wat betreft het belang dat ze hebben om u te informeren en/of invloed uit te oefenen?
- Kan u de aanpak van 11.11.11/CNCD/11.11.11 en CJP vergelijken met andere actoren die ook aan beleidsbeïnvloeding doen? Zijn er andere methoden van beleidsbeïnvloeding die u goed/beter vindt werken. Kan u eventueel voorbeelden geven?
- Is er een sterke tegenlobby op dit thema? Hoe gaat u hier mee om? Wat zijn de afwegingen die u maakt?
- Wat is volgens u de meerwaarde van het klimaatrechtvaardigheidsplatform?
- Is het voor u duidelijk met wie u spreekt (profilering NGOs' tov het platform)?

Leden van het klimaatrechtvaardigheidsplatform/klimaatcoalitie

- Sinds wanneer bent u lid van het klimaatrechtvaardigheidsplatform (politieke werkgroep klimaatrechtvaardigheid)?
- Kan u de relatie tussen uw organisatie en het platform kort beschrijven?
- Met welke activiteiten van het platform bent u vertrouwd?
- Wat zijn de sterktes van het platform? Wat zijn de zwaktes?
- In welke mate doet uw organisatie haar beleidsbeïnvloedend werk via het platform?
 - Indien in sterke mate, wat is de belangrijkste meerwaarde om dit via het platform te doen?
 - Indien niet of in beperkte mate, waarom doet u dit niet via het platform?
- Kunt u een voorbeeld geven van een succesverhaal van het platform ihkv beleidswerk rond klimaatrechtvaardigheid (bv. beleidsmakers effectief kunnen beïnvloeden ivm bepaalde eis van het platform, etc.)?
 - Wat was de specifieke rol van het platform in dit succesverhaal?
 - Wat waren de belangrijkste elementen van de strategie die bijgedragen hebben tot dit succes?
- Kunt u een voorbeeld geven van een minder geslaagd traject van beleidsbeïnvloeding die via het platform werd gecoördineerd?
 - Wat is er misgelopen volgens u?
- In 2017 heeft de VS zich teruggetrokken uit het Parijsakkoord. Op welke manier heeft het platform hierop ingespeeld in haar beleidsbeïnvloedend werk? Hoe beoordeelt u in het algemeen de capaciteit van het platform om in te spelen op externe gebeurtenissen/factoren

(vooral rond thema's zoals de Belgian contribution to climate finance, Belgian emissions reduction, and the Just transition to a zero-carbon society)?

- Kunt u een kwalitatieve beoordeling geven over de outputs van het platform sinds 2017? Wat vond u daar goed aan en wat was minder goed? Specifiek over:
 - Het proces om tot gecoördineerde posities te komen en de kwaliteit van die posities.
 - Informatiemateriaal dat intern verspreid werd door het CJP over klimaatrechtvaardigheid
 - Evenementen en acties opgezet door het platform?
 - De communicatiekanalen binnen het platform (tussen leden onderling en met de coördinatoren)
- Wat vindt u goed aan de coördinatie van het platform door 11.11.11 en CNCD?
- Wat zou u graag anders zien aan de coördinatie van het platform?
- In april 2018 is het klimaatrechtvaardigheidsplatform opgegaan in de Klimaatcoalitie. Hoe schat u de gevolgen (positief/negatief) van deze merger in voor het beleidsbeïnvloedend werk van het platform?
- Hoe verloopt de coördinatie/onderlinge afstemming tussen het platform en de Klimaatcoalitie? Wat zou daar nog aan kunnen verbeteren?

ANNEX 8: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Rapportageformulier

Naam interviewee:

Functie en partij interviewee:

Naam interviewer:

Datum interview:

Duurtijd interview:

Suggesties andere personen te interviewen:

Nummer interview:

Inleiding: <i>In welke mate bent u actief bezig met het thema ?</i>
Link met NGO en thema: <i>Op welke manier bent u in contact gekomen met (naam NGO)? Over welke onderwerpen werd u in het bijzonder geïnformeerd? Welke informatie heeft u gekregen en/of aan welke activiteiten heeft u deelgenomen die door (naam NGO) georganiseerd werden over (thema)?</i>
<i>Output 8</i>
Standpunten/focus op output: <i>Zijn de standpunten van de (naam NGO) over (thema) voor u duidelijk? Wat vindt u van de analyses en standpunten van (naam NGO) over (thema)?</i>
Invloed op beleid/rival explanations: <i>Welke (beleids)acties heeft u zelf al genomen mbt (thema)? Wat heeft hiertoe aanleiding gegeven (factoren die u aangezet hebben tot het nemen van initiatief)? In welke mate heeft u de informatie en standpunten van (NGO) over (thema) hierbij een rol gespeeld? Kan u concrete voorbeelden geven?</i>
<i>Outcome 3&4; Impact 1&2</i>
Invloed op beleid: <i>Wanneer en hoe kunnen volgens u NGOs best wegen op uw standpuntbepaling?</i>
Appreciatie werk NGOs: <i>Hoe beoordeelt u in het algemeen het politieke werk van (NGO)mbt (thema)? Wat zijn sterke kanten en wat kan verbeterd worden?</i>
<i>Outcome 3&4</i>
Rival explanations: <i>Hoe situeert u de (NGO) tov andere organisaties/personen wat betreft het belang dat ze hebben om u te informeren en/of invloed uit te oefenen? Kan u de aanpak van vergelijken met andere actoren die ook aan beleidsbeïnvloeding doen? Zijn er andere methoden</i>

van beleidsbeïnvloeding die u goed/beter vindt werken. Kan u eventueel voorbeelden geven? Is er een sterke tegenlobby op dit thema? Hoe gaat u hier mee om? Wat zijn de afwegingen die u maakt? (Indien de interviewee voor verschillende thema's wordt gecontacteerd): ziet u een verschil in de aanpak tussen de verschillende thema's?

Klimaat: Kent u het Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid? Wat is volgens u haar meerwaarde

Outcome 3

Schema voor analyse en codering interviews

	parlement	kabinet	administratie
Meerwaarde en relevantie	–	–	–
Strategie	–	–	–
Kwaliteit	–	–	–
Gebruik	–	–	–
Platform	–	–	–
Aanbevelingen	–	–	–

ANNEX 9: RESULTS OF ONLINE SURVEY

See separate document, survey report



ACE EUROPE bvba • www.ace-europe.be

Leopoldstraat 39 • B-2800 Mechelen • tel. +32(0)15 34 88 84 • fax +32(0)15 34 88 64 • info@ace-europe.be