

Impact evaluation of the coordination of CSO advocacy for climate justice in Belgium

Mid-Term Evaluation Report

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Preface

“Climate change is the single biggest thing that humans have ever done on this planet. The one thing that needs to be bigger is our movement to stop it.” (Bill McKibben)

The evaluation team would like to thank 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11, and the coordinator of the Climate Coalition for their constructive participation and operational support. Also lots of thanks to the members of the Climate Coalition that have shared their experiences, ideas and thoughts about the functioning of the Climate Coalition. We hope that this impact evaluation exercise contributes to reflections on how to further develop policy influencing processes and the monitoring thereof.

Geert Phlix (ACE Europe) Mechelen, Belgium. 2021



Executive summary

This Mid-Term evaluation is part of a large impact evaluation exercise on assessing impact of non-governmental development programmes, an exercise which is coordinated by the NGO Federatie, with support of the Belgian Ministry for Development Cooperation.

Subject of this impact evaluation are the policy influencing interventions implemented by the Political Working Group (PWG) of the Climate Coalition, coordinated by 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11, and financed by the Belgian Ministry for Development Cooperation. In the period 2017-2021, the programme aims at influencing Belgian decision makers to develop and implement an ambitious Belgian policy in favour of climate justice, to enhance European ambitions and to implement the Paris agreement. The PWG is composed by CSOs (developmental, environmental, youth), trade unions and civic initiatives advocating for climate justice. The policy influencing strategy combines campaigning, advocacy, formal and informal lobbying. The programme also aims at enhancing knowledge and expertise on climate justice of the members of the PWG and to contribute to enhanced leverage and credibility of the PWG/Climate Coalition and its members on the topic of climate justice.

A baseline study was conducted in the first half of 2018. Implementation of the mid-term evaluation was delayed because of the absence of a new federal government and the long formation process 2019-2020. The evaluation was conducted just before the new federal government came in place and as such covers at the period end of 2018 – September 2020. The final evaluation will start by the end of 2021 and will be finalised in 2022.

Taking into account the political context 2019-2020, it was decided to only interview a small group of members of parliament (MP) (as they will be interviewed again one year later). It was considered not relevant to interview ministers as there have been many changes in the period 2019-2020 (resigning government, transitional government, new government) and as the government was resigning no new policy initiatives could be taken. No administrations were interviewed for the same reasons. The data-collection was further based on an extensive document analysis. Four policy cases have been selected to pilot the methodology of contribution analysis and process tracing.

Several methodological limitations are described in the report. Most important challenges relate to (1) the limited number of interviews. The contribution claims resulting from the contribution analysis can only be confirmed under reservation. During the final evaluation, more targeted interviews will be conducted to validate the set of primary and rival mechanisms that were identified. (2) Because of the lack of transparency in the climate policy debate, it is difficult to reconstruct the policy development process and to assess the extent to which positions of the PWG are (literally) copied in policy documents. Information obtained through interviews and through the study of the available documents give already a clear indication of the extent positions have been taken into account in the policy development process, but a black box remains. (3) The challenge to obtain interviews with MP

that do not share the ideas of the PWG only remained a challenge in the French speaking community where only interviews could be conducted with PTB-PVDA and Ecolo. MP of MR, for example, have appeared to be very active on the parliamentary climate commissions and could not be interviewed. This challenge will need specific attention during the final evaluation. (4) The subject of the evaluation is rather complex, in content and strategy. A black box remains as the evaluation does not assess in detail the policy influencing process and its effects at the regional level. Furthermore, emission reduction and decarbonization involve many different thematic measures, that are not at the core of interest of the North-South movement. All these topics are currently addressed by the Climate Coalition and the PWG. The focus of the evaluation is more on the social dimensions of the climate debate rather than on the technical dimensions, though they mutually influence the opinion and attitudes of policy makers. It has not been possible yet to capture all the factors that have eventually an influence on the Belgian position with regard to emission reduction and decarbonisation.

Presentation of the main conclusions

The ToC for policy influencing on climate justice by the PWG/Climate Coalition is validated through the evaluation. The PWG applies a smart mix of strategies that has been relevant and effective in putting topics on the political agenda and in some occasions in contributing to positions taken over by political decision makers. The composition of the Climate Coalition (variety of civil society represented, complementary expertise and intergenerational), the high-level knowledge and quality of information provided contribute to the recognition of the Climate Coalition as a reputable and credible actor in the climate debate.

Mainly direct communication appears to be the most effective means to influence political decision-makers. The PWG is respected by lobby targets for its 'supportive -informative' role. The PWG also has contributed to accelerating some policy processes, by grasping political momentum and pushing influential decision makers to adopt a position in line with the PWG (informal lobby). Indirect communication through media was assessed to have little influence on shaping the opinions of political decision makers or in influencing the political agenda, at least not in direct ways. Mass demonstrations kept the climate debate on the political agenda but appear to have had more effect in influencing the political debate at European level than at Belgian level. Parties that do not agree with the positions of the PWG consider the demonstrations as not representative for the general public debate, although research showed that 94% of the Belgians support the European ambition to become climate neutral by 2050.

Bottleneck is the disagreement between different political and societal groups on how to reach this high ambition, and what the consequences are for our daily lives. The PWG/Climate Coalition is also less clear on this. Interviewees confirmed that they would like to receive more hands-on input to that regard. This political disagreement is rooted in different visions on the solutions forward and relate to different levels (socio-economic, environmental-technological and social-technological positions).

The PWG has been able to build long-standing relations with politicians and invested in building relations with newly elected MP. The PWG has more contact with MP (direct communication and through institutionalised fora) compared to engaging with political parties and ministerial cabinets, and more contact with like-minded political groups. However, through its participation in institutionalised fora, the PWG is also able to reach out to other political groups, and the so-called foes or opponents. And because of its enhanced recognition, also supported by the mass



demonstrations, the PWG/Climate Coalition was invited by high influential politicians (ministers and informateur).

Several positions of the PWG have been taken over in the political discourse and were put on the political agenda by MP, such as the positions of the Climate Coalition with regard to the ambition level in the NECP, the need to include human rights and gender in the NECP, the negative impact of biofuels, the Belgian contribution to the Green Climate Fund, regulations of the international carbon market. The Climate Coalition also contributed to the discussions in parliament on the Special Climate Act. The inter-parliamentary resolution that was adopted by November 15, 2019 includes several of the positions of the PWG/Climate Coalition but does not refer to concrete ambitious targets.

According to the interviewees (MP and resource persons) most political decision makers understand the urgency for ambitious climate policy but differ in opinion regarding the need for concrete targets and commitments with regard to emission reduction and international climate finance. However, an evolution can be noticed. Not only the opposition parties but also Open VLD, CD&V and MR (part of the coalition at that time) have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the Climate Coalition and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP, and to show more ambitions during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA and Vlaamse Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitious.

With regard to policy change, some successes were achieved. At COP 25, Belgium joined the Article 6 coalition that pleads for strong rules for the global carbon markets and Belgium confirmed doubling federal contribution by making a pledge of 100 million EUR to the Green Climate Fund and confirmed that the funding is additional. The contribution of the PWG to these results was assessed as necessary.

Not much advancement was obtained in other cases, such as the NECP and the lobby on the Special Climate Act. The NECP 2030 (finalised in December 2019) only aims at -35% emission reduction in non ETS sectors, which is far below the demands of the PWG, and the European ambition. The NECP does not demonstrate sufficient ambition and lacks concrete measures towards just transition.

A set of contextual factors have a strong influence on the political debate on climate policy and explain why many positions of the PWG have not been translated yet in policy targets and measures. The complicated institutional political landscape in Belgium can be seen as one of the important hampering factors. The new federal government, installed in October 2020, fully aligns with the European ambitions of the Green Deal, which means that the NECP2030 needs to be adapted to these new goals. The federal government engaged to make the necessary adaptations through an 'action plan'. The latter will be subject of the final evaluation.

The assumptions that were identified during the reconstruction of the ToC have been confirmed by the MTE. PWG manages to access spaces for political dialogue and is able to generate relevant policy input on its coordinated positions. The PWG is correctly identifying and targeting influential policy makers, though not based on a comprehensive stakeholder and power mapping. The PWG has adaptive ability to respond quickly to changes in the political environment and a visible support base strengthens the legitimacy and leverage of the PWG interventions. During the evaluation, other assumptions have been identified that explain the effectiveness of L&A on climate policy. These refer to (i) the importance of seizing policy windows, (ii) the importance of having access to power elites or highly influential decision makers and (iii) having allies in power.

PWG was low in changing policy positions in those cases where there is much more disagreement. Cases that are complex as they concern a transition to a carbon neutral society and that demand measures that are not only technical but also influenced by societal and political visions. The PWG does not give insight in the reasons behind the disagreements and how to address these, as such bringing the debate on these disagreement to the forefront.

The PWG has mainly targeted MP, though MP are neither the only, nor the most influential political elites engaged in climate policy development. The PWG has to deal with opaque policy processes, hierarchies, political interest within political groups and administrations. Navigating these was more challenging than advocating the parliamentary policy making process.

The climate coalition is an example of a strong coalition and unique in Europe as it unites diverse members from the North-South movement, the environmental movement, the trade unions, the youth and civic initiatives. Diversity in the coalition adds to complementarity but it also adds to the complexity in defining policy demands. Defining and maintaining a common set of objectives and positions is not a one-time exercise. It requires a continuous process of discussions, debates and consensus-building among the network members. This process has been well organised by the PWG coordinators and appropriate decisions have been taken by the Climate Coalition to structure the decision-making process within the coalition. The integration of the PWG into the Climate Coalition has been conducive for strengthening the synergy between the political work and the mobilisations.

The PWG and Climate Coalition perform well according to different indicators that assess the quality and effectiveness of collaborative processes and coalitions, such as quality of leadership, management, structure, technical expertise and knowledge, the collaborative culture, the diversity and how it is being managed. Room for improvement exist with regard to internal communication. Lot of information is being shared and all interviewees referred to the need to further rationalise and systematize the information flow. A balance needs to be looked for between general and specialised information, between too technical and too simple, between information needs of the climate experts and the needs of the non-experts. Furthermore, according to some interviewees less information is being shared on the advocacy process itself and the progress or milestones realised. Lastly, the PWG has no resources available for L&A at European level. This is being done separately by individual members, often through their international branches and through CAN.



Mid-term evaluation data on the level of success of PWG influencing points of view of political decision makers

*Indicator 1a - **Outreach**: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who knowingly have received information from PWG*

- List of direct contacts was not updated (had been developed specifically for the baseline study but is not an existing M&E tool). There have been 19 direct contacts with individual MP or groups of MP, and 12 meetings in institutionalised fora where all climate experts of MP were met (varying from 20 to 79 persons).
- PWG had encounters with all relevant ministers (climate and development cooperation), 7 formal meetings in total, and with the negotiators and ‘informateur’.
- PWG has direct contact with all lead thematic experts of all political parties (except extremist parties), but the number of contacts with opposition parties outnumber the number of contacts with ruling parties and the quality of interaction differs. There is a closer relation and more frequent interaction with opposition parties (also requesting PWG for advice) compared to the interactions with ruling parties.
- All 8 members of parliament interviewed confirmed having received information from PWG

*Indicator 1b - **Spaces for influencing**: Number of meetings with cabinets, ministers, parliamentarians, study services of political parties*

A list of meetings is presented in the report (and detailed overview in annex 6). The evaluators consider this number being less relevant because the number of meetings does not explain the level of success of policy influencing interventions.

*Indicator 2a - **Appreciation of CJP’s contributions**: Share of national policy makers reached by PWG, who view the information as (scale from 1 to 4: all / majority / minority / nobody) relevant, timely, qualitative and usable, and that perceive CJP members and 11.11.11 and CNCD/11.11.11 as legitimate and credible advocates for climate change*

- All people interviewed, without distinction to political parties, find the information provided by CJP relevant, usable and of high quality.
- PWG is an important information source for all interviewees for formulating their positions.
- Cabinets and administration: not interviewed during MTE
- All opposition parties appreciate the ambitious character of the positions of the climate coalition, and even think they can be more ambitious. It was recognised that the memorandum is a compromised text.
- All ruling parties agree with the principles of the analyses and positions but do not agree with the concrete and ambitious targets proposed (as assessed not being feasible) and ask for more suggestions on the ‘how’, a roadmap towards just transition.

*Indicator 2b - **Agenda setting**: Number of parliamentary interpellations and questions, proposed resolutions, adopted; resolutions and motions introduced by PWG lobby targets that are in line with PWG positions; Number of amendments by parliamentarians in line with PWG positions; Number of interventions of the Belgian delegation of decision-makers at the next COPs in line with PWG*

positions.

- Positions of the Climate Coalition with regard to the ambition level in the NECP, the need to include human rights and gender in the NECP, the negative impact of biofuels, the Belgian contribution to the Green Climate Fund, regulations of the international carbon market are put on the political agenda during discussions in parliament. The Climate Coalition also contributed to the discussions in parliament on the Special Climate Act.
- In principle all Belgian parties support the Paris Agreement and agree with the principle that Belgium needs to develop an ambitious climate policy. Not only the opposition parties but also Open VLD, CD&V and MR (part of the coalition at that time) have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the Climate Coalition and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP and to show more ambitions during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA and Vlaamse Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitious.
- The inter-parliamentary resolution was adopted by November 15, 2019 and includes several of the positions of the PWG/Climate Coalition but does not refer to concrete ambitious targets.

Indicator 3 - Discursive change: Number of political parties who take-up the PWG positions/terminology/ rhetoric/framing in their line of argumentation during the policy preparation phase

- All political decision makers understand the urgency for ambitious climate policy but differ in opinion regarding the need for concrete targets and commitments with regard to emission reduction and international climate finance.
- Not only the opposition parties but also Open VLD, CD&V and MR (part of the coalition till October 2020) have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the PWG and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP and to show more ambition during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA and Vlaams Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitious.
- Till the end of 2018, ruling parties adopted a climate conservative approach whereas opposition parties pushed for concrete and ambitious targets that are in line with PWG positions. The new federal government that was installed in October 2020 shows more commitment in its government agreement for climate policy. Three relevant ministers that are responsible for climate relate policy domains within the federal government belong to the green parties.

Indicator 4 - Policy change: Belgian Policy in favour of climate justice

- At procedural level: lack of transparency of the decision-making process of the national climate commission still continues. Improvement of climate governance, as demanded by PWG, is included in the proposal for Special Climate Act.
- At policy level:
 - Effort sharing regulation horizon 2030 between the regions was part of the development of the NECP. The NECP only aims at -35% emission reduction in non ETS sectors, which is far below the demands of the PWG, and the European ambition.
 - NECP 2030 finalised in December 2019 not demonstrating sufficient ambition and lacking concrete measures towards just transition. The NECP is not an integrated plan but a compilation of the regional and federal climate policies.
 - Inter-parliamentary resolution adopted but without concrete targets for emission reduction and international climate finance. Several positions of PWG have been being included.
 - Positions at COP meetings (Katowice and Madrid): Belgium not joining the High Ambition Coalition. Belgium not supporting the European ambition of -55% emission reduction by 2030. Belgium joining Article 6 coalition that pleas for strong rules for the global carbon markets.



- Belgium confirming contribution of 100 million EUR/year to the Green Climate Fund that is additional.¹
- Official government position regarding emission reduction was in 2018 set on -35% by 2030. The NECP of December 2019 refers to an increase in ambition and states that the emission reduction should be higher than -40% by 2030 (but without clear targets).
 - The new federal government, installed in October 2020, fully aligns with the European ambitions of the Green Deal, which means that the NECP needs to be adapted to these new goals. The federal government engaged to make the necessary adaptations through an ‘action plan’.

*Indicator 5 - **Relevance of communication channels**: Share of national policy makers reached by PWG, who view the communication channels applied as relevant and Indicator 6 - **Qualitative assessment of relevance** of the different forms of communication channels and how they are embedded in the overall policy influencing strategy*

- idem as baseline
- Mass mobilisations and one-off actions have not influenced much positions of politicians but have contributed to putting or keeping the climate debate on the political agenda

*Indicator 7 - **Influence of PWG**: Share of national policy makers who view the PWG as influential on their opinion-forming process, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change*

- Only a limited number of policy makers was interviewed. They all recognised the PWG/Climate Coalition as a legitimate advocate for climate justice

*Indicator 8 - **Influence of other actors**: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who name other actors than PWG as one of the more influential stakeholders on their opinion-forming process*

- idem baseline

*Indicator 9 - **Knowing PWG**: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who know the PWG*

The PWG/Climate Coalition is well known by all policy makers interviewed. They do not make a distinction between PWG and Climate Coalition. The advocates are known as representing the Climate Coalition. They know that the Climate Coalition represents a large group of CSOs and that the different groups of CSOs are represented in the coalition. In the French community, the spokesperson of the Climate Coalition is well known, through his participation in panels and debates in the media.

¹ The Belgium contribution to the Green Climate Fund till 2020 was set on 50 million EUR/year, new and additional. Belgium reported a contribution of 100 million EUR in 2016 but PWG had critique on the definition of climate financing, and contribution was not new or additional.

*Indicator 10 - **Added value of composition**: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who view the specific composition of the CJP (with many different social organisations) as a comparative strength.*

- idem as baseline

Baseline data on the functioning of the PWG

Indicator 11 - % of PWG member who use other channels for their advocacy work on climate justice; % of PWG members who rank the PWG as their main channel for advocacy work

- idem as baseline

Indicator 12 - % of PWG members who use the positions of the PWG in communication with national political decision makers

- idem as baseline
- Members of the Climate Coalition have also put their own specific demands on the agenda of the PWG, of which several have become included in the memorandum of the Climate Coalition.

Indicator 13 - Qualitative description of the strengths and weaknesses of the PWG by the members

Strengths:

- Idem as baseline +
- The division of the PWG into a core group and the broader group has enhanced efficiency of developing positions.
- Consistency of representatives of the Climate Coalition and the PWG, which has a positive influence on visibility and relation building
- Diversity is well managed. Diversity in expertise and networks is an added value of members.
- The PWG scores high on the 6 parameters for assessing collaborative processes

Weaknesses:

- Weaknesses identified during baseline are still valid (and inherent part of this type of broad coalitions) but are better managed currently.
- Not all members of the PWG participate well-prepared at meetings
- Communication flow could be further rationalised and systematised, taking into account the different information needs of the members.

Indicator 14 and Indicator 15

The coordinators have shown good knowledge of the policy context and climate policy development processes. The PWG has been able to respond adequately to windows of opportunity for policy influencing and to react quickly (see cases on international climate finance, COP 25 negotiation). The PWG has been important in organising the political work around the climate mobilisations in 2019, as such leveraging the activism of the Youth for the climate to bring also concrete political demands into the political debate (e.g. case on Special Climate Act).



Indicator 16 - Qualitative assessment of the quality of the delivered products by CJP

Indicator 17- Qualitative assessment by the members about the quality of the coordination of the PWG

Indicator 18 - Qualitative assessment of synergies between the climate coalition and CJP

- idem as baseline data
- An appropriate communication mix is provided (newsletters, website, mailings), which is sufficient informative but more systematization and rationalisation of the information flow is suggested by interviewees. More information on the advocacy process is asked for.
- Study events are of high quality, high experts are engaged. Study events have become more relevant with the acceleration of the climate policy debates and the entrance of new members in the Climate Coalition.
- The PWG coordinators manage well the diversity of the coalition.
- Leadership (of PWG and of the Climate Coalition) is shared rather than positional. There is sufficient transparency, data and research are freely shared and explained. the PWG coordinators put sufficient energy in completing the tasks and improving working relations.
- As the PWG has become integrated in the Climate Coalition, synergy has improved considerably. The advocacy work is becoming more aligned to the mobilisation and campaigning, but can be further strengthened.

List of Abbreviations

ACLVB	Algemene Centrale der Liberale Vakbonden
CAN	Climate Action Network
CD&V	Christen Democratische Volkspartij
CdH	Centre Démocrate Humaniste
CJP	Climate Justice Platform
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DBE	Dienst Bijzondere Evaluaties
DGD	Directorat General for Development
ETS	Emission Trading System
EU	European Union
FOD VVVL	Federale Overheidsdienst Volksgezondheid, Veilighied van de Voedselketen en Leefmilieu
FRDO	Federale Raad voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
L&A	Lobbying and Advocacy
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MP	Member of Parliament
MR	Mouvement Reformateur
NECP	National Energy and Climate Plan
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NGA	Niet Gouvernemente Actoren
N-VA	Nieuwe Vaamse Alliantie
PWG	Political Working Group
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SP.A	Socialistische Partij Anders
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
VLD	Vlaamse Liberale Democraten
WWF	World Wide Fund



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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 SUBJECT OF THE EVALUATION

- ¹ Subject of this impact evaluation is the development cooperation programme, funded by the Belgian federal ministry for development cooperation, that involves the coordination of civil society organisation (CSO) advocacy efforts for climate justice in Belgium. In the period 2017-2021, 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 are implementing a programme on climate justice, aimed at influencing Belgian decision makers to develop and implement an ambitious Belgian policy in favour of climate justice, enhance European ambitions and to implement the Paris Agreement. A large part of the policy influencing strategy is done through a platform of CSOs that have joined forces for climate justice policy influencing, the Climate Justice Platform (CJP), that has turned into the Political Working Group (PWG) of the Climate Coalition in 2018. 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 have assumed the role of coordinators of this platform (now Political Working Group) since its origin in 2011. A policy influencing strategy has been developed that combines campaigning, advocacy, formal and informal lobbying.
- ² This report presents the findings and conclusions of the Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE). The MTE builds further on the methodology, evaluation design, experiences and results of the baseline study that was finalised in 2018. According to the contract of ACE Europe/HIVA KU Leuven with the NGO federation, and as described in the evaluation report of the baseline study, a mid-term evaluation was foreseen to take place half way the programme. In November 2018 (finalisation of the baseline), two options were identified for the planning of the MTE, taking into account the fact that 2019 would be an election year:
- Option 1: MTE conducted in 2019: The MTE would focus on the work of the parliament till that October 2019, with as possible cases: (1) inter parliamentary resolution, (2) Belgian position taken at COP24 in Katowice and (3) the extent PWG positions were included in the electoral programmes. Only members of parliament would be interviewed.
 - Option 2: MTE conducted in fall 2020: the new governments might be in place and have been working one year. All types of policy makers could be interviewed. The final evaluation still can take place in the third and fourth quarter of 2021.
- ³ Taking into account the political context anno 2019-2020, with no new federal government in place yet at the start of the preparation of evaluation, it was decided, upon consultation with the NGO federation, 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11, to conduct the MTE in the last quarter of 2020. However, it was decided that only a small group of members of parliament (MEP) would be interviewed (as they

will be interviewed again one year later), that it would not be relevant to interview ministers as there have been many changes in the period 2019-2020 (resigning government, transitional government, new government) and as the government was resigning no new policy initiatives could be taken. No administrations were interviewed for the same reasons. During the inception phase of the MTE, a new federal government was established eventually.

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE IMPACT STUDY

- ⁴ The objectives of the impact study are twofold:
- (1) Accountability – measuring impact will enable 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 to account to DGD for the results achieved, including results at impact level.
 - (2) Learning – apart from identifying lessons learned from the intervention and the possibility to adapt the strategy during implementation, this assignment aims at providing insight in the set-up and implementation of impact evaluations of NGO-interventions. The objective is to draw lessons on the use of specific methodologies, on the feasibility of conducting impact studies of NGO interventions and to build experience in applying mixed methods evaluations. As such this evaluation is part of a learning trajectory on impact evaluations that is steered by the three NGA federations, DGD and DBE. A first discussion note, presenting lessons learned from the baseline, was shared in June 2019, and was discussed during the learning event organised by the NGO federation and DGD in September 2019.
- ⁵ A ToC for the coordination of the climate justice policy influencing of the PWG was reconstructed by Syspons, in collaboration with 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11, during the preparatory phase of the impact studies and an assessment grid was developed. The assessment grid was further adapted by ACE Europe and HIVA K.U.Leuven during the baseline study. The ToC and assessment grid (evaluation framework, see annex 2) includes several result levels (output, outcome and impact) and questions related to relevance (e.g. relevance of information received). The focus of this evaluation is put on the impact level but also the other results levels are being assessed (effectiveness), which evidently will contribute to explaining the level of impact achieved.

1.3 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH OF THE EVALUATION

- ⁶ For the mid-term and final evaluation, it was suggested in the baseline study report, to select a number of policy influencing cases for more in-depth analysis, including a contribution analysis. During inception phase of the MTE, several options were explored with 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 and four cases were selected that were at the core of the policy influencing work in 2019-2020, and in line with the focus that was chosen in the baseline study. All cases are relevant in realising the objectives of the PWG aimed at increasing the ambition level of Belgium with regard to international climate finance, emission reduction and decarbonisation (focus of the impact study) and all cases are inter-linked.




1. The Belgian contribution to International Climate Finance
 2. The intra-Belgian climate governance, more specifically with regard to the Special Climate Act
 3. The intra-Belgian climate governance, more specifically with regard to the effort sharing regulation between the different regional governments in Belgium, the National Energy and Climate Plan 2030
 4. The influence of the political working group on the positions taken by the Belgian delegation with regard to the different COPs that have taken place, in particularly the COP24 in Katowice, and the following COP 25 in Madrid (COP 26 in Glasgow was postponed due to the corona crisis)
- 7 The evaluation framework (see annex 2) was guiding for collecting data. The evaluation showed however that applying an evaluation framework in a rigid way is not suitable for assessing policy influencing interventions, as reporting on predefined indicators does not give good insight in the mechanisms that have contributed to the results. A contribution analysis and narrative assessment approach were applied to assess the cases. The results of the evaluation are presented according to the steps of a contribution analysis. results of the contribution analysis are used to inform the indicators of the evaluation framework and are presented per indicator, also comparing with the data of the baseline study.

Contribution analysis and process tracing

- 8 Contribution analysis and process tracing were combined in order to evaluate the contribution of the intervention towards observed impact. Step 1 and 2 of a contribution analysis (see following figure) were done in the baseline phase. During the MTE, the ToC 'in use' (step 2) was further reconstructed, so to obtain actualisation of the strategy, assumptions, risks and to gain insight in the causal mechanism. Step 3 and step 4 were applied, though we have to take into account that not sufficient data might be collected, due to the fact that only a limited number of lobby targets among political decision makers was interviewed. During the MTE performance stories for each of the cases were developed, but during the final evaluation these performance stories need to be revised, based on additional evidence as more lobby targets and more triangulation of data will take place during the final evaluation.

Figure 1: Steps in contribution analysis




⁹ In order to assess the contribution of political working group to the envisaged changes and to find evidence of rival explanations, the methodology of process tracing was applied. This methodology starts with a clear description of the case(s) to be assessed and a reconstruction of a timeline of the policy influencing work. This timeline was reconstructed in a workshop with the coordinators of the political working group. The timeline provided insight in internal and external factors that had contributed to the envisaged changes. To be able to gain insight in the contribution of other members of the PWG to the envisaged changes and to gain more information on factors that had an influence on the envisaged changes, interviews were conducted with several individual members that also conduct L&A, such as Oxfam Belgium, WWF, Arbeid&Milieu, Greenpeace, ACLVB. In these interviews also a timeline of their policy influencing work was reconstructed. Based on these interviews a set of rival explanations and influencing factors were identified that needed to be validated through other interviews. As the number of interviewees is limited in this MTE, most probably several of these mechanisms need to be further triangulated and validated during the final evaluation.

¹⁰ In a contribution analysis, a distinction is made between the following types of causal explanations:

- primary explanation (mechanism related to the intervention)
- direct rival (different mechanism that undermines the contribution story of the intervention)
- commingled rival (other mechanism that occurs alongside target mechanism)
- influencing factors (that modify the outcomes)

¹¹ As the causal analysis requires substantial time and resources, in each case study, a limited number of causal relations was explored in the analysis, and only the most likely direct rival explanations and/or commingled rival explanations. Following figure visualizes the link between ToC, assumptions (primary explanations) and rival explanations.

Figure 2: General example of Theory of Change diagram with assumptions (contributing factors) and rival explanations added (from Mayne, 2012)



¹² An analysis was done of causal claims and the contribution of the PWG to the observed changes. Based on available literature of causal relations in policy influencing programmes, the evaluation team assumed that the causal relationships would be of the **INUS type**.² This implies that the intervention itself will not be sufficient to bring about change on its own (it is part of a wider causal package), but that in the case positive change is observed, the main question to be answered is the 'necessary' question (aside from the question about rival explanations). In other words, was the intervention a 'necessary component' of the causal package that brought change? The approach of process tracing as described by Collier (2011)³ was applied, as visualised in following box. Each mechanism (primary, commingled, rival) was assessed of being necessary and/or sufficient. Four combinations are possible, that have given a "name" by Collier: Straw-in-the-wind, Hoop, Smoking Gun and Double decisive. A detailed analysis of the causal mechanisms is added in annexes 7 and 8. Through semi-structured interviews with members of PWG, MP and external resource persons, information was collected on the causal, rival and commingled explanations. It might be possible that some of the causal claims can only be validated during the final evaluation.

² Most lobbying and advocacy work is an Inufficient, but Necessary, part of a causal package, that is, itself, Unnecessary but Sufficient for the occurrence of the effect.

³ Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process tracing. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 44(4), 823-830.

Box 1: Process tracing test for causal inference

		SUFFICIENT FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	
		No	Yes
NECESSARY FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	No	1. Straw-in-the-Wind a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it. b. Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is slightly weakened. c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>slightly</i> weakens them. Failing <i>slightly</i> strengthens them.	3. Smoking-Gun a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis. b. Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is somewhat weakened. c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>substantially</i> weakens them. Failing <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.
		2. Hoop a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it. b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis. c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>somewhat</i> weakens them. Failing <i>somewhat</i> strengthens them.	4. Doubly Decisive a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis and eliminates others. b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis. c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing <i>eliminates</i> them. Failing <i>substantially</i> strengthens them.
	Yes		

Interviews

- 13 As described in the introduction, only a limited number of interviews was planned. Not all planned interviews could be conducted because of non-response of the stakeholder (even after frequent reminders). Because of the corona pandemic, all interviews were conducted online. A list of people consulted is added in annex 3. With regard to the members of the PWG, only a list of 15 organisations was provided by the PWG (not planned 20), including a combination of active members of the core PWG, members of the broader group, representing the different groups of members (North-South, environment, trade union, youth and civic initiatives) and balance between French and Flemish speaking. Although not all interviews could be conducted, this variety could be realised in the interviews that were conducted.

Table 1: Overview of interviews with stakeholders planned and realised

Stakeholder	Planned	realised
Members of Parliament	11	8
Members of PWG	20	14
– Core group ⁴	– 6	– 6
– Broader group	– 14	– 8
Resource persons (academic world, journalists, private sector) + FOD VVVL	12	7

⁴ The core group exists out of 9 members + coordinators. It was planned to conduct interviews with 6 members, apart from the coordinators. That has not been possible. 6 members have been interviewed, including the coordinators. BBL and IEW indicated they had no time for such an interview.



- ¹⁴ In order to assess the functioning of the political working group, these topics were included in the interviews with the members of the PWG. It was decided during inception phase, to not organise an electronic survey among all members of the climate coalition (as suggested in the baseline report) but to organise such a survey during the final evaluation, as two surveys in a time span of 12 months was not advisable.
- ¹⁵ A narrative report of each interview was drafted. No software was used for data analysis as the number of interviews was manageable for manual review and assessment. The analysis started with a re-reading of the individual interviews to gain a deep understanding of the individual narratives and maintain a view on the coherence of the individual interviews. This review involved a first marking of interesting aspects and insights, questions that it raises, and issues that might need follow-up. Secondly, for the coding of the interviews an analytical matrix was developed based on the evaluation framework (see annex 10). In addition, the interviews were screened for unintended outcomes and effects, or for emerging themes, which were then included in the evaluation framework for further analysis. After the table was completed with the excerpts, a transversal analysis was done for each area of the analytical framework to highlight similarities and differences between interviews. For purposes of research triangulation, interview transcripts were analysed by two consultants. Findings were further discussed among the consultants involved in the evaluation to reach a consensus in interpretation and formulation of conclusions. Triangulation of information obtained through interviews was further complemented by the analysis of documents.

Document review

- ¹⁶ To compensate the limited number of interviews that would be conducted, sufficient time was dedicated to document analysis. Policy documents relevant for the cases were analysed on content. For each document, the evaluators will identify what recommendations of the political working group had been included, in line with the evaluation framework for the MTR (see for example annex 11). Because of the lack of transparency of climate governance in Belgium, reports and policy documents are not always easy accessible and a lot of policy influencing takes place informally without immediate results in formal documents (e.g. of National Climate Commission, COP meetings). Apart from the policy documents developed by the PWG, documents analysed concerned mainly reports of parliamentary commissions, parliamentary questions, and the climate policies of the different governments. Following the suggestion of the Special Evaluator, also relevant literature was consulted to assess the ToC 'in use' against the state of art. A list of documents consulted is added in annex 4.

1.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE EVALUATIONS

- ¹⁷ Because only a limited number of interviews were conducted, data need to be further triangulated and validated during the final evaluation, in particularly data from the process tracing exercise. The contribution claims resulting from the contribution analysis can only be confirmed under reservation. During the final evaluation, more targeted interviews will be conducted to validate the set of primary and rival mechanisms that were identified.
- ¹⁸ Because of the lack of transparency in the climate policy debate, it is difficult to reconstruct the policy development process and to assess the extent to which positions of the PWG are (literally) copied in policy documents. Information obtained through interviews and through the study of the available documents give already a clear indication of the extent positions have been taken into account in the policy development process, but a black box remains.
- ¹⁹ As indicated in the baseline study, it is easier to obtain interviews with MEP that share the ideas of the PWG than with the opponents. During the MTE this only remained a challenge in the French speaking community where only interviews could be conducted with PTB-PVDA and Ecolo. MP of MR, for example, have appeared to be very active on the parliamentary climate commissions and could not be interviewed. This challenge will need specific attention during the final evaluation.
- ²⁰ The subject of the evaluation is rather complex, in content and strategy. Climate policy is a complicated policy topic in multilevel political systems such as Belgium and touches upon competences of both the federal government and the three regions. The subject of the evaluation however is the federal level (Belgian position in European and international negotiations and the Belgian ambition regarding emission reduction and decarbonisation), that is influenced by the positions at regional level. A black box remains as the evaluation does not assess in detail the policy influencing process and its effects at the regional level. Furthermore, emission reduction and decarbonization involve many different thematic measures, that are not at the core of interest of the North-South movement. All these topics are currently addressed by the Climate Coalition and the PWG. The focus of the evaluation is more on the social dimensions of the climate debate rather than on the technical dimensions, though they mutually influence the opinion and attitudes of policy makers. It is not possible to capture all the factors that have eventually an influence on the Belgian position with regard to emission reduction and decarbonisation.



2 DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE JUSTICE ADVOCACY

2.1 POLICY CONTEXT ON CLIMATE JUSTICE

- ²¹ Since the finalisation of the baseline study by the end of 2018, there have been several evolutions in the Belgian and European context that have had an influence on the CSO advocacy for climate justice.
- ²² In 2019, the public debate about the climate crisis moved-up the political and societal agenda in Belgium, with a growing mobilisation that covered the school strikes, youth for climate, grand-parents for climate, Sign for my Future, etc. This resulted in mass mobilisation and climate demonstrations from early 2019 till the beginning of 2020.
- ²³ In the run-up of the federal elections of May 2019, the climate crisis became one of the main topics but rather than growing towards a consensus, it became a polarized debate in which political parties supported very different positions about the way forward. The formation of a new federal government took more than 1.5 year, with the establishment of the new federal government by October 2020.
- ²⁴ In March 2020, the corona pandemic kicked-off in Belgium. As in other spheres of our professional and personal lives, the corona crisis has also had a substantial influence on NGOs and citizen movements as it greatly affected the way people could interact. This was also visible in the type of lobby and advocacy activities that could be organised, and the availability of L&A spaces and opportunities. Climate justice advocacy continued online and the Climate Coalition also participated in the Global#Climate StrikeOnline.
- ²⁵ As described in the baseline report, climate policy development in Belgium is complicated by the complex governance structure and the fact that climate policy belongs to the competencies of the regional governments and the federal government, which have also different types of government coalitions. As a consequence, parliaments, administrations and cabinets at all these levels are involved in climate policy development. The critique of the civil society about the lack of transparency with regard to climate policy development still holds. Functioning and transparency of the national climate commission⁵ has not improved. Also, the FRDO who is advising the government on topics related to sustainable development, including climate policy, has often not come to a

⁵ The National Climate Commission coordinates the policy preparation work and the development of the national climate policy. It is constituted by representatives of the different cabinets (www.cnc-nkc.be)

consensus and as such not much advice on climate policy has been provided in the period 2019-2020.⁶ The Special Commission on Climate and Sustainable Development⁷ has approved the inter-parliamentary resolution on 15 November 2018 (by the end of the baseline study), which was the result of an inter-parliamentary debate that was launched to prepare the COP23 (2017 in Bonn upon initiative of the president of the Flemish regional parliament (N-VA). Inter-parliamentary meetings of the federal and regional parliamentary climate commissions keep on taking place.

- ²⁶ The federal and regional ministers for environment are responsible for the respective federal and regional climate policies. New regional parliaments were elected in May 2019 and soon after regional governments were formed. These governments were responsible for further developing/adapting the respective climate policies, but even more important, were expected to collaborate on the development of a National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), that was imposed by the European Commission. The consultants also observed that several representatives of civil society (and members of the climate coalition) have moved to several federal or regional ministerial cabinets, more so in the Walloon region than in the Flemish region.
- ²⁷ At the international level, Belgium is represented by the federal minister for environment at the COP meetings. At European level, Belgium is alternately represented by one of the regional ministers responsible for environment. In the period under review (end 2018-October 2020) this was done by Minister Crucke (Walloon government) in the period July 2018 – June 2019, and by Minister Demir (Flemish government) in the period July 2019-June 2020. In this period, following COP meetings took place: COP24 in Katowice (end 2018-after the baseline study), COP 25 in Madrid (2019) and COP 26 in Glasgow (planned in November 2020). Because of the COVID-19 situation, the COP26 in Glasgow was postponed with one year.

2.2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE EVOLUTION FROM THE CLIMATE JUSTICE PLATFORM TOWARDS THE POLITICAL WORKING GROUP OF THE CLIMATE COALITION

- ²⁸ The Climate Justice Platform (CJP) has been transformed into the political working group (PWG) of the national Climate Coalition in March 2018, in order to strengthen alignment and coordination with the mobilisation and campaigns that are coordinated by the Climate Coalition. The composition of the political working group differs slightly from the former CJP, as does the way of working and internal governance procedures.

⁶ Based on interviews and checked on the FRDO website where a list of advices is presented (on all topics dealt with by FRDO)

⁷ At parliamentary level, the initiative was taken by the senate (after the COP21 in Paris in 2015) to create an inter-parliamentary commission where representatives of the four regional parliaments (Flemish, Walloon, Brussels regional capital, federation Brussels-Wallonia) and the federal parliament meet (with the German parliament as observer) to prepare the Belgian position in European and international climate negotiations (with focus on COP meetings).



- ²⁹ The membership of the political working group amounts currently to 71 organisations that are also member of the national Climate Coalition,⁸ compared to the 29 members of CJP, and still represents the North-South movement, trade unions, environmental organisations and youth organisations. The scope of the political working group was expanded and does not cover only international ambitions (such as emission reduction, international climate, etc.) but also national ambitions with regard to mobility, bio-diversity, renewable energy, bio-fuels, agro-ecology, etc. The political working group still is coordinated by 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11, funded through the DGD programme (2017-2021).⁹ To optimise and rationalise the internal decision-making process, the decision was taken in 2019 to install, within the PWG, a smaller group of climate lobby experts that is meeting frequently and a second group involving more than 70 members that participates in the strategic debates. A second working group is responsible for the coordination of the mobilisation and campaigns. Since the start of the School Strikes for Climate, the Climate Coalition and Youth for Climate started to collaborate, in fact the PWG of the Climate Coalition provided technical support to the lobby agenda of Youth for Climate.
- ³⁰ The Climate Coalition is steered by a small board of directors in which the different members groups are represented (development, environment, youth, trade unions) and two presidents (one Flemish (Greenpeace, environmental NGO) and one French (CNCD-11.11.11, representing the NGOs for development cooperation) who are also the two spokespersons of the Climate Coalition (and the PWG).
- ³¹ The L&A strategy of the PWG remained the same (see pathway of change on external representation in the ToC), but the role of the PWG coordinators in the PWG has slightly changed compared to the ToC that was reconstructed at the start of the impact study. The coordinators of the PWG have become mainly responsible for 'drafting and facilitating common positions' and for 'organising and facilitating the meetings of the PWG' resulting in 'coordinated positions on climate justice issues' (output 4 of the ToC). The coordinators organise the meetings of the platform, which take place on an ad hoc base to discuss joint statements and positions that are prepared by the coordinators. The platform meets several times per year, with additional meetings in case of specific events or policy developments. Sometimes the consultation process is done through email communication. Other activities such as 'policy monitoring', 'conducting research on climate justice topics' and 'organising


⁸ The Climate Coalition is the national platform bringing together 79 organisations from the environmental movement, the North-South movement, the trade unions, youth, socio-cultural organisations and private initiatives like Grand-Parents for the Climate. It was created in 2008 and organises campaigns in order to mobilise citizens in the discussion on climate change. The topic is not only approached as an ecological problem, but also looks at implications for social cohesion and the impact on vulnerable populations in the South and North.

⁹ It is difficult to provide the budget for the coordination of the PWG by 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11. as this coordination is part of the entire budget for policy influencing interventions of both organisations, which is further divided over several thematic subjects. At 11.11.11 0,5 FTE is foreseen for lobbying climate policies, at CNCD-11.11.11 0,75 FTE. However, these staff members are also implementing organisation specific interventions on climate justice policy, and are only partially involved in the coordination of the platform. Both organisations also pay membership contribution to CAN Europe. It is difficult to provide specific information on working resources and direct costs (meeting costs, communication materials, transportation costs of staff members to attend meetings, etc.) as it is not possible to make a distinction between activities conducted on behalf of the PWG or for the organisation itself.

study days for PWG members' are a shared responsibility of all members and are coordinated by the board of directors and the coordinator of the climate coalition.

- 32 The L&A strategy remained similar and is built on indirect and direct communication with political decision-makers and active participation and communication of positions in European and international networks. In practice most efforts go to advocacy (informing, sensitizing via policy briefs, conferences, hearings). Exceptionally, the PWG also provides advisory services, for example, to the study services of political parties. Lobbying (formal and informal) takes place during info sessions or meetings with Belgian decision-makers. PWG members are invited to participate in these meetings. Most of the outputs of the PWG are focused on outlining general principles decision-makers should take into account, more than detailed technical suggestions or demands. Stronger alignment with the mobilisation strategy of the Climate Coalition is taking place (outcome 1: creating a visible social support for demands in favour of climate justice and outcome 3: PWG and CSOs gain leverage and credibility on the topic of climate justice). In fact, the PWG and the Climate Coalition operate through the four quadrants of policy influencing as visualised in following figure.

Figure 1: Four engagement methods to policy influencing ¹⁰



- 33 Because of the integration of the PWG in the national Climate Coalition, the topics covered by the political working group have been expanded. For this evaluation, the focus will remain on the international dimensions of climate justice (and not on all thematic subjects that are on the agenda of the Climate Coalition and the PWG), as this was the initial focus of the impact study and included in the DGD programme.

2.3 ENVISAGED POLICY OUTCOMES OF PWG AS EXPLAINED BY THE TOC

- 34 In the baseline study, the ToC for climate justice policy influencing was further developed, describing how the causal mechanisms are expected to work, what specific changes are expected to be seen in relation to the outcome, and identifying assumptions, rival explanations and risks. This ToC still is valid (see annex 5).

¹⁰ https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/odi_roma_guide.pdf (page 31)



- ³⁵ The first group of outputs are situated at the **internal level of the Climate Coalition**: practices and knowledge on climate justice are developed and exchanged (output 2), the members of the PWG are up-to-date on current climate justice issues (output 3) and coordinated positions on climate justice issues are adopted (output 4). Following the causal logic of the ToC, these outputs should lead to a visible social support for demands in favour of climate justice (outcome 1) and high-quality knowledge on climate justice within the platform (outcome 2), which then would contribute to an increase in the leverage and credibility of the platform members and civil society organisations (CSOs) (outcome 3).
- ³⁶ A second group of outputs is situated at the **external level**, including direct (formal and informal) and indirect (through media) communication to political decision makers (outputs 5 and 6) and an active participation and communication of the PWG positions in European and international networks (output 7). Output 5 also relates to the internal functioning of the platform, and contributes to an increase in leverage and credibility of the PWG and CSOs (outcome 3). Outputs 5, 6 and 7 combined have as a result that political decision makers receive information, positions and policy advice on climate justice (output 8), which then should contribute to the sensitisation and education on climate justice of these decision makers (outcome 4).
- ³⁷ At the impact level, both outcomes 3 and 4 should lead to Belgian decision makers taking over positions of the platform and incorporating them in their decisions on national, European and international policy (impact 1 and 2), which would then lead to the adoption of a Belgian policy in favour of climate justice (impact 3). During the baseline study, indicators at outcome and impact level have been finetuned,¹¹ making a distinction in levels of engagement that can be expected from political decision makers, and making it possible to identify clear targets. This resulted in the following indicators and targets as presented in following box.

Box 2: Revised indicators on outcome and impact level

- Agenda setting (outcome 4):
 - o Number of parliamentary interpellations, amendments and questions in relation to the (1) inter-parliamentary climate resolution, (2) the development of regional and Belgian climate policies, (3) the development of the burden sharing regulation, (4) the Belgian position at European and international level, that are in line with positions of the climate coalition
- Discursive change (impact 1 and 2)
 - o Political parties and thematic political experts take up positions of the climate coalition in their argumentation during debates, public events, in media, etc.
- Procedural change (impact 3)
 - o There is more transparency in the decision-making process of the national climate commission with regard to the development of the Belgian National Energy and Climate Plan 2030
- Policy change at Belgian level (impact 3)
 - o An ambitious interparliamentary resolution includes positions of the Climate Coalition

¹¹ Indicators for Outcome 4 referred to actions taken like number of questions in parliament, which in fact can be seen as agenda setting. Agenda setting can be seen as a first step in the policy making process.

- Effort sharing regulation, with regard to emissions reduction at the national level (between the regions of Belgium) already takes place before the elections of 2019, is finished by 2020 and leaves room for a possible increase in EU (and Belgian) ambition.
- Ambitious National Energy- and Climate Plan 2030 (NEKP 2030) which leaves room for a possible increase in EU (and Belgian) ambition, with regard to emissions reduction.
- Belgian financial resources for climate finance are increased and 'additional'.
- Policy change regarding the Belgian position at European/international level (impact 2):
 - Belgium strives for an increase of the European 2030-goals with regard to emissions reduction up to -55% emission reduction compared to 1990.
 - Paris Rulebook contains positions of the climate coalition on definitions and clear agreements on reporting on climate finance.

³⁸ Up till the merge of the CJP with the Climate Coalition and the formation of the PWG, L&A work was based on a framework of 11 common positions that guided the policy influencing work of the CJP. These common positions must rather be seen as the “driving narrative” for policy influencing on climate justice. With the evolution of the CJP to the PWG in 2018 and the upcoming elections in 2019, there was a need to revise this framework. By the end of 2018 and early 2019, the PWG embarked in a process of developing a memorandum that would be used for L&A during the electoral period. This memorandum (finished by March 2019) is now being used as the referential framework for climate justice L&A, conducted by the PWG and its individual members. The memorandum was developed through different sub-groups, steered by a member with expertise in a specific matter and refers to a set of concrete demands and proposals with regard to following domains: energy, mobility and spatial planning, buildings, industry, consumption, food and agriculture, nature and biodiversity. Following tables present an overview of the concrete demands with regard to the international ambitions of Belgium and a just transition towards a carbon free society, both at national and international level, which are the focus of this Impact Study. A comparison is also made with the demands that were guiding the L&A process during the period 2017-2018. Table 2 presents the demands targeting the Belgian government, table 3 specifically highlights the demands with regard to the Belgian position at the COPs.

³⁹ The visual, following the two tables, provides an overview of the main outputs delivered by PWG, linked to the policy making process, and the most important milestones in this decision-making process so far. During the first half of 2019, after N-VA had withdrawn from the federal government and the start of the mass climate demonstrations, climate policy became more prominent on the political agenda. Discussions on the need for a Special Climate Act accelerated, and was responded by the PWG and Climate Coalition with direct lobby and one-off actions. In 2019, the government had to adapt its NECP, a process to which the PWG also has contributed, through formal and informal lobby and participation in public consultation and the multi-stakeholder dialogue. The memorandum of the PWG/Climate Coalition was developed and shared with all political parties and MP in the run-up to the elections of May 2019. During the formation process of the regional governments, L&A was conducted to ensure integration of positions of the PWG in the regional government agreements. At federal level, the policy development process came to a stand-still with a resigning government in place. L&A concentrated mainly on the COP 25 Madrid.

In 2020, there still was no federal government in place and from March onwards the corona crisis hits the country. Not much L&A took place. But, the PWG/Climate Coalition was invited by one of the “informateurs” to give input in the formation note that supported the development of the new government (November 2019).



Table 2: Summary of concrete demands of CJP for 2017-2018 and PWG for 2019-2020 (memorandum March 2019 and demands formation federal government September 2020)

	Demands CJP 2017-2018	Demands PWG 2019-2020
Distribution of climate goals	1. The effort sharing regulation between the regions of Belgium starts before the 2019 elections, is finished before 2020, and leaves room for a possible increase of the European (and Belgian) ambition.	1. Improve intra-Belgian collaboration and develop effective effort sharing regulations to support the discussions after the current agreement will end by December 31, 2020
Ambition	2. The Talanoa Dialogue at the COP24 (Poland, 2018) gives a strong impulse to an increase of ambition of all National Determined Contributions (NDCs).	
	3. Europe increases its 2030-goals to at least -55% emission reduction compared to 1990. Belgium takes an active role at the European level to push for this increase. 4. Prioritise drastic emission reduction in the most polluting sectors	2. Europe increases its 2030-goals to at least -55% emission reduction compared to 1990. Belgium takes an active role at the European level to push for this increase.
	5. Promote a European policy to phase out fossil fuels and nuclear energy and to set the goal of 100% renewable energy in 2050, taking into account a just transition process	
National policy	6. The National Energy and Climate Plan 2030 reflects a Belgian vision on climate policy, where complementarity is key and clear goals are being pursued such as on emission reduction (deadline first draft December 31, 2018), that includes an effort sharing regulation, phasing out of fossil fuels by 2020, implementation strategy towards a just transition (and included in the social dialogue), policy coherence, education to accompany a just transition to a carbon-zero society and that is aligned to the objectives set in the Paris agreement	3. Revise and adapt fundamentally the National Energy and Climate Plan 2030, to align with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal. A set of concrete measures is listed to be included in this revised NECP, with regard to nuclear power, the phase-out of biofuels and subsidies for car (salariswagen en brandstofkaarten), public transport, promotions of products with low energy efficiency
		4. Adopt an Inter-Federal climate law that aligns to the objectives of the Paris Agreement, that foresees in the installation of an independent climate council (involving academic experts, and guaranteeing a multi-disciplinary approach), that develops concrete action plans (developed through multi-stakeholder engagement including civil society, with a

		clear timing and sufficient budget), that takes into account the obligations for international climate finance
		5. Align Belgian positions to the Paris Agreement and European Green Deal, more in particular with regard to: support and strengthen the Green Deal, and ensure coherence of other EU policies (e.g. trade); invest in diplomacy with the Belgian trade partners to strengthen a common (fiscal) policy so to create a level playing field that takes into account environmental and social protection; promote circular economy
Inter-parliamentary resolution	6. The Inter-parliamentary resolution adopts a large part of the positions of the CJP and actively pushes for more cooperation between the entities. It pushes for an increase in Belgian and European ambitions. The resolution is voted by all parties in all parliaments.	6.The work that was started with the interparliamentary resolution for COP24 continues and the interparliamentary work adopts a large part of the positions of the PWG, and pushes for more cooperation between the entities.
International climate finance	5. Belgian contributions to climate finance do not drop below 100 million euro a year and Belgium agrees upon a structural increase of these resources to 500 million euro a year by 2020. The financial resources are new and additional. Look for innovative financial sources. . 6. Harmonise the methods applied by the Belgian regions and the federal government when reporting on their contribution to international climate finance and optimise transparency	7. Belgian contribution to international climate finance increases so to contribute a fair share to the realisation of the internationally agreed objective of 100 billion dollar/year for international climate finance. Belgium agrees upon a structural increase of these resources to 500 million euro a year. The financial resources are new and additional
	7. Guarantee that resources are being used for climate adaptation for the most vulnerable countries	8. Continue the focus of climate finance on adaptation and the most vulnerable countries
		9. Recognise the necessity that additional funding is needed to compensate Loss and Damage for vulnerable countries
International negotiations (see following table with regard to COP meetings)	8. The 2018 Talanoa Dialogue builds on the conclusions of the IPCC report on 1,5°C goal and leads to more ambition. Europe takes the lead for an increase of the 2030-goals and Belgium actively urges for that.	10. See following table
	9. A clear Paris Rulebook is agreed upon at the COP24 which includes agreements on all necessary issues, e.g. on the definition and reporting on climate finance.	
	10. Develop an ambitious and just national climate and energy plan 2030 that includes a decrease of energy consumption and 100% renewable	11. Just transition towards a carbon neutral society has to become a transversal priority: prominent in the government agreement, assigned to a vice-prime



Decarbonisation and just transition towards a carbon free society	<p>energy by 2050, a coherent vision, phasing out of fossil fuel by 2050, a vision on a just transition.</p> <p>11. Guarantee coherence of all political decisions with the international climate objectives, which include the abolition of the structural dependency on fossil fuels and alignment of the National Pact for Strategic Investments with the Paris Agreement.</p>	<p>minister, at least 55% emission reduction by 2030, align Belgian ambition to the European ambition, align all policy goals with the objectives of the Paris declaration and the European Green deal, stop policy measures that keep on enhancing dependency on fossil fuel and over consumption; gradual phasing-out of subsidies and tax exemption for fossil fuels, invest substantially in sectors to support just transition such as agro-ecology, renovation and isolation of buildings, carbon neutral public transport and renewable energy; install a just carbon tax in Belgium to finance just and sustainable transition; install a carbon stress test; invest all income from ETS in climate policy (national and as contribution to international climate finance)</p>
		<p>12. Install a national conference on just transition towards a carbon neutral society that includes political actors, civil society and citizens, develop a vision towards a just transition, provide funding for research and study and bring these on the agenda of the social dialogue.</p> <p>Reference is also made towards food security, human rights, rights of indigenous people, gender equality and women rights, land rights, natural resources.</p>
Climate refugees		<p>13. Recognise the existence of climate refugees and look for solutions at international and national level</p>

Table 3: Summary of the concrete demands regarding the COP meetings in 2017 and 2018


2017 (Bonn)	2018 (Katowice)	2019 (Madrid)
1. Increase the European 2030 climate ambition (-55% greenhouse gas reduction, 45% renewable energy and 40% energy-efficiency)	1. Increase the European 2030 climate ambition. Belgian has to support the initiative taken by the Netherlands that plead for an emission reduction of 55%	1. Europe increases its 2030-goals to at least -55% emission reduction compared to 1990 and aims at carbon neutrality by 2050. Belgium takes an active role at the European level to push for this increase
2. Guarantee that the facilitative dialogue (2018) results in an increase of National Determined Contributions by 2020		2. Only agree on the implementation of international carbon markets, on the condition that a set of concrete measures and conditions to regulate the international carbon market system, that was established as a mechanism to support the achievement of the national goals as set in the Nationally Determined Contributions, is agreed, so that the system does not undermine the Paris Agreement and international agreements on human rights and sustainable development.
3. Enhance political pressure on countries that want to withdraw from the Paris agreement		
4. Propose border tax adjustment measures on products imported from countries that do not respect social and environmental European regulations	<i>Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the EU negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission</i>	3. Just transition towards a carbon neutral, resilient and 100% renewable energy society, through carbon border tax adjustment measures at European level, a European Fund for Just transition and the Green Deal
5. Support educational programmes to fight climate change within Europe and in the World	<i>Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission</i>	
6. Plead for a balance between financing for mitigation and adaptation		4. Plead for a balance between financing for mitigation and adaptation
7. Put the increase of European climate finance on the agenda of the COP24		5. Increase of International Climate Finance and include gender equality and women rights in the Funds mechanism
8. Accelerate the implementation of the Warsaw International mechanism for Loss and Damage, and plead for the need for a new financing mechanism		6. Recognise the necessity of financing for Loss and Damage
9. Look for solutions for climate refugees and include them in the new UN Global Compact on refugees and the UN Global Compact on safe and Regular Migration (by end 2018)	<i>Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission</i>	7. Recognise the existence of climate refugees + the need for solutions and national and international level
10. Develop a programme to promote sustainable food production systems and food	<i>Not specifically taken in the policy briefs for the COP negotiations but included in</i>	8. Include food security, human rights and social protection in the international negotiations



security, to enhance human rights and protect the environment	<i>the lobby of the inter-parliamentary climate commission</i>	
	2. Support the development of an action plan towards a just transition	9. Just transition towards a carbon neutral, resilient and 100% renewable energy society, through carbon border tax adjustment measures at European level, a European Fund for Just transition and the Green Deal
	3. A clear Paris Rulebook is agreed upon which includes agreements on all necessary issues, e.g. the definition and reporting on climate finance	


The following visual presents the milestones of the evolution of climate policy in Belgium between end of 2018 and October 2020. The figure does not include all formal and non-formal, direct and indirect communications. Only the most important milestones as identified by the PWG coordinators are presented.

Milestones climate policy Belgium: end 2018 – October 2019





Milestones climate policy Belgium October 2019 – December 2020



3 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE PWG INFLUENCE THE POINTS OF VIEW OF BELGIAN DECISION MAKERS AND THE POLICY POSITIONS ON CLIMATE JUSTICE-RELATED TOPICS AND OTHER TOPICS COVERED BY THE PWG?

- ⁴¹ This chapter describes the policy influencing findings of the L&A process of the PWG. We start by summarising the ToC, after which the report looks specifically at the programme-wide findings at output level and the first level of outcomes. These outputs and outcomes often entail conditions for the programme to be effective at higher levels of the causal chain. A third section then delves into the higher level outcomes and impacts by executing a contribution analysis on the four selected case studies. In line with methodological insights for the evaluation of L&A, we provide thick descriptions of the context and pay sufficient attention to the narratives of key informants to document and assess the performance stories and the relative contribution of the PWG at outcome and impact level. A final section draws conclusions about the policy impact of the programme on different dimensions (agenda setting, discursive change, procedural change and policy change).
- ⁴² The impact hypothesis that is under evaluation reads as “The PWG influences the points of view of Belgian decision makers and the policy positions on climate justice-related topics and other topics covered by the PWG”. The analysis of the impact hypothesis was applied on four cases (see chapter 3.3.).

3.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF INTERVENTIONS IMPLEMENTED FOR THE POLICY INFLUENCING PATHWAY OF CHANGE IN THE TOC

- ⁴³ Chapter three assesses the first causal question, namely “to what extent does the PWG influence the points of view of Belgian decision makers and the policy positions on climate justice-related topics and other topics covered by the PWG?” The ToC for policy influencing by the PWG is summarised in following table, which also includes the activity types per output as implemented by the PWG.
- ⁴⁴ As described in chapter 2, the PWG has developed a memorandum that was used for L&A during electoral period and that is currently being used as the reference framework for further policy influencing. Following coordinated position papers (output 4) have been drafted and distributed among policy makers:
- Q&A on the climate law (March 2019)
 - Memorandum of the Climate Coalition (March 2019)
 - Recommendation for the Climate Summit in Madrid (COP 25) (November 2019)
 - Analysis of the European Green Deal (March 2020)
 - Analysis of the National Energy and Climate Plan (March 2020)
 - Recommendations for the future federal government (September 2020)



- ⁴⁵ Policy influencing activities were conducted by the PWG coordinators, often in collaboration with some of the members, through direct, formal and informal, communication with political decision makers (output 5 and 6). Members of the PWG still participate in institutionalised dialogues that are organised by the federal administration for environment before and after the COP-meetings. PWG coordinators and several members are included in the Belgian delegation at the COP meetings and meet daily with the negotiators. In the margin of the COP-negotiations, there are plenty spaces to meet also informally with members of parliament and ministers. CNCD-11.11.11 and 11.11.11 also participate in the Federal Council for Sustainable Development (FRDO) where the different actors of the civil society (including workers organisations) and employers' organisations meet with representatives of the federal ministers. Yearly, the FRDO organises a round table with the federal minister for climate in preparation of the COP.
- ⁴⁶ CNCD-11.11.11 and 11.11.11 actively participate in the European division of the Climate Action Network (CAN), contribute financially and provide input in the development of positions. 12 times, reference to CAN position papers was put under the attention through websites and social media by CNCD-11.11.11
- ⁴⁷ The Climate Coalition has organised several campaigns and one-off actions, coordinated by the working group on mobilisation and aligned to the policy influencing work of the PWG. In the period 2019-Oct 2020, 12 actions have been organised, of which the most important actions have been: Claim the Climate on December 2, 2018 – first larger climate demonstration in Brussels (75.000 participants), participation in the Youth for Climate demonstrations (2019), participation in the International Climate Strikes (2019 and 2020), Occupy Wetstraat (March 2019), 100 days Countdown in 2019 (NECP), 2 actions on COP 25 Madrid (2019), Handing over fries and beer to the appointed formers during formation process of the government (18 September 2020).

Table 4: ToC for climate justice policy influencing

Outputs and activity type		Immediate outcome	Intermediate outcomes (or first impact level)	Impact (or second level impact)
1. Indirect communication to political decision makers through (social)media (output 5)	Press releases Twitter Website Climate Coalition	Political decision makers received information, positions and policy advice on climate justice (output 8)	Belgian decision makers take over positions of Climate Coalition and incorporate these in their decisions with regard to the Belgium climate policy (impact 1) Belgian decision makers take over positions of Climate Coalition and incorporate these in their decisions at European or international policy level (impact 2)	Belgian policy in favour of climate justice adopted (impact 3)
2. Direct communication with ministers, MEP, advisors (output 5)	Position briefs and memorandum sent by mail to all MEP, cabinets and relevant administrations Formal and informal contact (by phone or face-to-face) with political decision makers	Political decision makers are sensitized and educated on climate justice (outcome 4)		
3. Active participation in institutionalised (multi-stakeholder) meetings (output 6)	Presenting positions in multi-stakeholder meetings: – inter-parliamentary climate commission, federal and regional climate commissions, – multi-stakeholder meeting to prepare the COP, – member of FRDO			
4. Active participation and communication of positions in European networks (output 7)	Financial support to CAN Europe			
5. PWG drafting and facilitating common positions (output 4)	Coordinated positions (memorandum, policy briefs with analyses and positions)	Climate Coalition gains leverage and credibility the topic of climate justice (outcome 3)		
6. Conferences and lectures for members of CC (output 2)	Knowledge in climate justice developed and exchanged Members of CC are up-to-date of current climate justice issues			
7. Newsletters to keep CC members up-to-date (output 3)				
8. Mobilisation campaigns and one-off actions organised (output 1)	Large climate mobilisations like Claim the Climate One-off actions like x, y, z	Visible support base for demands in favour of climate justice (outcome 1)		



3.2 DATA ON OUTPUT AND OUTCOME LEVEL

Share of national policy makers (from the total pool of policy makers engaged in the topic of climate change), who knowingly have received information from CJP (output 8, indicator 1)

- ⁴⁹ Annex 6 gives an overview of the number of L&A activities conducted by CNCD-11.11.11 and 11.11.11 in the period 2019-October 2020. The databases provided by the PWG coordinators do not always make a distinction between interventions conducted on behalf of the Climate Coalition or on behalf of the own organisation, which is not perceived as being relevant. The L&A on climate justice overlap between the coalition and the own organisation and mutually reinforce.
- ⁵⁰ *Direct contacts:* From the databases¹² of the PWG coordinators, it is learned that in the period 2019-October 2020, there have been 19 direct contacts with political decision makers, through (i) in-person meetings with new electoral candidates, (ii) with all new members of the newly elected parliaments, (iii) meetings with bureau or leaders of political parties (CDH, PS, MR, Ecolo, CD&V), and (iv) with all relevant ministers at federal and regional level. Since the Covid-19 pandemic (March 2020), there have not been many direct contacts with members of parliament in 2020 (somehow starting online since October 2020).
- ⁵¹ The PWG has participated 12 times in institutionalised consultations. The PWG was invited for four hearings in the federal, regional parliamentary and inter-parliamentary climate commissions and has invited MP of these parliaments for one lunch meeting. The number of MP in these commissions varies between 20 to 79 politicians. Furthermore, the PWG participated in the public consultation (April-June 2019) and the multi-stakeholder dialogue on the NECP (April 1, 2019), and in meetings and side events before and during the COP. For example, during the COP 25 (Madrid, 2019), PWG participated in an interparliamentary meeting with MP of Open VLD, N-VA, CD&V, Groen, Ecolo, MR. Furthermore, the PWG coordinators and several of the members of the PWG are member of the FRDO, who meets frequently to prepare advices for the federal government, among others on climate related topics
- ⁵² In the period before the elections of May 2019, the focus was on the memorandum of the Climate Coalition and the Special Climate Act, from April 2019 onwards on the NECP and from November onwards on the COP. When the discussions on the Special Climate Act took off in March-April 2019, the PWG has met different political parties (leaders and/or bureau) to inform on the importance of a Special Climate Act (see also case 2). The PWG also had several meetings to inform political parties

¹² These databases keep track of meetings, and where relevant these encounters are substantiated by evidence (linkages to press releases, websites referring to the event).

(CD&V, Open VLD, GROEN, PVDA, SP.A, CDH, MR, PS, Ecolo) on the positions of the Climate Coalition with regard to the NECP (see case 3).

- ⁵³ Direct contacts with ministers and their cabinets are rather limited as shown by the contact-tracing databases of 11.11.11. and CNCD-11.11.11. (approached mainly indirectly through mailings), however COP meetings provide formal and informal spaces for direct contact. During the COP 24 in Madrid (December 2019), the Climate Coalition had meetings with four different ministers present at the COP (Demir, Maron, Henry and Marghem) and was invited to the round table, organised by the FRDO. Furthermore, the PWG has had meetings with minister Michel (prime minister till October 2019), minister Wilmès (prime minister till October 2020) and minister De Croo (prime minister since October 2020). During the formation of the regional governments, the Climate Coalition has engaged with nine negotiators (PS, Ecolo) of which several of them became minister in the regional or federal governments. The Climate Coalition was also invited by 'informateur' Maignette (PS), which proves that the Climate Coalition is considered as a credible and legitimate actor in the climate debate and that climate had become an important issue, high on the political agenda.
- ⁵⁴ In 2019, the Climate Coalition also had direct contact with members of the administration, one time with DGD (June 25) to exchange information on international climate finance and three times with the federal administration Health, Food Safety and Environment (FOD FVVVL) to exchange on international climate finance and the international carbon market.
- ⁵⁵ As described in the baseline study, the PWG has contact with all thematic leads on climate policy from the different political parties, both opposition (except Vlaams Belang) and ruling parties, but the direct contacts with opposition outnumber the contacts with the ruling parties.
- ⁵⁶ It is not possible to describe the number of informal meetings with these direct contacts as these are not recorded on a systematic manner by the PWG coordinators and no consolidated overview is available.
- ⁵⁷ Eight mailings were sent to all new members of parliament, all members of the federal parliamentary climate commission, to climate ministers, one to relevant administrations and one letter to the prime minister. No consolidated overview of all indirect contacts was made available to the evaluators.
- ⁵⁸ *Indirect contacts:* In the period 2019-2020, indirect communication to political decision makers through (social) media increased substantially, also due to the increased attention the topic was receiving as a consequence of the climate demonstrations. Fourteen press releases¹³ have been made in the period 2019-October 2020. The PWG coordinators have been active at twitter,¹⁴ their organisations (11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11) regularly published opinions that were taken over by newspapers and websites of news channels (not always as confirmed by the communication officer at 11.11.11) and, mainly in the Walloon region, the spokesperson of the Climate Coalition (CNCD-11.11.11) was given the floor in several panels, debates, radio and television shows.

¹³ Source: website of the Climate Coalition (more press releases are put on the website as reported in the M&E databases, where 10 press releases are registered).

¹⁴ Always on behalf of their organisation. There is no consolidated overview of presence at Twitter



59 There are no consolidated data on the presence of the PWG and the climate coalition in the media. The large and frequent climate mobilisations have put the debate on Climate Change in the picture and were highly covered by the media. The press overview of CNCD-11.11.11 on media coverage of climate justice amounts to 542 appearances in media but includes not only interviews and press releases of the Climate Coalition but also the large mobilisations. From the interviews, it was learned that the climate coalition has received much more media attention in the French speaking part of Belgium compared to the Flemish community.

Baseline data	MTE data
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 52 direct contacts, of which 25 in administrations, 16 members of parliaments, 7 with cabinets (all but federal cabinet for development cooperation), 5 contacts with study services or assistants of members of parliament. – CJP has direct contact with all lead thematic experts of all political parties (except extremist parties), but the number of contacts with opposition parties outnumber the number of contacts with ruling parties and the quality of interaction differs. There is a closer relation and more frequent interaction with opposition parties (also requesting CJP for advice) compared to the interactions with ruling parties. – All 25 people interviewed confirmed having received information from CJP (9/25 administration, 9/16 members of parliament, 3/7 members of cabinet and 4/5 staff at study services, see annex 3). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – List of direct contacts was not updated (had been developed specifically for the baseline study but is not an existing M&E tool). There have been 19 direct contacts with individual MEP or groups of MP, and 12 meetings in institutionalised fora where all climate experts of MEP were met (varying from 20 to 79 persons). – PWG had encounters with all relevant ministers (climate and development cooperation), 7 formal meetings in total, and with the negotiators and ‘informateur’. – PWG has direct contact with all lead thematic experts of all political parties (except extremist parties), but the number of contacts with opposition parties outnumber the number of contacts with ruling parties and the quality of interaction differs. There is a closer relation and more frequent interaction with opposition parties (also requesting PWG for advice) compared to the interactions with ruling parties. – All 8 members of parliament interviewed confirmed having received information from PWG

Share of national policy makers that have been reached who asses the information received from PWG as relevant, timely, qualitative and usable and that perceive PWG as a legitimate and credible advocate for climate justice (outcome 3&4)

Though only a small number of interviews were held with members of parliament, they all confirm the findings that were described in the baseline.

- ⁶⁰ *Relevance*- All political decision makers interviewed confirmed that information received from the Climate Coalition (PWG) was relevant for their work. As stated during the baseline, members of parliament acknowledge that the PWG/Climate Coalition is well informed on climate policy issues, and bring specific topics to the attention that are less addressed by other lobbyist, such as international climate finance, putting the climate debate in an international perspective (e.g. climate refugees, leaving no-one behind) and bringing the topic of biofuels (also lobbied for separately by 11.11.11) more to the forefront. The information provided is even more relevant for new members of parliament, of which several do not know the content of the inter-parliamentary resolution that was adopted under the former government.
- ⁶¹ *Quality* - all 8 interviewees agree that the information provided by the PWG/Climate Coalition is of high quality: information is perceived as correct and reliable, well-structured and presented, and understandable. The thematic expertise of the PWG/Climate Coalition is acknowledged. These interviewees also referred to the high quality of presentations brought by the PWG in sessions of the interparliamentary commission. Furthermore, there are also some differences in appreciation of the quality of the work between the leftist parties on the one hand and the other parties at the other hand. Interviewees from SP.A, Groen and Ecolo confirm that they share the ambitions set by the Climate Coalition and even think the Climate Coalition may be more ambitious and more critical. They recognised that the memorandum has been the result of a compromise. Interviewees from Open VLD, CD&V and Vlaams Belang question the feasibility of the positions of the Climate Coalition, and are more interested in the 'how' than in setting ambitious targets. They would like to see more pragmatic recommendations and support in developing roadmaps to achieve the ambitions, taking into account the political climate, the socio-economic context and the support base among the general public towards just transition.
- ⁶² *Usability* – all 8 interviewees perceive the Climate Coalition as an important information source, next to other information sources. The list of direct contacts shows that frequent meetings have taken place with members of Ecolo during the negotiations for new governments. Information provided by the Climate Coalition was well used during these negotiations. Interviewees from GROEN and SP.A confirmed that information was also used to formulate their positions and/or to prepare parliamentary questions.¹⁵ Interviewees of Open-VLD, Vlaams Belang and CD&V stated that they lacked concrete proposals that they could use in their parliamentary work. For interviewees from Open VLD and Vlaams Belang, the Climate Coalition is associated with 'left'. They regret the lack of opportunities to have a constructive conversation, bringing in different points of views and nuances.
- ⁶³ All 8 interviewees agreed that the PWG can be more pro-active. They recognise that the members of the PWG are accessible but would expect more pro-active action from the PWG/Climate Coalition in informing and keeping MP up-to-date. A suggestion was made to organise a better follow-up of mailings, conferences or meetings after members of the Climate Coalition met with MP. Some of the MP interviewed would like to receive more hands-on and concrete suggestions for their own political work. The statements and positions are rather general statements.

¹⁵ See overview of parliamentary questions added in annex 4 and table 5



Baseline data	MTE data
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – All people interviewed, without distinction to political parties, find the information provided by CJP relevant, usable and of high quality. – CJP is an important information source for all interviewees for formulating their positions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Opposition parties: for questioning the positions taken by the ruling parties ○ Ruling parties: to know the position of the opposition as CJP is considered to be “leftist” – Cabinets and administration: use the CJP information to strengthen their own positions (when deviating from the dominant discourse internally) and to enrich the debate – All opposition parties and the majority of cabinets appreciate the ambitious character of the CJP positions as it calls for urgent action. One cabinet argues that the positions do not fully take into account the political sensitivity and room for manoeuvre as described by the government agreement. – All ruling parties agree with the principles of the analyses and positions but do not agree with the concrete and ambitious targets proposed (as assessed not being feasible) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – All people interviewed, without distinction to political parties, find the information provided by CJP relevant, usable and of high quality. – PWG is an important information source for all interviewees for formulating their positions. – Cabinets and administration: not interviewed during MTE – All opposition parties appreciate the ambitious character of the positions of the climate coalition, and even think they can be more ambitious. It was recognised that the memorandum is a compromised text. – All ruling parties agree with the principles of the analyses and positions but do not agree with the concrete and ambitious targets proposed (as assessed not being feasible) and ask for more suggestions on the ‘how’, a roadmap towards just transition.

Level of agenda-setting with regard to climate justice (outcome 3&4, indicator 2b)

⁶⁴ *Parliamentary questions:* The indicators for this outcome (agenda setting) refer to the number of parliamentary interpellations and questions, proposed resolutions, amendments made by members of parliament that are in line with positions of the Climate Coalition, and hence contribute to putting their positions on the policy agenda. An analysis was done of the debates that have taken place at the federal parliamentary Commission for Energy, Environment and Climate (meeting once or twice a month), as the federal level is the focus in this impact study.

⁶⁵ The period between July 2019 (start of the new elected federal parliament) - October 2020 (start of data collection for the MTE) was examined. From the 365 parliamentary questions that have been raised, 69 (or 19 %), were related to selected case studies for the impact study (see chapter 2), divided along the different topics as shown in following table. A full list of questions is added in annex 4.

Table 5: Overview of number of questions raised for the selected case study topics, the content and the political groups that drafted the question or interpellation.¹⁶

Topic (and number of questions)	Question	Political group(s)
NECP (#17)	With regard to the quality of the public consultation process:	
	– Question on the public consultation process – draft NECP was not subject of the public consultation	GROEN and SP.A
	– More than 75% of the participants to the public consultation were Flemish speaking. What about the French speaking participation?	MR and PS
	– What was done with the input and feedback provided during the public consultation	MR and SP.A
	– Need for appropriate tools to structure a dialogue on the NECP	SP.A
	– To little ambition and too little coordination	GROEN, PS, SP.A, MR, Ecolo, PVDA
	– How will the European ambitions be included in the NECP	GROEN and PVDA
	Need to include references to human rights and gender in the NECP	PVDA
	Negative impact of biofuels, not being a good alternative for fossil fuels	GROEN, PVDA
	Too little attention for (alternative) energy supply	N-VA
	The impact of climate change on human Rights and gender needs to be included in the NECP	PVDA
International climate finance (#6)	On the need to double the Belgian contribution to the Green Climate Fund, since the commitment made by prime minister Michel at the Climate Summit in New York	MR, PVDA, GROEN, CD&V and Open-VLD
	Contribution to the Green Climate Fund must be additional	PVDA
COP negotiations (#5)	Asking for the Belgian ambitions Ministers are hiding behind the European ambitions	ECOLO and PS
	Agenda COP 26: Belgian needs to continue supporting the San Jose principle regarding the ambition of the international carbon market	ECOLO
Level of ambitions (#18)	– Referring to the critique of the EC regarding the Belgian commitments and planning – The regional and federal energy and climate plans are not on line with the European ambition – Belgium needs to align its ambitions with the European objectives	MR, Open VLD, PS, SP.A, PVDA, Ecolo
	Belgium should make use of European budget to finance climate related projects	Vlaams Belang
Emission reduction and decarbonisation (#3)	Referring to the role of cars in the strategy for CO2 emission reduction	Ecolo and Vlaams Belang

¹⁶ See list of parliamentary questions in annex 4



	There is ambition but no action. The federal government is not doing enough	PS
Climate governance (#1)	What will be done to make the national Climate Commission more transparent. Request for making the agenda, minutes and positions public and to report regularly to the parliament	PVDA

- ⁶⁶ The majority of the questions concern the level of ambition and the development process of the NECP. Six political parties asked that Belgium should align its ambitions to the European ambitions (i.e. Europe setting the ambition of -55% emission reduction by 2020, while Belgium at that time was aspiring -35% reduction by 2030), a position that was supported by four political families, green, socialist and liberal + PVDA/PTB. The same political parties were also critical on the NECP, having too little ambition, not being in line with the European ambition and demonstrating weak governance by organising a non-transparent public consultation process. Their positions are fully in line with the memorandum of the Climate Coalition. From the interviews, it was learned that the so-called 'leftist' parties share the positions and ambition level of the Climate Coalition. The analysis of the parliamentary work also shows that the liberal political group (Flemish and French) also raised critical questions on the ambition level, in line with the position of the Climate Coalition.
- ⁶⁷ In the parliamentary debate, also the topic of biofuels has been put on the agenda (by GROEN and PVDA), and attention was drawn on the impact of the climate crisis on human rights and gender (by PVDA). These topics were included in the memorandum but mainly advocated by individual members of the climate coalition (e.g. Oxfam lobbying also on the impact of climate change on women). Complementary, a small coalition on biofuels (not included in the Climate Coalition) had been established with participation of several members of the Climate Coalition, like 11.11.11, that coordinated the L&A on biofuels.
- ⁶⁸ After the commitment made by prime minister Michel at the Climate summit in New York¹⁷ (see case 1), September 2019, regarding the Belgian contribution to the Green Climate Fund MP were pushed by the Climate Coalition to hold the minister accountable. PVDA, GROEN, CD&V and Open VLD raised questions to that end. MR MP also have developed a proposal of resolution to that end (October 10, 2019).¹⁸ In that resolution, reference was made to other European countries that had already

¹⁷ <https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/michel-wil-belgische-bijdrage-voor-strijd-tegen-klimaatopwarming-verdubbelen~b840fea3/>
<https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2019/09/23/bjoern-soenens-premier-michel-kondigt-aan-dat-belgie-fonds-ste/>
<https://11.be/verhalen/ngos-verwelkomen-belgische-bijdrage-aan-klimaatfonds>
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190923_04623228
<https://www.mo.be/nieuws/boodschap-klimaattop-wij-hebben-de-cyclus-van-het-leven-gebroken-1>

¹⁸ <https://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/55/0572/55K0572007.pdf>. and <https://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/PDF/55/0572/55K0572001.pdf>

committed to double their contribution, an argument that also the PWG has used in its lobby work. Furthermore, it is PVDA who highlights the fact that this contribution should be additional, as demanded by the Climate Coalition.

- ⁶⁹ Less attention seems to be paid on the COP negotiation in this committee, with only 5 questions from Ecolo and PS. They refer to the San Jose principle regarding the organisation of the international carbon market that needs to be maintained during the negotiations at COP 26 (see case 4), a topic that had been put under the attention of the COP negotiators during the COP 25 in Madrid, and that was taken up by Ecolo. Lastly, the issues of climate governance, specifically the functioning of the national Climate Commission, was only taken up by PVDA.
- ⁷⁰ In response to the proposal of resolution on international climate finance (October,10 2019), the federal parliament adopted a resolution (November 25, 2019) on the priorities of Belgium at the COP 25.¹⁹ The text has several references to positions of the Climate Coalition, such as doubling the Belgian contribution to the Green Climate Fund, reference to human rights, gender, climate refugees, and Article 6 of the Paris Declaration (regulating the carbon markets).

Table 6: Overview of number of parliamentary questions raised per political group in the period July 019-October 2020, in the federal parliamentary climate commission on the topics of the PWG/Climate Coalition.

Flemish political group	name	Number of questions	French political group	name	Number of questions
PVDA	Greet Daems	15	Ecolo	Sarah Shlitz	5
	Steven De Vuyst	1			
GROEN	T. van der Straeten	12	PTB	Thierry Warmoes	3
Vlaams Belang	Kurt Ravyts	12	MR	Christophe Bombled	2
	Reccino Van Lommel	1		Michel de Maegd	1
SP.A	Kris Verduykt	7	PS	Daniel Senesael	2
				Melissa Hanus	1
				Sophie Themont	1
CD&V	Nawal Farih	3			
Open VLD	Vincent van Quickenborne	1			
	Patrick De Wael	1			
N-VA	Tomas Roggeman	1 ²⁰			
Total ²¹		54			15

- ⁷¹ Members of the federal parliamentary climate commission are informed on the positions of the Climate Coalition through the mailings, and during formal meetings or hearings, upon invitation of the commission, or during meetings with the PWG at their political bureaus. No direct individual contacts have taken place with the MP listed in the table (except with Michel de Maegd, Greet Daems, Melissa Hanus and Sarah Schlitz). MP interviewed confirmed that they have used the

¹⁹ Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers. (2019). Voorstel van resolutie over de Belgische bijdrage aan de financiering van de strijd tegen de klimaatverandering. Retrieved on 26 November 2020 from <https://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/PDF/55/0572/55K0572001.pdf>

²⁰ This questions only addressed the position of the Belgian rail ways in the NECP and was not related to any of the positions of the Climate Coalition.

²¹ The total in this table differs from the total in table x as the latter presents aggregated questions



information provided by the PWG in the development of their parliamentary questions. It is not possible to analyse to what questions the PWG directly have contributed.

⁷² The majority of the questions is proposed by a small group of MP that show genuine commitment for climate justice, such as PVDA (#15 questions), SP.A (#7) and Ecolo (#5). They have confirmed in interviews²² that they have used the input from the climate Coalition to develop their parliamentary questions, in particularly with regard to international climate finance and on biofuels.

⁷³ A lot of questions also have been posed by Vlaams Belang, being critical on the European Green Deal, the Green Climate fund and the European Climate Act, but also supporting positions of the Climate Coalition with regard to just transition, the need for ambitious long-term objectives and biofuels.

⁷⁴ The fact that much more parliamentary questions were raised in the parliament, compared to the baseline study, can be explained by two context factors: political and societal.

- At political level, more room for manoeuvre was created for discussions on climate justice since N-VA had left the federal government in December 2018. 2019 -2020 was a specific period, with five months of a reorganised federal government (after N-VA left the coalition), 11 months of a resigning government (characterised by several changes at ministerial level, including the prime minister), followed by a 5-months transitional government and resulting in the installation of the new government by October 2020. Because of the lack of a full-fledged government, power had shifted to the parliament that took many policy initiatives, between and beyond the political groups that were part of the coalition, which is also visible in the climate debate and the attention given to climate justice by the different political parties.²³
- At societal level, the period 2019 and 2020 is characterised by the large climate mobilisations and the schools strikes and the extreme dry summers showing the impact of climate change. These factors have put the climate topic on the political agenda, including the elections, as confirmed by all interviewees.

⁷⁵ *Amendments on the Climate Act*: In March,13 2019 the proposal of Special Climate Act²⁴ was discussed in a hearing of the Special Commission Climate and Sustainable Development of the federal

²² Thierry Warmoes also represented the opinion of Greet Daems in the interview.

²³ as confirmed by two interviewees

²⁴ <https://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/pdf/54/3517/54K3517004.pdf>

parliament, for which the Climate Coalition was formally invited as a contributor.²⁵ Complementary, 11.11.11 shared a set of amendments on the proposal of Climate Act (14 additions and 7 adaptations): asking to refer explicitly to human rights, sustainable development and the sustainable development goals, the Paris declaration, include a focus on supporting the most vulnerable countries and the challenges of development countries, including international climate finance, gender, the importance of policy coherence.²⁶ According to 11.11.11, all amendments have been taken into account, but the process was put on hold after the statement of the Council of the States that a revision of Article 7bis of the constitution was needed before adopting the Special Climate Act. A specific reference to climate needed to be included in Article 7bis. A policy proposal supported by all French speaking political groups + GROEN and SP.A reads as follows: 'Zij (*het federale niveau, de gemeenschappen en de gewesten, nvdr.*) werken inzonderheid samen aan een doeltreffend klimaatbeleid overeenkomstig de doelstellingen, beginselen en modaliteiten vastgesteld bij een wet aangenomen met de meerderheid bepaald in artikel 4, laatste lid'.²⁷ (see further case 2)

Baseline data:

- Positions of CJP with regard to carbon taxation, climate refugees, Belgian climate ambitions (emission reduction), burden sharing and Belgian contribution to international climate financing are put on the political agenda during discussions in parliament.
- In principle, all Belgian parties support the Paris Agreement and agree with the principle that Belgium needs to develop an ambitious climate policy. Only the opposition parties have formulated a set of amendments²⁸ that refer to the CJP positions and insist in putting concrete targets in the inter-parliamentary resolution that will set the boundaries for developing the Belgian climate policy.
- Mainly opposition parties are questioning the government on the Belgian climate policy (11 of the 14 parliamentary questions formulated by opposition parties)

MTE data:

- Positions of the Climate Coalition with regard to the ambition level in the NECP, the need to include human rights and gender in the NECP, the negative impact of biofuels, the Belgian contribution to the Green Climate Fund, regulations of the international carbon market are put on the political agenda during discussions in parliament. The Climate Coalition also contributed to the discussions in parliament on the Special Climate Act.
- In principle all Belgian parties support the Paris Agreement and agree with the principle that Belgium needs to develop an ambitious climate policy. Not only the opposition parties but also Open VLD, CD&V and MR (part of the coalition at that time) have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the Climate Coalition and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP and to show more ambitions during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA and Vlaamse Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitious.
- The inter-parliamentary resolution was adopted by November 15, 2019 and includes several of the positions of the PWG/Climate Coalition but does not refer to concrete ambitious targets.

²⁵ Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers. Verslag van de bijzondere commissie “Klimaat en Duurzame Ontwikkeling” van 13 maart 2019 <https://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/html/54/ic1052x.html>

²⁶ 11.11.11 (March 2019) Klimaatwet – voorstel amendementen 11.11.11

²⁷ Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers. (13 maart 2019). Voorstel tot herziening van artikel 7bis van de Grondwet teneinde de klimaatdoelstellingen en -beginselen te verankeren (verklaring van de wetgevende macht). Retrieved on 24 November 2020 from <https://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/54/3642/54K3642001.pdf>.

²⁸ Difficult to calculate the number of amendments. There are many drafts of the inter-parliamentary resolution, which is amended at several occasions. The evaluators do not have access to all amendments (only Groen/Ecolo) and can only track the discussion based on the minutes of the meetings of this commission.



3.3 DATA AT OUTCOME AND IMPACT LEVEL – WITH REGARD TO POLICY RESULTS OF THE SELECTED CASES

- ⁷⁶ Before presenting the data at outcome and impact level (policy change and analysis of the influence of the PWG) according to the indicators set-out in the evaluation framework, the results of the contribution analysis are presented that was applied on the four cases that constitute the backbone of the policy influencing work of 2019-October 2020 (and which provided the input for assessing the data of the evaluation framework).
- ⁷⁷ Contribution analysis was used as an overarching methodological framework, but specific steps were further elaborated with complementary methodologies. Process tracing was used for the assessment of the strength of evidence related to the causal claims (see annexes 7 and 8). The four in-depth case studies are, aside from document review and interviews with external stakeholders, informed by Narrative Assessment,²⁹ an approach specifically designed for the evaluation of lobby & advocacy programmes. Narrative Assessment takes the day-to-day experiences and strategic reflections of the advocates as an important source of information. This helps to reconstruct the complex story of change in the case studies as experienced by key stakeholders. These stories of change (or performance stories) are presented in this chapter, followed by the results of the contribution analysis to confirm or refute the claims made by the coordinators of the PWG.

3.3.1. PERFORMANCE STORIES OF THE SELECTED CASES

Case 1: Belgian contribution to International Climate Finance

- ⁷⁸ In the Paris Agreement, countries have re-committed (first commitment: Copenhagen Accord, 2009) to international climate finance, with an objective of 100 billion USD/year by 2020. The PWG has been lobbying for many years to raise the contribution of the Belgian government to 500 million by 2020 (the Belgian commitment is 50m EUR/year until 2020, in reality approximately 100m EUR has been contributed in the past years). Furthermore, the financial resources should be new and additional. The Green Climate Fund established in 2014 (within the framework of the UNFCCC) was in need of new funding in 2019 and pushed high-income countries to increase their contributions substantially. It was in this context that the PWG asked Belgium to at least double its previous contribution of 50m EUR/year to the fund, as part of an overall commitment of 500m EUR. After two meetings, in Oslo (April 2019) and Canada (August 2019), the new contributions were confirmed by the international community at the Pledging Conference in Paris in October 2019.³⁰ It was unclear

²⁹ <https://hivos.org/news/narrative-assessment-bringing-out-the-story-of-your-advocacy/>

³⁰ <https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/resource-mobilisation/gcf-1#replenishment-0>

how much Belgium had committed to contribute at that time (with 40m EUR showing up in a table communicated after the meeting by the Belgian government).³¹

- ⁷⁹ 2019 was the year that, after N-VA had withdrawn from the coalition at federal level (December 2018), the government Michel II came in place. In May 2019, federal and regional elections took place. The memorandum for the elections of the climate coalition had been shared with all political parties and new political candidates in the run-up of the elections, and the PWG had meetings with electoral candidates and several political groups (more so with French speaking politicians than with Flemish speaking politicians).³² After the elections, the PWG had meetings with the negotiators that were forming the regional governments (again, more so in Wallonia and Brussels than in Flanders). The new Walloon, French-speaking Community and Brussels governments were soon established and included the green political group. Interviewees confirm that (i) the climate marches, (ii) the ongoing lobby of members of the climate coalition and (iii) the new compositions of the regional governments have contributed to the fact that high climate ambitions were included in the Walloon and Brussels regional climate policies, including references to international climate finance.³³
- ⁸⁰ The long process of formation of a new federal government (16 months) complicated the policy influencing interventions of the PWG. There were not many opportunities for lobbying federal level as the government was dismissing. The memorandum of the Climate Coalition was sent to all newly elected MPs and a policy brief with the demands from the PWG was handed over during the first session of the new federal parliament (20 June 2019).³⁴ Furthermore, the PWG invited MP of the federal and inter-parliamentary climate commissions for meetings (16/09/2019, 2/10/2019, October 2020).³⁵ In these meetings, the demand of raising the Belgian contribution to the Green Climate Fund to at least 100 million EUR was repeated.
- ⁸¹ A L&A opportunity, was the presence of prime minister Michel at the UN Climate Action Summit in New York of September 23 2019, which was preceded by the global climate strike with an estimated participation of 4 million people. The PWG estimated that prime minister Michel most probably would give a speech at this summit (strengthening personal international profiling and his candidacy for a European position) and a letter with positions of the climate coalition was sent to the minister,³⁶ accompanied with twitter messages. In his speech, minister Michel committed for doubling Belgium's contribution to the Green Climate Fund (in line with the position of PWG, but without mentioning clear number), under the condition of approval by the federal parliament (there was no formal

³¹ No written resources, based on information provided by PWG

³² Contact tracing provided by the coordinators of the PWG

³³ (1) <https://leefmilieu.brussels/news/de-brusselse-regering-heeft-haar-energie-en-klimaatplan-goedgekeurd>; (2) <https://energie.wallonie.be/fr/la-contribution-wallonne-au-plan-national-energie-climat-2030.html?IDC=6238&IDD=127763>; (3) Agence Wallonne de l'air et du climat. (2019). Plan Air Climat Énergie à l'horizon 2030 (PACE 2030). Retrieved on 12 November 2020 from <http://www.awac.be/images/Pierre/PACE/2030/PACE%202030.pdf>; (4) Gouvernement Wallon. (2019). Contribution de la Wallonie au plan national énergie climat 2030 (PNEC2030). Retrieved on 17 November 2020 from <https://energie.wallonie.be/servlet/Repository/pwec-2030-version-definitive-28-novembre-2019-approuvee-par-le-gw.pdf?ID=58450>; (5) Demir, Z. (2019). Beleidsnota 2019-2024 Klimaat. Retrieved on 18 November 2020 from file:///C:/Users/Gebbruiker/Downloads/beleidsnota_klimaat.pdf; (6) Vlaamse Overheid. (2019). Vlaamse Klimaatstrategie 2050. Retrieved on 17 November 2020 from https://omgeving.vlaanderen.be/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2019-12-20_VlaamseKlimaatstrategie2050.pdf (6) Wallonie. (2020). Fonds Kyoto: 110 millions € pour financer des politiques de transition. Retrieved on 17 November 2020 from <https://www.wallonie.be/fr/actualites/fonds-kyoto-110-millions-eu-pour-financer-des-politiques-de-transition>.

³⁴ Contact tracing coordinators PWG

³⁵ ibidem

³⁶ Klimaatcoalitie (19 September 2019) Brief aan onze Premier naar aanleiding van Climate Action Summit retrieved on www.klimaatcoalitie.be



position yet of the government, which at that time was a dismissing government).³⁷ This position was later on formally confirmed by the federal minister for environment Marghem at the COP 25 in Madrid, who at that moment gave clarity on the amount of the contribution to the Green Climate Fund, i.e. 100 million EUR (or 20 million EUR/year in the period 2019-2023).

- ⁸² During the COP 25 in December 2019, the PWG has lobbied intensively minister Marghem as it was known that she would speech at the COP and that she had to confirm the commitment that had been taken by Michel at the UN summit in New York, some months earlier. Prior to the COP, formal and informal lobby has taken place by PWG targeting the cabinet of minister Marghem (who takes the lead in the negotiations) and the cabinet of development cooperation, at the time headed by minister De Croo, on whose budget the contribution to international climate finance would be put.³⁸ The position of Marghem was further influenced by the parliamentary resolution of October 10, 2019 (upon initiative of her own political party-MR) that demanded for the doubling of the Belgian contribution to the Green Climate Fund. The resolution refers, among others, to the commitments agreed upon in the inter-parliamentary resolution that was adopted by 15 November 2018.³⁹ The PWG has provided input in this resolution and had meetings with the MP that have defended the resolution.

Case 2: Intra-Belgian climate governance

- ⁸³ The inter-parliamentary declaration of December 2017 (see baseline study) already included the intention to develop a Climate Act that sets the short- and long-term objectives and regulates the intra-Belgian burden sharing to achieve the objectives of the Paris Declaration. The inter-parliamentary resolution of November 2018 was less explicit about a Climate Act. Since 2017, the PWG (at that time, still in the form of the CJP) has been advocating for the need for improved intra-Belgian collaboration on climate policy and had pointed at the lack of transparency, shared vision and clear agreements (see positions as described in chapter 2). The PWG pushed the idea of a Special Climate Act as a tool to improve the intra-Belgian collaboration in the complex Belgian institutional context. A Special Climate Act was envisaged as it applies to both the federal and the regional governments. The need for a Special Climate Act was also included in the memorandum of the Climate Coalition for the May 2019 elections.

³⁷ <https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/michel-wil-belgische-bijdrage-voor-strijd-tegen-klimaatopwarming-verdubbelen~b840fea3/>
<https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2019/09/23/bjoern-soenens-premier-michel-kondigt-aan-dat-belgie-fonds-ste/>
<https://11.be/verhalen/ngos-verwelkomen-belgische-bijdrage-aan-klimaatfonds>
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190923_04623228
<https://www.mo.be/nieuws/boodschap-klimaattop-wij-hebben-de-cyclus-van-het-leven-gebroken-1>

³⁸ Contact tracing of coordinators of the Climate Coalition and narrative story by coordinators

³⁹ dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/55/0572/55K0572001.pdf

- ⁸⁴ Pushed by the large mobilisation of the ‘Claim the Climate March’ of December 2018, several professors (U Ghent and KU Leuven) acknowledged the need for a Special Climate Act in order to accelerate the discussions on how to improve Belgian climate governance.⁴⁰ They developed a draft proposal of Climate Act in January 2019, which was, unintendedly, immediately put at the agenda of the federal parliament by the Green political groups. According to the interviewees, there was a growing consensus among the MPs that there is a need to improve climate governance. A press release on the need for a Special climate Act was published on March 1,⁴¹ which was followed by a meeting with the cabinet of the prime minister (March 12, 2019).⁴² The PWG was invited for a hearing in the federal parliamentary climate commission and was given the floor, together with other experts, to explain its position (March,13 2019). The PWG formulated several amendments to the proposal of Climate Act, mainly related to strengthening the attention for the international dimension of climate policy, and demanding a stronger integration of the climate policy in existing frameworks such as the sustainable development goals and human rights.⁴³ According to the PWG coordinators, these proposals were welcomed by several political parliamentary fractions (less by N-VA).
- ⁸⁵ However, the proposal for Climate Act was examined by the State Council⁴⁴ that stated that for the adoption of the Climate Act, a revision of Article 7bis⁴⁵ of the Belgian constitution was needed, which, theoretically, was possible as this article was already open for revision under the government at that time. Article 7bis regulates the collaboration between the different governments in Belgium with regard to their contribution to sustainable development. A specific reference to climate needed to be added to the Article. As such, lobby and advocacy by the PWG changed focused and called all MPs to vote for a revision of Article 7bis. The PWG had been lobbying since long on the need of a Climate Act, and in the period of the voting on Article 7bis, engaged formally and informally with several MEPs (mainly those that were not in favour of revising Article 7 bis: CD&V, N-VA, Open VLD)⁴⁶ to push for the revision of Article 7bis. The PWG also asked the parties that were in favour (like MR and CDH) to put pressure on their colleagues of other political groups (like Open VLD and CD&V).⁴⁷ The PWG also met with the Flemish minister responsible for Climate policy and a mailing was sent to all federal and regional MPs and ministers.⁴⁸ During the debates and voting in the federal parliament in March 2019, the Climate Coalition co-organised an action of civil disobedience by occupying the ‘Wet straat’ (which is officially a neutral zone, not accessible for any political manifestation), an action called ‘Occupy for climate’, that lasted two days.⁴⁹

⁴⁰ Confirmed by interviews with two professors involved in the process

⁴¹ [Persbericht: maand van de waarheid voor het klimaat | Klimaatcoalitie](#) on www.klimaatcoalitie.be

⁴² Contact tracing coordinators PWG

⁴³ 11.11.11 (Maart 2019) Klimaatwet – voorstel amendementen 11.11.11

⁴⁴ <https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2019/03/08/raad-van-state-over-klimaatwet/>

⁴⁵ Article 7bis states: ‘Bij de uitoefening van hun respectieve bevoegdheden streven de federale Staat, de gemeenschappen en de gewesten de doelstellingen na van een duurzame ontwikkeling in haar sociale, economische en milieu-gebonden aspecten, rekening houdend met de solidariteit tussen de generaties’.

⁴⁶ Schilts, W.F. (27 maart 2019) Klimaatbeleid: we moeten Artikel 7bis van de grondwet niet wijzigen, uitvoeren. *Opinie in Knack*. <https://www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/klimaatbeleid-we-moeten-artikel-7bis-van-de-grondwet-niet-wijzigen-wel-uitvoeren/article-opinion-1445921.html>

⁴⁷ Narrative story by PWG coordinators

⁴⁸ Contact tracing PWG coordinators

⁴⁹ See under actions on www.klimaatcoalitie.be (including pictures)



⁸⁶ Having a semi-constitutional status, such a Special Act requires a 2/3 majority in the federal parliament and a normal majority in each of the language groups. A 2/3 majority in parliament has not been achieved during the voting in March 2019. According to the interviewees, the main bottleneck was related to the sensitivity of the intra-Belgian governance in general, and the fear of N-VA and CD&V for loosing autonomy of the regional governments with regard to climate policy.⁵⁰ The PWG continued lobbying, this time to keep Article 7bis on the list of articles that would be open for revision in the period of the next government, which succeeded (April 2019).⁵¹ The new government has shown commitment to advance in adopting the Special Climate Act. *“De regering zal een voorstel neerleggen om artikel 7bis, dat voor herziening vatbaar is verklaard, aan te passen. Het voor herziening vatbaar verklaarde artikel 7bis over duurzame ontwikkeling wordt deze beleidsperiode gemoderniseerd met aandacht voor de rechtvaardige transitie naar een klimaatneutrale samenleving, de circulaire economie en de stopzetting van het verlies aan biodiversiteit. In dat kader onderzoekt de regering, samen met de gewestregeringen, hoe de federale overheid en de deelstaten tot meer samenwerking en een betere coördinatie kunnen komen inzake klimaat, met respect voor hun respectieve bevoegdheden. Mits het akkoord van de deelstaten, en enkel in dat geval, kan deze update van artikel 7bis uitgroeien tot een basis voor een samenwerkingsakkoord en/of bijzondere interfederaal klimaatwet. Wanneer deze update in deze beleidsperiode onmogelijk blijkt, zal de regering artikel 7bis opnieuw opnemen in de verklaring tot herziening.”* (Federal Government Agreement, October 2020) As the new government came in office during the Covid-19 crisis (October 2020), no advancement could be noticed so far with regard to the Special Climate Act.

⁵⁰ Sources: triangulated interviews

⁵¹ Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers. (2019). Aangenomen tekst van het voorstel tot herziening van artikel 7bis van de Grondwet teneinde de klimaatdoelstellingen en -beginselen te verankeren. Retrieved on 24 November 2020 from <https://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/54/3642/54K3642003.pdf> and Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers. (13 maart 2019). Voorstel tot herziening van artikel 7bis van de Grondwet teneinde de klimaatdoelstellingen en -beginselen te verankeren (verklaring van de wetgevende macht). Retrieved on 24 November 2020 from <https://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/54/3642/54K3642001.pdf>. https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190329_04288686 <https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2019/03/26/kamercommissie-grondwet-keurt-wijziging-van-grondwetsartikel-7-b/> <https://www.hln.be/binnenland/kamercommissie-verklaart-tegen-verwachtingen-in-artikel-1-en-7bis-grondwet-voor-herziening-vatbaar~a3ac5d38/>

Case 3: National Energy and Climate Plan 2030

- ⁸⁷ In 2018, the European Union obliged its member states to develop an integrated National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) for the period 2021-2030. The first draft of the Belgian NECP, presented at the EU in December 2018, was assessed by the EU as having too many shortcomings.⁵² A revised and final NECP was introduced by the Belgian government in December 2019. The draft and final version of the NECP needed to be presented to the EU by the end of the year (2018 and 2019 respectively).
- ⁸⁸ L&A on the NECP was mainly done separately by individual member organisations of the Climate Coalition, each focusing on their specific topics (e.g. environmental NGOs focussing on technical topics with regard to pollution, biodiversity, mobility, energy, etc., the development NGOs on the international dimensions, 11.11.11 and several other NGOs focusing also on biofuels, etc.).⁵³ Several members of the climate coalition (including 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11) are member of the FRDO that formulates policy advice to the government. The PWG coordinators confirmed that no strong advice could be formulated by the FRDO on the NECP because no consensus could be reached among the members of the FRDO.⁵⁴ A public consultation via an online survey (60.910 participants) and the possibility to provide additional comments (20.000 participants + 400 mails)⁵⁵ was organised by the government in June-July 2019 to provide input in the NECP, a process to which several members of the climate coalition have contributed, including 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11.⁵⁶ The Climate Coalition was very unhappy with the way this consultation process was organised, but developed a set of answers that citizens, who wanted to participate in the consultation, could use. Furthermore, IEW, member of the climate coalition, was invited by the federal government to participate in the multi-stakeholder dialogue (13 September 2019), to give input in the NECP. IEW included also demands of the North-South movement and referred to the memorandum of the Climate Coalition (upon suggestion of Oxfam, based on the comprehensive analysis of the draft NECP as was done by Oxfam).⁵⁷ The PWG shared concrete demands with members of the federal parliamentary climate commission (2 October) and during the multi-stakeholder meeting to prepare the COP (15 November),⁵⁸ including the demand to revise the draft NECP, to bring the Belgian ambition in line with the European objectives (with a specific reference to the concern of the increasing use of biofuels).⁵⁹ MP respondents interviewed confirmed that they have used info from PWG in drafting parliamentary questions that were raised in the Federal Parliamentary Climate Commission, where the draft NECP was being debated. MP criticized the government mainly for the lack of transparency

⁵² ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/beswden.pdf and <https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2019/06/18/europese-commissie-geeft-belgie-onvoldoende-voor-klimaatplan/>

⁵³ Confirmed by interviews with members of the Climate Coalition

⁵⁴ Also checked on the FRDO website and confirmed: www.frdo-cfdd.org

⁵⁵ Answers to parliamentary question on the NECP consultation process: Samengevoegde vragen van Méliissa Hanus aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De publieksbevraging over het ontwerp van het geïntegreerd Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan" (55000230C), Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem over "De analyse van de resultaten uit de publieksbevraging rond het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan" (55000233C), Michel De Maegd aan Marie-Christine Marghem over "De follow-up van de voor het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan uitgevoerde publieksbevraging" (55000288C),

⁵⁶ <https://www.nationaalenergieklimaatplan.be/> and

http://www.klimaatcoalitie.be/nieuws/de_klimaatcoalitie_reageert_op_de_publieksbevraging_over_het_nationaal_energie_en_klimaatplan

⁵⁷ Confirmed by interviews with Oxfam, CNCD-11.11.11

⁵⁸ Klimaatcoalitie (November 2019) Aanbevelingen voor de klimaatop van Madrid (COP25)

⁵⁹ To increase the ambition of an emission reduction of -55% by 2030 and climate neutrality before 2050; clearly include a fair transition in the NECP along with concrete measures; a reduction in the current target for biofuels, an improvement in fiscal taxation.



in developing the NECP (Groen, SP.A, MR, PS) and its lack of ambition (Groen, PS, SP.A, MR, Ecolo, PVDA), positions that were in line with the position of the PWG.⁶⁰

- ⁸⁹ The Climate Coalition has mobilised around two occasions in the fall of 2019, namely around the Climate Summit in New York of September 2019 and before the COP 25 in Madrid in December 2019. In September, the Climate Coalition mobilised for participation at the 'global climate strike' and launched at that moment a countdown of 100 days,⁶¹ time that was left for Belgium to develop an ambitious NECP.⁶²
- ⁹⁰ Climate ambitions that are in line with the demands of the Climate Coalition have been incorporated in the regional climate policies of Brussels and Wallonia (see annex 8). The NECP at Belgium level (December 2019) was assessed by the PWG as far below expectations. Following critique was formulated by the Climate Coalition: (i) lack of ambition by 2030, (ii) lack of shared long term vision, (iii) no balanced decision of commitments to reduce emissions between ETS sectors on the one hand and citizens and SME on the other hand, (iv) lack of concrete measures to realise the ambitions set towards a just transition, (v) an unacceptable focus on biofuels, (vi) lack of planning, budget and modalities to realise a just transition and no attention for the impact of the global South, (vii) the NECP is not an integrated plan but a compilation of the separate regional and federal climate policies, (viii) democratic deficit the NECP has not been subject of discussions in parliament and the public consultation has not resulted in a genuine consultation of the public.⁶³

Case 4: Influencing Belgian positions at COP 24 (Katowice) and COP25 (Madrid)

- ⁹¹ The Belgian position to guide preparation and negotiation processes at COP meetings is since December 2017 supported by an inter-parliamentary declaration, and since 15 November 2018 by a formally adopted inter-parliamentary resolution that sets the framework and boundaries for negotiations. The lobbying conducted by the PWG on this resolution and achievements have been described in the baseline report. Several of the positions of the PWG have been integrated in this resolution⁶⁴, except references to ambitious targets as proposed by the PWG (e.g. at least -55% emission reduction by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2050, phasing out of biofuels). Further, the resolution is rather vague with regard to the intra-Belgian governance and strategies towards a just transition to a carbon free society, which is explained by the fact that the focus of the resolution was the preparation of COP24.

⁶⁰ ibidem footnote 51

⁶¹ http://www.klimaatcoalitie.be/100_dagen_om_te_reageren_op_de_klimaatcrisis

⁶² Contact tracing PWG coordinators and info and pictures on www.klimaatcoalitie.be

⁶³ https://www.klimaatcoalitie.be/sites/default/files/documents/analyse_nationaal_energie_klimaatplan.pdf

⁶⁴ Such as support for vulnerable countries, climate change impacting on gender and women rights, right of indigenous people, loss and damages regulations, recognition of climate refugees, contribution to international climate financing, carbon border adjustment tax, look for solution for climate governance challenges and the need to have a Special Climate Act

- ⁹² Following the guidelines of UNFCCC, a consultation process needs to be organised in each country to prepare the COP meetings. In Belgium, these are organised by the administration (FOD VVVL) and several stakeholders, including civil society, are invited to participate and contribute. The coordinators, and some of the members of the PWG, participated in the meeting of 25 November 2019 (no meeting seems to have taken place in October 2020, due to postponement of the COP and COVID-19)⁶⁵. Furthermore, the memorandum is guiding the L&A process, including the Belgian positions to be taken at the COP meetings. The memorandum was sent to all MPs, cabinets and administration, and defended in the preparatory meetings. Additionally, a mailing was sent each time to MPs of the federal and regional parliamentary climate commissions with the specific demands of the PWG, prior to the COP meetings.⁶⁶
- ⁹³ The climate coalition is also present at the COP. Members of the PWG such as, 11.11.11, CNCD-11.11.11, Oxfam Belgium, IEW, BBL, Greenpeace, WWF, ACV etc. (as being member of the FRDO), are appointed by the government as official members of the delegation (observer status). During the COP in Katowice, members of the PWG had informal contacts with the Belgian delegation, including several ministers (not all, for example no contact could be established with the Flemish minister of environment) that were participating. Members of PWG have participated in formal meetings during the COP, and were also able to organise workshops such as a workshop on the effect of climate change on gender.⁶⁷ According to the PWG coordinators, their presence at the COP mainly serves purposes of relation building but also provided spaces to lobby the ministers on the NECP that was being finalised. Several interviewees confirmed that involvement of the civil society in the COP preparations and negotiations is well organised in Belgium and stronger compared to the position of civil society in many other countries.
- ⁹⁴ At the start of the COP24 in Katowice, the first big climate mobilisation took place in Brussels on December 2, the 'Claim the Climate March', mobilising 75.000 people, pushing Belgium to take ambitious decisions, among others to support -55% emission reduction by 2030, to bring the NECP in line with the Paris Declaration, and demanding a Belgian Climate Act so to improve climate governance and intra-Belgian coordination.⁶⁸
- ⁹⁵ The negotiations at the COP in Katowice did not result in clear and ambitious agreements. Belgium is not known for its ambitious positions taken during the COP meetings, partly explained by the fact that four ministers are responsible for climate policy, increasing the institutional and political complexity to come to an agreement on shared positions. At the COP24 in 2018, Belgium was not part of the coalition of the ambitious countries. In particular, the Flemish government did not agree with the European ambition of -55% emission reduction by 2030. The COP however, pushed Belgium to finalise the NECP. A draft NECP was finalised in December 2018 (see case 3).
- ⁹⁶ 2019, the year of COP 25 in Madrid, was the year of the climate marches in Belgium and all over the world. The COP 25 in Madrid has not delivered many tangible results either with regard to the implementation of the Paris Declaration.⁶⁹ One achievement at the COP 25 in Madrid is the fact that

⁶⁵ Contact tracing PWG coordinators

⁶⁶ Contact tracing PWG coordinators

⁶⁷ Narrative stories of 11.11.11, CNCD-11.11.11, Oxfam, WWF and Greenpeace

⁶⁸ Contact tracing PWG coordinators and info and pictures on actions on www.klimaatcoalitie.be

⁶⁹ VRT, metro, interviews



the federal minister for climate, Mrs. Marghem (MR), confirmed the federal contribution to the Green Climate Fund of 100 million (see case 1).

- ⁹⁷ One of the subjects of the discussions at the climate conference in Madrid was Article 6 of the Paris Declaration. This article foresees in market mechanisms for the trade in emission. On the one hand, there were countries that wanted to prevent such carbon markets from hampering efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. On the other hand, there were countries that were more relaxed about it. A group of countries, including Belgium, supported a plea for strong rules for the introduction of global carbon markets. Towards the end of the conference, upon initiative of Costa Rica, a declaration was drawn up: the so-called '*San Jose principles for increased ambition and the integrity of international carbon markets*'. This text starts from the idea that "*the negotiations should not result in an Article 6 that would gradually demolish the Paris climate agreement*".⁷⁰ Brussels Minister for Climate Transition, Alain Maron (Ecolo), being the last Belgian minister present at the COP by the end of the conference, decided that Belgium would join this coalition for Article 6 (supported by the government).⁷¹
- ⁹⁸ By the end of the COP, the moment that Costa Rica took the initiative for its declaration, representatives of the PWG, have successfully pushed the Belgian ministers to join this coalition Article 6 (through pressure on its cabinets, and informal contacts during the COP).

3.3.2. CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS

- ⁹⁹ A contribution analysis was done on all the four cases together as the cases are interrelated. A set of causal explanations has been identified by the evaluators, making a distinction between four types of causal explanations: primary explanation (mechanism related to the intervention), commingled rival (other mechanism that occurs alongside target mechanism), direct rival (different mechanism that undermines the contribution story of the intervention), influencing factors (that modify the outcomes). Primary explanations are related to the strategies as included in the ToC. During the baseline study, several rival explanations have been identified. During the MTR, other rival explanations could be identified during interviews and document study. An overview of all identified explaining mechanisms is added in annex 7.
- ¹⁰⁰ The methodology of process tracing was applied to test the causal linkages (see 1.3 methodology). An analysis was done of the causal claims and the contribution of the PWG group to the observed changes. For this purpose, we developed a set of (Excel-based) tools. These describe the causal

⁷⁰ <https://klimaat.be/klimaatbeleid/internationaal/klimaatconferenties/2019-cop25-madrid>

⁷¹ <https://nl.metrotimes.be/2019/12/14/news/belgie-sluit-zich-aan-groep-landen-die-sterke-koolstofmarkten-eisen/> and <https://www.7sur7.be/belgique/cop25-la-belgique-rejoint-une-coalition-de-pays-plaidant-pour-des-marches-du-carbone-solides~ae0e7000/>

questions and the possible contribution of the project (primary mechanism) and of rival mechanisms and factors. In an additional table, these mechanisms are compared with the available data and findings and their causal claim is confirmed or refuted. Also, the validity and reliability of the data of the available data is also weighed. On this basis, the contribution of certain mechanisms and factors is then confirmed or refuted and the contribution of the intervention compared to rival explanations is pronounced. (see box 1 in chapter 1.3.). Based on available literature of causal relations in policy influencing programme, the evaluation team assumes that the causal relationships are of the INUS type.⁷² This implies that the intervention itself will not be sufficient to bring about change on its own (it is part of a wider causal package), but that in the case positive change is observed, the main question to be answered is the ‘necessary’ question (aside from the question about rival explanations). In other words, was the intervention a ‘necessary component’ of the causal package that brought change? An overview of the explaining mechanisms, evidence and their assessments are added in annex 7 and 8. Following tables present the result of this assessment.

¹⁰¹ The first table presents the results of the overall assessment of the primary and commingled explanations. The second table presents the results of the contribution analysis applied on the four selected cases, by including the assessment of the rival explanations that are specific for each case.

Table 7: Results contribution analysis

Explaining mechanisms or causal claim	Contribution is assessed as high, moderate low (++) or (+) evidence confirming the causal claim, (--) and (-) evidence weakening the causal claim⁷³
Indirect communication informing and sensitizing politicians	Low <i>It is very unlikely that media coverage of PWG positions has had an influence on political decision makers.</i> (+) Climate has been highly covered by media, not only covering climate manifestations but also bringing own dossiers (e.g. Knack); positions of PWG covered by media in Wallonia, almost not in Flanders (-) From the interviews it was learned that MPs are not informed on PWG positions through media
Direct communication informing and sensitizing politicians, taking over positions	High <i>It is confirmed that direct communication has had influence on politicians, that several positions have been taken over and put on the political agenda</i> (++) The importance of direct communication was confirmed by all interviewees. It has been sufficient and necessary to put the PWG positions on the political agenda, to influence the political discourse in favour of PWG positions and to obtain policy change with regard to ‘softer’ topics (e.g. general statements on gender, climate refugees, just transition). (+) The lobby of PWG towards Minister Maron and other climate ministers pushed the minister to join Article 6 Coalition during the COP 25 (-) other information sources (studies, research, advice from other stakeholders) also inform politicians
Active participation in institutionalised meetings having an influence on the positions taken in those meetings	Moderate <i>Participation in institutionalised meetings is necessary to put the positions of PWG on the political agenda, but not sufficient to have influence on positions taken</i> (+) The importance of providing information through institutionalised meetings was confirmed by all interviewees.

⁷² “Most lobbying and advocacy work is an *Insufficient*, but *Necessary*, part of a *causal package*, that is, itself, *Unnecessary* but *Sufficient* for the occurrence of the effect.”

⁷³ Based on the evidence tables added in annex 7 and 8



	<p>(-) Other stakeholders also have contributed to these debates, sometimes defending similar positions.</p> <p>(--) The lack of clear commitments towards higher ambitions is influenced by the lack of political consensus among political parties and between the different government levels</p>
<p>One-off actions and mobilisation: informing and sensitizing politicians and pushing them to be more ambitious</p>	<p>Moderate <i>It can be assumed that mobilisations have put the climate debate higher on the political agenda but have had less influence on the actual decisions taken</i></p> <p>(+) Public manifestations have put the climate debate more frequently on the agenda of parliament but have not had an effect yet on procedural or policy change with regard to climate policy, according to interviewees. Some interviewees do not believe the mass mobilisations are representative for the general public.</p> <p>(+) One-off actions have drawn attention of the politicians to the positions of the PWG (e.g. Occupy Wetstraat)</p> <p>(-) Several one-off actions have not resulted in the intended effect (like for example, 100 Countdown to the NECP)</p> <p>(--) The level of ambition is determined by the positions of political parties, that are not always in line with the position of PWG</p>
<p>Leverage and credibility of the PWG enable access to politicians and make sure they take positions of PWG into account</p>	<p>High <i>The Climate Coalition is perceived by politicians as a legitimate and credible actor in the climate policy debate and the coalition is being consulted.</i></p> <p>(++) Confirmed by all interviewees. The fact that the climate coalition unites civil society is an added value. Quality of input and expertise of PWG is recognised.</p> <p>(++) The climate coalition is heard during government formation process, during preparation of COP meetings, members are included in the official delegation at the COP meetings</p>
<p>L&A done by other members of the Climate Coalition informs and sensitizes politicians and makes them taking into account their positions</p>	<p>High <i>This is a commingled rival. The action takes place alongside the interventions of the Climate Coalition and they mutually reinforce</i></p> <p>(++) Confirmed by all interviewees. Members of the climate coalition lobby on specific thematic subjects or defend higher ambitions. Politicians take these also into account, they do not make a distinction between the Climate coalition and the individual members. All information is welcome. These thematic topics are defended by reputable NGOs like 11.11.11, CNCD-11.11.11, Oxfam, WWF, Greenpeace, etc. that also have legitimacy and credibility by the politicians.</p> <p>(++) The thematic lobby is complementary to the lobby done on behalf of the Climate Coalition, as confirmed by politicians and NGOs consulted.</p>

¹⁰² The contribution analysis demonstrates that the intervention mix implemented by the PWG and the Climate Coalition has been relevant and effective in putting topics on the political agenda and in some occasions in contributing to positions taken over by political decision makers. The assessment demonstrates that direct advocacy and lobbying by the PWG towards political decision makers has contributed highly to influencing the opinions and positions of political decision makers. The Climate Coalition is perceived by politicians as a legitimate and credible actor in the climate policy debate and

their positions are being taken into account. The same applies for the L&A done by different members of the Climate Coalition. Politicians do not make a distinction between the actions of individual members and the climate coalition at large. They mutual reinforce. However, combined forces have most often not resulted yet in effective policy change, as explained in following table.

¹⁰³ Indirect communication through media was assessed as contributing low to influencing positions of politicians, based on interviews and literature. According to Yves Pepermans, who has a PhD on the coverage of the climate debate in media, media in Belgium is mainly covering the political agenda and much less influencing the political agenda. *“A variety of studies have shown that news coverage tends to follow and reflect the political agenda on climate change rather than the other way around (e.g., Anderson, 1997; Berglez, Höijer & Olausson, 2009; Carvalho, 2005; Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Olausson, 2009; Ungar, 2014). Reporting on climate change does not only rely on whether an event fits journalistic norms and logics (e.g., the novelty or drama norm) but also on whether it resonates with the broader political context”*.⁷⁴ The media takes over the framing as developed by the different stakeholders, such as the narrative of those that set ambitious climate objectives (including the messages of the Climate Coalition) and the narrative of the climate realists. However, according to his research, the apparently contradictory narratives are not analysed in the media, nor the tension between the two narratives. The coverage by media by consequence does not challenge politicians.

¹⁰⁴ Mass demonstrations kept the climate debate on the political agenda. According to Frans Timmermans, vice-president of the European Commission, the School Strikes for the Climate clearly have contributed to accelerating the development of the European Green Deal, including the clear ambition level.⁷⁵ However, in Belgium these demonstrations have not had a similar effect on the Belgian political decision makers to show more climate ambition and improve intra-Belgian climate governance.

Following table builds further on the analysis in the above, applied on the four selected cases (based on evidence in the description of the cases and on the evidence table added in annex 8).

Table 8: Results of the contribution analysis on the four selected cases

Cases	Contribution of the PWG (+) contribution by primary and commingled mechanisms related to the PWG (-) contribution by rival mechanisms and external influencing factors
Case 1: Belgian contribution to international climate finance	High, the contribution of PWG has been necessary and sufficient (++) Direct L&A by the PWG (++) PWG having influenced the resolution proposed by MR and adopted in federal parliament, in line with position of PWG (+) Direct lobby of the members of the Climate Coalition (+) Mass demonstrations put climate policy higher on the political agenda (+) Inter-parliamentary resolution voted in November 2018 refers to the need to double international climate finance contribution, influenced by PWG (+/-) one off action such as Occupy Wetstraat (-) Changing political climate since N-VA had withdrawn in December 2018 (-) New composition of the regional governments (Wallonia and Brussels) that support the positions of the PWG

⁷⁴ Maesele, P., & Pepermans, Y. (2017). Climate change communication, media and ideology. The Oxford research encyclopedia of climate change communication

⁷⁵ Interview with Frans Timmermans in Knack on June 14, 2020



<p>Case 2: Intra-Belgian climate governance (Special Climate Act and revision of Article 7bis of the constitution not adopted – but Article 7bis maintained open for revision)</p>	<p>(--) Political profiling by former prime minister (2019)</p> <p>Low, the PWG did not succeed in convincing federal parliament to vote for the revision of Article 7bis. The intra-Belgian governance was the most important decisive factor. The intervention has been necessary in keeping the topic on the political agenda.</p> <p>(+) Mass demonstrations put climate policy higher on the political agenda and as such the need to have a Special Climate Act</p> <p>(+) Amendments of the PWG taken into account by all political groups (except N-VA)</p> <p>(++) Direct L&A by the PWG convincing or confirming sufficient political parties that a Special Climate Act is needed and as such a revision of Article 7bis is relevant, which kept the Article 7bis open for revision in the next government period</p> <p>(--) Draft Special Climate Act developed and proposed by professors of U Ghent and KU Leuven</p> <p>(-) Input from other stakeholders (administration, diplomats, Van Ypersele, ...) in political debate</p> <p>(--) Initiative of the Green political group on parliament to put the proposal of Special Act on the agenda of the federal parliament</p> <p>(-) Special Act requires a revision of the constitutions, as such delaying the process of voting a Special Climate Act</p> <p>(--) Different opinions on the need of having a Special Climate act among politicians⁷⁶ and sensitivity of the intra-Belgian governance, and fear among N-VA and CD&V of losing regional autonomy</p> <p>(--)</p>
<p>Case 3: NECP 2030 Recognition of the need of just transition but no ambitious targets set for 2030</p>	<p>Low, the PWG has not succeeded in getting an ambitious and integrated NECP. The contribution of PWG was not sufficient, but to a certain extent necessary. PWG contributed to the formulation of parliamentary questions on the NECP and has been informing since longer the Walloon and Brussels regional government that show more ambition compared to the Flemish government. The European Union also pushes for more ambition.</p> <p>(++) Direct L&A by the PWG</p> <p>(+) Participation of PWG in institutionalised consultations</p> <p>(+) Direct lobby of the members of the Climate Coalition</p> <p>(+/-) One-off actions by the Climate Coalition (e.g. 100 days countdown)</p> <p>(-) Political considerations and feasibility of the positions of the PWG questioned by several MP</p> <p>(--) Lack of consensus between the different federal and regional governments</p> <p>(--) Ambitious regional climate policies (Wallonia and Brussels) have influence on the debate</p>

⁷⁶ example: Opinion of Schiltz in Knack (27 March 2019) , opinion of Vuye and Wouters (their website vuyewouters.be on 7 February 2019)

	(-) Influence of the European Green Deal pushing Belgium to be more ambitious (but positions less ambitious as demanded by Climate Coalition)
Case 4: Belgian positions at COP24 and COP 25 Belgium joining Article 6 coalition and confirming doubling the Belgian contribution to international climate finance	<p>High, the contribution of the PWG has been necessary (with regard to the achievements obtained at COP)</p> <p>(++) Direct L&A by the PWG (and specifically on lobbying minister Maron by the end of the COP 25)</p> <p>(+) Participation of PWG in institutionalised consultations</p> <p>(+) Direct lobby of the members of the Climate Coalition</p> <p>(+/-) Mobilisation by Climate Coalition for Global climate strikes</p> <p>(+) Direct influence of PWG on parliamentary resolutions that were adopted: (+)</p> <p>Inter-parliamentary resolution voted in November 2018 refers to the need to double international climate finance contribution, including positions of PWG; Resolution of October 10, 2019 on the Belgian contribution to international climate finance referring to the need to double the contribution; (+)</p> <p>Resolution of November 25, 2019 on the priorities for COP 25 that refers to international climate finance but also to Article 6</p> <p>(-) Input from the administration (DGD and FOD VVVL)</p> <p>(-) Changing political climate since N-VA had withdrawn from federal government in December 2018</p> <p>(-) Resolutions mentioned in the above proposed by MR, same political party as the federal minister for climate</p> <p>(-) New composition of the regional governments (Wallonia and Brussels) that support the positions of the PWG</p> <p>(--) Political profiling by former prime minister</p>

¹⁰⁵ Small successes (positions adopted) were obtained in two of the four cases, but in general the PWG mainly contributed to agenda setting and discursive change. The contribution of the PWG is assessed as necessary. The PWG has brought specific topics under the attention of the political decision makers. Different roles are played by the PWG: (1) *supporting role*: political decision makers make use of the knowledge, expertise and information of the PWG in developing their own position. The PWG was invited at meetings of bureaus of political parties and consulted by MP when developing parliamentary questions. (2) *Accelerator*: the PWG grasped political momentum (speech of Marghem at COP 25, and signing the declaration of Article 6 at COP 25) and pushed political decision makers to adopt a position in line with the PWG demands, mainly via informal lobby.

¹⁰⁶ Literature also confirms that “*lobbying is the most effective when lobbyists are trusted allies who have longstanding relationships with key decision-makers, and when information and argumentation on one side of an issue overwhelms information and argumentation on the other side of an issue*”. (Brulle, R. 2017) PWG has longstanding relationships with several political actors, but mainly among like-minded political parties.



- ¹⁰⁷ The mobilisations have contributed to keeping climate on the political debate but have had less influence on the positions taken by the different political decision makers. For example, a survey from April 2019 showed that 94% of the Belgians supports the European ambition to become climate neutral by 2050, though Belgium did not succeed to communicate ambitious national climate targets to the European Commission in 2019.⁷⁷
- ¹⁰⁸ A set of direct rival explanations was identified for the different cases that also have contributed to informing and sensitizing political decision makers such as, the input provided by other stakeholders and the administrations, other studies, publications and proposals from the academic world. These can be seen as complementary to the input provided by the PWG. With regard to case 2, the academic world has contributed to the acceleration of the debate on the Special Climate Act. Following the acceleration of the debate, the PWG shared amendments related to the international dimensions of climate policy, which were also shared in the hearing in parliament on the Special Climate Act.⁷⁸ Discussions thereof, however, were postponed as a constitutional problem arose.
- ¹⁰⁹ A set of contextual factors also have had a strong influence on the political debate on climate policy and explain why many positions of the PWG have not been translated yet in policy targets and measures. The complicated institutional political landscape in Belgium can be seen as one of the important hampering factors. Because of lack of consensus and different opinions, mainly between the different government levels (different composed governments) no ambitious climate policy is being developed yet in Belgium.
- ¹¹⁰ In literature, it is recognised that transition towards just climate policy is difficult in multi-level political systems. In many countries, the so-called co-operation agreements, allow the governments to develop common policies. In Belgium, however, the inter-parliamentary declaration does not include concrete ambitious targets, which shows that no consensus could be reached between the different government levels. A large part of inter-governmental co-operation is triggered by external requirements, mostly European commitments and requirements, as is the case for climate policy. International literature has pointed that sub-national governments are no longer mere observers in international climate policies but also influential actors, as is the case in Belgium. *“Climate change is not perceived as a political priority, often triggering intergovernmental conflicts with regard to the future of sectors such as industry, transport and energy. Climate action in Belgium is predominantly shaped by EU requirements (in turn driven by the international negotiations), subnational governments are not proactive participants and are often defensive of top-down commitments. Moreover, the current system does not deter these regions from maintaining low ambitions. (...) The low levels of ambition on climate change in Belgium are partly the outcome of a weak central*

⁷⁷ Dupont, c. (2020) Is België te complex voor een effectief klimaatbeleid? on www.sampol.be

⁷⁸

government, unable to raise ambition beyond what is mandated internationally and by the EU for the regions to follow". (Jørgensen et al, 2015)

- ¹¹¹ Other influencing factors relate to the political climate in Belgium. The fact that progress could be obtained in some cases was partially explained by the fact that N-VA had withdrawn from the federal government, newly composed regional governments had been installed and that at the end of the COP 25, during the decision on Coalition Article 6, the Brussels minister for climate was present that had to take the lead in negotiating the Belgian position, who supported the positions of the PWG.
- ¹¹² Another explaining mechanisms is related to the L&A strategy. Several interviewees confirmed that positions of the PWG were not always perceived as feasible and that they lacked concrete recommendations on practical measures and roadmaps towards a just transition to a carbon neutral society.
- ¹¹³ The contribution analysis also informs the assessment of the assumptions that were identified during inception phase for each part of the chain between interventions and impacts. Following table complements the data from the baseline.



Table 9: Baseline and MTE data for identified assumptions

Assumptions as formulated in the inception report	Results of baseline data	Results of MTE
There are spaces for dialogue between policy makers and the PWG on climate justice issues, and PWG manages to access those spaces.	Confirmed. Consultation of civil society is institutionalised (see multi-stakeholder dialogues) and there are ample formal and non-formal meetings with policy makers. Dialogue with opposition parties is more fluid compared to dialogue with some ruling parties.	Confirmed In most countries NGOs have no formal role in international negotiations. ⁷⁹ In Belgium some of the members of the PWG are included in the formal delegation and have direct access to the negotiators.
The PWG is able to generate relevant (from a decision-maker perspective) policy input on its coordinated positions.	Confirmed. Positive assessment of the relevance, quality and usability of the CJP information. Positions are perceived as ambitious. Different opinions between opposition and ruling parties about feasibility of the CJP's positions.	Confirmed Comments made by some interviewees that they need more practical and feasible recommendations.
CJP is correctly identifying and targeting influential policy makers.	Partially confirmed. CJP is targeting all relevant and thematic experts within all political parties (except extremist parties) and has contacts with all relevant cabinets. Contact with the federal ministry for environment are more difficult. A comprehensive stakeholder analysis is lacking and no information is available on who are the opponents and allies within each political party and at cabinets.	Confirmed ⁸⁰ The PWG has had meetings also with political groups that are more critical towards the positions of the PWG (like CD&V, Open VLD ad MR) and had meetings with highly influential policy makers, such as the prime ministers, the ministers for climate the negotiators of the new government and the informateur.

⁷⁹ Rietig, K. The Power of Strategy: environmental NGO influence in International Climate Negotiations. on file://C:/users/gebruiker/Downloads/22GlobalGovernance269.pdf

⁸⁰ See contact tracing database of PWG coordinators added in annex 6

	MTR and final evaluation need to provide more information on the appropriate mix of interventions to target policy makers.	A comprehensive stakeholder analysis is lacking and no information is available on who are the opponents and allies within each political party and at cabinets
Policy makers at the federal level can be influenced directly but also via their counterparts at the regional level.	Partially confirmed. In particular the inter-parliamentary climate commission provides a space where the different government levels meet, which justifies the fact that policy influencing is targeting all these levels. The interaction between the regional and federal governance levels needs to be further confirmed during MTR and final evaluation.	Partially confirmed. Policy makers meet each other at the inter-parliamentary climate commission, and lobbying the regional governments has resulted in the Brussels and Walloon regional government to take over several PWG positions in their new government agreements (see annex 11). However, in federal parliament these political groups (composing the Brussels and Walloon regional governments) do not have a majority of votes and have not been able to convince the other political groups to share their positions.
PWG structure and governance allow PWG members to work together in ways that maximize their influence.	Confirmed. Via the contribution analysis more detailed information will become available.	See under chapter 4
PWG quickly recognizes changes in the political environment and adapts the strategy for greater impact.	Confirmed. CJP has good knowledge of the political environment and adapts its strategy accordingly. For example, with the installation of the inter-parliamentary climate commission it was decided to lobby a broader package of demands on behalf of the CJP platform, to have more influence (instead of all members lobbying for their own specific points of interest). This assumption needs to be reconfirmed during MTR and final evaluation.	Confirmed. The PWG is able to grasp political momentum and act accordingly.
Decision makers take informed decisions, based on the information provided by -among others – PWG.	Confirmed. CJP is an important information source for policy makers, both opposition and ruling parties but information is used in different ways by opposition and ruling parties.	Confirmed, but not all decision makers agree with the positions of the PWG.
A visible support base strengthens the legitimacy and leverage of the PWG interventions.	Not confirmed yet. Policy makers acknowledged the variety of the CJP composition as a strength and appreciate the fact that they have one counterpart within civil society to interact with. The interviewees did not provide confirmation explicitly on the importance of a	Confirmed. The PWG and the climate coalition are considered as legitimate and credible advocates for climate justice, mainly for their demonstrated expertise and knowledge and the fact that the coalition unites the civil society on the climate issue.



	visible support base of CJP but recognize CJP platform as a legitimate advocate for climate justice.	Their support base became visible through the mass mobilisations (not only organised by the Climate Coalition) and the one-off actions organised by the Climate Coalition.
If the PWG's advocacy actions are more aligned with the mobilisation and campaign work on climate justice, thanks to the merger of the PWG and the climate coalition, the leverage and credibility of the PWG will increase.	Not confirmed yet. During baseline there were no large mobilisations and campaigns implemented.	Not confirmed. There is more alignment between the political work and the mobilisations, but interviewees seem not to be aware of this integration process. Mobilisations were conducive for keeping the climate topic on the political agenda but have not increased the leverage of credibility of the PWG.

3.3.3. CONCLUSIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE STORY

- ¹¹⁴ During the MTE, a first analysis was done of the contribution claims as described in the performance stories of the four cases. These contribution claims need to be further substantiated and validated during the final evaluation. The conclusions of the contribution analysis are described here. First the cases are presented where the PWG contributed highly to the observed changes, followed by a reflection on the two cases where the contribution was limited.
- ¹¹⁵ For two cases (case 1 and case 4) we have presented strong affirmative evidence that the PWG has contributed to the stated outcomes. We did not find disconfirming evidence, which give us the confidence that there was a clear causal relation between the L&A outputs of the PWG, the immediate⁸¹ and intermediate outcomes.⁸² The evidence on the primary mechanisms in these cases passed the hoop tests (see chapter 1.3 methodology). In addition, the evaluation provides information to confirm the assumptions (also tested applying the same methodology, see annex 6 and 7) and has identified new assumptions (that are also described in literature).⁸³ Following we develop further some new assumptions identified.
- ¹¹⁶ **Policy window:**⁸⁴ In both cases, a policy window, an opportunity was properly grasped by the PWG (profiling of prime minister at the New York Climate summit, and the initiative of Costa Rica at the COP to create an Article 6 coalition and the presence of the Brussels minister for climate). The cases show that policy change can happen during a window of opportunity when advocates can successfully connect two or more components of the policy process, in these cases the way the problem was defined, the policy solution to the problem and the political climate of that issues.
- ¹¹⁷ **The role of power elites:**⁸⁵ The cases also give prove of the power elites theory. Policy change is made by working directly with those with power. In both cases, the PWG had lobbied formally and informally the former prime minister (case 1) and the current Brussels minister for climate (case 4).
- ¹¹⁸ **Having allies in power:**⁸⁶ The Coalition theory states that policy change happens through coordinated action among a range of individuals with the same core beliefs. It is clear that, within the parliament, there are several political groups that share the same beliefs, opinion and positions taken by the PWG, the so-called allies or friends. More is possible with regard to climate policy since like-minded political groups have joined the federal and regional governments. However, many climate policy issues are complicated, comprising several aspects. Allies may agree on some positions but may still differ over other positions. In the cases 1 and 4, topics were at stake that were less controversial, the so-called social dimensions or ‘softer’ dimensions of the climate debate, that are impacting less on our daily lives. In the two other cases (case 3 and 4) also more technical topics were at stake or

⁸¹ Political decision makers receive information, positions and policy advice and are sensitized and educated on climate justice, The climate coalition gains leverage and credibility and there is a visible support base for climate justice

⁸² Belgian decision makers take over positions of the PWG and incorporate them in their decisions

⁸³ Stachowiak, 2013 retrieved from https://www.orsimpact.com/DirectoryAttachments/132018_13248_359_Center_Pathways_FINAL.pdf

⁸⁴ Policy windows or agenda setting theory (Kingdon)

⁸⁵ Power Elites theory (Mills, Domhoff)

⁸⁶ Coalition theory (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith)



positions needed to be taken that directly impact our lives, showing more disagreement within and between political groups.

- ¹¹⁹ Access to friends is of course more easily gained than access to foes. A study of Gullberg⁸⁷ on this subject showed that some advocates lack access to their foes in the non-institutionalised part of the policy-making process, which is also the case for the PWG. She further observed that *“Business organisations have a great advantage with regard to building broad networks of contacts because they are not as specialised as the environmental organisations. Hence, business and industry attend more arenas and could probably reach more people”* (Gullberg, 2008). The strategy adopted by the PWG to convince ‘foes’ was to use the ‘friends’ for lobbying the opponents, which proved not to be successful so far.
- ¹²⁰ Cases 2 and 3 give further more insight in assumptions that explain why the contribution of the PWG was low in changing the policy positions.
- ¹²¹ **Adapting the narrative according to the lobby target:** The cases 2 and 3 are much more complex as they concern a transition to a carbon neutral society and as such concrete measures are needed, which are not only “technical” but also influenced by the societal and political vision on how to organise the society and what future one sees for this society. Pepermans points to the fact that the existing disagreement between different political groups is only superficially presented in the mainstream narratives (ambition vs realist) but that there are other underlying disagreements with regard to social-economic; environmental-technological and social-technological positions. These disagreements are hardly covered by media and not made visible, also not by the civil society. *“In general, two approaches can be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the dominant approach, which aims to mainstream and depoliticize climate change in order to decrease disagreement and build widespread consent for climate action. It sees people mainly as consumers who need to be better informed. On the other hand, there is the approach which attempts to (re)politicize the climate change debate. It aims to make contingency, conflict, inequality, ideology and power visible in order to make space for the massive political mobilization and social struggle necessary for achieving a socially just policy. It sees people as democratic citizens who should take part in societal debate. However, the influence of the latter remains marginal in both research and initiatives.”*⁸⁸ and *“It argues that the depoliticization of climate change serves as a barrier to transformative socio-ecological change. It calls for its repoliticization to revive the democratic debate and contestation about alternative sustainable futures.”*⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Gullberg, A. T. (2008). Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and environmental interest groups in the European Union. *Energy Policy*, 36(8), 2964-2972.

⁸⁸ Pepermans, Y., & Maesele, P. (2017). Climate Change Communication in Belgium. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science*

⁸⁹ Pepermans, Y., & Maesele, P. (2016). The politicization of climate change: problem or solution? *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 7(4), 478-485.

¹²² The memorandum and positions of the PWG mainly refer to general ambitions and positions but are not accompanied with roadmaps or clear solutions on how to reach these objectives. Several interviewees pointed out that they were lacking such suggestions. One can also reflect on the narrative that is disseminated by Climate Coalition. The narrative uses a language that is recognised by the group of politicians and the general public that share the same opinion but is less convincing for parties that are not fully aligned with the positions of the PWG. The narrative is based on general principles and general long-term objectives, but does not explain the reasons behind the disagreements in the political debate. As such it creates less opportunities to enter into a debate with different groups in society. Research of Katharina Rietig also confirmed the need to differentiate the messages between aligned objectives (friends) and not-aligned objectives (foes) in order to change the governments' positions.⁹⁰

¹²³ **Political space:** The PWG has mainly targeted MEP, though MEP are neither the only, nor the most influential political elites engaged in climate policy development. The PWG has to deal with opaque policy processes, hierarchies, political interest within political groups and administrations. Navigating these was more challenging than advocating within the ordinary policy making process.

⁹⁰ Rietig, K. (2016). The power of strategy: environmental NGO influence in international climate negotiations. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 22(2), 269-288.

3.4 SUMMARY OF DATA ON OUTCOME AND IMPACT LEVEL

¹²⁴ Following table provides an overview of the results achieved so far at impact level, based on the selected cases.

Table 10: Overview of evolution on the indicators at outcome and impact level

<p>Agenda setting (outcome 4)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Positions of the PWG with regard to the ambition, the need to include human rights and gender in the NECP, the negative impact of biofuels, the Belgian contribution to the Green Climate Fund, regulations of the international carbon market, emission reduction and climate governance were put on the political agenda during discussions in parliament. – A Special Climate Act was debated in federal parliament.
<p>Discursive change (impact 3)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – There is a growing sense of urgency with regard to climate policy – Not only the opposition parties but also Open VLD, CD&V and MR (part of the coalition till October 2020) have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the PWG and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP and to show more ambition during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA and Vlaamse Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitious.
<p>Procedural change (Impact 3)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – No results yet with regard to enhancing transparency of the National Climate Commission or the Special Climate act – Critique from parliament that the development of the NECP has not been transparent
<p>Policy change at Belgian level with regard to the selected cases (impact 3)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – NECP finalised but not in line with PWG positions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Emission reduction of -35% by 2030 ○ Belgian contribution to international climate finance of 50 million EUR/year in 2020, no concrete target set for 2021-2030 – Recognition of the need for a just transition
<p>Policy change regarding the Belgian position at European/international level (Impact 2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Belgium not joining the High Ambition Coalition – COP 24: Belgium signed the declaration towards just transition and a declaration on gender and climate refugees – COP 25: Belgium joint the Article 6 coalition and confirmed its contribution of 100 Million EUR (20 million EUR/year) to the Green Climate Fund.

Discursive change with regard to climate policy (impact 1, indicator 3)

- ¹²⁵ The climate crisis has become more visible (e.g. more drought, rains, cold) and there are less climate change deniers. The equation is currently rather between climate realist and the ambitious group. All political decision makers understand the urgency for ambitious climate policy but differ in opinion regarding the need for concrete targets and measures to be taken and as such differ in opinion regard the commitments that need to be taken towards emission reduction and decarbonisation. On soft issues, such as the impact of climate on gender, the existence of climate refugees and the importance of international climate finance there is less disagreement.
- ¹²⁶ Till the end of 2018, ruling parties adopted a climate conservative approach whereas opposition parties pushed for concrete and ambitious targets that are in line with PWG positions. The new federal government that was installed in October 2020 shows more commitment in its government agreement for climate policy. Three relevant ministers that are responsible for climate relate policy domains within the federal government belong to the green parties.
- ¹²⁷ Although several targets as proposed by the PWG have not been adopted as formal Belgian position, there is an evolution in the political debate. For example, the NECP already indicates that the emission reduction should be higher than -40% by 2030.

Baseline data:

- There are no base-line data on policy discourse on the Belgian climate policy of the main thematic experts in the different political parties, as this is currently not being tracked systematically by CJP coordinators.
- With regard to the European negotiations, under the current government, Belgium has lost its position of a constructive and progressive ally on climate policy topics.
- Under pressure of N-VA, Belgium is not lobbying for ambitious concrete targets with regard to emission reduction, stating that the lower targets are already not being achieved.

MTE data:

- All political decision makers understand the urgency for ambitious climate policy but differ in opinion regarding the need for concrete targets and commitments with regard to emission reduction and international climate finance.
- Not only the opposition parties but also Open VLD, CD&V and MR (part of the coalition till October 2020) have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the PWG and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP and to show more ambition during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA and Vlaamse Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitious.
- Till the end of 2018, ruling parties adopted a climate conservative approach whereas opposition parties pushed for concrete and ambitious targets that are in line with PWG positions. The new federal government that was installed in October 2020 shows more commitment in its government agreement for climate policy. Three relevant ministers that are responsible for climate relate policy domains within the federal government belong to the green parties.



Belgian policy in favour of climate justice (impact 3, indicator 4)

¹²⁸ *Procedural change* – The PWG has already since long advocated to increase transparency of the policy making process with regard to climate policy. Mainly the lack of transparency of the National Climate Commission is criticized. The lack of transparency was also criticised by several MP when discussing the development of the NECP (see previous sections). Climate governance is perceived by many stakeholders (including political decision makers) as problematic. PWG has formulated several proposals, among them the need for a Special Climate Act, the need for the installation of an independent climate expert panel and independent audits of the work of the National Climate Commission. The only progress achieved is the fact that Article 7bis of the constitution was accepted to be open for revision during the new government period (2020 onwards), which can create the modalities to vote for a Special Climate Act. The relevance of such a Special Climate Act is accepted by all political parties, except N-VA. Discussions on the content of the Act prove to be challenging.

¹²⁹ *Policy change* – policy change achieved is summarised in table 10 at the start of this section and described in the cases presented in chapter 3. Following table, presents an overview of the evolution in the Belgian climate policy development process, compared to the baseline situation. Detailed analysis of the extent the demands of the PWG have been included in the federal and regional NECP is added in annex 11.

Table 11: Description of the state of affairs regarding climate policy development processes

Policy development processes	State of affairs mid 2018⁹¹	State of affairs October 2020
The effort sharing regulation between the regions of Belgium	The effort sharing regulation horizon 2030 between the regions has not started. There are no indications for an increased Belgian and European ambition.	Discussions on the effort sharing regulations have started at the National Climate Commission.
The inter-parliamentary climate resolution	The draft resolution was being discussed at the moment of the baseline. CJP positions with regard to emission reduction targets and international climate finance (without targets) will only be dealt with as minority amendments. The draft of June 2018 does not reflect any of the CJP ambitions and refers only to some principles of the urgency of a need for an ambitious climate policy.	The inter-parliamentary resolution was voted on 15 November 2018. 13 of the 24 PWG positions have been being discussed of which 7 have been adopted. ⁹² No reference to concrete ambitious targets as proposed by the PWG (e.g. -55% emission reduction by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2050, phasing out of biofuels). Further, the resolution is rather vague with regard to the intra-Belgian governance and strategies towards a just transition to a carbon free society. With regard to the emission reduction target for 2030. A compromise seems to have been reached as reference is made to an emission reduction target that should be higher than -40% and in line with the European ambition. ⁹³
The National Energy and Climate Plan 2030	Policy development process is ongoing and guided by the NCC. No drafts are available yet. From the interviews, it appears that there is a lack of political will to develop a national policy with clear ambitious targets.	A NECP was finalised by December 2019 but judged by the European Commission as not sufficiently ambitious. Critique of the Climate Coalition is the following: (i) lack of ambition by 2030, (ii) lack of shared long term vision, (iii) no balanced decision of commitments to reduce emissions between ETS sectors on the one hand and citizens and SME on the other hand, (iv) lack of concrete measures to realise the ambitions set towards a just transition, (v) an unacceptable focus on biofuels, (vi) lack of planning, budget and modalities to realise a just transition and no attention for the impact of the global South, (vii) the NECP is not an integrated plan but a compilation of the separate regional and federal climate policies.

⁹¹ Based on CJP (Februari 2018) beleidscontext Platform Klimaatrechtvaardigheid. And CJP (s.d.) Analyse van de klimaatop in Bonn (COP23) Aanbevelingen voor 2018. And minutes from the inter-parliamentary climate commission. And Interviews conducted during baseline study.

⁹² From the initial set of 24 demands 7 have been adopted: the need for a Climate Act, Reform of company-car system, border tax system, recognition of climate refugees, biodiversity, carbon tax, enhance transparency in decision making of national climate commission. Other demands of PWG also have been adopted that refer to the need to support for vulnerable countries, climate change impacting on gender and women rights, right of indigenous people, loss and damages regulations, contribution to international climate financing (but only up to 50 million EUR/year)

⁹³ Voorstel van resolutie betreffende het Vlaamse en nationale klimaatbeleid van Robrecht Bothuyne, Andries Gryffroy, Willem-Fredeik Schilts, Bruno Tobback en Johan Danen. Voorstel van 24 oktober 2018 en goedgekeurd op 15 november 2018.



		<p>The new federal government, installed in October 2020, fully aligns with the European ambitions of the Green deal, which is in line with the demands of the PWG, and which means that the NECP needs to be adapted to these new goals. The federal government engaged to make the necessary adaptations through an 'action plan'.</p>
<p>The Belgian position in the international negotiations</p>	<p>The COP24 In Katowice is the next milestone (end 2018)</p> <p>Belgium has not shown yet commitment to take an ambitious position in the international negotiations. Room for manoeuvre for the negotiators is guided by the inter-parliamentary resolution.</p> <p>Indications that the Belgian delegation will ask for a clear Paris Rulebook, which includes agreements on all necessary issues, such as on the definition and reporting on climate finance (as defended by Belgian at COP23 in Bonn). But discussions ongoing at federal and regional level about the definition of climate finance.</p> <p>The permanent representation of Belgium towards the EU abstained during the voting (June 2018) in the European council, of the European climate agreement between the European council, the commission and the European parliament, not wanting a commitment to increase emission reduction up to -40% by 2030.</p>	<p><i>COP24 Katowice (December 2018):</i></p> <p>Belgium did not join the High Ambition Coalition, blocked by the position of the Flemish government. No ambition shown with regard to the Belgian contribution to international climate finance.</p> <p>The Paris Rulebook⁹⁴ was adopted but remains vague on several topics.</p> <p>No agreement obtained on how to regulate the international carbon market.</p> <p>Belgium, together with 52 countries, signed the declaration towards just transition but this is not yet included in the Paris Rulebook or other mechanisms to implement the Paris Agreement. In the margin of the COP, Belgium signed a declaration on gender and climate refugees.</p> <p><i>COP25 Madrid (December 2019):</i></p> <p>Belgium not joining the High Ambition Coalition. The European Green Deal presented at the COP, showing commitment to an emission reduction of -55% by 2030 and to become carbon neutral by 2050. Belgium does not support this ambition.⁹⁵</p>

⁹⁴ Rules and guidelines to put the Paris Agreement into practice

⁹⁵ In December 2020, the new government has taken the decision to adopt the European ambition of -55% emission reduction by 2030 (to be subject of the final evaluation)

		Belgium joining the Article 6 coalition, a group headed by Costa Rica that plea for strong rules for the introduction of global carbon markets. Belgium (federal) confirmed a pledge to the GCF of 100 millionEUR.
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Baseline data:

- At procedural level: lack of transparency of the decision-making process of the national climate commission.
- At policy level:
 - Absence of a National Energy and Climate plan 2030. Policy development ongoing. Lack of political will so far to develop an ambitious national policy that also includes ambitious targets regarding burden sharing within Belgium.
 - Effort sharing regulations⁹⁶ date from 2015 (only put in practice since 2017) but stay far below the targets asked by CJP. Effort sharing regulation horizon 2030 between the regions has not started. No indications that there is room for an increased Belgian and European ambition.
 - Draft inter-parliamentary resolution does not include concrete targets for emission reduction and international climate finance. 13 of the 24 CJP positions are being discussed.
 - Preparations for COP24 in Katowice: Belgium is not willing to take an active role at the European level to push for an increase of the European 2030 goals to -55% emission reduction and is, besides Italy, the only country in west-Europe that is not pushing for this ambition.
 - No tangible commitments for an annual increase in the Belgian contribution to climate finance; and contribution is not new or additional. Belgian contribution to climate finance mounted to 100 million in 2016 but CJP critique on the definition of climate financing number (no numbers yet for 2017)
 - No official government position to push for ambitious targets regarding emission reduction. Government does not want concrete targets and defends an emission reduction of maximum – 40% by 2020.
- All political decision makers understand the urgency for ambitious climate policy but differ in opinion regarding the need for concrete targets and commitments with regard to emission reduction and international climate finance. Ruling parties adopt a climate conservative approach whereas opposition parties push for concrete and ambitious targets that are in line with CJP positions.

Mid-Term data:

- At procedural level: lack of transparency of the decision-making process of the national climate commission still continues. Improvement of climate governance, as demanded by PWG, is included in the proposal for Special Climate Act.
- At policy level:
 - Effort sharing regulation horizon 2030 between the regions was part of the development of the NECP. The NECP only aims at -35% emission reduction in non ETS sectors, which is far below the demands of the PWG, and the European ambition.
 - NECP 2030 finalised in December 2019 not demonstrating sufficient ambition and lacking concrete measures towards just transition. The NECP is not an integrated plan but a compilation of the regional and federal climate policies.

⁹⁶ The Effort Sharing legislation establishes binding annual greenhouse gas emission targets for Member States for the periods 2013–2020 and 2021–2030. These targets concern emissions from most sectors not included in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), such as transport, buildings, agriculture and waste.

- Inter-parliamentary resolution adopted but without concrete targets for emission reduction and international climate finance. Several positions of PWG have been being included.
- Positions at COP meetings (Katowice and Madrid): Belgium not joining the High Ambition Coalition. Belgium not supporting the European ambition of -55% emission reduction by 2030. Belgium joining Article 6 coalition that pleads for strong rules for the global carbon markets. Belgium confirming contribution of 100 million EUR to the Green Climate Fund that is additional.⁹⁷
- Official government position regarding emission reduction was in 2018 set on -35% by 2030. The NECP of December 2019 refers to an increase in ambition and states that the emission reduction should be higher than -40% by 2030 (but without clear targets).
- The new federal government, installed in October 2020, fully aligns with the European ambitions of the Green Deal, which means that the NECP needs to be adapted to these new goals. The federal government engaged to make the necessary adaptations through an 'action plan'.

Share of national policy makers reached by PWG, who view information channels (direct formal, direct non-formal and indirect communication) as relevant. (output 8, indicator 5 and 6)

- ¹³⁰ All political decision makers interviewed confirmed that information received from the PWG was relevant for their work. As stated during the baseline, members of parliament acknowledge that the PWG/Climate Coalition is well informed on climate policy issues, and brings specific topics to the attention that are less addressed by other lobbyist, such as international climate finance, putting the climate debate in an international perspective (e.g. climate refugees, leaving no-one behind) and bringing the topic of biofuels (also lobbied for separately by 11.11.11) more to the forefront. The information provided is even more relevant for new members of parliament, of which several do not know the content of the inter-parliamentary resolution that was adopted under the former government.
- ¹³¹ As described in the section contribution analysis (chapter 3.3) the most effective L&A strategy in influencing positions of decision makers is through direct contact (formal and non-formal), to a lesser extent mailing, and even less relevant the presence in the media. Several interviewees indicated they would like to have more contact, to feel more supported by the members of the PWG during their policy work.
- ¹³² Mass mobilisations and one-off actions have not influenced much positions of politicians but have contributed to putting or keeping the climate debate on the political agenda.

Baseline data:

- All members of parliament reached (opposition and ruling parties) find direct contacts (both formal and informal) more relevant compared to indirect contact.
- All interviewees at cabinets agree that ministers want to be informed by civil society but that they also are sensitive for indirect actions like letters and civic actions.

⁹⁷ The Belgium contribution to international climate finance till 2020 was set on 50 million EUR/year, new and additional. Belgium reported a contribution of 100 million EUR in 2016 but PWG had critique on the definition of climate financing, and contribution was not new or additional.



MTE:

- idem as baseline
- Mass mobilisations and one-off actions have not influenced much positions of politicians but have contributed to putting or keeping the climate debate on the political agenda

Share of national policy makers, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who view the PWG platform as influential on their opinion forming process (outcome 3, indicator 7)

¹³³ Only a limited number of policy makers was interviewed. They all recognised the PWG/Climate Coalition as a legitimate advocate for climate justice.

Share of national policy makers, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who name other actors as one of the more influential stakeholders on their opinion-forming process (outcome 3, indicator 8)

¹³⁴ All interviewees have referred to other sources and stakeholders that inform them on climate policy matters, but none of these other actors lobby on the international dimension of the climate debate. Environmental NGOs are recognised for the technical-environmental expertise and consulted as such. The societal and political vision of decision makers is dominant in developing their positions.

Baseline data:

- The large majority of the interviewees and 22 of the 31 respondents (online survey) recognise the CJP as a legitimate advocate for climate justice.
- The CJP is perceived by all interviewees as the most important information source and influencer from the civil society, on the topic of the Belgian position in the European and international negotiations.
- Other important influencers, from civil society, on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian position in international climate negotiations are Greenpeace, WWF, 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11

MTE data:

- idem baseline

Share of national policy makers form the total pool of policy makers engaged in the topic of climate change, who know the PWG (outcome 3, indicator 9)

¹³⁵ The PWG/Climate Coalition is well known by all policy makers interviewed. They do not make a distinction between PWG and Climate Coalition. The advocates are known as representing the Climate Coalition. They know that the Climate Coalition represents a large group of CSOs and that the different groups of CSOs are represented in the coalition. In the French community, the spokesperson of the Climate Coalition is well known, through his participation in panels and debates in the media.

Share of national policy makers form the total pool of policy makers engaged in the topic of climate change, who view the specific composition of the PWG as a comparative strength. (outcome 3, indicator 10)

¹³⁶ All interviewees appreciate the fact that a wide variety of civil society organisations have joined one platform at Belgian level (including Flemish and Walloon organisations) and support common positions. It facilitates the dialogue with the civil society. Interviewees appreciate the variety of expertise that is present in the platform. There is no misunderstanding among policy makers of the positions and advocacy agendas of the PWG and of its separate members, except the fact that it is for many policy makers difficult to separate the positions defended by 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 directly from the positions brought forward as spokesperson and coordinators of the platform (as they often relate to the same topic and/or the same advocates lobby on behalf of the own organisation and of the Climate Coalition).

Baseline data:

- All thematic experts of the different political parties and all relevant cabinets know the existence of the CJP platform.
- The majority of the policy makers also know the composition of the platform (they can name the different groups constituting the platform)
- All interviewees (parliament and cabinets) appreciate the fact that a wide variety of civil society organisations have joined one platform at Belgian level and support common positions. It enables an efficient dialogue with civil society.

MTE:

- idem as baseline



4 TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE INTERNAL COORDINATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORTS OF THE PWG STRENGTHEN THE LEVERAGE, CREDIBILITY AND CAPACITY OF THE PWG AND ITS MEMBERS?

4.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION STRATEGIES AS DESCRIBED IN THE TOC

¹³⁷ The second causal question is related to the internal functioning of the Climate Coalition, more specifically its political working group (PWG) and reads as follow “To what extent do the internal coordination and capacity building efforts of the PWG strengthen the leverage, credibility and capacity of the PWG and its members?” (impact hypothesis).

¹³⁸ In the ToC that was reconstructed during the baseline study, several outputs are situated at the internal level of the Climate Coalition: practices and knowledge on climate justice are developed and exchanged (output 2), the members of the PWG are up-to-date on current climate justice issues (output 3) and coordinated positions on climate justice issues are adopted (output 4). These outputs should lead to a visible social support for demands in favour of climate justice (outcome 1) and high-quality knowledge on climate justice within the platform (outcome 2), which then would contribute to an increase in the leverage and credibility of the platform members and civil society organisations (CSOs) (outcome 3).

Table 12: Reconstructed pathway of change with regard to the internal functioning of the Climate Coalition

Activity type	Outputs	Immediate outcome	Intermediate outcome	Impact
Dialogue between the PWG and the Climate Coalition	Mobilisation campaigns and one-off actions organised and aligned to political work (output 1)	Visible support base for demands in favour of climate justice is generated (outcome 1)	The Climate Coalition gains leverage and credibility on the topic of climate justice	Contribution to different levels of impact at policy level (see table 10 in chapter 3.4)
Meetings of the PWG	Coordinated positions on climate justice (memorandum, policy briefs with analyses and positions) (output 4)			
Policy monitoring				
Drafting and facilitating common positions				
Research on climate justice topics (by members PWG)	Practices and knowledge on climate justice are	High quality knowledge on climate justice		

Study days (organised by Climate Coalition and/or its members)	developed and exchanged (Output 2)	within the PWG is available (outcome 2)		
Information put on the website of the Climate Coalition (by the coordinator of the Climate Coalition)	The members of the PWG are up-to-date on current climate justice issues (output 3)			
Mailings to members of the Climate Coalition (by the coordinator of the Climate Coalition)				

¹³⁹ During baseline, following assumptions have been identified for the functioning of the PWG:

- PWG members are able to reach common positions on climate justice issues
- Individual members of the PWG are able to transcend their individual interests
- PWG member organisations combine sufficient expertise in order to generate high quality knowledge in the platform

¹⁴⁰ The role of the coordinators of the PWG (11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11) has slightly changed since the integration of the PWG in the Climate Coalition in 2018. The secretariat of the Climate Coalition has become responsible for facilitating knowledge exchange and bringing members up-to-date on climate justice issues, which is not limited to the members of the PWG but targets all members of the Climate Coalition. This is mainly done through the organisation of study events, the development of a newsletter (4 in 2019, 7 in 2020), through the website (information on activities of the Climate Coalition, newsletter, press releases, positions of the PWG and policy briefs) and direct mailings to the members of the Climate Coalition.

¹⁴¹ The role of the coordinators of the PWG (subject of this impact evaluation) consists mainly in preparing and facilitating the meetings of the PWG, preparing draft positions and facilitating the process of drafting coordinated positions of the PWG. In 2019, a lot of effort was put in developing a memorandum that has become a comprehensive policy document representing all shared positions of the Climate Coalition (representing positions of the North-South movement, the environmental movement, the trade unions, youth and civic initiatives). Based on this memorandum, specific recommendations have been formulated, for example on the NECP, for the COP25 in Madrid and for the future federal government (see also chapter 2). The recommendations of the Climate Coalition are the result of a consensus.

¹⁴² Research and analysis of policy evolutions (policy monitoring) is taken up by the individual members of the PWG on their topics of interest. The extent research is being conducted depends on the human and financial resources available at the respective organisations. For example, Oxfam has done a comprehensive analysis of the NECP, WWF did a study on fossil fuel subsidies and Arbeid&Milieu on the role of investment companies in financing transition and on carbon taxation. In their analyses, the position of the own organisation is guiding, which is often more ambitious than the positions taken by the Climate Coalition. Research and policy analyses are shared among the



coalition members, but this process is not systematised and dependent on the initiative of the individual members.

- ¹⁴³ Also, the coordinators of the PWG build expertise in specific policy topics. 11.11.11. is developing a dossier on biofuels (supported by an adhoc coalition on biofuels), 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 advocate also on behalf of their organisation on the Belgian ambition at European and international level with regard to the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The coordinators of the PWG have made analyses of the COP meetings and the Green deal, which were shared with the coalition members and put on the website of the Climate Coalition.
- ¹⁴⁴ Since 2018, the Climate Justice Platform has become formally integrated in the Climate Coalition, which has the independent juridical statute of a non-profit organisation, with a general assembly (all members), a management board, and three working groups (the political working group, the working group on mobilisation and the working group on communication). Statutes have been updated in 2018, among others to organise well the decision-making process within the coalition and to finetune the admission process (to enable also membership of the so-called 'civic initiatives' like grandparents for the Climate and youth for the climate). It was agreed that the two presidents (president and vice-president) would need to represent the two language communities and the two largest groups of CSO, namely the North-South movement and the environmental movement. In the period 2019-2020, these presidents, were the advocacy officer of Greenpeace (vice) and the head of the policy department of CNCD-11.11.11. (president). These two presidents also act as spokesperson. In the management board, the different groups within civil society are represented: environmental CSOs, North-South movement and human rights, trade unions, youth, civic initiatives for the climate. There is also place for two representatives from the other CSOs that cannot be categorised in the former groups (like CSOs for education, democracy, alternative economy, ...). A bureau was established, consisting of the two presidents, the treasurer and the secretary. The Climate Coalition has a small secretariat, with one employee, the Climate Coalition coordinator.
- ¹⁴⁵ The political working group counts 11 members (9 members + 2 coordinators + climate coalition coordinator). In 2019, the decision was taken to install a core group of nine members, all professional climate experts, that closely monitors policy processes, conducts the policy influencing work and has the mandate to make quick and flexible decisions with regard to urgent matters or current events. A broader group of 71 members supports the work of the core team (almost the entire Climate Coalition). It is the place for the broader discussions on the political analyses and the positioning of the Climate Coalition. In 2019, the broader group was involved in the development of the memorandum of the Climate Coalition, which serves as the guiding policy document for the L&A that is conducted on behalf of the Climate Coalition.

4.2 DATA AT OUTPUT LEVEL

¹⁴⁶ The baseline data for the internal stream of the ToC are grouped under three evaluation questions (see annex 2) : (1) to what extent do the members of the PWG view the PWG as their main channel for advocacy on climate justice (with indicators 11, 12 and 13), (2) to what extent are the PWG and its members able to adjust and capitalise on the changing political and social context (indicators 14 and 15) and (3) how are the members of the PWG and the Climate Coalition cooperating with each other (indicators 16, 17 and 18). Following, the results of the interviews with members of the Climate Coalition and the study of documents of the Climate Coalition are presented.

Share of CJP members who use other channels for their advocacy work on climate justice (success factor, indicator 11)

¹⁴⁷ The Climate Coalition unites 77 CSOs and civic initiatives that advocate for climate justice. Variety of members does not only relate to the topics and target groups these members represent but also to the expertise, human and financial resources available for climate justice advocacy. The latter explains the extent organisation individually are involved in climate justice advocacy work. Organisations that do not have climate justice at the core of their work and/or that do not have specific staff available to that end, rely on the Climate Coalition for the climate justice advocacy (e.g. Eckerk, Vlaamse Jeugdraad, Forum des Jeunes, Fian, Natuurpunt, ACLVB, ...). Other organisations with relevant expertise and resources available on climate policy conduct a lot of policy influencing directly, focussing on their specific priorities (e.g. WWF on fossil fuels and biodiversity, Arbeid en Milieu on financing transition and carbon tax, Greenpeace on mobility, ...). Some of them are also member of the FRDO (like Oxfam, the trade unions), are invited directly to participate in multi-stakeholder meetings (e.g. Oxfam, IEW, ...), are included in the official delegation at the COP (e.g. 11.11.11, CNCD-11.11.11, Oxfam), or through their international networks represented at the COP (e.g. Greenpeace, WWF, ...).

¹⁴⁸ According to the interviewees, the L&A conducted separately by the members of the Climate Coalition strengthens the L&A conducted by the PWG, and vice versa. Often members refer to the positions of the Climate Coalition in their own L&A interventions. Their own direct advocacy work usually centres on more ambitious positions, as compared to the positions of the Climate Coalition, which are the result of a consensus of a broad and varied group of organisations, or on more technical aspects of positions.

Baseline data:

- The majority of the platform members do not have a policy officer or do not prioritise their policy influencing on the CJP topics and delegate the policy influencing on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian position in international negotiations to the platform.
- Those members that have a policy officer and that are actively influencing policy decision makers on climate issues combine their own policy influencing strategies with policy influencing strategies through the platform and often accompany the CJP coordinators during their meetings with decision makers. This is also the case of the CJP coordinators themselves who also relate with policy makers (directly and indirectly) on similar topics as defended by the platform.

MTE data

- idem as baseline



Share of PWG members who use the positions of PWG in communication with national policy makers (success factor, indicator 12)

- ¹⁴⁹ See in the above. Members of the Climate Coalition interviewed confirmed that in their communication with policy makers they refer to the positions of Climate Coalition, which are complementary to their own theme-specific advocacy and as such mutually strengthening the L&A work of the PWG and the individual members.
- ¹⁵⁰ Several organisations interviewed confirmed that the Climate Coalition also serves as a platform to disseminate their own positions among the civil society, as such advocating internally, within the network, to bring their positions on the agenda of the PWG or on the agenda of other CSO. Several of these theme-specific positions have become included in the memorandum that was developed in 2019.

Baseline data:

- CJP members that are actively involved in climate justice policy influencing use also CJP positions in their own interventions.
- Individual members of the platform most often defend more ambitious demands and positions as compared to the common positions of CJP, which are based on a consensus of a broad and diverse group of CSO.

MTE data:


- idem as baseline
- Members of the Climate Coalition have also put their own specific demands on the agenda of the PWG, of which several have become included in the memorandum of the Climate Coalition.

Qualitative description of the strengths and weaknesses of the PWG by the members (success factor, indicator 13)

- ¹⁵¹ To assess the quality of the PWG, the framework for Assessing Collaborative Processes (JP Mc Mahon 2008) was applied that assesses strengths and weaknesses on six parameters (see annex 12), as visualised in following figure, further substantiated by using evidence-based indicators of success of coalitions as documented by the TCC Group for the California Endowment.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Raynor, J. (2011) What makes an effective coalition? Evidence-based indicators of success. USA/ The California Endowment.

Figure 2: Scoring on the six dimensions for assessing collaborative processes



¹⁵² *Collaborative context:* Climate justice is a priority concern for many CSOs and already since 2008 the importance of joining forces was recognised by civil society. The added value of advocating through a coalition only has become increasingly recognised by CSOs, also demonstrated by the fact that new members keep on joining the Climate Coalition (e.g. Grand-parents for the Climate and the mutual insurance companies). The topic is suitable for collaboration. Climate justice touches upon many different topics that demand a variety of expertise. Interviewees confirm that one of the added values of the Climate Coalition is the opportunity it creates for internal networking, linking with and learning from other CSO and other movements. The cross-over between the North-South movement, the environmental movements, the trade unions and youth is assessed as very enriching. The transition that is needed for the implementation of the Paris Declaration requires a broad support base in society. Each of the members of the climate coalition is contributing to building this support base.

¹⁵³ After the integration of the PWG in the Climate Coalition, and to prepare for the electoral period in 2019, a memorandum has been developed in a democratic and participatory manner, involving all members of the Climate Coalition. This process resulted in a common understanding and agreement of positions, translated in a shared position document that is guiding the advocacy work. Evidently, the memorandum is the result of a broad consensus, which makes the positions less ambitious. Some interviewees referred to the fact this resulted in more feasible positions for political actors.

¹⁵⁴ The memorandum was developed through a transparent and inclusive decision-making process, which was positively appreciated by all people interviewed. The interests of all members have been discussed and understood. The memorandum includes a broad set of topics and positions. Two interviewees also would like to see a more concise policy document that aligns the members around clearly identified common goals or a clear long-term vision to guide the political work of the coalition.



Members are too often focused on their own thematic topics. The development of a long-term vision and a multi-annual programme is planned but delayed since the corona outbreak.

- ¹⁵⁵ *Competent representation:* This criterion assesses to what extent representatives of participating organisations in a collaborative process are sufficiently qualified, well selected and sufficiently engaged in the collaboration. As described in the above, the coalition represents a variety of members, also in terms of expertise and knowledge, human and financial resources available. Members that have climate justice at the core of their work are usually active members and show similar commitment and motivation to invest in the PWG. They attend most meetings of the PWG and are well prepared. They receive also adequate organisational support from their respective organisations. Other members show varying levels of commitment and motivation, and do not always attend well-prepared the meetings. This has delayed the decision-making process in the PWG as members needed to be brought up-to-date and discussions needed to be repeated.
- ¹⁵⁶ Also, smaller organisations that have to rely on the advocacy work of the Climate Coalition sometimes strongly pushed for their opinions to be included in the positions of the PWG, which were sometimes more interest driven than based upon evidence and/or not supported by a broad support base. As decisions are taken by consensus/unanimity, all members have equal power and all voices are taken into account, which at times delayed the decision-making process.
- ¹⁵⁷ In the course of 2019, the Climate Coalition has taken the decision to divide the PWG into a core group and a broader group, with the core group demanding and expecting a certain level of commitment and expertise. In the core group, the more political and technical discussions are now taking place and positions are being developed, which are further presented for discussion and approval in the broader group. This appears to have been a good decision to increase efficiency, but is at the same time a (maybe inevitable) concession to the democratic nature of the decision-making process, as stated by some interviewees.
- ¹⁵⁸ Staff turn-over is common in civil society, but it can be noticed that many representatives of members are already engaged in the PWG since long, including the Flemish coordinator (11.11.11) of the PWG and the president of the Climate Coalition (CNCD-11.11.11). This consistency contributes to the effectiveness of the advocacy work, in terms of expertise built, visibility and relationship building.
- ¹⁵⁹ *Embrace diversity:* All interviewees agree that the diversity of the coalition is well managed by the coordinators of the PWG. The tension between the more pragmatic opinions and the more radical opinions, often becoming visible along the divide between professional organisations (having more technical expertise, evidence based) and volunteers (more emotional driven), is a continuous challenge for the coalition. All interviewees confirm that the coordinators of the PWG demonstrate good diplomatic skills, sensitivity for all different opinions, and that they give the radical organisations proper attention without allowing them to take-over the debates. The coordinators also ensure that the views of less powerful members are given a voice.

- ¹⁶⁰ The diversity of the Climate Coalition is also seen by all interviewees as an added value. Use is made from available expertise among members and the networks they are involved in (e.g. FRDO, Nationale Vrouwenraad, CAN, IISD (international Institute for Sustainable Development, UNDP). Studies are shared, through newsletters, in meetings or during study events. Via the different contacts and networks of the members, high experts could be attracted for the study events (e.g. from CAN Europe on emission reductions, an expert on carbon tax, ...). Another example, IEW that was invited for the multi-stakeholder dialogue on the NECP (and not the PWG) informed the PWG on this event and facilitated the participation of Oxfam in the discussions (Oxfam having made a comprehensive analysis of the draft NECP).
- ¹⁶¹ *Collaborative attitude*: is assessed as strong. According to the interviewees, all members demonstrate attitudes of respect and trust. Leadership is shared, rather than positional. Members show flexibility. There is sufficient transparency, data and research are freely shared and explained. The coordinators put energy in both completing the tasks and improving the working relationships.
- ¹⁶² *Effective communication*: Dialogue and consensus building are key in the decision-making process, within the PWG and the coalition at large. There is sufficient openness to listen to each other and accept different opinions. The coordinators play an important role to that end. They come well-prepared at the meetings and these are well-structured.
- ¹⁶³ There is a lot of information sharing and all interviewees referred to the need to further rationalise and systematize the information flow. A balance needs to be looked for between general and specialised information, between too technical and too simple, between information needs of the climate experts and the needs of the non-experts. Furthermore, according to some interviewees less information is being shared on the advocacy process itself and the progress or milestones realised.
- ¹⁶⁴ *Collaborative structure*: With the integration of the PWG in the Climate Coalition, a new structure, including clear task description and clear voting process, was developed as described in the introduction of this chapter (general assembly, management board, bureau, secretariat, three working groups). This seems to work well. The way of working of the PWG was adapted because of corona, and according to the interviewees, the online meetings need to be maintained in post-corona times (combined with face-to-face meetings) as these demands less time investment and creates more focused meetings. An observation by some of the interviewees relates to the management board that is maybe too operational. It has happened that discussions that have taken place in the core group of the PWG have been repeated in the management board (which is redundant for organisations that participate in both organs).
- ¹⁶⁵ The collaborative structure takes the diversity of the membership fully into account, balancing Flemish and French speaking representatives and representatives from the different CSO groups. Since the climate demonstrations, new civic initiatives also have joined the Climate Coalition and were given a place in the structure of the organisation. It was acknowledged that the coordinators of the PWG both (Flemish and French) represent the North-South movement. Actually, this is not perceived as problematic as both coordinators are sufficiently sensitive for the positions of the other groups. But the same approach as existing for the appointment of the presidents should apply also for the PWG coordinators, according several interviewees.



¹⁶⁶ Because of the unpredictability of policy influencing, rapid action is sometimes needed. It was noted by several interviewees that sometimes positions have been taken before they had been approved by all relevant organs. Furthermore, adaptations have been done to the statutes with regard to the decision-making process after a conflict had arisen on the decision to participate as Climate Coalition in the Sign for my future action (coordinated by several private companies and the Shift). This decision was highly contested by several members. The new procedure now foresees in the possibility to ask for a specific meeting to rediscuss a position if 25% of the members in the general assembly are not agreeing with a certain position.

Baseline data:

Strengths:

- Diverse composition of the platform, which is unique in Europe. Including a North-South dimension in to the policy debates of the environmentalist group and trade unions
- CJP contributes to enhanced knowledge on climate issues, keeps the members up-to-date on actual climate debates at Belgian and international level and contributes to the internal policy debates within the members organisations
- Good knowledge of the CJP coordinators of the strengths, positions and sensitivity of each of the members and ability to propose positions that are acceptable for the entire group
- Different opinions are respected, transparent decision-making process. Consensus is being looked for
- Process and procedures in place to react quickly when needed

Weaknesses:

- Diversity of the platform members complicates the process of formulating ambitious positions
- It takes time to come to common positions shared by the large and diverse group

MTE data:

Strengths:

- Idem as baseline +
- The division of the PWG into a core group and the broader group has enhanced efficiency of developing positions.
- Consistency of representatives of the Climate Coalition and the PWG, which has a positive influence on visibility and relation building
- Diversity is well managed. Diversity in expertise and networks is an added value of members.
- The PWG scores high on the 6 parameters for assessing collaborative processes

Weaknesses:

- Weaknesses identified during baseline are still valid (and inherent part of this type of broad coalitions) but are better managed currently.
- Not all members of the PWG participate well-prepared at meetings
- Communication flow could be further rationalised and systematised, taking into account the different information needs of the members.

¹⁶⁷ In summary, the members of the PWG, view the PWG as an important channel for advocacy on climate justice. For several PWG members that actively advocate themselves on climate justice topics, the PWG is not the only channel for climate justice advocacy, but an important one, as it is the only coalition that represents a large support base within civil society and as such enhances its legitimacy and credibility. The Climate Coalition (including the PWG) is a well-functioning coalition that manages well diversity, adopts an inclusive decision-making process and that is an important information source for all its members on climate justice advocacy.

4.3 DATA ON INDICATORS AT OUTCOME LEVEL

To what extent are the PWG and its members able to adjust and capitalise on the changing political and social context? (success factor; indicators 14 and 15)

See chapter 3.3. under the assessment of the contribution of the PWG to policy changes.

¹⁶⁸ The coordinators have shown good knowledge of the policy context and climate policy development processes. The PWG has been able to respond adequately to windows of opportunity for policy influencing and to react quickly (see cases on international climate finance, COP 25 negotiation). The PWG has been important in organising the political work around the climate mobilisations in 2019, as such leveraging the activism of the Youth for the climate to bring also concrete political demands into the political debate (e.g. case on Special Climate Act).

Qualitative assessment of the quality of the delivered products by PWG and quality of the coordination (outcome 2, indicators 16 and 17)

¹⁶⁹ The assessment of these indicators is included in the previous chapter under 'effective communication' and 'embrace diversity', and summarised in the box below that gives an overview of the MTE data.

Qualitative assessment of synergies between the climate coalition and PWG (outcome 1, indicator 18)

¹⁷⁰ It is clear that the integration of the former Climate Justice Platform in the Climate Coalition, has improved considerably the synergy between the PWG and the Climate Coalition. In fact, the PWG is now integral part of the Climate Coalition. Furthermore, much more members are interested in and involved in the political work, as compared to the baseline (29 members of the CJP). Currently 71 members (almost all members) have indicated their interest in the political work and are member of the broad PWG. Effective decision-making processes and voting procedures have been installed to guarantee inclusive, transparent and democratic decision making. The political positions are supported by a broad support base within civil society.

¹⁷¹ Synergy between the political work and the actions/mobilisations has improved a lot. There are examples of actions with a clear link between the advocacy work (e.g. the Occupy for Climate when Article 7bis was being debated and voted, the 100 days Countdown on the NECP, Fries and beers action in Brussels when the PWG handed over a letter with demands to the 'preformateurs'. Some



interviewees stated that alignment between the political work and ‘mobilisations/actions’ still can be improved, not all demonstrations are directly linked to policy influencing work.

Baseline data:

- The quality of the products delivered by CJP is assessed as good by all 11 members CJP interviewed and confirmed in the survey
- The functioning of CJP is assessed as good by all 11 CJP members interviewed: good quality of reports of the platform meetings, good facilitation of the meetings, good quality of the preparatory work, good frequency of meetings and the timely delivery of preparatory documents. The participatory approach is appreciated and members feel that their opinions are taken into account.
- The CJP coordinator manage to find a good balance in the different positions of CJP members.
- Active participation of CJP and communication of its positions in European and international networks is perceived by CJP members as limited.
- As there was not much synergy in action between CJP and the climate coalition before the merger, it is expected that synergy will improve after the merger of the CJP and the climate coalition.

MTE data:

- idem as baseline data
- An appropriate communication mix is provided (newsletters, website, mailings), which is sufficient informative but more systematization and rationalisation of the information flow is suggested by interviewees. More information on the advocacy process is asked for.
- Study events are of high quality, high experts are engaged. Study events have become more relevant with the acceleration of the climate policy debates and the entrance of new members in the Climate Coalition.
- The PWG coordinators manage well the diversity of the coalition.
- Leadership (of PWG and of the Climate Coalition) is shared rather than positional. there is sufficient transparency, data and research are freely shared and explained. the PWG coordinators put sufficient energy in completing the tasks and improving working relations.
- As the PWG has become integrated in the Climate Coalition, synergy has improved considerably. The advocacy work is becoming more aligned to the mobilisation and campaigning, but can be further strengthened.

¹⁷² In summary, the PWG coordinators are very committed in completing their tasks and in improving working relationships within the Climate Coalition. The process of developing common positions and a shared understanding among the members is well facilitated and satisfying for the members. The PWG coordinators demonstrate diplomatic skills and facilitate an inclusive and transparent decision-making process. Furthermore, the Climate Coalition, by its diversity, provides opportunities for information and knowledge exchange, and networking. Both the work of the PWG coordinators as the way the Climate Coalition is organised (valorising available expertise) have contributed to the availability of high-quality knowledge on climate justice within the Climate Coalition.

- ¹⁷³ The Climate Coalition has been able to involve more CSOs in the policy influencing process. A visible support base was created for the demands in favour of climate justice, further supported by the mass demonstrations that have taken place in 2019 (and virtually in 2020). The fact that the Climate Coalition unites a critical mass of CSOs has strengthened its legitimacy and credibility. The Climate Coalition gained leverage and credibility on the topic of climate justice, as evidenced by the fact that the Climate Coalition was invited for an audience by the 'informateur' during formation process of the new federal government, and the fact that the Climate Coalition has been able to have audiences with the former and current prime minister and their cabinets. The extent the Climate Coalition was able to effectively influence climate policy is described in chapter 3.3.
- ¹⁷⁴ In the reconstructed ToC assumptions were formulated at strategy/implementation level, which are all confirmed during this evaluation, as described in this chapter: (i) PWG members are able to reach common positions on climate justice issues, (ii) individual members of the PWG are able to transcend their individual interests, (iii) PWG member organisations combine sufficient expertise in order to generate high quality knowledge in the coalition.



5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 CONCLUSIONS

- ¹⁷⁵ The ToC for policy influencing on climate justice by the PWG/Climate Coalition is validated through the evaluation. The PWG applies a smart mix of strategies that has been relevant and effective in putting topics on the political agenda and in some occasions in contributing to positions taken over by political decision makers. The composition of the Climate Coalition (variety of civil society represented, complementary expertise and intergenerational), the high-level knowledge and quality of information provided contribute to the recognition of the Climate Coalition as a reputable and credible actor in the climate debate. Lobby targets of the PWG/Climate Coalition do not make a distinction between the L&A of the individual members or the PWG. These actions mutual reinforce each other.
- ¹⁷⁶ Politicians assessed the information provided by the PWG/Climate Coalition as relevant, of high quality and useable. The PWG/Climate Coalition is an important information source for politicians, next to other sources. Mainly direct communication appears to be the most effective means to influence political decision-makers. The PWG is respected by lobby targets for its 'supportive - informative' role. The PWG also has contributed to accelerating some policy processes, by grasping political momentum and pushing influential decision makers to adopt a position in line with the PWG (informal lobby).
- ¹⁷⁷ Indirect communication through media was assessed to have little influence on shaping the opinions of political decision makers or in influencing the political agenda, at least not in direct ways. In the period under review, some resource persons pointed out to the fact that the media mainly followed the quickly evolving developments in society and in the political arena, rather than actively feeding the political agenda. Mass demonstrations kept the climate debate on the political agenda but appear to have had more effect in influencing the political debate at European level than at Belgian level. Parties that do not agree with the positions of the PWG consider the demonstrations as not representative for the general public debate, although research showed that 94% of the Belgians support the European ambition to become climate neutral by 2050.
- ¹⁷⁸ Bottleneck is the disagreement between different political and societal groups on how to reach this high ambition, and what the consequences are for our daily lives. The PWG/Climate Coalition is also less clear on this. Interviewees confirmed that they would like to receive more hands-on input to that regard. This political disagreement is rooted in different visions on the solutions forward and relate to different levels (socio-economic, environmental-technological and social-technological positions). Researchers pointed at the dominant approach, also visible in climate advocacy in Belgium, that aims

to mainstream and depoliticize climate change in order to decrease disagreement instead of 'repoliticizing' the climate change debate and make contingency, conflict, inequality, ideology and power visible.

- ¹⁷⁹ The PWG has been able to build long-standing relations with politicians and invested in building relations with newly elected MP. The PWG has more contact with MP (direct communication and through institutionalised fora) compared to engaging with political parties and ministerial cabinets, and more contact with like-minded political groups. However, through its participation in institutionalised fora, the PWG is also able to reach out to other political groups, and the so-called foes or opponents. And because of its enhanced recognition, also supported by the mass demonstrations, the PWG/Climate Coalition was invited by high influential politicians (ministers and informateur).
- ¹⁸⁰ Several positions of the PWG have been taken over in the political discourse and were put on the political agenda by MP, such as the positions of the Climate Coalition with regard to the ambition level in the NECP, the need to include human rights and gender in the NECP, the negative impact of biofuels, the Belgian contribution to the Green Climate Fund, regulations of the international carbon market. The Climate Coalition also contributed to the discussions in parliament on the Special Climate Act. The inter-parliamentary resolution that was adopted by November 15, 2019 includes several of the positions of the PWG/Climate Coalition but does not refer to concrete ambitious targets.
- ¹⁸¹ According to the interviewees (MP and resource persons) most political decision makers understand the urgency for ambitious climate policy but differ in opinion regarding the need for concrete targets and commitments with regard to emission reduction and international climate finance. However, an evolution can be noticed. Not only the opposition parties but also Open VLD, CD&V and MR (part of the coalition at that time) have formulated questions that refer to the positions of the Climate Coalition and insist in putting concrete and higher targets in the NECP, and to show more ambitions during the COP negotiations. At Flemish side, mainly N-VA and Vlaamse Belang are hesitant in setting concrete and high ambitious.
- ¹⁸² Till the end of 2018, ruling parties adopted a climate conservative approach whereas opposition parties pushed for concrete and ambitious targets that are in line with PWG positions. The new federal government that was installed in October 2020 shows more commitment in its government agreement for climate policy. Three relevant ministers that are responsible for climate related policy domains within the federal government belong to the green parties.
- ¹⁸³ With regard to policy change, some successes were achieved. At the COP meetings (Katowice and Madrid), although Belgium is not joining the High Ambition Coalition, Belgium signed the declaration on gender and on climate refugees (COP24) and joined the Article 6 coalition that pleads for strong rules for the global carbon markets (COP25). Belgium (federal) confirmed doubling its initial contribution by making a pledge of 100 million EUR to the Green Climate Fund and confirmed that the funding is additional. The contribution of the PWG to these results was assessed as necessary. The PWG has brought these specific topics under the attention of political decision makers and no evidence was found to disconfirm this contribution.



- ¹⁸⁴ Not much advancement was obtained in other cases, such as the NECP and the lobby on the Special Climate Act. The NECP 2030 (finalised in December 2019) only aims at -35% emission reduction in non ETS sectors, which is far below the demands of the PWG, and the European ambition. The NECP does not demonstrate sufficient ambition and lacks concrete measures towards just transition. The NECP is not an integrated plan but a compilation of the regional and federal climate policies.
- ¹⁸⁵ A set of contextual factors have a strong influence on the political debate on climate policy and explain why many positions of the PWG have not been translated yet in policy targets and measures. The complicated institutional political landscape in Belgium can be seen as one of the important hampering factors. Because of lack of consensus and different opinions, mainly between the different government levels (different composed governments) no ambitious climate policy is being developed yet in Belgium. The new federal government, installed in October 2020, fully aligns with the European ambitions of the Green Deal, which means that the NECP2030 needs to be adapted to these new goals. The federal government engaged to make the necessary adaptations through an 'action plan'. The latter will be subject of the final evaluation.
- ¹⁸⁶ The assumptions that were identified during the reconstruction of the ToC have been confirmed by the MTE. PWG manages to access spaces for political dialogue and is able to generate relevant policy input on its coordinated positions. The PWG is correctly identifying and targeting influential policy makers, though not based on a comprehensive stakeholder and power mapping. The PWG has adaptive ability to respond quickly to changes in the political environment and a visible support base strengthens the legitimacy and leverage of the PWG interventions. This means that it is vital for influencing networks to be rooted in their constituencies.⁹⁹
- ¹⁸⁷ During the evaluation, other assumptions have been identified that explain the effectiveness of L&A on climate policy. These refer to (i) the importance of seizing policy windows, (ii) the importance of having access to power elites or highly influential decision makers and (iii) having allies in power. The new federal government, involving more like-minded political parties will most probably demand other type of policy influencing.
- ¹⁸⁸ Other assumptions explain why the contribution of the PWG was low in changing policy positions. These relate to cases where there is much more disagreement. Cases that are complex as they concern a transition to a carbon neutral society and that demand measures that are not only technical but also influenced by societal and political visions. One assumption is about the narrative that is applied by the PWG. The L&A of the PWG is not sufficiently diversified and adapted to the discourse of the different lobby targets. The PWG does not give insight in the reasons behind the disagreements and how to address these, as such bringing the debate on these disagreement to the forefront. Another assumption relates to the political space. The PWG has mainly targeted MP,

⁹⁹ Oxfam (2020). Beating the drum. Stories of influencing networks. The Netherlands: Oxfam Novib.

though MP are neither the only, nor the most influential political elites engaged in climate policy development. The PWG has to deal with opaque policy processes, hierarchies, political interest within political groups and administrations. Navigating these was more challenging than advocating the parliamentary policy making process.

- ¹⁸⁹ The climate coalition is an example of a strong coalition and unique in Europe as it unites diverse members from the North-South movement, the environmental movement, the trade unions, the youth and civic initiatives. Diversity in the coalition adds to complementarity but it also adds to the complexity in defining policy demands. Defining and maintaining a common set of objectives and positions is not a one-time exercise. It requires a continuous process of discussions, debates and consensus-building among the network members.¹⁰⁰ This process has been well organised by the PWG coordinators and appropriate decisions have been taken by the Climate Coalition to structure the decision-making process within the coalition. The integration of the PWG into the Climate Coalition has been conducive for strengthening the synergy between the political work and the mobilisations. The latter still can be improved.
- ¹⁹⁰ The majority of the members of the PWG do not have an advocacy officer, or do not prioritise their policy influencing on the PWG topics and delegate the policy influencing on the Belgian climate policy and the Belgian positions in international negotiations to the PWG. Several members also use the PWG for internal influencing purposes, by putting their specific thematic demands on the political agenda of the Climate Coalition. Furthermore, the PWG and the Climate Coalition are conducive for networking within the civil society, which has been beneficial in enhancing knowledge and expertise on climate policy topics and in getting access to other contacts and networks.
- ¹⁹¹ The PWG and Climate Coalition perform well according to different indicators that assess the quality and effectiveness of collaborative processes and coalitions, such as quality of leadership, management, structure, technical expertise and knowledge, the collaborative culture, the diversity and how it is being managed. Room for improvement exist with regard to internal communication. Lot of information is being shared and all interviewees referred to the need to further rationalise and systematize the information flow. A balance needs to be looked for between general and specialised information, between too technical and too simple, between information needs of the climate experts and the needs of the non-experts. Furthermore, according to some interviewees less information is being shared on the advocacy process itself and the progress or milestones realised. Lastly, the PWG has no resources available for L&A at European level. This is being done separately by individual members, often through their international branches and through CAN.

¹⁰⁰ Oxfam (2020). Beating the drum. Stories of influencing networks. The Netherlands: Oxfam Novib



5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

With regard to the policy influencing process

The climate policy discourse has evolved over the last past years, from a dichotomy between climate change deniers and climate change doomsayers, towards a solution focused debate bringing other tensions to the forefront, such as between eco-realists and people that promote mainly technological solutions and those that promote the need for more fundamental system and behaviour change. The discussion is fuelled by different visions on the solutions to combat climate change (and by consequence target setting realism-optimism), more in particularly on how to realise the ambitious targets of CO2 emission reduction. Furthermore, with the adoption of the European Green Deal, the policy debate will become more technical. The debate on solutions touches upon differences in ideological visions on shaping our society (socio-economic, environmental-technological, social-technological). In order to remain relevant, the Climate Coalition will need to position itself in these debates, and other type of policy influencing approach might be needed:

- 1) Several policy makers are asking for more practical and technical information (when possible, evidence-based) on concrete solutions to several climate change related challenges. The role of civil society might need to evolve from a confrontational towards a more collaborative approach, becoming engaged in a co-creation process, within which solutions can be explored and discussed. The complementary expertise and resources available within the Climate Coalition can be an asset. Moreover, an evolution towards more solution focused debates might be conducive for managing and valorising differences in opinions and positions among the Climate Coalition members.
- 2) The Climate Coalition also has a role in strengthening the support base for possible solutions to climate change challenges. Research demonstrated that 94% of the Belgians support the European ambition to become climate neutral by 2050, though several interviewees stated that the climate demonstrations are not representative for the general public. As such, the technical debate does not have to take place only in the political arena, but also in the society at large, to which the Climate Coalition can contribute, for example by including its support base in these debates, investing more in informing, consulting its support base and/or involving them in exploring (technical) solutions. This will contribute in further strengthening the effectiveness of the policy influencing work.
- 3) The narrative adopted by the Climate Coalition will need to take into account the diversity in opinion and positions, both among policy makers as the general public. More diversity in narratives will be needed (ex. how to frame a message, what and type of information needed, ...) to remain relevant, not only for the allies (politicians and public) but also among the foes (politicians and public).

- 4) The Climate Coalition also has a role in monitoring how solutions are framed in the political discourse, both in public as in parliament. Both a confrontational (bringing to the attention mistakes or misconceptions) and a collaborative approach (supporting politicians in building correct understanding of the topic at stake and how to explain this in political and public debates) can be adopted.
- 5) With the evolutions in social media, fake news, increasing populisms, etc. the position and influence of civil society in the political debate might also change (risk of becoming less influential). Furthermore, with the Green Deal, industry will enhance its own lobby. In order to remain relevant, the Climate Coalition needs to be on top of things, in particularly when the debates move towards more solution focussed debate. We believe there is a role for the Climate Coalition in bringing and keeping the climate change debate public and transparent, and by openly questioning the messages of other influential actors.

With the new federal government in place that includes more like-minded parties, there exists the risk that NGOs become less critical for the government and copy the policy discourse. It will be important to remain vigilant and critical. Evidently, having allies in power will facilitate the L&A.

- 6) The L&A strategies most probably will evolve towards a more collaborative approach in supporting allies within the government parties and cabinets. However, also within political parties and cabinets there are different interests at stake. Having allies within these spaces, more easily information can be obtained on the diverse positions that might exist within parties and cabinets. Consequently, L&A messages can be adapted accordingly.
- 7) The PWG has much more frequent contacts with politicians in like-minded political groups, and more with members of parliament; whereas the real power might be situated among other political groups and/or at other political decision levels/institutions, depending on the moment. To enhance effectiveness of L&A, also at the long term, and to strengthen agility so to respond to -sometimes fast- changing political contexts, it is recommended to broaden the network of lobby targets.

With regard to the PWG/Climate Coalition

- ¹⁹² Reflections can take place on how to further systematize and organise the information flow within the coalition, so to respond to the varying needs of the different coalition members. A dashboard approach on the website might be a relevant approach.
- ¹⁹³ To improve the communication within the coalition on the progress of the policy influencing process, it can be helpful to develop a L&A plan, based on objectives and milestones, that facilitates the monitoring of the policy influencing process and the communication thereof.



6 ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: TOR

See separate file

ANNEX 2: EVALUATION FRAMEWORK (REVISED VERSION OCTOBER 2018)

Revised version of the evaluation framework (October 2018)				
Evaluation question	Reference	Indicators / descriptors	Differentiation	
Online survey and narrative interviews with policy makers				
To what extent was the CJP successful in influencing points of view of political decision makers?	Output 8	1a	Outreach: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who knowingly have received information from CJP	Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition parties - ruling parties - administration & diplomats
		1b	Spaces for influencing: Number of meetings with cabinets, ministers, parliamentarians, study services of political parties	
	Outcome 3 & 4	2a	Appreciation of CJP's contributions: Share of national policy makers reached by CJP, who view the information as (scale from 1 to 4: all / majority / minority / nobody) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - relevant - timely - qualitative - usable and perceive CJP members and 11.11.11 and CNCD-11.11.11 as legitimate and credible advocates for climate change	Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition parties - ruling parties - administration & diplomats
		2b	Agenda setting¹⁰¹: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number of parliamentary interpellations and questions, proposed resolutions, adopted resolutions and motions introduced by CJP lobby targets that are in line with CJP positions. - Number of amendments by parliamentarians in line with CJP positions. 	Differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - interpellations, resolutions, and motions - amendments - interventions during COPs

¹⁰¹ Awareness raising, getting issues on the political agenda (Kamstra, 2017)



			– Number of interventions of the Belgian delegation of decision-makers at the next COPs in line with CJP positions	
	Impact 1 & 2	3	Discursive change ¹⁰² : Number of political parties who take-up the CJP positions/terminology/ rhetoric/framing in their line of argumentation during the policy preparation phase	Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together): - opposition parties - ruling parties
	Impact 3	4	Procedural change ¹⁰³ : Certain institutional procedures are adjusted in line with CJP's priorities Policy change ¹⁰⁴ : Belgian Policy in favour of climate justice ¹⁰⁵ <i>Demands related to the following 4 areas (to be differentiated between expect to see/like to see/love to see)</i> – Ambition and quality of the national energy and climate plan 2030 ¹⁰⁶ – Ambition and quality of the interparliamentary climate resolution – Effort sharing ¹⁰⁷ regulation adopted with room for increase in EU ambition	– Belgian national policy – Belgian position in European policy – Belgian position on international policy

¹⁰² Advocacy targets adopt terminology, rhetoric, and/or framing (Kamstra, 2017)

¹⁰³ Influencing institutional (decision-making) procedures (Kamstra, 2017)

¹⁰⁴ Actors change their policies related to climate change

¹⁰⁵ Impact three is added in the baseline study to document the current state of affairs. Policy change to be measured at mid-term and endline measurement.

¹⁰⁶ To be further elaborated: what ambition and what quality

¹⁰⁷ This relates to the agreement between the different regional governments with regard to climate ambitions and measure that will be taken and targets set at each of the governance levels. The CJP advocates for an ambitious agenda, which includes that the agreement around this “effort sharing” also is ambitious. CJP does not formulate minimum or maximum expectations regarding this effort sharing.

			– Belgian financial resources for climate finance increase and are ‘additional’ ¹⁰⁸	
What are the most effective means for influencing political decision makers?	Output 8	5	Relevance of communication channels: Share of national policy makers reached by CJP, who view the following communication channels as relevant (all / majority / minority / nobody): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Indirect communication (media & social media¹⁰⁹) - Direct formal communication - Direct informal communication 	Differentiated between (but not presented in aggregated form for 3 categories together): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition parties - ruling parties - administration & diplomats
	Outcome 3 & 4	6	Qualitative assessment of relevance of the different forms of communication channels and how they are embedded in the overall policy influencing strategy	– In mid-term evaluation
To what extent do the political decision makers recognize influence of the CJP?	Outcome 3	7	Influence of CJP:- Share of national policy makers who view the CJP platform as influential on their opinion-forming process, from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change	Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats – (cabinet & parliament)
		8	Influence of other actors: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who name other actors than CJP as one of the more influential stakeholders on their opinion-forming process	Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats – (cabinet & parliament)
To what extent is CJP recognised as a platform with a broad social basis, encompassing trade unions, etc.?	Outcome 3	9	Knowing CJP: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who know the CJP	Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats

¹⁰⁸ Additional refers to the fact that extra budget for climate finance is foreseen and not taken from the budget for development cooperation.

¹⁰⁹ Data to be collected & analysed by CJP/11.11.11



				– (cabinet & parliament)
		10	Added value of composition: Share of national policy makers from the total pool of policy makers engaged on the topic of climate change, who view the specific composition of the CJP (with many different social organisations) as a comparative strength.	Not presented in aggregated form, only differentiated between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposition: all – ruling party: majority – administration & diplomats – (cabinet & parliament)

		Online survey and narrative interviews with CJP members and members of the climate coalition:		
To what extent do the members of CJP view the CJP as their main channel for advocacy on climate justice?	Success factors	11	% of CJP member who use other channels for their advocacy work on climate justice % of CJP members who rank the CJP as their main channel for advocacy work	/ /
		12	% of CJP members who use the positions of the CJP in communication with national political decision makers	– Members which have a policy officer with dedicated time to do climate policy work – Members which do not have a policy officer with dedicated time to do climate policy work
		13	Qualitative description of the strengths and weaknesses of the CJP by the members	/
To what extent are the CJP and its members able to adjust and capitalise	Success factors	14	Qualitative analysis of success and non-success cases (change in policy decision makers' view points) with regard to:	– The influence of CJP – Influence of external factors (e.g. Trump decision)

on the changing political and social context?				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The influence of internal factors (e.g. party politics)
		15	Qualitative analysis of the CJP's activities with regard to the timely internalisation of external events into their activities, especially with regard to the following themes:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Belgian contribution to climate finance – Belgian emissions reduction – Just transition to a zero-carbon society
How are the members of the CJP <i>and the climate coalition</i> cooperating with each other	Outcome 2	16	Qualitative assessment of the quality of the delivered products by CJP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Coordinated positions – Information materials – Events & actions – Created communication channels within the platform
		17	Qualitative assessment by the members about the quality of the coordination of the CJP	/
	Outcome 1	18	Qualitative assessment of synergies between the climate coalition and CJP	/



ANNEX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

Political decision makers and resource persons

	Dutch	Function	French	Function
Administration # 1			Etienne Hannon	FOD Health, Food Safety and environment (till July 2017 Walloon Cabinet energy-climate)
Parliament # 8	Kurt Ravyts Kris Verduykt Chris Steenwegen Pieter-Jan Cluyse Nawal Farih	Federal parliament – Vlaams belang Federal parliament – SP.a Flemish parliament – Groen Study service - Open VLD Federal parliament – CD&V	Séverine de Laveleye Thierry Warmoes Wim Debucquoy	Federal parliament – Ecolo Federal parliament – PTB-PVDA Federal parliament – PTB-PVDA
Resource persons #6	Bart Corijn Luc Lavrysen Carole Billiet Hendrik Schoukens Yves Pepermans	Programme manager Change, The Shift Environmental and Energy Law professor at U Ghent Researcher at U Ghent Researcher at U Ghent Advisor Climate Policy – Province of Antwerp	Gilles Toussaint	Journalist – La Libre

Members of the Climate Justice Platform and Climate coalition

Lien Vandamme	Coordinator PWG – policy advisor 11.11.11
Rebecca Thissen	Coordinator PWG – CNCD-11.11.11
NicolasVan Nuffel	Vice-president and spokesperson Climate Coalition – head of policy department CNCD-11.11.11
Dave Van Meel	Vice-president and spokesperson Climate Coalition – head of policy department Greenpeace (left Greenpeace)
Alba Saray Perez Teran	Member PWG – staff officer Oxfam Solidarity
Julie Van Houtryve	Coordinator Climate Coalition
Nadège Carlier	UN delegate for Climate – Forum des jeunes
Reine Spiessens	Un delegate for Sustainable Development – Vlaamse Jeugdraad
Karel Malfliet	member PWG – staff officer Ecokerk
Yelter Bollen	Policy advisor and researcher – Arbeid en Milieu
Hadrien Vanoverbeke	Advisor environnement – CBSLB
Francois de Borman	Grandparent pour le Climat
Robin Verachtert	Natuurpunt
Manuel Eggen	FIAN



ANNEX 4: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

ANNEX 4: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

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15/07/2019

Samengevoegde vragen van mevrouw Tinne Van der Straeten aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "het ontwerp-NEKP, de publieksbevraging en de volgende stappen" (nr. 21C), mevrouw Melissa Hanus aan de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling over "het Nationaal Energie-Klimaatplan" (nr. 31C)

04/09/2019

geen vragen gelinkt aan de geselecteerde cases

18/09/2019

Samengevoegde vragen van Mélissa Hanus aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De publieksbevraging over het ontwerp van het geïntegreerd Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan" (55000230C), Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem over "De analyse van de resultaten uit de publieksbevraging rond het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan" (55000233C), Michel De Maegd aan Marie-Christine Marghem over "De follow-up van de voor het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan uitgevoerde publieksbevraging" (55000288C), Tinne Van der Straeten aan Marie-Christine Marghem over "Het ontwerp-NEKP en de voorbereiding op de informele consultatie met de Europese Commissie" (55000296C), Kris Verduyck aan Marie-Christine Marghem over "Het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan" (55000311C).

Vraag van Mélissa Hanus aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De klimaatconferentie te Santiago" (55000232C).

Vraag van Daniel Senesael aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het verslag van het Federaal Planbureau over de Belgische doelen inzake duurzame ontwikkeling" (55000282C).

Samengevoegde vragen van Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De goedkeuring van 'superethanol'" (55000305C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De goedkeuring van 'superethanol'" (55000494C), Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het koninklijk besluit dat de verkoop van met ethanol verrijkte benzine (E85) mogelijk maakt" (55000509C).

Vraag van Sarah Schlitz aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het concrete Belgische plan voor de UN Climate Action Summit van 23 september 2019" (55000308C).



Vraag van Sarah Schlitz aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De Belgische ambitie inzake de vermindering van de broeikasgasuitstoot" (55000309C).

Vraag van Tinne Van der Straeten aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De biobrandstoffen in het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan" (55000503C).

16/10/2019

geen vragen gelinkt aan de geselecteerde cases

22/10/2019

Dringende klimaatdossiers: het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan en COP 25. Toegevoegde vragen van Nawal Farih aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De oproep van de artsen om een onafhankelijke klimaatraad op te richten" (55000936C), Thierry Warmoes aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De ambities van het NEKP" (55001035C) Thierry Warmoes aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De langetermijnstrategie" (55001036C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Gendergelijkheid en mensenrechten in het NEKP" (55001037C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De biobrandstoffen in het NEKP" (55001038C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De transparantie bij de NKC" (55001039C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De internationale klimaatfinanciering" (55001040C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De ambities van het NEKP" (55001159C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De langetermijnstrategie" (55001160C)

21/11/2019

Actualiteitsdebat Climate Fund en toegevoegde vragen van Tinne Van der Straeten aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De bijdrage van België aan het Green Climate Fund" (55001315C), Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De 'pledging' van België op de First Replenishment van het Green Climate Fund in Parijs" (55001320C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De resolutie over de klimaatfinanciering" (55001332C), Nawal Farih aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het Green Climate Fund" (55001389C), Vincent Van Quickenborne aan Marie-Christine Marghem

(Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De federale bijdrage aan het Green Climate Fund" (55001787C)

Vraag van Tinne Van der Straeten aan MarieChristine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De langetermijnstrategie inzake klimaat" (55001745C).

03/12/2019

Het Nationaal Energie-Klimaatplan: gedachtewisseling met de minister van Energie, Leefmilieu en Klimaat en toegevoegde vragen van: Tinne Van der Straeten aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De voortgang van het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan" (55001742C), Tinne Van der Straeten aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De langetermijnstrategie inzake klimaat" (55001745C), Kris Verduyckt aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan 2021-2030 en de langetermijnstrategie" (55001788C), Kris Verduyckt aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan" (55001789C), Tomas Roggeman aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het spoorvervoer in het Nationaal Energie en Klimaatplan" (55001912C)

08/01/2020

geen vragen gelinkt aan de geselecteerde cases

15/01/2020

Vraag van Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De houding van België en van de federale minister met betrekking tot de Europese Green Deal" (55002047C).

Samengevoegde vragen van Reccino Van Lommel aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De stijging van de gemiddelde CO2-uitstoot met betrekking tot nieuwe wagens" (55002426C), Sarah Schlitz aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De hogere gemiddelde CO2-uitstoot van nieuwe wagens" (55002587C).

Vraag van Tinne Van der Straeten aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De flexibiliteit in het NKEP" (55002580C)

Vraag van Tinne Van der Straeten aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De langetermijnstrategie inzake klimaat" (55002585C)

Vraag van Sarah Schlitz aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De studie 'New diesels, new problems' van T&E" (55002588C).

11/02/2020



Vraag van Sophie Thémont aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het klimaatbeleid en de sociale ongelijkheden" (55002245C)

Samengevoegde vragen van Daniel Senesael aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het Fonds voor een rechtvaardige transitie" (55002688C), Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De territoriale plannen in het kader van het Fonds voor een rechtvaardige transitie" (55002993C), Nawal Farih aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het Fonds voor een rechtvaardige transitie in het kader van de Green Deal" (55003030C), Tinne Van der Straeten aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het Fonds voor een rechtvaardige transitie" (55003217C)

Vraag van Kris Verduyckt aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De nationale dialoog naar aanleiding van het NEKP" (55002740C)

19/02/2020

geen vragen gelinkt aan de geselecteerde cases

03/03/2020

geen vragen gelinkt aan de geselecteerde cases

15/04/2020

Vraag van Mélissa Hanus aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De uitstoot van broeikasgassen in België" (55003238C).

Samengevoegde vragen van Steven De Vuyst aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De Green Deal" (55003421C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De Green Deal" (55003423C), Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het advies van de Europese Commissie m.b.t. de intra-Belgische verdeling van de JTF steun" (55003627C), Tinne Van der Straeten aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De verdeling van de middelen van het JTF" (55003707C).

Samengevoegde vragen van Thierry Warmoes aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De langetermijnstrategie" (55003425C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De langetermijnstrategie" (55003426C), Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De Belgische (langetermijn)klimaatstrategie voor 2050" (55003534C), Tinne Van

der Straeten aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De langetermijnstrategie en het NEKP" (55003709C).

Samengevoegde vragen van Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De projects of common interest" (55003737C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De Europese klimaatwet" (55003738C), Greet Daems aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De publieksbevraging in het kader van het ETS" (55003739C), Greet Daems aan (Marie-Christine Marghem) (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De perverse effecten van het ETS-systeem" (55003740C).

Samengevoegde vragen van Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De publieke consultatie met betrekking tot de Europese klimaatwet" (55003844C), Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het Belgische standpunt tijdens het EU overleg over de Europese klimaatwet" (55003862C), Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De bepalingen van het in de Europese klimaatwet opgenomen monitoringkader" (55004214C), Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De Belgische standpuntbepalingen op de Europese Milieuraad van 5 maart 2020" (55004218C).

Vraag van Mélissa Hanus aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De impact van de achteruitgang van de biodiversiteit op de gezondheid" (55004919C)

29/04/2020

geen vragen gelinkt aan de geselecteerde cases

06/05/2020

geen vragen gelinkt aan de geselecteerde cases

10/06/2020

Vraag van Sarah Schlitz aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het toetsen van de afbouw van de lockdown in België aan de klimaatdoelstellingen" (55005665C)

30/06/2020

Vraag van Kris Verduyckt aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "Het Belgische standpunt met betrekking tot de EU-biodiversiteitsstrategie 2030" (55006906C)

15/07/2020

geen vragen gelinkt aan de geselecteerde cases



22/09/2020

Samengevoegde vragen van Kurt Ravyts aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De stand van zaken rond de Europese klimaatwet" (55008543C), Mélissa Hanus aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De State of the Union van de voorzitter van de Europese Commissie" (55008873C), Kris Verduyckt aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De State of the Union van de voorzitter van de Europese Commissie" (55008912C), Christophe Bombled aan Marie-Christine Marghem (Energie, Leefmilieu en Duurzame Ontwikkeling) over "De klimaatambities van de Europese Unie tegen 2030" (55008941C)

27/10/2020


Samengevoegde vragen van Malik Ben Achour aan Tinne Van der Straeten (Energie) over "De Belgische doelstellingen inzake hernieuwbare energie" (55010137C), Patrick Dewael aan Tinne Van der Straeten (Energie) over "De evaluatie van het Belgische Nationaal Energie- en Klimaatplan door de Europese Commissie" (55010302C), Christophe Bombled aan Tinne Van der Straeten (Energie) over "De evaluatie van het Belgische Energie-Klimaatplan door de Europese Commissie" (55010110C)

Vraag van Kris Verduyckt aan Tinne Van der Straeten (Energie) over "De oproep in het kader van de input van de Europese Green Deal" (55010275C)

<https://www.dekamer.be/kvocr/showpage.cfm?section=/cricra&language=nl&cfm=dcricra.cfm?type=comm&cricra=cra&count=all&legislat=55>

ANNEX 5: RECONSTRUCTED TOC

Theory of Change:
Climate Justice Platform 11.11.11 en
CNCD/11.11.11



Sphere of control
Inputs:
The financial, human, and material resources used for the development intervention (DAC/OECD)

Sphere of control
Activities:
Actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, technical assistance and other types of resources are mobilized to produce specific outputs (DAC/OECD)

Sphere of control
Outputs:
The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention (DAC/OECD)

Sphere of influence
Outcomes:
The direct benefits on the level of the beneficiaries realized through the intervention objectives (European Commission)

Sphere of interest
Impacts:
Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended (DAC/OECD)

ANNEX 6: RECONSTRUCTED TIMELINE OF KEY ACTIVITIES FOR INFLUENCING BELGIAN CLIMATE POLICY BY PWG

Timeline	Description of activity	Activity ¹¹⁰
<i>End of 2018</i>		
October 2018	Recommendations for decision makers on the COP24 Katowice - mailing	2
25 October 2018	Press release: Climate express and climate coalition aim for biggest protest ever in Belgium	1
2 December 2018	Large mobilisation (75.000 people) "Claim the Climate"	8
10 December 2018	Press release: To make climate a real priority, Michel II must now get to work	1
2 – 15 December 2018	Participation at COP 24 Katowice: formal and informal meetings with decision makers present at COP	2
	Participation at COP 24 Katowice: participation in round table meeting with minister during COP	3
<i>2019 (electoral year, dismissing government and government in current affairs, start of school strikes for climate)</i>		
29 January 2019	Meeting with prime minister Michel	2
February – March 2019	Meetings (in group, and individual/face-to-face interviews) with political parties (political bureau, MEP) CdH, Ecolo, MR, PS, CD&V, GROEN	2
25 February 2019	Hearing at Walloon parliamentary climate commission	3
1 March 2019	Press release on the Special Climate Act	1
12 March 2019	Meeting chef of cabinet prime minister Michel followed by press release	2 + 1
13 March 2019	Hearing Federal parliamentary climate commission on the need for a Special Climate Act	3
18 March 2019	Meeting Flemish minister for climate, on the Special Climate Act	2
19 March 2019	Mailing MEP (federal, regional) and ministers	2
19 March 2019	Twitter targeting MR to support the revision of Article 7bis	1
23-24 March 2019	Occupy Wetstraat "Occupy for Climate"	8
25 March 2019	Meeting with MEP Open VLD, on Special Climate Act	2
29 March 2019	Press release: Ambition bumps into closed doors of parliament	1

¹¹⁰ Reference is made to activity type/output of the ToC (see table 4 on page 40)

March-April 2019	Meetings with electoral candidates (Ecolo) (not as climate coalition but as CNCD-11.11.11)	2
9 April 2019	Meeting with cabinet Peeters (federal minister of ...) on NECP and biofuels (not as climate coalition but as 11.11.11)	2
22 May 2019	Press release: Time for collaboration and ambition on the climate crisis	1
23 May and June 25 2019	Meetings with DGD on international climate finance	2
29 May and 20 August 2019	Meetings FOD VVVL on international climate finance	2
June 2019	Meetings with political decision makers during formation process of Walloon and Brussels new government (not as climate coalition but as CNCD-11.11.11)	2
4 June – 15 July 2019	Participation in the public consultation of the NECP	3
20 June 2019	Policy brief handed over at the first session of the new federal parliament	8
26 June 2019	Mailing of memorandum to all newly elected MEP (except Vlaams Belang)	2
4 July 2019	Mailing to cabinet De Croo (development cooperation) and administrations on international climate finance (not as climate coalition but by CNCD:11.11.11, 11.11.11 and Oxfam)	2
13 September 2019	Participation at multi-stakeholder dialogue at federal level on NECP	3
13 September 2019	Meeting FOD VVVL on position regarding international carbon market at COP 25	2
14 September	100 Days Countdown for the NECP	8
16 September 2019	Meeting with inter-parliamentary climate commission	2
19 September 2019	Letter to cabinet prime minister Michel, on international climate finance	2
20 September 2019	Participation in the Global Climate Strike	8
24 September 2019	Mailing to members of the parliamentary climate commissions Wallonia and Brussels (not as climate coalition but as CNCD-11.11.11)	2
25 September 2019	Mailing to climate ministers in the Walloon and Brussels regional governments (not as climate coalition but as CNCD-11.11.11)	2
2 October 2019	Hearing federal parliamentary climate commission	3
14 October	Meeting MEP PVDA on NECP	2
15 October 2019	Meeting cabinet prime minister Michel on FRDO advice regarding the NECP	2
16 October 2019	Participation in the climate commission of CD&V, on the NECP	2
16 October 2019	Meeting cabinet Brussels minister for climate, on international climate finance	2
19 October 2019	Twitter targeting prime minister Michel: remember promises made at Climate Summit New York September 2019 (by CNCD-11.11.11)	1
19 November 2019	Meeting with Magonne (PS), royal informer	2
21 November 2019	Meeting MEP SP.a on COP 25	2
25 November	Participation in multi-stakeholder meeting COP 25	3
29 November 2019	United for Climate – Global strikes for Climate	8
8 December 2019	United for Climate – human chain around parliament and royal palace	8
6-12 December 2019	Several meetings with regional and federal ministers responsible for climate policy	2
11 December 2019	Participation in inter-parliamentary meeting at COP 25	3
12 December 2019	Participation in round table organised by FRDO during COP 25	3
January – December 2019	X meetings with FRDO	3

<i>2020 (Transitional government till October 2020 when new government came in place, Corona crisis since March)</i>		
15 January 2020	Meeting FOD VVVL on international climate finance	2
3 March 2020	Press release: Europe is making progress, Belgium cannot lag behind (on Green deal and the European climate act)	1
2 April 2020	Press release: Glasgow climate summit postponed: climate action still needed	1
24 April 2020	Global Climate Strike online	8
3 July 2020	Meeting MEP GROEN	2
4 July 2020	United for a New Normal	8
8 September 2020	Meeting Brussels minister for climate – input of climate policy	2
? September 2020	Mailing to all negotiators and to Rousseau and Lachaeart, appointed formers to from a new government	2
18 September 2020	Press release: A climate government to save Belgian fries and beer	1
18 September 2020	Action targeting Rousseau and Lachaeart (appointed formers to from a new government in Brussels), handing over fries and beer - to raise attention for climate during negotiations of the new government agreement	8
October 2020	Hearing in the inter-parliamentary climate commission	3
October 2020	Petition demanding the Belgian government to increase its contribution to international climate finance (1.431 signatures) (11.11.11)	8
22 October 2020	Meeting FOD economy - on biofuels	2
27 November 2020	Press release: Climate coalition organises longest climate protest ever (announcing 60 hrs of protest)	
30 November – 2 December 2020	60 hours of protest (online) to demand an emission reduction of -60 % by 2030	8
20 November 2020	Press release: The Climate Coalition enlists the help of Sinterklaas	1
7 December 2020	Handing over letters to prime minister De Croo demanding for more ambition	8
7 December 2020	Press release: St. Nicholas and Climate Coalition paid a visit to the prime minister	1
11 December 2020	Press release: European climate ambition: important step but no big party on the European decision for -55% emission reduction by 2030	1
January – October 2020	7 meetings with FRDO	3

ANNEX 7: CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS – ANALYSIS OF THE EXPLAINING MECHANISMS

Cases		Explaining mechanisms/factor <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Primary explanation (mechanism related to the intervention) – Direct rival (different mechanism that undermines the contribution story of the intervention) – Commingled rival (other mechanism that occurs alongside target mechanism) – Implementation rival (influencing factors that modify the outcomes) Influencing factor	Type	Likelihood INUS principle ¹¹¹	Implication – contribution claim (Based on the likelihood that the factor/explanation occurred, what does this imply for the contribution claim about the intervention(s)?)
Effect of CC on Belgian policy positions Belgium committed to double its contribution to the Green Climate Fund Belgium committed to be ambitious, but not translated as such in the NECP Article 7bis open for revision(Special climate Act) COP 24 Belgium not part of the High Ambition group COP25: Belgium part of the Article 6 Coalition (carbon markets)	1	Indirect communication informing and sensitizing politicians	Primary explanation	Straw-in-the-wind	low
	2	Direct communication informing and sensitizing politicians, taking over positions	Primary explanation	Double decisive	high
	3	Active participation in institutionalised meetings having an influence on the positions taken in those meetings	Primary explanation	Hoop	moderate
	4	One-off actions and mobilisation inform and sensitize politicians and push them to be more ambitious	Primary explanation	Hoop	moderate
	5	Leverage and credibility of the CC enable access to politicians and make sure they take positions of CC into account	Primary explanation	Hoop	high
	6	Influence through European and international networks	Commingled rival	Not possible to assess	Not possible to assess
	7	Input from administration (DGD and FOD VVVL)	Commingled rival	Not possible to assess	Not possible to assess
	8	L&A done by other members of the CC informs and sensitizes politicians and makes them taking into account their positions	Commingled rival	Hoop	High
	9	Sign for my future, by the Shift put climate on the political agenda and pushed politicians to be ambitious	Commingled rival	Straw in the wind	low
	10	Studies and publications of reputable institutions inform politicians	Direct rival	Smoking gun	low
	11	Input from other stakeholders (diplomats, UN staff, ...) is used during debates at meetings of politicians	Direct rival	Smoking gun	high
	12	L&A done by corporate sector has influence on positions taken by politicians	Direct rival	Hoop	moderate
	13	Advice from academic world has influence on their positions	Direct rival	Smoking gun	moderate

¹¹¹ Straw-in-the-wind = not sufficient or necessary; Hoop = necessary but not sufficient; Smoking-Gun = sufficient but not necessary, double decisive = sufficient and necessary for affirming the causal inference

	14	Formal and informal advice from other think tanks and lobby groups inform and sensitize politicians	Direct rival	Smoking gun	moderate
	15	The European Green Deal and discussions on the European Climate Act has influenced the Belgian positions	Direct rival	Double decisive	high
	16	Practical considerations and feasibility of CC positions as perceived by political decision makers explain the extent positions are adopted	Influencing factor	Smoking gun	high
	17	Progress hampered by lack of consensus between the different federal and regional governments	Influencing factor	Smoking gun	high
	18	Changes in composition of governments were conducive for CC positions taken over by government	Influencing factor	Smoking gun	high
	19	Political profiling	Influencing factor	Hoop	moderate
	20	Climate change become visible through period of extreme drought, rains or cold and pushes politicians to take CC positions into account	Influencing factor	Double decisive	high

ANNEX 8: EVIDENCE TABLE FOR CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS

Cases		Explaining mechanisms/factor – following factors contribute to Belgian decision makers taking over positions of CC	Item of evidence	Statement (what does the evidence say)	Confirming or refuting
Effect of CC on Belgian policy positions Belgium committed to double its contribution to the Green Climate Fund Belgium committed to be ambitious, but not translated as such in the NECP Article 7bis open for revision(Special climate Act) COP 24 Belgium not part of the High Ambition group COP25: Belgium part of the Article 6 Coalition (carbon markets)	1	Indirect communication informing and sensitizing politicians	Monitoring info from coordinators PWG Interviews politicians	Presence of CC, CNCD-11.11.11 and 11.11.11 in print media, twitter, Facebook and radio Climate has been omnipresent in media, which put the topic higher on the political agenda, but media was not cited by MEP interviewed as having an effect on the positions taken. Some interviewees obtained information from the website from the Climate Coalition	Partially refuting
	2	Direct communication informing and sensitizing politicians, taking over positions	Monitoring info from coordinators PWG Interviews politicians and resource persons	Politicians receive mailings and have direct contact. Direct contact is more important than mailings. Politicians confirmed that PWG is an important information source and that they use information on developing parliamentary question Resource persons confirm the importance of L&A by civil society (among them PWG) to keep on putting pressure on politicians and holding them accountable. They oblige politicians to take position	confirm
	3	Active participation in institutionalised meetings having an influence on the positions taken in those meetings	Monitoring info from coordinators PWG Minutes meetings Interviews politicians	Input of PWG and conclusions described in minutes of meetings (but not all minutes could be obtained), enabling to assess what positions have been adopted and what not. Mix results of adoption	confirm
	4	One-off actions and mobilisation inform and sensitize politicians and push them to be more ambitious	Monitoring info from coordinators PWG Media coverage Website Flemish government Interviews Resource persons Interviews politicians	Long list of one-off actions organised by CC and the mass mobilisations to which CC also has contributed, accompanied by press releases of CC and covered by media. Public pressure has put the climate crisis higher on the agenda, e.g. The Flemish parliament organised two plenary sessions in December 2018 and January 2019 after the mass mobilisation, prime minister Michel referring to climate policy as a priority in December 2018 Mixed opinions among politicians interviewed on the role of Youth for Climate on the actual policy debate	Partially confirming

	5	Leverage and credibility of the CC enable access to politicians and make sure they take positions of CC into account	Interviews politicians	Confirmed by all politicians interviewed. Quality and reliability of the information provided confirmed. The fact that the CC unites civil society is an added value. Credibility and legitimacy evidenced by invitations of preformateur to meet CC and invitation to speak in hearings at parliament	confirm
	6	Influence through European and international networks	No evidence yet	No info obtained yet in interviews.	Not possible to assess
	7	Input from administration (DGD and FOD VVVL)	Interviews politicians but not much evidence yet	Not mentioned by interviewees Studies and policy proposals are developed and shared by federal administration. NGOs provide input in these policy development process (e.g. climate finance, on carbon taxation, climate governance) and are often multiplier of policy proposals developed by the administration. Administration and NGOs are often allies in the climate debate	Not possible to assess
	8	L&A done by other members of the CC informs and sensitizes politicians and make them taking into account their positions	Interviews politicians Interviews other members CC	Confirmed by all interviewees. Other members of CC lobby on specific thematic subjects (e.g. WWF on carbon tax and biodiversity, Oxfam on NECP) or defend higher ambitions (e.g. Oxfam advocating for -65% emission reduction by 2030 and contribution of 500 million EUR/year to GCF). Interviewees make no distinction between lobby by CC or individual members. All info is appreciated and used.	confirm
	9	Sign for my future, by the Shift put climate on the political agenda and pushed politicians to be ambitious	Interviews coordinators, interview The Shift, interviews politicians	The petition Sign for my future, though highly covered by media has not had much influence on politicians. Purpose was putting climate on the political agenda, which was already happening due to the School strikes for Climate	refute
	10	Studies and publications of reputable institutions inform politicians	Interviews politicians	Interviewees refer to a variety of information sources, without specifying.	confirm
	11	Input from other stakeholders (diplomats, UN staff, ...) is used	Minutes meetings multi-stakeholder meetings	In multi-stakeholder meetings, several stakeholders provide input and advice that is further debated by politicians.	confirm

		during debates at meetings of politicians	Not much evidence yet		
12		L&A done by corporate sector has influence on positions taken by politicians	Not much evidence yet	Corporate sector member of FRDO, discussions at FRDO have become complicated and did not result often in clear advice; corporate sector in FRDO not supporting an ambitious climate policy. No information on direct lobby by corporate sector on politicians	confirm
13		Advice from academic world has influence on their positions	Interviews coordinators PWG, academic world and politicians	Input from academic world is used as information source but not always has influence on positions taken by politicians. The proposal of Special Climate Act, developed by professors was used by GROEN to advance in climate governance during parliamentary debate, but was initially not supported by several other political groups.	Partially confirm
14		Formal and informal advice from other think tanks and lobby groups inform and sensitize politicians	Interviews politicians	Confirmed by interviewees. Politicians make use of several different sources. But they acknowledge that the PWG is the main source with regard to international climate finance.	confirm
15		The European Green Deal and discussions on the European Climate Act has influenced the Belgian positions	Interviews politicians and resource persons	Interviews confirming the high influence of the EU, and in particularly the Green deal, which forced a break-through in Belgium to revise ambitions, e.g. towards -55% emission reduction and carbon neutral society; positions that have been lobbied for since longer by CC	confirm
16		Practical considerations and feasibility of CC positions as perceived by political decision makers explain the extent positions are adopted	Interviews politicians	Not all politicians share the level of ambition as proposed by the CC. They all show commitment for an ambitious Belgian climate policy but do not agree with the feasibility of certain targets and ask for more reflection and input on how to reach the ambitious targets	confirm
17		Progress hampered by lack of consensus between the different federal and regional governments	Interviews politicians, coordinators PWG and resource persons Analyses NECP by CC, media and EU	In the period 2019-2020 progress was hampered mainly because of the position of the Flemish government. The NECP (December 2019) was assessed by the EU as insufficient.	confirm
18		Changes in composition of governments were conducive for CC positions taken over by government	Interviews politicians and coordinators PWG	For L&A one needs an interlocutor. With the changes in the federal and regional governments, more openness was created to engage with civil society. Several government composed by political parties that share the positions of the CC have become in power. With N-VA withdrawing from the federal government, more room for manoeuvre was created to take more ambitious positions at federal level	confirm

	19	Political profiling	Interviews coordinators PWG	As prime minister Michel had ambitions for a high level political position, he needed international profiling. The Climate Summit in New York (September 2019) offered such an opportunity.	Confirm (not triangulated)
	20	Climate change become visible through period of extreme drought, rains or cold and pushes politicians to take CC positions into account	Interviews politicians and resource persons Literature	Confirmed by interviewees	confirm

ANNEX 9: INTERVIEW GUIDES

Politicians

- Hoe lang bent u al politiek actief op het thema klimaatrechtvaardigheid ?
- Welke organisaties of instellingen zijn uw voornaamste informatiebronnen?
- Welke organisaties of instellingen zijn de actiefste lobbyisten?
- Over welke onderwerpen m.b.t. klimaatrechtvaardigheid werd u in het bijzonder geïnformeerd door organisaties uit het middenveld?
- Over welke onderwerpen heeft u informatie, verkregen van organisaties uit het middenveld, goed kunnen gebruiken in uw eigen beleidswerk? En welke acties heeft u genomen (vb. thema's op de agenda gezet binnen uw eigen partij, standpunten van de klimaatcoalitie verdedigd in de klimaatcommissie, ontwikkeling van een resolutie, parlementaire vraag, in publieke verklaringen, ...)
- Welk informatiekanaal of informatiedrager is voor u het meest informatief: direct persoonlijk contact, telefonisch contact, mailing, nieuwsbrieven, conferenties, studiedagen, andere ... ?
- Heeft u deelgenomen aan activiteiten (hoorzitting, studiedag, conferentie, ...), die door het middenveld georganiseerd werden over klimaatrechtvaardigheid? Indien ja, welke? In welke mate was deze activiteit zinvol voor uw werk?
- Wat zijn voor u de belangrijkste evoluties m.b.t. het politiek debat over klimaat en klimaatrechtvaardigheid van de laatste twee jaar (2019-2020)?
- Welke factoren hebben hierin een rol gespeeld?

- Kent u de klimaatcoalitie? Indien ja :
- Met wie of met welke organisatie had u contact en op welke manier bent u in contact gekomen?
- Wat vindt u van de kwaliteit en bruikbaarheid van de informatie aangeleverd door de klimaatcoalitie:
- Zijn de standpunten over klimaatrechtvaardigheid voor u duidelijk?
- Zijn de voorstellen/standpunten haalbaar?
- Zijn de analyses voldoende onderbouwd, evidence-based, betrouwbaar?
- Hoe situeert u de klimaatcoalitie ten opzichte van andere organisaties/personen wat betreft het belang dat ze hebben om u te informeren en/of invloed uit te oefenen?
- Hoe beoordeelt u in het algemeen het politieke werk van NGOs en de klimaatcoalitie met betrekking tot klimaatrechtvaardigheid? Wat zijn sterke kanten en wat kan verbeterd worden? Denk aan:
- Manier van contact nemen, framen van boodschap, expertise, legitimiteit, aanvoelen van de context van de beleidsmaker, aanpak en timing, samenwerking academici, rol van netwerken, ...
- Kan u de aanpak van (leden van) klimaatcoalitie vergelijken met andere actoren die ook aan beleidsbeïnvloeding doen? Zijn er andere methoden van beleidsbeïnvloeding die u goed/beter vindt werken?
- Wanneer en hoe kunnen NGO's het meeste wegen op uw standpuntbepaling?
- Is het voor u duidelijk wanneer een individuele organisatie uit het middenveld de eigen standpunten verdedigd en wanneer dit gebeurt in naam van de klimaatcoalitie?

Leidraad voor reconstructie lobbywerk zes meest actieve leden (BBL, WWF, IEW, Oxfam Solidariteit, ACV, Arbeid & milieu)

Deel 1: reconstructie van lobby werk

- Rond welke thema's doet uw organisatie zelf actief aan beleidsbeïnvloeding mbt het klimaatbeleid?
- Indien overlap met volgende thema's (het nationale energie- en klimaatplan, de internationale klimaatfinanciering, de klimaatwet, Europese ambities inzake emissiereductie en decarbonisatie, climate governance) vragen we om tijdens het interview een reconstructie te doen van het lobbyproces sinds september 2018 tot nu. (identificeren van belangrijkste mijlpalen)
- Specifieke vragen bij de tijdslijn:
 - Welke factoren hebben invloed gehad op de geïdentificeerde mijlpaal?
 - Welke lobby voert u samen met en/of in naam van de klimaatcoalitie en wat doet u in naam van de eigen organisatie?
 - Op basis waarvan beslist u om te lobbyen in naam van de klimaatcoalitie en/of in naam van de eigen organisatie?
 - Wat is de meerwaarde van de politieke werkgroep voor uw organisatie?

Deel 2: interview

- Sinds wanneer bent u lid van de politieke werkgroep van de klimaatcoalitie?
- Vindt u dat er voldoende aandacht is voor het verhogen van de kennis over de lobby thema's bij alle leden van de klimaatcoalitie? Op welke manier draagt de klimaatcoalitie bij tot het verhogen van kennis van haar leden? Wat werkt goed en wat zou kunnen verbeteren?
- Is er voldoende uitwisseling van kennis en ervaringen tussen de leden van de politieke werkgroep (kerngroep en brede groep) over de lobby-thema's en het lobby-werk?
- Is de klimaatcoalitie uw belangrijkste informatiebron wat betreft het nationale energie- en klimaatplan, de internationale klimaatfinanciering, de klimaatwet, Europese ambities inzake emissiereductie en decarbonisatie? Wat zijn eventueel andere informatiebronnen?
- Als u terugkijkt op de evolutie van het klimaatrechtvaardigheidsplatform naar de politieke werkgroep van de klimaatcoalitie, in welke mate heeft dit het lobbywerk positief dan wel negatief beïnvloed? Wat zijn de huidige sterktes van de politieke werkgroep? Wat zijn de zwaktes?
- Wat vindt u goed en/of minder goed aan:
 - Het proces om tot gecoördineerde posities te komen en de kwaliteit van die posities/standpunten.

- Informatiemateriaal dat intern verspreid wordt door de politieke werkgroep over klimaatrechtvaardigheid
- Activiteiten die opgezet door de politieke werkgroep
- De communicatie binnen de politieke werkgroep (tussen leden onderling en met de coördinatoren)
- De afstemming op acties/mobilisaties die door de klimaatcoalitie opgezet worden
- Wat vindt u goed aan de coördinatie van de politieke werkgroep door 11.11.11 en CNCD?
- Wat zou u graag anders zien aan de coördinatie van de politieke werkgroep?
- Wat vindt u in het algemeen van het proces van besluitvormingsproces binnen de klimaatcoalitie?
- Op welke manier krijgen leden inspraak in het vastleggen van standpunten? Zou u hier graag meer in betrokken worden?

Leden politieke werkgroep

- Sinds wanneer bent u lid van de politieke werkgroep van de klimaatcoalitie?
- Rond welke thema's doet uw organisatie zelf actief aan beleidsbeïnvloeding met betrekking tot het klimaatbeleid?
- Welke lobby voert u samen met en/of in naam van de klimaatcoalitie en wat doet u in naam van de eigen organisatie?
 - Op basis waarvan beslist u om te lobbyen in naam van de klimaatcoalitie en/of in naam van de eigen organisatie?
 - Wat is de meerwaarde van de politieke werkgroep voor uw organisatie?
- Kunt u een voorbeeld geven van een succesverhaal van een actie van de politieke werkgroep in het kader van beleidswerk rond klimaatrechtvaardigheid?
 - Wat was de specifieke rol van de politieke werkgroep in dit succesverhaal?
 - Wat waren de belangrijkste elementen van de strategie die bijgedragen hebben tot dit succes?
- Kunt u een voorbeeld geven van een minder geslaagd traject van beleidsbeïnvloeding die via de politieke werkgroep werd gecoördineerd?
 - Wat is er misgelopen volgens u?
- Vindt u dat u voldoende op de hoogte wordt gehouden door de klimaatcoalitie en de politieke werkgroep over de evoluties in het klimaatbeleid (Belgisch en Europees)?
- Vindt u dat er voldoende aandacht is voor het verhogen van de kennis over de lobby thema's bij alle leden van de klimaatcoalitie? Op welke manier draagt de klimaatcoalitie bij tot het verhogen van kennis van haar leden? Wat werkt goed en wat zou kunnen verbeteren?
- Is er voldoende uitwisseling van kennis en ervaringen tussen de leden van de politieke werkgroep (kerngroep en brede groep) over de lobby-thema's en het lobbywerk?
- Is de klimaatcoalitie uw belangrijkste informatiebron wat betreft het nationale energie- en klimaatplan, de internationale klimaatfinanciering, de klimaatwet, Europese ambities inzake emissiereductie en decarbonisatie? Wat zijn eventueel andere informatiebronnen?
- Als u terugkijkt op de evolutie van het klimaatrechtvaardigheidsplatform naar de politieke werkgroep van de klimaatcoalitie, in welke mate heeft dit het lobbywerk positief dan wel negatief beïnvloed? Wat zijn de huidige sterktes van de politieke werkgroep? Wat zijn de zwaktes?
- Wat vindt u goed en/of minder goed aan:
 - Het proces om tot gecoördineerde posities te komen en de kwaliteit van die posities/standpunten.

- Informatiemateriaal dat intern verspreid wordt door de politieke werkgroep over klimaatrechtvaardigheid
- Activiteiten die opgezet door de politieke werkgroep
- De communicatie binnen de politieke werkgroep (tussen leden onderling en met de coördinatoren)
- De afstemming op acties/mobilisaties die door de klimaatcoalitie opgezet worden
- Wat vindt u goed aan de coördinatie van de politieke werkgroep door 11.11.11 en CNCD?
- Wat zou u graag anders zien aan de coördinatie van de politieke werkgroep?
- Wat vindt u in het algemeen van het proces van besluitvormingsproces binnen de klimaatcoalitie?
- Op welke manier krijgen leden inspraak in het vastleggen van standpunten? Zou u hier graag meer in betrokken worden?

Leden klimaatcoalitie

- Sinds wanneer bent u lid van de klimaatcoalitie?
- Waarom bent u lid van de klimaatcoalitie? Wat is de meerwaarde van de klimaatcoalitie voor uw eigen werk?
- Kunt u een voorbeeld geven van een succesverhaal van een actie van de politieke werkgroep in het kader van beleidswerk rond klimaatrechtvaardigheid?
 - Wat was de specifieke rol van de politieke werkgroep en de klimaatcoalitie in dit succesverhaal?
 - Wat waren de belangrijkste elementen van de strategie die bijgedragen hebben tot dit succes?
- Kunt u een voorbeeld geven van een minder geslaagd traject van beleidsbeïnvloeding die via de politieke werkgroep werd gecoördineerd?
 - Wat is er misgelopen volgens u?
- Vindt u dat u voldoende op de hoogte wordt gehouden door de klimaatcoalitie en de politieke werkgroep over de evoluties in het klimaatbeleid (Belgisch en Europees)?
- Vindt u dat er voldoende aandacht is voor het verhogen van de kennis over de lobby thema's bij alle leden van de klimaatcoalitie? Op welke manier draagt de klimaatcoalitie bij tot het verhogen van kennis van haar leden? Wat werkt goed en wat zou kunnen verbeteren?
- Is de klimaatcoalitie uw belangrijkste informatiebron wat betreft het nationale energie- en klimaatplan, de internationale klimaatfinanciering, de klimaatwet, Europese ambities inzake emissiereductie en decarbonisatie? Wat zijn eventueel andere informatiebronnen?
- Wat vindt u in het algemeen van het proces van besluitvormingsproces binnen de klimaatcoalitie?
- Op welke manier krijgen leden inspraak in het vastleggen van standpunten? Zou u hier graag meer in betrokken worden?

ANNEX 10: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Rapportageformulier

Naam interviewee:

Functie en partij interviewee:

Naam interviewer:

Datum interview:

Duurtijd interview:

Suggesties andere personen te interviewen:

Nummer interview:

Intro: Hoe lang bent u al politiek actief op het thema klimaatrechtvaardigheid?
Link met NGO en thema: <i>Op welke manier bent u in contact gekomen met de klimaatcoalitie/11.11.11/CNCD? Over welke onderwerpen werd u in het bijzonder geïnformeerd? Welke informatie heeft u gekregen en/of aan welke activiteiten heeft u deelgenomen die door klimaatcoalitie/11.11.11/CNCD georganiseerd werden over klimaatrechtvaardigheid?</i>
<i>Output 8</i>
Standpunten/focus op output: <i>Zijn de standpunten van de klimaatcoalitie/11.11.11/CNCD over klimaatrechtvaardigheid voor u duidelijk? Wat vindt u van de analyses en standpunten van klimaatcoalitie/11.11.11/CNCD over klimaatrechtvaardigheid?</i>
Invloed op beleid/rival explanations: <i>Evoluties klimaatbeleid. Welke (beleids)acties heeft u zelf al genomen mbt (thema)? Wat heeft hiertoe aanleiding gegeven (factoren die u aangezet hebben tot het nemen van initiatief)? In welke mate heeft u de informatie en standpunten van klimaatcoalitie/11.11.11/CNCD over klimaatrechtvaardigheid hierbij een rol gespeeld? Kan u concrete voorbeelden geven?</i>
<i>Outcome 3&4; Impact 1&2</i>
Welk informatiekanal of informatiedrager is voor u het meest informatief: <i>direct persoonlijk contact, telefonisch contact, mailing, nieuwsbrieven, conferenties, studiedagen, andere?</i> Wanneer en hoe kunnen NGO's het meeste wegen op uw standpuntbepaling?

Appreciatie werk NGOs: *Hoe beoordeelt u in het algemeen het politieke werk van klimaatcoalitie/11.11.11/CNCD mbt klimaatrechtvaardigheid ? Wat zijn sterke kanten en wat kan verbeterd worden?*

Outcome 3&4

Rival explanations: *Hoe situeert u de klimaatcoalitie/11.11.11/CNCD tov andere organisaties/personen wat betreft het belang dat ze hebben om u te informeren en/of invloed uit te oefenen? Kan u de aanpak van vergelijken met andere actoren die ook aan beleidsbeïnvloeding doen? Zijn er andere methoden van beleidsbeïnvloeding die u goed/beter vindt werken. Kan u eventueel voorbeelden geven? Is er een sterke tegenlobby op dit thema? Hoe gaat u hier mee om? Wat zijn de afwegingen die u maakt? (Indien de interviewee voor verschillende thema's wordt gecontacteerd): ziet u een verschil in de aanpak tussen de verschillende thema's?*

Klimaat: Kent u de klimaatcoalitie? Wat is volgens u haar meerwaarde

Outcome 3

ANNEX 11: ANALYSIS NATIONAL, FLEMISH, WALLOON AND BRUSSELS ENERGY AND CLIMATE PLANS

Eisen PWG klimaatcoalitie	Nationaal energie- en klimaatplan	Vlaams energie- en klimaatplan	Waals energie- en klimaatplan	Brussels energie- en klimaatplan
Broeikasgassen en koolstofneutraliteit				

<p>1. België moet samen met de meest ambitieuze Europese landen een verhoging van de Europese klimaatdoelstellingen in het kader van het Parijsakkoord te verdedigen: minimum -55% uitstoot van broeikasgassen in 2030 en koolstof neutraliteit uiterlijk tegen 2050.</p> <p>2. Op Belgisch, Vlaams, Waals en Brussels niveau moeten de versterkte klimaatdoelstellingen geïmplementeerd worden.</p>	<p>1. - 35% broeikasgas uitstoot in 2030 ten opzichte van 2005 in niet ETS-sectoren</p> <p>2. Huishoudelijke uitstoot van broeikasgassen verminderen met ten minste 80% in 2050 ten opzichte van 1990</p> <p>3. Verschuiven van de lasten naar fossiele grondstoffen, uitfaseren van de steun aan fossiele brandstoffen en financiële stromen consistent maken met de transitie naar een koolstofarme samenleving.</p>	<p>1. - 35% broeikasgas uitstoot in 2030 ten opzichte van 2005 in de niet-ETS sectoren</p>	<p>1. - 37% broeikasgas uitstoot in 2030 ten opzichte van 2005 in de niet-ETS sectoren</p>	<p>1. - 40% broeikasgas uitstoot in 2030 ten opzichte van 2005 in de niet-ETS sectoren</p> <p>2. Tegen 2050 moet de Europese doelstelling van koolstofneutraliteit benaderd worden</p>
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Just transition				
<p>1. De transitie naar een koolstofarme maatschappij moet op een uitvoering van een sociaal rechtvaardige manier gebeuren. Dit moet zich vertalen in Europese initiatieven zoals een Europees Fonds voor een eerlijke transitie, de invoering van carbon border tax adjustment measures aan de Europese grenzen en een Europese Green Deal.</p> <p>2. Klimaat verandering treft kwetsbare landen het hardst, dus moeten er voldoende middelen voorzien worden om deze veranderingen het hoofd te bieden.</p> <p>3. Erkenning van de noodzaak van financiering voor loss and damage die voortkomt uit de aanpassing naar koolstofarme en klimaat neutrale ontwikkeling.</p> <p>4. Erkenning van het probleem van klimaat-ontheemden en klimaat-vluchtelingen.</p> <p>5. Zorg ervoor dat voedselzekerheid, mensenrechten en sociale bescherming centraal staan in internationale onderhandelingen.</p>	<p>1. Niet iedereen zal op dezelfde manier beïnvloed worden door de omslag naar een koolstofarme maatschappij. Daarom moet men specifiek rekening houden met de arbeidsmarkt, kansarmoede en de genderdimensie van klimaat verandering.</p>	<p>1. Energie armoede: Vlaanderen wil inzetten op sociale bescherming tegen afsluiting van energielevering en het structureel werken aan een verlaagd energieverbruik in de woningen</p>	<p>/</p>	<p>1. Milieudoel stellingen moeten omgezet worden in economische kansen via het Gewestelijk Programma voor Circulaire Economie (GPCE)</p> <p>2. Bij het vastleggen van fiscale maatregelen moet er aandacht zijn voor sociale rechtvaardigheid.</p> <p>3. Energie armoede: consumenten bevinden zich in een kwetsbare positie ten opzichte van energie leveranciers en moeten voldoende beschermd worden.</p>
Klimaatfinanciering				

<p>1. Verhoging van de Belgische bijdrage aan de klimaatfinanciering, zonder aan de bestaande budgetten voor ontwikkelings- samenwerking te raken</p> <p>2. Een strategie invoeren om een rechtvaardige transitie naar een koolstofarme samenleving mogelijk te maken, met o.a. het afschaffen van alle subsidies en belastingvrijstellingen ten gunste van fossiele brandstoffen, goederen en diensten met een hoog koolstofgehalte.</p> <p>3. Investeren in de sectoren die essentieel zijn voor de transitie naar een koolstofarme samenleving zoals agro-ecologie, renovatie en isolatie van gebouwen, emissievrij openbaar vervoer en hernieuwbare energie.</p> <p>4. Een sociaal rechtvaardige koolstofheffing invoeren, volgens het principe van de vervuiler betaalt.</p> <p>5. Alle inkomsten uit de Europese handel in emissierechten (ETS-inkomsten) besteden aan het klimaatbeleid.</p>	<p>1. België moet een "rechtvaardige bijdrage" aan de klimaat financiering leveren</p> <p>2. Tot 2020 ligt de Belgische bijdrage vast op 50 miljoen, waarvan 25 miljoen van de federale overheid komt. Voor de periode 2021-2030 liggen nog geen bedragen vast.</p>	<p>1. De Vlaamse bijdrage aan de Belgische klimaat financiering bedroeg in de periode 2017-2020 jaarlijks 14,5 miljoen euro. De verdeling voor 2021-2030 is nog niet bekend.</p>	<p>1. Inzetten op bilaterale solidariteitsprojecten die Noord-Zuid werking ondersteunen</p> <p>2. Bijdragen aan multilaterale fondsen zoals het Green Cimate Fund en Adaptation Fund.</p>	<p>1. Het gewestelijk klimaatfonds moet voldoen aan richtlijn 2003/87/EG, die de lidstaten ertoe verplicht de inkomsten uit de verkoop van emissierechten uit het ETS te gebruiken voor bepaalde specifieke doeleinden, zoals de vermindering van de broeikasgas emissies.</p>
<p>Bossen en biodiversiteit</p>				
<p>1. Ambitieuze verklaringen over belangrijke thema's zoals bossen en biodiversiteit steunen</p>	<p>1. Mogelijkheid tot verdere bebossing in België is beperkt</p>	<p>1. Voorkomen van ontbossing en gericht beheer van bestaande natuur. Hierbij zal geïnvesteerd worden in natuur met een groot koolstofopslag potentieel.</p>	<p>1. Aandeel bos in Wallonië blijft stabiel</p> <p>2. Waalse boswet promoot bosbouw praktijken om Waalse bossen aan te passen aan de gevolgen van de klimaat verandering</p>	<p>/</p>

overige eisen PWG klimaatcoalitie

Eisen PWG klimaatcoalitie	Federaal, Vlaams, Waals en Brussels energie- en klimaatplan
Een systemische en interfederale visie ontwikkelen. België heeft nood aan een geïntegreerd, federaal klimaatplan, geen document dat bestaat uit knip- en plakwerk uit de gewestelijke klimaatplannen	Niet vermeld in de energie- en klimaatplannen.
De wet op kernuitstap respecteren en in dit verband uiterlijk in 2025 definitief kernenergie afschaffen. De gescheurde reactoren in Doel 3 en Tihange 2 zo snel mogelijk sluiten.	
Een einde maken aan het gebruik van biobrandstoffen op basis van landbouwgewassen	



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