

**11.11.11**

**VECHT MEE TEGEN ONRECHT**

# **TRIPLE NEXUS**

**HOW HUMANITARIAN, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE ACTORS  
CAN WORK TOGETHER**

**OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND WAYS FORWARD FOR BELGIUM**

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**JUNE 2021**





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## **ABSTRACT**

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In recent years debates on international cooperation have increasingly been dominated by the so-called “triple nexus” between humanitarian aid, development and peace. Although not an entirely new concept, momentum behind the “triple nexus” has accelerated after the publication of an OECD DAC “recommendation” on the triple nexus in February 2019. This paper aims to nourish the ongoing discussions on the triple nexus approach and provide answers to the following questions: what are the potential strengths and opportunities of a triple nexus approach? Which potential challenges and risks can be identified? Which “lessons learnt” for an effective triple nexus approach can be identified from initial programming efforts? And finally, how can the Belgian government ensure that a triple nexus approach is used to further promote a gender mainstreaming agenda?



## **METHODOLOGY**

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This paper is informed by a desk study, literature review, a short questionnaire and discussions among 16 local, Belgian and international organisations.

## **COLOPHON**

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

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This paper aims to answer the following questions: What are the potential strengths and opportunities of a triple nexus approach? Which potential challenges and risks can be identified? Which “lessons learnt” for an effective triple nexus approach can be identified from initial triple nexus programming efforts? And finally, how can the Belgian government ensure that a triple nexus approach is used to further promote a gender mainstreaming agenda?

Its **general conclusion** is that a “triple nexus” approach, as outlined by the OECD DAC in February 2019, should be considered an opportunity to improve the effectiveness of international aid and cooperation. The OECD DAC recommendation on the triple nexus has several **strengths**, including the emphasis it places on an inclusive approach that puts people at the centre and prioritises the needs of local communities; its emphasis on gender sensitivity and gender equality; its focus on the need for more flexible and multi-annual funding; and its strong emphasis on engagement with local CSO actors and affected communities.

Additionally, this paper also identifies several **opportunities** of a triple nexus approach. It can be an important opportunity to increase cooperation, collaboration, coherence and complementarity between humanitarian, development and peace actors; has strong potential to enhance local leadership and localised response systems; allows for a greater focus on the specific needs of women and girls and offers opportunities to enhance gender justice and mainstream gender analysis throughout different sectors; offers important opportunities to further promote and mainstream conflict-sensitivity analysis; and is an important opportunity to discuss how to do longer-term and more structural development work in conflict areas.

At the same time, however, several **challenges and risks** remain. There continues to exist conceptual confusion and lack of operational guidance on how to further operationalise and implement the triple nexus, while the scope and purpose of the “peace” pillar of the triple nexus remains unclear. Questions also remain on whether international actors will live up to their commitment to allow local actors to take a more central role, or whether the further operationalisation of triple nexus approaches will be implemented in a top down manner. Risks also exist that in certain cases a triple nexus approach could lead to the instrumentalization of humanitarian or development cooperation for political or even security purposes. For humanitarian cooperation, this means above all the risk of undermining the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality. Moreover, several humanitarian and development practitioners – including those who are generally supportive of the triple nexus – have pointed to a possible competition between humanitarian or development work on the one hand, and triple nexus approaches on the other, whereby an overly dominant focus on the latter risks to ultimately result in immediate humanitarian or structural development needs not receiving adequate support anymore. They emphasise that the triple nexus is not a panacea and should not be seen as the “only game in town”.

Finally, this paper also identifies some initial **“lessons learnt”** from existing triple nexus programming efforts. In recent years, several organisations have already started (pilot) projects and programs that address some of the different issues associated with triple nexus approaches in fragile and conflict-affected countries. On this basis, four such “lessons learnt” are



highlighted in this paper, which could guide future efforts to operationalise the triple nexus:

1. national and local civil society, in particular women's rights organisations and organisations striving for gender equality, must always be at the forefront;
2. any triple nexus approach should put in place concrete mechanisms that ensure accountability to affected populations;
3. triple nexus projects require more flexible and multi-year funding approaches;
4. human resources play a key role in the further operationalisation and practical application of any triple nexus approach.

Based on these findings, 11.11.11 recommends that the Belgian government takes the following actions:

## GENERAL APPROACH

1. **Policy Coherence for Development:** operationalising the triple nexus has to be part of the wider aim to guarantee policy coherence for development. This means guaranteeing sustainable development and at the very least preventing any damage to that objective (*do no harm*), while also putting an end to the global arms trade that fuels humanitarian crises and renders sustainable development impossible.
2. **Long-term and structural approach:** develop long-term and structural programming modalities and objectives that prioritise prevention, addressing the root causes of conflict, structural development and peacebuilding. Invest more in public and universally accessible healthcare, social protection and education. Contribute to a sustained strengthening of the systems behind these services to make them more resilient to future crises. Provide a gender-sensitive child and human rights approach to ensure universal access to these services. Strengthen the resilience of the local economy through support for local enterprises, family farming and decent work. Support local governments, civil society actors and spaces for a structural dialogue that contribute to this.
3. **Operational guidance for the triple Nexus:** develop an Operational Guidance Note which explains, for both internal and external audiences, Belgium's role in and vision and avenues for implementation of the triple nexus. Such guidance document should include, among others: 1) a clarification on the interpretation of basic terms and definitions that are used by the Belgian government (in particular on the third "peace" pillar); 2) a gender sensitive guiding menu of approaches to support country teams and partners to identify practical options for common risk and context analysis, programming and funding; 3) learning and advice on potential mechanisms for understanding needs across the triple nexus; 4) learning and advice on the use of beneficiary feedback and downward accountability mechanisms, as well as on best practices to ensure an equal partnership and systematic consultation processes with local CSO partners (in particular women's rights organisations); and 5) guidance on the kind of contexts where a triple nexus is applicable, and where it is not. Existing instruments at Belgian level can be integrated and used (e.g. risk analysis with FRAME, common strategic frameworks as coordination mechanisms, etc).



4. **Promote a “positive peace” approach:** when interpreting the third “peace” pillar of the triple nexus, develop a “positive peace” approach in which peace is framed as a bottom-up, community-based approach that addresses root causes and takes into account local dynamics, in order to ensure that the peace pillar is not being instrumentalised for security, counterterrorism or opportunistic political agendas. Encourage other donor governments, including during discussions at OECD DAC level, to adopt a similar interpretation on the third “peace” pillar.
5. **Increase internal capacity:** strengthen staff expertise and analytical capacity at Headquarters- and country-level, both through the recruitment of specific profiles and through trainings (including trainings on discrimination and gender). Ensure that such experts closely work together with local CSOs and affected communities when developing triple nexus action plans per pilot country.
6. **Pilot approach:** adopt a bottom-up approach to triple nexus programming, in which nexus approaches are tested in a selected number of pilot countries. In each pilot country, develop an action plan on how to move the triple nexus forward, in close consultation with local CSO actors and affected communities, throughout all stages of the process. After carefully identifying lessons learnt and best practices in pilot countries, consider scaling up triple nexus approaches.

## MEANINGFUL ENGAGEMENT WITH LOCAL ACTORS

7. **Establish mechanisms for regular and meaningful “capacity sharing” and dialogue,** including the organisation of Partnership Fora at capital level and the organisation of triple nexus workshops at country level. Such mechanisms should bring together key stakeholders, including local CSOs and NGOs (with a particular focus on organisations fighting for gender equality and women empowerment), in order to identify practical ways for engagement on the triple nexus; to highlight existing good practices and lessons learnt in triple nexus approaches; to identify challenges and opportunities when working on the triple nexus in a particular context; to consider potential thematic and specific geographical areas where a triple nexus approach could be successfully applied; to identify policy recommendations that could enable effective triple nexus programming; and to build lasting and long-term partnerships between local actors and donors.
8. **Support localised triple nexus research:** allocate specific resources to locally-led and locally-owned research efforts on the operationalisation of triple nexus approaches, in order to build a solid and diversified knowledge base on what works and what does not work in a particular context, and to help ensure that the knowledge and expertise of local actors is better incorporated into policy discussions on the triple nexus.
9. **Support localised triple nexus advocacy:** ensure meaningful participation by local CSOs and representatives of affected communities in international decision-making processes (including at OECD DAC level) regarding the triple nexus. This can be done, among others, by covering travel costs to participate in international meetings and by ensuring that information is accessible to local actors in relevant languages.





10. **Duty of care:** ensure that risks are shared equally across the operational chain (from donor to downstream partner), and that the burden of operating in high-risk environments does not unequally fall on the downstream partner.
11. **Support innovative accountability mechanisms:** make resources available for the identification of innovative (digital) methods that ensure downward accountability, so that affected populations are not only able to identify their needs and risks, but are also involved in (high level) policy debates, and are included in the review of policies that affect them.

## GENDER EQUALITY

12. Throughout the operationalisation of a triple nexus approach, pay **particular attention to a gender sensitive approach and the Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) of women and girls**. The nexus approach should also tackle Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in all its forms, as it provides a unique opportunity to address GBV prevention, risk mitigation and response.
13. In addition to a gender mainstreaming approach, **pay particular attention to triple nexus projects/programmes that specifically address gender challenges and empowerment of women and girls**, and use strict **gender markers** in any triple nexus programming.
14. Increase internal capacity to conduct **gender analysis and gender impact assessments**.
15. Increase efforts to **structurally involve the perspectives of women's rights organisations** in all discussions on the design, implementation and evaluation of triple nexus projects and programmes.



## FUNDING

16. Start an **active reflection**, in the context of the "Nexus Working Group", on **potential funding options** for the triple nexus, taking into account the principles outlined below. This may concern the search for flexible financing within the current framework to systemise a complementary approach where relevant, as well as a discussion on the potential advantages and disadvantages of establishing a stand-alone mechanism for triple nexus programming in a selected number of pilot countries.
  - Allow for sufficient **flexibility** in terms of activities, multi-year timelines and implementation schedules, time and resources for local consultations, indicator frameworks and risk management modalities;
  - Ensure a growth path of the 0.7% of GNI, so that **additional** resources can be used if needed for a triple nexus approach and that existing funding for structural development cooperation, humanitarian cooperation and peacebuilding is not compromised.



- Explore possibilities for more **decentralisation** in decision-making processes, wherein a greater level of responsibility is given to country staff;
- Explicitly stipulate specific requirements in terms of **equal partnerships** with local CSOs and meaningful consultation and feedback processes for affected communities. Insist on the need to create “capacity-sharing” spaces between local and international actors;
- Ensure a **structural approach**, which takes into account lessons learnt from pilot projects, rather than an approach that only focusses on ad hoc calls for proposals.

17. **Aid localisation:** accelerate and concretise aid localisation efforts and commitments, by providing longer-term and flexible funding that includes adequate support for overhead costs to cover safety, health insurance, severance pay and other risk management priorities.



## 1. INTRO

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In the past decade, there has been a sharp increase in the number of conflicts and conflict-related deaths across the globe.<sup>1</sup> Conflicts have become more protracted, and forced displacement more common. By the end of 2020 more than 80 million people were forcibly displaced due to persecution, conflict, and human rights violations, almost double the number of forcibly displaced persons in 2010.<sup>2</sup> 85 % of the global refugee population is living in developing countries, where most of them have no access to any of the three “durable solutions” for displaced persons (local integration; safe, voluntary and dignified return; and resettlement or other legal pathways to third countries).<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, nearly half of the world’s people in extreme poverty are living in fragile contexts. It is estimated that this will increase to 80 % by 2030. Conflict is currently driving 80 % of humanitarian needs, while climate-related shocks are becoming increasingly intense and frequent. In 2019, for example, 23.9 million people were displaced due to weather-related disasters, the highest number recorded since 2012.<sup>4</sup> In addition to conflict-related shocks and extreme weather events, people across the globe are also experiencing widespread injustices and economic shocks that restrict their rights, freedoms and development opportunities. Issues such as gender inequality, discrimination, economic inequality, food insecurity, political and economic instability, elite capture of resources and rapid unplanned urbanisation are shaping vulnerabilities before, during and after specific events.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, military interventions and the global arms trade have often initiated and/or fuelled humanitarian crises.



Against this alarming backdrop, in recent years debates on international cooperation have increasingly been dominated by the so-called “triple nexus” between humanitarian aid, development and peace. Although not an entirely new concept, momentum behind the “triple nexus” has accelerated after the publication of an **OECD DAC “recommendation” on the triple nexus** in February 2019.<sup>6</sup> In this recommendation (a first Mid-Term Review is planned in 2022), a “nexus approach” is defined as *“the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity. The approach seeks to capitalize on the comparative advantages of each pillar – to the extent of their relevance in the specific context – in order to reduce overall vulnerability and the number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address root causes of conflict.”* More specifically, the DAC recommendation calls upon ‘donor governments’ to:

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**Debates on international cooperation have increasingly been dominated by the so-called “triple nexus” between humanitarian aid, development and peace**

- **Improve cooperation across the nexus**, by undertaking joint risk-informed, gender-sensitive analysis of root causes and structural drivers of conflict; providing appropriate resourcing to empower leadership for cost-effective coordination across the humanitarian, development and peace architecture; and by utilising political engagement and other tools, instruments and approaches at all levels to prevent crises, resolve conflicts and build peace;





- **Improve programming within the nexus**, by prioritising prevention, mediation and peacebuilding, investing in development whenever possible, while ensuring immediate humanitarian needs continue to be met; putting people at the centre, tackling exclusion and promoting gender equality; ensuring that activities do no harm, are conflict sensitive to avoid unintended negative consequences; aligning joined-up programming with the risk environment; strengthening national and local capacities; and investing in learning and evidence across humanitarian, development and peace actions;
- **Improve financing across the nexus**, by developing evidence-based humanitarian, development and peace financing strategies at global, regional, national and local levels; and by using predictable, flexible, multi-year financing wherever possible.

This paper – which is informed by a desk study, literature review, and a short questionnaire and discussions among 16 local, Belgian and international organisations<sup>7</sup> aims to nourish the ongoing discussions on the triple nexus approach and provide answers to the following questions: what are the potential strengths and opportunities of a triple nexus approach? Which potential challenges and risks can be identified? Which “lessons learnt” for an effective triple nexus approach can be identified from initial programming efforts? And finally, how can the Belgian government ensure that a triple nexus approach is used to further promote a gender mainstreaming agenda?



## 2. THE TRIPLE NEXUS IN BELGIAN DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

### 2.1. GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT AND POLICY STATEMENTS

In recent years – in particular since the publication of the OECD DAC recommendation in February 2019 – the “triple nexus” has increasingly become an important narrative within Belgian foreign and development policy. Most importantly, the **Government Agreement** (30 September 2020) of the current Belgian government has stated that (unofficial translation):

“In fragile countries the government will also focus on the link between structural aid and humanitarian aid. The government will continue to evaluate how best to realize an impactful policy (...) Belgium will pay particular attention to the protracted nature of humanitarian crises, paying attention to the intertwining of the humanitarian, development, and peace and security.”<sup>8</sup>

This statement is also repeated in the “**Policy Declaration**” of Belgian Minister for Development Affairs Meryame Kitir (unofficial translation): *“In fragile contexts, various humanitarian and political crises where humanitarian aid is deployed last longer and longer. In such situations it is important to save lives, but also to promote self-reliance by focusing on projects that make the link between structural aid, humanitarian aid and peacebuilding. We want to make people in humanitarian crises more resilient. More resources will be freed up for conflict prevention and society building. In time, the aim is to structurally anchor the “Transitional Development” instrument, which will focus in particular on tackling the root causes of fragility, conflict and humanitarian crises. The impact of climate change will be an important element here. In the context of international refugee crises, Belgium will also support the development of high-quality reception and protection in the region of conflict areas.”*<sup>9</sup> The policy declaration of minister Kitir further states that the OECD DAC recommendation on the triple nexus will be an important “*guidance*” for Belgian development policy in fragile countries.

Furthermore, the **annual policy note** by Minister Kitir (2021) also references the triple nexus approach, and specifies a number of priority regions for application of such triple nexus approach (unofficial translation): *“Belgian humanitarian aid will focus on priority regions where there is proven expertise and where monitoring is possible. Specific attention will be paid to the ongoing crises in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria), the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Uganda), the occupied Palestinian territory (Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem) and Syria (and neighbouring countries). Attention will be paid to saving lives, but also again to promoting self-reliance by focusing on projects that make the link between structural aid, humanitarian aid and peacebuilding.”*<sup>10</sup> Finally, the 2021 development affairs budget (adopted by the federal parliament in late 2020) also foresees a small budget (7.5 million Euro) for “*call for proposals for the transition to development*”, which can potentially also be used for the funding of triple nexus projects (although not exclusively).



## 2.2. STRATEGIC NOTES

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In recent years the Belgian government has also adopted two strategic notes that have implications for discussions on the triple nexus<sup>11</sup>:

- In 2019 a **“Policy Framework for the Belgian Development Cooperation in the security sector”** was adopted.<sup>12</sup> This Framework elaborated on how Belgium defines and understands “security”; what are the general principles guiding development interventions in the security sector; what are the basic preconditions – at country and operational level – and criteria for Belgian support to a specific intervention; what are potential risks of an intervention in the sphere of “security” (to be assessed through a specific methodology and framework for risk management, “FRAME”<sup>13</sup>); and how potential risks can be mitigated (including ending support to a specific intervention). In this framework a broad understanding of “security” is proposed (in line with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16; thus including the judicial sector and other non-military aspects of security), and it is stated that most Belgian support in the period 2008-2019 was situated in the following domains: legal and judicial development; security sector management and reform; support to UN peace missions; ending violence against women and girls; civil peacebuilding and conflict prevention; and prevention and demobilisation of child soldiers. The Policy Framework also identified 3 strategic priority domains in which the Belgian Development Cooperation aims to achieve concrete results in the future: 1) security and justice for women; 2) security and justice for children and youth; and 3) performant, responsible and transparent institutions for a peaceful society.<sup>14</sup>
- In 2017 a **“Strategy note Comprehensive Approach” (CA)** was adopted, which sets a general framework for an intensified cooperation, coordination and exchange between different Belgian governmental actors.<sup>15</sup> To this end, a “Steering Group” was created within the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which oversees the work of various new “task forces” at country and thematic level. These task forces are, among others, expected to serve as a platform for maximal information exchange, the exploration of potential synergies, and the development of common risk- and context analyses. Coordination and cooperation in the context of the “triple nexus” also takes place within these CA structures.



## 2.3. POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT

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Finally, there is the principle of “policy coherence for development”, which is written in the law on the Belgian Development cooperation (2013). Often, other policy areas (such as the security, climate, trade, fiscal or migration policy of European countries) have a greater impact on developing countries than development cooperation as such. Policy coherence for development means that the impact of other policy areas on the sustainable development of developing countries is monitored. This means, on the one hand, a do no harm approach, but



on the other hand, active contributions to sustainable development from various policy actors. As for any other approach that seeks greater cooperation and coherence, this principle should also be the guiding principle for a triple nexus approach.

## 2.4. GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE?

At the same time, **it remains unclear to what extent this emerging emphasis on the triple nexus will also lead to actual policy change.** The 2020 OECD DAC “peer review” of Belgian development policy, for example, noted that there still is a “*need to strengthen common understanding of the comparative advantages of the various implementation modalities and types of intervention in order to strengthen the links between humanitarian aid, peace and development.*” According to the OECD DAC review, the challenges of operationalising a nexus approach also become evident in Belgium’s funding to multilateral organisations that are active in protracted emergency contexts: “*For reasons specific to Belgian financing channels, these agencies are assigned the “label” of either humanitarian or development organisation, which is often perceived as an unnecessary straightjacket, ill-adapted to the complex realities of crisis and fragility contexts. Several partners would therefore like to be able to call on a broader range of Belgian funding channels, depending on the situation (...) As Belgian ODA is organised through separate financing channels and partnerships, there is little scope for financing other types of projects by bilateral and multilateral partners which combine humanitarian, development and peace-protection activities. There is also limited scope for shifting from a development approach to an emergency response in the event of new crises.*”<sup>16</sup>

Finally, there continues to exist a **disconnection between the emerging vision on a triple nexus approach on the one hand, and the available means for the third “peace” pillar on the other.** As noted by the 2020 OECD DAC review of Belgium, there is a “*gap between vision and means in the areas of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and United Nations peace and security reform, all of which are important to Belgium and yet are poorly funded.*”<sup>17</sup> Such a gap is indeed evident when analysing the available budget, in the past 15 years, for Belgian peacebuilding efforts. In the period between 2006 and 2019 Belgium contributed a mere 7.8 million USD to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, an annual average of 0.56 million USD.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, in the past decade the available budget for the budget line “peacebuilding”, managed by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has substantially decreased. In 2021, there is 3.92 million Euro available for the “peacebuilding” budget line, a decrease of 73.5 % since 2014 (and even 83.9 % when compared to the 2006 budget for peacebuilding).<sup>19</sup> In an answer to parliamentary questions (February 2021), Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sophie Wilmès also explicitly stipulated that there will be no increase in the available budget for the peacebuilding budget line “in the coming years”.<sup>20</sup>

**It remains unclear to what extent this emerging emphasis on the triple nexus will also lead to actual policy change**



Moreover, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there still seems to be limited awareness about the triple nexus approach and logic. In response to a parliamentary question, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wilmès has recently suggested that there are limited connections to be made between peacebuilding and development budget lines, stating that (unofficial translation) *“peacebuilding is directly related to the actions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs **and in no way to development cooperation or to society building**, which depend exclusively on the Minister of Development Cooperation (...) The ODA recommendations and the “triple nexus” can be followed by our budget line, but the budget line “peacebuilding” is not tied to these concepts, unlike the budget lines of development cooperation.”*<sup>21</sup> (emphasis added)

Finally, it should be noted that budget limitations have resulted in **serious under-staffing of specific units that work on the triple nexus**. Within the Directorate-General for Development and Humanitarian Aid (DGD), the Directorate “Humanitarian Aid and Transition” (D5; divided in a unit “Humanitarian Aid” (D5.1) and “Transition to Development and Good Governance” (D5.2) ) is the central actor in triple nexus-related discussions. The Directorate however remains understaffed<sup>22</sup>, resulting in limited opportunities to further build the internal knowledge base on the practical application of a triple nexus approach.

## 3. THE TRIPLE NEXUS: STRENGTHS, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

### 3.1. STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES

For the purpose of this paper, 11.11.11 conducted a questionnaire among seven Belgian CSOs (both member organisations and non-member organisations), seven partner organisations in the Great Lakes and MENA regions, and two International NGOs (INGOs).

In this questionnaire, the 16 respondents expressed a generally positive attitude towards a “triple nexus” approach, as outlined in the OECD DAC recommendation (2019). More specifically, the following **main strengths** were cited by questionnaire respondents<sup>23</sup>:

- The emphasis on an inclusive approach that puts people at the centre and prioritises the needs of local communities;
- The emphasis on gender sensitivity and gender equality;
- The focus on a conflict sensitive approach<sup>24</sup>;
- The focus on the need for more flexible and multi-annual funding;
- The stronger emphasis on engagement with local Civil Society Organisations (CSO) actors and affected communities. Many questionnaire respondents noted that such engagement should however not be limited to one-way consultations, but should consist of an equal partnership that involves local actors in all stages of triple nexus programming. In this regard, respondents also cited the utility of the “triple nexus” OECD DAC recommendation in debates around the localisation of humanitarian aid.

In addition, a triple nexus approach offers many **opportunities**:

- **Collaboration and cooperation:** the triple nexus approach, as outlined in the OECD DAC recommendation, is seen by questionnaire respondents as an important opportunity to increase cooperation, collaboration, coherence and complementarity between humanitarian, development and peace actors.<sup>25</sup> In a context where almost 90 percent of humanitarian aid goes to so-called protracted crises, life-saving (but also inherently short-term) emergency relief that does not enhance long-term prospects for development and peace, risks to create aid dependencies and to undermine people’s dignity.<sup>26</sup> In such protracted crises a nexus approach is seen by many as an opportunity to adjust funding modalities, which are often siloed into strict humanitarian or development blocks that do not necessarily correspond to people’s personal experiences.<sup>27</sup> “A sequential

**In this questionnaire, the 16 respondents expressed a generally positive attitude towards a “triple nexus” approach, as outlined in the OECD DAC recommendation**



*approach has shown not to be an adequate solution, and synchronous humanitarian, development and peace actions are generally considered more effective”, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has also noted in this regard.<sup>28</sup>*

- **Localisation of aid:** researchers and practitioners alike have emphasised the strong potential that a triple nexus approach has to offer to enhance local leadership and localised response systems. As also noted by several questionnaire respondents, the OECD DAC recommendation on the triple nexus acknowledges the crucial role and knowledge of local actors, and stimulates direct collaboration with such actors.<sup>29</sup> This is also highlighted in a recent Oxfam paper, which states that the triple nexus allows “*more scope for supporting the people who respond first to crises – the people affected, national and local administrations, and local organizations – on their terms and based on their requirements (...) There is clear evidence that the resulting assistance is likely to be more appropriate for people’s needs.*”<sup>30</sup>

In a similar vein, researcher Marc DuBois has identified three points he considers emblematic of the bottom-up nature of triple nexus thinking: the affirmation of local context and capacity, and the steering away of humanitarian action from any hierarchical or paternalistic devaluation of local knowledge; the strengthening of horizontal and vertical accountability (including downward accountability to those affected by crisis); and the re-valuation of notions of proximity and presence, wherein people affected by crisis are not seen as mere “victims” but also as actors and drivers of change.<sup>31</sup>

- **Enhancing gender justice:** the triple nexus approach, as outlined in the OECD DAC recommendation, allows for a greater focus on the specific needs of women and girls and offers opportunities to mainstream gender analysis throughout the humanitarian, development and peace sectors.<sup>32</sup> Research by Oxfam and IASC, for example, has identified several opportunities a triple nexus approach can offer to enhance gender justice, including by providing long-term support to women’s rights organisations and using strict gender markers in programming. As such a triple nexus approach can further contribute to the structural and long-term promotion of gender equality, women empowerment and leadership, as well as better addressing Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and changing gendered power dynamics.<sup>33</sup>
- **Promoting conflict-sensitive approaches:** a triple nexus approach also offers important opportunities to further promote and mainstream conflict-sensitivity analysis, thereby contributing to interventions that are based on a proper analysis and understanding of a specific local context.<sup>34</sup>
- **Structural development and prevention:** several questionnaire respondents stressed that discussions on the triple nexus are an important opportunity to discuss how to do structural, development work in conflict areas. This must also involve a reflection on what development is, and where it should go in the

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longer term. It is about guaranteeing basic rights for everyone (the right to health care, education, decent work, social protection, sustainable and accessible food etc) and ensuring that people can claim these rights. This work cannot be done without starting from the needs, rights and perspectives of local communities. As such, discussions on the triple nexus offer an opportunity to (re-) initiate the debate on which specific objectives (for example social protection) should be the focus of development interventions.<sup>35</sup>

Furthermore, several questionnaire respondents noted the potential of a triple nexus approach to advance the prevention of conflict escalation and risks in fragile contexts. One questionnaire respondent also emphasized the opportunity to explore how Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and the triple nexus can be complementary and mutually beneficial, in order to increase efficient use of scarce resources and to counter specific problems in a sustainable and risk-sensitive way.

## 3.2. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES AND RISKS TO AN EFFECTIVE TRIPLE NEXUS APPROACH

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### 3.2.1. Conceptual confusion and lack of operational guidance

Several questionnaire respondents highlighted that although they are generally supportive of the triple nexus approach outlined by the OECD DAC, there exists a lack of guidance on how to further operationalise and implement it.<sup>36</sup> As many key elements of the OECD DAC recommendation do not address the “how” question and do not formulate specific action points, outcomes or next steps, it remains unclear for many operational actors what the triple nexus approach will actually mean in practice. *“The OECD DAC recommendation is a beautiful wish list, but it does not give the user many ways to approach the nexus in practical terms”*, one questionnaire respondent summarized this general sentiment.<sup>37</sup>

In a similar vein, several recent research reports on the operationalisation of the triple nexus have pointed to the lack of a common nexus definition, as well as a lack of common understanding of the exact scope and meaning of the nexus. Whereas in some countries, such as the UK and Sweden, top-level policies on the triple nexus already exist, such general frameworks do not always provide clear expectations on where, when and how to make connections between humanitarian, development and peace actions.<sup>38</sup>

A study commissioned by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Team (IASC-TT), for example, has noted a lack of clear guidance around how to develop Collective Outcomes (COs) or what should be included in such COs.<sup>39</sup> A 2019 study by VOICE (a network of 85 European humanitarian NGOs) subsequently called for more clarity on how (and by whom) COs are defined, while a 2019 review of the UK government’s work on the triple nexus highlighted the need for more operational guidance within donor’s agencies as a precondition for transforming general policies into operational strategies and action plans





at country and regional levels. Such operational guidance, it was argued, would be a vital step to come to a better common understanding of key concepts and definitions, to systematically capture lessons learnt, and to provide operational advice on programming and funding approaches (including sequencing, results, indicators and staffing). At the same time, however, the review (as well as other reviews) warned to avoid overly prescriptive approaches and to allow sufficient room for context-specific and flexible approaches.<sup>40</sup>

### 3.2.2. Unclear scope and purpose of the “peace” component

Discussions on the triple nexus are also characterised by a lack of consensus on the exact scope of the third “peace” component. A clear common understanding of what “peace” means in a triple nexus approach is missing, while there is considerable debate on how exactly the integration of a peace pillar in nexus approaches can be achieved, what the practical implications of such integration would be, and how to avoid possible instrumentalization for political, security and counter-terrorism agendas.<sup>41</sup> As explained by Oxfam in a 2019 research paper:

*“Peace interventions can be understood along a spectrum: conflict sensitivity; enhancing local capacities for peace; peacebuilding; peace processes and high-level political diplomacy; and preserving peace through peacekeeping mechanisms. ‘Peace’ itself can be understood as ‘negative peace’, in which there is simply an absence of direct violence (...) Alternatively, it can refer to ‘positive peace’, in which there has been a constructive resolution to the conflict, positive relationships have been restored and a social system that serves the needs of the whole population has been (re-)established (...) Oxfam believes peace should be framed as a bottom-up, community-based approach that addresses root causes (‘positive peace’), rather than being framed in terms of security (‘negative peace’) (...) States and the UN Security Council, however, often prioritize state-centric initiatives. State-led processes risk prioritizing state security and state-led security services over human security and a sense of safety for individuals (...) A clear, inclusive and common vision of what the peace component should deliver is needed.”<sup>42</sup> (emphasis added)*

Other case studies on the application of triple nexus approaches have taken a similar position and have argued in favour of **prioritising a “positive peace” approach when interpreting the third peace pillar, in order to ensure that this pillar is not being instrumentalised** for security, counter-terrorism or political agendas.<sup>43</sup> A 2020 IASC study, for example, explicitly advises against a “negative peace” approach, warning that *“overly militarized or securitized responses frequently exacerbate grievances and drivers of conflict”*, but that it should be *“possible for humanitarian actors to formally engage with actors and actions in the sphere of positive peace.”<sup>44</sup>*

A study by Development Initiatives (2019) has therefore recommended that donor governments start working with each other, in order to collectively identify the specific types of peace activities which are relevant and appropriate to the triple nexus, and those that are not.<sup>45</sup>



### 3.2.3. Top-down implementation, lack of meaningful localisation

As local people, communities and organisations know their own needs best, it has increasingly been recognised that more efforts are needed by international actors to ensure that the perspectives, ideas and views of local actors are given a central role in any humanitarian, development or peace effort. When local actors are closely involved in programme design – and if this happens on an equal basis – there is greater local ownership and interventions have a higher chance of being sustainable and responsive to the needs of affected people, given the close proximity of local organisations to affected populations. This proximity enables local organisations to bring vital insights and lessons learnt on how to successfully operationalise a triple nexus approach.<sup>46</sup>

Hence, for a triple nexus approach to be effective, it must meaningfully engage local actors (in particular women's rights organisations) from the very beginning, and ensure that such engagement is based on an equal partnership that recognises and takes into account pre-existing power imbalances between local actors and donors. This is also explicitly recognised in the OECD DAC recommendation on the triple nexus, which includes several commitments to putting people at the centre of any response and to strengthening local and national capacities.<sup>47</sup> In the words of a 2018 paper by CARE, which summarised CARE's experiences with nexus approaches in the MENA region: *"To really benefit from the opportunities of the nexus, we stress the need for a Nexus that is grounded in local realities (...) and adopts local responses to local challenges. This means utilising localisation, local ownership, and local participation as core drivers of nexus programming; and not being limited to national, donors or multilateral organisation's agendas"*<sup>48</sup>

**It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the triple nexus approach will actually deliver on its localisation commitments.** Several questionnaire respondents highlighted a top-down implementation of the triple nexus (wherein local communities and CSOs would not be properly involved in the design and implementation of triple nexus projects and programmes) as a key risk.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, several case studies on implementation of triple nexus approaches have documented an absence of real local involvement, a limited degree of local ownership and leadership given to local actors, and a failure to create proper consultation, feedback and accountability mechanisms towards affected populations. A 2019 report by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative on application of the triple nexus in Mali, for example, found that *"international actors have insufficiently included local actors in planning and implementation processes"*, while a 2019 VOICE study found *"very limited engagement"* with local CSO actors in most of the six countries (Chad, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda) where the EU initiated nexus pilot projects.<sup>50</sup> The same VOICE study – which included case studies in Lake Chad, Northeast Nigeria, Myanmar, Mali, Malawi, Jordan and Somalia – also found that many *"humanitarian, development and peace systems are not necessarily designed with affected people at the centre."*<sup>51</sup>

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**For a triple nexus approach to be effective, it must meaningfully engage local actors from the very beginning, and ensure that such engagement is based on an equal partnership that recognises and takes into account pre-existing power imbalances between local actors and donors**



A major review by the Center for International Cooperation (New York University) also found that progress on actual aid localisation is still slow, as national and local NGOs continue to receive less than 1 percent of humanitarian aid directly from donors, and decision-making power remains highly centralised within United Nations agencies and major INGOs.<sup>52</sup> Finally, a joint report issued by Save the Children and Saferworld in 2020 issued a scathing criticism of the lack of effective aid localisation:

*“With better local access, contextual understanding, and long-term presence, locally-led crisis response is expected to deliver more relevant results more efficiently, and sustain them over time. However, local communities are often overruled by donors and INGOs who determine how aid is used, and as a result, their skills, leadership and knowledge are not only under-utilised but are being eroded (...) The tendency among international organisations is still to uphold the status quo of marginalising local responders.”<sup>53</sup>*

To ensure active and meaningful participation of local organisations in triple nexus approaches, the VOICE report advises that political commitments on aid localisation need to be followed with concrete support measures, such as: ensuring that information is accessible to local organisations in relevant languages; covering travel costs to meetings where key decisions are likely to be made; and putting in place longer-term funding instruments to strengthen and sustain the organisational capacity of local and national organisations.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, a report by Development Initiatives on triple nexus efforts in Cameroon recommends to increase investments in the development of organisational and technical capacity of local NGOs, by expanding special grant facilities for local organisations and ensuring they are included in NGO consortia.<sup>55</sup>



### 3.2.4. Potentially undermining the humanitarian principles

Several questionnaire respondents have pointed to risks that in certain cases – and in a global context marked by growing nationalism, emphasis on national security and shrinking civic space – a triple nexus approach could lead to the instrumentalization of humanitarian aid for political or security purposes, thereby undermining the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality.<sup>56</sup>

In this regard, it has often been argued that humanitarian actors need to maintain a certain distance from the more political aspirations and working methods in the development and peace sector. In contexts where the state is an active party to the conflict and is not prioritising the rights and needs of all its citizens, or where donors prioritise their own political or security agendas over principled humanitarian action, it is argued, there exists a risk that such instrumentalization will undermine the independent and impartial perception of humanitarian actors, thereby reducing their effectiveness, legitimacy and access.<sup>57</sup>

**In certain cases a triple nexus approach could lead to the instrumentalization of humanitarian aid for political or security purposes, thereby undermining the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality**



Others have nuanced such critiques. A study by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), for example, argues that collaboration is not contrary to the humanitarian principles and that “*collaboration does not intend an integration of roles, but can be undertaken while respecting mandates, roles and organisational independence.*”<sup>58</sup> The IASC also noted that “*few interventions can be fully impartial, neutral or independent, despite efforts taken.*”<sup>59</sup> The latter argument is further developed by researcher Marc DuBois, who argues that the triple nexus offers the humanitarian sector an opportunity to actually improve respect for its humanitarian principles:

*“The rejection of the Nexus often rests on the mythological belief that a number of factors combine to deliver humanitarians above politics: its ideal of neutrality (not taking sides in a conflict) and independence (autonomy), its state-avoiding methodologies, its mantra that aid is exclusively based on the needs of people, and the virtuous intentions of its practitioners (...) The way forward involves side-stepping this false political-apolitical binary altogether (...) **There is no state of being impartial, neutral or independent, only degrees of alignment with the ideal. Their meaning in a given context is to be defined through praxis and subject to deliberate compromise – and indeed compromise is the rule** (...) Another false premise lies in the humanitarian claim that development work requires partnership with the state while the humanitarian principles require a ‘state-avoiding’ approach. Both characterisations are false, and nothing in the humanitarian principles suggests that avoiding the state is required for their fulfilment.”<sup>60</sup> (emphasis added)*

CARE International, in its response to the questionnaire, also stressed that “development” work can take many forms, and is not necessarily at odds with humanitarian principles:

*“CARE does not accept the argument that development work is necessarily driven by the priorities of national governments, and is therefore incompatible with humanitarian principles (...) Civil society development work in particular tends to be driven by bottom-up, community-led priorities (...) There is a tendency for European donor countries to equal development aid with working with partner country governments and that therefore development is at odds with humanitarian principles. We disagree with this conception of development and the notion of humanitarian principles and development aid necessarily clashing. CSOs and NGOs are development actors in their own right, working towards long term change, and we work at local level; this can be perfectly in line with humanitarian principles and indeed the peace element of the nexus. Work at community level to increase household’s resilience and community resilience can be a perfect example of triple nexus without clashing with humanitarian principles.”<sup>61</sup>*

### 3.2.5. Other needs not receiving adequate support

Several humanitarian practitioners, including those who are generally supportive of the triple nexus, have pointed to possible competition between humanitarian and triple nexus approaches, whereby an overly dominant focus on the latter risks to ultimately result in imme-



diate humanitarian needs not receiving adequate support anymore.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, in situations of acute armed conflict a triple nexus might not always be possible, and sufficient resources should therefore be guaranteed for immediate humanitarian responses.<sup>63</sup> In the words of a report by VOICE, which included case studies in Lake Chad, Northeast Nigeria, Myanmar, Mali, Malawi, Jordan and Somalia:

*“The current focus on the nexus should not be viewed as the only way of working. It is not a panacea and it cannot be seen as the “only game in town” (...) Because of increasing needs, there will always be humanitarian actors who retain their focus on providing life-saving humanitarian aid without engaging in the nexus approach.”<sup>64</sup>*

The above concern is also noted in a Development Initiatives (DI) report, which identified several lessons learnt from the UK government’s engagement in the triple nexus. In this report, employees from the UK’s Development Agency (DFID) interviewed by DI highlight certain limitations of a triple nexus approach in relation with specific humanitarian activities and contexts.

A similar concern has been expressed by development actors, who emphasise that the increasing focus on a triple nexus approach should not result in structural development needs not receiving adequate support. One questionnaire respondent also noted that there exists a risk that protection measures and approaches, notably for the most vulnerable, are not always taken into account or receiving adequate support in a triple nexus approach. This includes the need for special attention to the protection of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable people and groups, who are often the victims most likely to be threatened or exploited in a crisis.<sup>65</sup>

## 4. LESSONS LEARNT FOR AN EFFECTIVE TRIPLE NEXUS APPROACH

In recent years, several organisations have started (pilot) projects and programs that address some of the different issues associated with triple nexus approaches in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

On this basis, several lessons learnt and best practices can be identified, that contain insights for a further operationalisation of an effective triple nexus approach:

- **National and local civil society must be at the forefront:** a 2019 report by Oxfam – based on observations from Oxfam programmes in Iraq, Myanmar, South Sudan and Chad – emphasises that having local CSOs (in particular women’s rights organisations) in the driver’s seat is a vital pre-condition for effective triple nexus programming that is adjusted to a specific local context. This requires dedicated political and financial support, including more multi-year investment in local CSOs and support to the wider local humanitarian leadership agenda. Among other examples, Oxfam has highlighted the essential role of local leadership in the “Durable Peace Programme (DPP), a consortium of local, national and international NGOs in Myanmar: *“Working at a local level, being led by partners who understand the context and have strong links with the community, is essential to bring change in a nexus context. Local leadership as part of the DPP strengthens downwards accountability and trust with communities, and enables impactful programming in a very difficult and politicised context.”*<sup>66</sup>

A similar message can be found in a major review of triple nexus processes by the Center on International Cooperation (New York University). This review – based on over 300 interviews, country visits to Chad, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Nigeria and Somalia in 2008 and 2019, and insights from key informants in more than 20 countries – identified several “promising examples” of effective triple nexus approaches, including *“building country-level platforms that bring together all key stakeholders”*.<sup>67</sup> The need for such bottom-up approach to triple nexus approaches – in which country-level interventions are piloted and lessons learnt identified at country level, before interventions are scaled up – is also emphasised in a major study on triple nexus funding policies by FAO, NRC and UNDP. *“Actors at the country level frequently said that they found nexus discussions at capital level somewhat academic, and that they preferred bottom-up approaches to defining problems and developing practical solutions (...) These concrete initiatives can provide the basis for further investment and scale up”*, this study stated.<sup>68</sup>

The key added value that localisation has for effective triple nexus programming is also highlighted in a 2019 study on the application of the triple nexus in South Sudan. As noted by this study, *“the main value of localisation and working with local actors for the Triple Nexus approach stems from their understanding of*

## ENSURING MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL ACTORS

**Workshops with local NGOs:** In order to promote and facilitate NGO engagement and dialogue on the nexus approach in one of the EU's six nexus pilot countries (Myanmar), in March 2019 a one and a half-day workshop was organised between NGOs, the EU Delegation, EU Member States and UN agencies in Yangon, Myanmar. The workshop aimed to identify ways that NGOs can better engage with the nexus approach in Myanmar; to highlight existing good practices in NGO's nexus approaches; to identify challenges and opportunities of working in a nexus approach in Myanmar; to consider potential thematic and geographical areas

where a nexus approach could be usefully applied; and to identify potential recommendations on policy changes that may be needed to enable a nexus approach. By the end of the workshop, a number of specific recommendations and next steps had been developed, to be taken forward at both country and Brussels level.<sup>69</sup>

**Partnership Fora:** In 2019, the Swedish Development Agency (Sida) organised two partnership fora in Stockholm, which brought together Sweden's local NGO partners to share experience and lessons learnt on nexus programming.<sup>70</sup>

*local contexts and their proximity to local communities, as well as the sustainability of their operations thanks to their commitment to their surroundings (...) This aspect is essential for a Triple Nexus approach to work given its short to longer-term timeline." At the same time, however, the study found that many local actors still felt that they were highly restricted in terms of independent decision-making or meaningful involvement in every stage of the project cycle, particularly in the areas of context analysis and project inception.<sup>71</sup>*

The study therefore suggested that donors pay more attention to "**capacity-sharing**" efforts. As opposed to capacity-building, such "capacity-sharing" approach recognises that interactions between local actors and donors should be dynamic and two-way, as many local actors have capacities and insights that international actors do not have. The study also encouraged donors to provide more support to NGO consortia (in which local actors are equitable partners and can bring their expertise to a capacity-sharing space), and to allocate resources to triple nexus research efforts at the local level in order to build a sound and diversified knowledge base on the further operationalisation of the triple nexus.<sup>72</sup>

- **Need for flexible and multi-year funding approaches:** several recent case studies and reports have highlighted the added value of flexible and multi-year funding. Longer timeframes allow operational actors to properly consult and involve affected populations, to put in place joint and inclusive sense-making processes, to enhance trust building between different partners and to take sufficient time to step back and assess if activities are indeed contributing to their intended objective (and adjust programming where necessary).<sup>73</sup> This is also emphasised in a 2019 report by the umbrella organisation for European humanitarian



organisations VOICE (based on seven case studies in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia), which stated that *“flexible, adaptive, multi-year programming and funding based on what affected people and communities suggest or with which they are actively involved, enables better nexus programmes”*.<sup>74</sup>

A similar message can be found in a major review of triple nexus processes by the Center on International Cooperation (New York University), which highlighted the key importance of *“passing on or providing multiyear and core funding to national/local actors”*. At the same time, however, the study found a continued fragmentation of funding in donor policies, wherein many donors do not allow humanitarian and development funding to be pooled behind shared objectives.<sup>75</sup> Another study published by FAO, NRC and UNDP (2019) – based on evidence gathered on 5 research missions to Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ukraine between 2018 and 2019 – similarly called on donors to provide triple nexus funding with sufficient flexibility, so that partners can *“learn, adapt, stop things that don’t work and scale up those that do”*.<sup>76</sup>

VOICE, as well as other actors and respondents to the 11.11.11 questionnaire, has therefore suggested that donors put in place stand-alone transitional development/nexus funding mechanisms.<sup>77</sup> In addition to such stand-alone funding mechanism, it has also been suggested to allow for more flexibility in terms of activities (for example by introducing “crisis modifiers” in multi-year programs), budget lines, implementation schedules, indicator frameworks and measurements, and risk management modalities. Several other operational actors have also called for more decentralisation in decision-making processes, wherein decisions on programming priorities, budget (re)allocation and partnerships are more strongly driven by country staff rather than Headquarters level.<sup>78</sup>

- **Accountability to affected populations:** another key aspect of an effective triple nexus approach is accountability to affected populations. Such accountability can be achieved, among others, by putting more emphasis on inclusion and participation in the planning, design and implementation of projects, in order to ensure that a certain intervention effectively respond to the needs, priorities and preferences of affected communities. Moreover, feedback and grievance mechanisms should be set up that allow people to raise their voice, thereby ensuring proper responsiveness of the intervention and offering a systematic approach to capture best practices and lessons learnt.<sup>79</sup>
- **Human resources play a key role:** several reports and reviews of existing triple nexus approaches, as well as responses to the questionnaire conducted for the purpose of this paper, have highlighted that human resources play a key role in successful nexus programming.<sup>81</sup> Strengthening staff expertise and analytical capacity at headquarters and country-level, both through the recruitment of specific profiles and through trainings, is therefore seen as an important investment to effectively operationalise a triple nexus approach that can provide added-value on the ground. This is also highlighted, for example, in a 2019 review of efforts by the Swedish Development Agency (Sida) to operationalise the triple nexus:





## INNOVATIVE WAYS TO INVOLVE AFFECTED COMMUNITIES DIRECTLY IN TRIPLE NEXUS DISCUSSIONS

11.11.11 partner Upinion<sup>80</sup> is a social enterprise that has created a two-way communication platform that allows organisations to securely stay in touch with people affected by crisis and displacement using mobile technology. It supports NGOs' efforts to connect directly with communities they work with using messaging apps like Facebook Messenger, PWA, and Upinion app. To this end, Upinion has created online "U-panels" with large and representative samples of community members with which a continuous dialogue – based on the panellists' own preferences – can take place. By checking in with the panellists frequently, asking their feedback on a range of issues and sharing back verified, updated, peer-to-peer and relevant information (even on individual cases) based on their needs and interests, Upinion aims to positively impact the lives of these communities. Detailed service mapping can also be conducted to provide more useful and up to date information to the panel. Through this systematic monitoring, Upin-

ion is able to detect broad patterns in the communities' state of well-being, concerns, and perspectives.

Moreover, the U-panel tool is also designed to spearhead local ownership of the global aid agenda. Upinion aims to amplify the voices of vulnerable communities through means that transcend the traditional ways of engagement, by involving local communities real-time in stakeholder meetings and policy debates, and making their participation an integral part of the humanitarian and development world. By making use of the U-panel, policymakers, interlocutors and senior NGO staff can directly hear the voices of conflict-affected communities, despite the latter not being physically in the room. As such, Upinion aims to shift the power dynamics from a donor-oriented approach to a 'user-centric' approach, and to amplify the voices of communities and share their stories and experiences in a safe, equitable, open, and transparent manner.

*"In-country presence is – as we have seen – critical in ensuring practical connections at the nexus (...) In answer to these staffing capacity gaps, Sida has taken the bold move to prioritise recruitment of 10 resilience or nexus-focussed staff members – new posts created in mid-2019 and deployed to country or regional offices. They have been recruited to bring the skill-set, prior expertise and the official job description to be able to support and catalyse work across the nexus (...) Recruiting specific nexus roles is an important investment, both for the practical capacity it provides and the signal of intent it delivers (...) This needs to be supported and mirrored by staff capacity at the Stockholm level."<sup>82</sup> (emphasis added)*

In a similar vein, a major review of triple nexus processes by the Center on International Cooperation (New York University) called upon donors to "enhance the people pipeline of technical experts and advisers that can be deployed to strengthen nexus capacities" at country level; a call which is also echoed in a study by FAO, NRC and UNDP on triple nexus funding that was published in 2019.<sup>83</sup>



### EXAMPLES OF NEXUS APPROACHES

In **Uganda** and **South Sudan**, 11.11.11 member organisation Caritas International Belgium has implemented a project with both refugees and host communities in Northern Uganda, as well as displaced persons and returnees in the bordering areas in South Sudan.

The focus has been on providing and improving food security and livelihoods through income generation, while also contributing to social cohesion between communities with sensitization activities.

In **Lebanon**, 11.11.11 partner organisation Basmeh & Zeitooneh runs a number of local community centres. Through this community centre approach, humanitarian services (basic assistance, relief) are combined with educational and livelihood opportunities (including childcare) and peace education. At all stages of project implementation, the needs of the family – rather than the needs of the individual – are addressed in a holistic manner, with a particular focus on women empowerment.



## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BELGIAN GOVERNMENT

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### GENERAL APPROACH

- 1. Policy Coherence for Development:** operationalising the triple nexus has to be part of the wider aim to guarantee policy coherence for development. This means guaranteeing sustainable development and at the very least preventing any damage to that objective (*do no harm*), while also putting an end to the global arms trade that fuels humanitarian crises and renders sustainable development impossible.
- 2. Long-term and structural approach:** develop long-term and structural programming modalities and objectives that prioritise prevention, addressing the root causes of conflict, structural development and peacebuilding. Invest more in public and universally accessible healthcare, social protection and education. Contribute to a sustained strengthening of the systems behind these services to make them more resilient to future crises. Provide a gender-sensitive child and human rights approach to ensure universal access to these services. Strengthen the resilience of the local economy through support for local enterprises, family farming and decent work<sup>84</sup>. Support local governments, civil society actors and spaces for a structural dialogue that contribute to this.
- 3. Operational guidance for the triple Nexus:** develop an Operational Guidance Note which explains, for both internal and external audiences, Belgium's role in and vision and avenues for implementation of the triple nexus. Such guidance document should include, among others: 1) a clarification on the interpretation of basic terms and definitions that are used by the Belgian government (in particular on the third "peace" pillar); 2) a gender sensitive guiding menu of approaches to support country teams and partners to identify practical options for common risk and context analysis, programming and funding; 3) learning and advice on potential mechanisms for understanding needs across the triple nexus; 4) learning and advice on the use of beneficiary feedback and downward accountability mechanisms, as well as on best practices to ensure an equal partnership and systematic consultation processes with local CSO partners (in particular women's rights organisations); and 5) guidance on the kind of contexts where a triple nexus is applicable, and where it is not. Existing instruments at Belgian level can be integrated and used (e.g. risk analysis with FRAME, common strategic frameworks as coordination mechanisms, etc).
- 4. Promote a "positive peace" approach:** when interpreting the third "peace" pillar of the triple nexus, develop a "positive peace" approach in which peace is framed as a bottom-up, community-based approach that addresses root causes and takes into account local dynamics, in order to ensure that the peace pillar is not being instrumentalised for security, counterterrorism or opportunistic political agendas. Encour-



age other donor governments, including during discussions at OECD DAC level, to adopt a similar interpretation on the third “peace” pillar.

5. **Increase internal capacity:** strengthen staff expertise and analytical capacity at Headquarters- and country-level, both through the recruitment of specific profiles and through trainings (including trainings on discrimination and gender). Ensure that such experts closely work together with local CSOs and affected communities when developing triple nexus action plans per pilot country.
6. **Pilot approach:** adopt a bottom-up approach to triple nexus programming, in which nexus approaches are tested in a selected number of pilot countries. In each pilot country, develop an action plan on how to move the triple nexus forward, in close consultation with local CSO actors and affected communities, throughout all stages of the process. After carefully identifying lessons learnt and best practices in pilot countries, consider scaling up triple nexus approaches.

## MEANINGFUL ENGAGEMENT WITH LOCAL ACTORS

7. **Establish mechanisms for regular and meaningful “capacity sharing” and dialogue,** including the organisation of Partnership Fora at capital level and the organisation of triple nexus workshops at country level. Such mechanisms should bring together key stakeholders, including local CSOs and NGOs (with a particular focus on organisations fighting for gender equality and women empowerment), in order to identify practical ways for engagement on the triple nexus; to highlight existing good practices and lessons learnt in triple nexus approaches; to identify challenges and opportunities when working on the triple nexus in a particular context; to consider potential thematic and specific geographical areas where a triple nexus approach could be successfully applied; to identify policy recommendations that could enable effective triple nexus programming; and to build lasting and long-term partnerships between local actors and donors.
8. **Support localised triple nexus research:** allocate specific resources to locally-led and locally-owned research efforts on the operationalisation of triple nexus approaches, in order to build a solid and diversified knowledge base on what works and what does not work in a particular context, and to help ensure that the knowledge and expertise of local actors is better incorporated into policy discussions on the triple nexus.
9. **Support localised triple nexus advocacy:** ensure meaningful participation by local CSOs and representatives of affected communities in international decision-making processes (including at OECD DAC level) regarding the triple nexus. This can be done, among others, by covering travel costs to participate in international meetings and by ensuring that information is accessible to local actors in relevant languages.
10. **Duty of care:** ensure that risks are shared equally across the operational chain (from donor to downstream partner), and that the burden of operating in high-risk



environments does not unequally fall on the downstream partner.

11. **Support innovative accountability mechanisms:** make resources available for the identification of innovative (digital) methods that ensure downward accountability, so that affected populations are not only able to identify their needs and risks, but are also involved in (high level) policy debates, and are included in the review of policies that affect them.

## GENDER EQUALITY

12. Throughout the operationalisation of a triple nexus approach, **pay particular attention to a gender sensitive approach and the Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) of women and girls.** The nexus approach should also tackle Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in all its forms, as it provides a unique opportunity to address GBV prevention, risk mitigation and response.
13. In addition to a gender mainstreaming approach, **pay particular attention to triple nexus projects/programmes that specifically address gender challenges and empowerment of women and girls,** and use strict **gender markers** in any triple nexus programming.
14. Increase internal capacity to conduct **gender analysis and gender impact assessments.**
15. Increase efforts to **structurally involve the perspectives of women's rights organisations** in all discussions on the design, implementation and evaluation of triple nexus projects and programmes.



## FUNDING

16. Start an active reflection, in the context of the "Nexus Working Group"<sup>85</sup>, on potential funding options for the triple nexus, taking into account the principles outlined below. This may concern the search for flexible financing within the current framework to systemise a complementary approach where relevant, as well as a discussion on the potential advantages and disadvantages of establishing a stand-alone mechanism for triple nexus programming in a selected number of pilot countries.

**Accelerate and concretise aid localisation efforts and commitments by providing longer-term and flexible funding**

- Allow for sufficient **flexibility** in terms of activities, multi-year timelines and implementation schedules, time and resources for local consultations, indicator frameworks and risk management modalities;
- Ensure a growth path of the 0.7% of GNI so that **additional** resources can be used if needed for a triple nexus approach and that existing funding for structural development cooperation, humanitarian cooperation and peacebuilding is not compromised.



- Explore possibilities for more **decentralisation** in decision-making processes, wherein a greater level of responsibility is given to country staff;
- Explicitly stipulate specific requirements in terms of **equal partnerships with local CSOs** and meaningful consultation and feedback processes for affected communities. Insist on the need to create “capacity-sharing” spaces between local and international actors;
- Ensure a **structural approach**, which takes into account lessons learnt from pilot projects, rather than an approach that only focusses on ad hoc calls for proposals.

17. **Aid localisation:** accelerate and concretise aid localisation efforts and commitments, by providing longer-term and flexible funding that includes adequate support for overhead costs to cover safety, health insurance, severance pay and other risk management priorities.



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- 2 <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/12/5fcf94a04/forced-displacement-passes-80-million-mid-2020-covid-19-tests-refugee-protection.html>.
- 3 <https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf>, p 2.
- 4 See <https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2020/>.
- 5 Oxfam 2019, p 9 (<https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/the-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-what-does-it-mean-for-multi-mandated-o-620820/>)
- 6 See <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5019>.
- 7 These 16 organisations include seven Belgian NGOs; four 11.11.11 partner organisations in the Great Lakes region; three 11.11.11 partner organisations in the Middle East; and two INGOs.
- 8 [https://www.belgium.be/sites/default/files/Regeerakkoord\\_2020.pdf](https://www.belgium.be/sites/default/files/Regeerakkoord_2020.pdf), p 97.
- 9 Beleidsverklaring van de minister van Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, belast met Grote Steden, november 2020, p 14-15.
- 10 <https://www.dekamer.be/doc/FLWB/pdf/55/1580/55K1580018.pdf>, p 18.
- 11 Besides the Belgian discussions, there is also European coordination (e.g. Team Europe) within the framework of the nexus. See f.e. the last communication of the European Commission referring to the nexus: <https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/hacommunication2021.pdf>
- 12 [https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/beleidskader\\_veiligheidssector.pdf](https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/beleidskader_veiligheidssector.pdf).
- 13 [https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/frame\\_methodology.pdf](https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/frame_methodology.pdf). This framework has so far been applied in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Uganda. The 2020 OECD DAC Peer Review also notes that “however, not all staff within the FPS and Enabel have fully made the new approach to risk analysis and management, which is largely based on the Fragility Resilience Assessment Management Exercise (FRAME), their own”.
- 14 The Belgian Development Agency Enabel is also active in the field of “peace and security”, for example in Burkina Faso (<https://open.enabel.be/en/projects/854/burkina-faso.html>) and in Niger (<https://open.enabel.be/en/NER/2444/p/soutien-la-scurit-et-la-stabilisation-au-niger.html>). This illustrates Belgium’s willingness to play a role in the third pillar of the triple nexus, but also raises questions of whether such interventions are always in balance with the other pillars of the nexus.
- 15 [https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/strategienota\\_comprehensive\\_approach.pdf](https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/strategienota_comprehensive_approach.pdf).
- 16 OECD-DAC (2020), Peer Review of the development cooperation policies and programmes of Belgium, p 64.
- 17 OECD-DAC (2020), Peer Review of the development cooperation policies and programmes of Belgium, p. 58.
- 18 [https://www.paxchristi.be/sites/default/files/4\\_dossier\\_vredesweek.pdf](https://www.paxchristi.be/sites/default/files/4_dossier_vredesweek.pdf), p. 3.
- 19 Antwoord van Vice-eersteminister en Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Europese Zaken en Buitenlandse Handel, en de Federale Culturele Instellingen op mondelinge vraag in Commissie nr. 55014532C van de heer WouterDe Vriendt betreffende Budgetlijn “Vredesopbouw”; [https://www.paxchristi.be/sites/default/files/4\\_dossier\\_vredesweek.pdf](https://www.paxchristi.be/sites/default/files/4_dossier_vredesweek.pdf), p 5.
- 20 Antwoord van Vice-eersteminister en Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Europese Zaken en Buitenlandse Handel, en de Federale Culturele Instellingen op mondelinge vraag in Commissie nr. 55014532C van de heer WouterDe Vriendt betreffende Budgetlijn “Vredesopbouw”;
- 21 Antwoord van Vice-eersteminister en Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Europese Zaken en Buitenlandse Handel, en de Federale Culturele Instellingen op mondelinge vraag in Commissie nr. 55014532C van de heer WouterDe Vriendt betreffende Budgetlijn “Vredesopbouw”;
- 22 D5.1 employs 8 officials, while D5.2 employs 4 people.
- 23 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021.
- 24 Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to: a) understand the context in which it is operating, b) understand the interaction between the intervention and that context including on conflict dynamics, and c) act upon that understanding, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the conflict. Conflict sensitivity needs to be taken into account and involves understanding and anticipating risk and considering the internal and external results and impacts of certain actions. It requires greater understanding of the conflict situation and sensitivities of different actors and being mindful of these when programming, including in partner selection, recruitment and staff training, procurement, and flexibility to adjust projects and programmes as the situation requires. Conflict sensitivity is an approach that seeks to maximise the positive impacts of humanitarian and development initiatives for peace, whilst avoiding harm.
- 25 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021.
- 26 Weishaupt 2020, p 1 ([https://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/\(httpAuxPages\)/384F8172D81CA0B2802585D-C003903AB/\\$file/WP2020-8--Weishaupt.pdf](https://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/384F8172D81CA0B2802585D-C003903AB/$file/WP2020-8--Weishaupt.pdf)); 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021; ECDPM 2019, p v (<https://ecdpm.org/publications/think-local-bridging-between-humanitarian-aid-development-peacebuilding-somalia/>)



- 27 Oxfam 2019, p 15; VOICE 2019, p 8-9 (<https://reliefweb.int/report/world/voice-report-ngos-perspectives-eus-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus>). See also OESO's State of Fragility 2018; 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021.
- 28 IASC 2020, p 1 (<https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/humanitarian-development-collaboration/issue-paper-exploring-peace-within-humanitarian-development>)
- 29 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021.
- 30 Oxfam 2019, p 3, p 32.
- 31 DuBois 2020 (<https://www.chaberlin.org/en/news/triple-nexus-humanitarian-principles-at-risk-new-cha-discussion-paper-by-marc-dubois/>)
- 32 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021.
- 33 Oxfam 2019, p 3, 33; IASC 2020, p 9.
- 34 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021.
- 35 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021.
- 36 A similar reflection was also made in a 2018 paper by ACROPOLIS, which stated that “an effective operationalisation of a Comprehensive Approach will need to find a right balance between strategic and operational coherence. Sufficient and adequate strategic top-down steering should be combined with sufficient flexibility to leave room for a bottom-up and problem-driven approach.” See Governance for Development (2018), Green paper: Roadmap for a comprehensive approach for Belgian Policy Development, p. 7.
- 37 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021.
- 38 Development Initiatives, 2019a, p 5-6 (<https://devinit.org/resources/donors-triple-nexus-lessons-united-kingdom/>); Development Initiatives, 2019b, p 3, p 18 (<https://devinit.org/resources/donors-triple-nexus-lessons-sweden/>); Development Initiatives 2020, p 59 (<https://devinit.org/resources/supporting-longer-term-development-crises-nexus-lessons-cameroon/introduction/>); VOICE 2019, p 29-30; <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/connecting-dots-triple-nexus>; CARE 2018, p 4 (<https://insights.careinternational.org.uk/development-blog/doing-nexus-differently-what-do-we-know-and-what-can-you-tell-us>); FAO, NRC and UNDP 2019, p 6, p 13 (<https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/financing-the-nexus-report/financing-the-nexus-report.pdf>)
- 39 Cited in VOICE 2019, p 31.
- 40 VOICE 2019, p 31; Development Initiatives, 2019a, p 5-6; Development Initiatives 2020, p 59.
- 41 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021; Oxfam 2019, p 4; VOICE 2019, p 21-22; Weishaupt 2020, p 13; DuBois 2020; Tronc et al 2019, p 29 ([https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=3404351](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3404351)); Development Initiatives 2020, p 65; Development Initiatives 2019a, p 15; Hövelmann 2020, p 3; <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/05/13/triple-nexus-peace-development-security-humanitarian-policy>; Barakat, S & Milton, S (2020): “Localisation Across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus”, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, Vol 15(2), p 152-153;
- 42 Oxfam 2019, p 4, p 11, p 37.
- 43 VOICE 2019, p 21-22; IASC 2020, p 1-2, p 6-7; Weishaupt 2020, p 13; DuBois 2020; Tronc et al 2019, p 29; Perret 2019, p 22 ([https://publications.iom.int/fr/system/files/pdf/operationalizing\\_hdpn.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/fr/system/files/pdf/operationalizing_hdpn.pdf))
- 44 IASC 2020, p 7, p 12.
- 45 Development Initiatives 2019a, p 15.
- 46 VOICE 2019, p 45. See also <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/connecting-dots-triple-nexus>; <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/special-report/2019/09/24/triple-nexus-humanitarian-development-peace-building-views>; <http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2016/08/19/humanitarianism-local-international-actors>; Barakat, S & Milton, S (2020): “Localisation Across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus”, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, Vol 15(2); Tanner, L., & Moro, L. (2016): “Missed out: The role of local actors in the humanitarian response in the south Sudan conflict”, CAFOD; Ward, P. (2020): “Capitalising on ‘local knowledge’: The labour practices behind successful aid projects—The case of Jordan”, Current Sociology.
- 47 <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5019>
- 48 CARE 2018, p 3.
- 49 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021.
- 50 Tronc et al 2019, p xxv; VOICE 2019, p 23.
- 51 VOICE 2019, p 25.
- 52 Center on International Cooperation (New York University), 2019, p 6, p 7 (<https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/triple-nexus-in-practice-brochure-december-2019-final.pdf>)
- 53 Safe the Children & Saferworld 2020, p 5, p 7 (<https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/library/turning-tables-insights-locally-led-humanitarian-partnerships-conflict-affected-situations>)
- 54 VOICE 2019, p 46.
- 55 Development Initiatives 2020, p 9.
- 56 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021.





- 57 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021; VOICE 2019, p 9, p 32; Oxfam 2019, p 35; DuBois 2020; Hövelmann 2020, p 4; Copenhagen 2020, p 5; <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/connecting-dots-triple-nexus>; See also a critical case study on the application of the triple nexus in Mali, which found that in Mali *"Humanitarian action, along with its driving principles and approaches, has been subsumed and instrumentalized by security priorities and international military agendas" (...) the triple nexus can only succeed if peacebuilding-development-humanitarian linkages do not lead to the perception, or the reality, that humanitarian action has been subsumed by a political agenda (...) Humanitarian actors have an uneasy, and at times difficult, relationship with Malian communities. Some humanitarians are perceived to be engaged in intelligence gathering. Others have been criticized for being blind to the minimal humanitarian impact and political consequences of their activities"* (Trunc et al (2019), p xxv, p 27, p 31)
- 58 IASC 2020, p 4, p 11.
- 59 IASC 2020, p 11.
- 60 DuBois 2020.
- 61 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021.
- 62 See Hövelmann 2020, p 4 (<https://www.chaberlin.org/en/publications/triple-nexus-to-go-2/>)
- 63 IASC 2020, p 1-2; Oxfam 2019, p 4.
- 64 VOICE 2019, p 9.
- 65 Follow up email exchange with 11.11.11 member organisation, March 2021.
- 66 Oxfam 2019, p 23-24. See also Weishaupt 2020, p iii for the importance of working towards differentiated nexus configurations that are adjusted to a particular context and that avoid the imposition of "nexus blueprints".
- 67 Center on International Cooperation (New York University), 2019, p 3.
- 68 FAO, NRC and UNDP 2019, p 6, p 21. See in this regard also ECDPM 2019, p v-vi.
- 69 VOICE 2019, p 61-74.
- 70 Development Initiatives, 2019b, p 33.
- 71 DCA and Act Alliance 2019, p 5-6, p 25 (<https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/triple-nexus-and-local-faith-actors-south-sudan>)
- 72 DCA and ACT Alliance, 2019, p 6, p 26.
- 73 Oxfam 2019, p 25, p 27. The EU-funded "Durable Peace Programme" in Myanmar, in which Oxfam plays a central role together with 27 local CSOs, has a timeframe of seven years. See also <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/connecting-dots-triple-nexus>;
- 74 VOICE 2019, p 50.
- 75 Center on International Cooperation (New York University), 2019, p 3, p 6, p 7.
- 76 FAO, NRC and UNDP 2019, p 8.
- 77 VOICE 2019, p 50; Development Initiatives 2019a, p 6; Development Initiatives 2020, p 66; Perret 2019, p vi; IASC 2020, p 2-3.
- 78 Development Initiatives 2020, p 9, p 11, p 59; Oxfam 2019, p 29, p 25; Perret 2019, p 23; IASC 2020, p 2-3.
- 79 Oxfam 2019, p 23-25; IASC 2020, p 9.
- 80 11.11.11 and Upinion work together in the "Refugee Protection Watch" project that conducts research and advocacy on the situation inside Syria for refugee returnees, and for conditions for refugees and host communities in Lebanon.
- 81 VOICE 2019; Development Initiatives 2019a, p 51; Development Initiatives 2020, p 60; IASC 2020, p 17; 11.11.11 questionnaire, February 2021. See also a similar reflection on the importance of sufficient human resources, in Governance for Development (2018): "Green Paper: Roadmap for a comprehensive approach for Belgian policy development", p 30, p 36.
- 82 Development Initiatives 2019b, p 43.
- 83 Center on International Cooperation (New York University) 2019, p 9; FAO, NRC and UNDP, 2019, p 8.
- 84 ILO Recommendation 205: Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience Recommendation, 2017, [https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100\\_ILO\\_CODE:R205](https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:R205)
- 85 See <https://www.ngo-federatie.be/nl/event/nexus-werkgroep>



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